

7

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

# Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

7

A large, stylized, handwritten signature in white ink, likely representing Jawaharlal Nehru, positioned in the lower right quadrant of the cover.A small, stylized, handwritten signature in white ink, likely representing Jawaharlal Nehru, positioned in the bottom left corner of the cover.









"So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote ... the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being."

Indira Gandhi

**Selected  
works of  
Jawaharlal  
Nehru**



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IN 1948



# **Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru**

**Second Series**

**Volume Seven**

**A Project of the  
Jawaharlal Nehru  
Memorial Fund**

© 1988

All rights reserved

Enquiries regarding copyright  
to be addressed to the publishers

**PUBLISHED BY**

Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund  
Teen Murti House, New Delhi 110011

**DISTRIBUTED BY**

Oxford University Press  
YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110001  
Bombay Calcutta Madras  
Oxford New York Toronto  
Melbourne Tokyo Hong Kong

**PRINTED BY**

Dhawan Printing Works  
26A, Mayapuri, Phase I  
New Delhi 110064

General Editor

S. Gopal



## FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.


No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the



outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.



New Delhi  
18 January 1972

Chairman  
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

## EDITORIAL NOTE

During the twelve weeks from 1 July to 5 October 1948, covered by this volume, India celebrated the first anniversary of the achievement of independence and the first Gandhi Jayanti after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. The Government were faced with an economic crisis due to soaring prices; and they integrated by police action the Hyderabad State with the Union. Pakistan belatedly admitted the participation of her troops in the fighting in Kashmir. The United Nations Commission could find no solution to the problem but, at the end of its visit of ten weeks to India and Pakistan, brought forward a proposal for a ceasefire. Anti-Indian propaganda in Pakistan continued. But the communal tension in India was far less than before and this helped towards the solution of some of the special problems resulting from partition.

Jawaharlal Nehru constantly impressed on the people that only by following the Mahatma's example and principles could India endure. He stressed the need for unity and tolerance, the exploitation for the general good of the many resources of the country, the building of an industrial base and the development of scientific research. Both at home and abroad all issues should be viewed on their merits. He gave special attention to the problems of Indians overseas, particularly in Sri Lanka and the countries of South East Asia.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to provide access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us a large number of documents in her possession, and these papers have been referred to in the footnotes as the J.N. Collection. The Broadlands Archives Trust has permitted us to reproduce extracts from the Mountbatten papers. The Secretariats of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Ministries of Home and External Affairs and the National Archives of India have authorized the reproduction of some notes and letters in their possession. Much of it is classified material, and some portions have necessarily been deleted. A few items from the volumes of *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* have also been included. Shankar has permitted us to reproduce a cartoon from *Shankar's Weekly*.

The biographical footnotes covered in the earlier volumes of the *Selected Works* have been mentioned in the index with the volume number.

The standard practice has been followed in the editing of these volumes of not mentioning the names of the individuals associated with the editing. But it is appropriate at this stage to acknowledge the services of Shri Sangam Lal, who has recently retired after working as Associate Editor for nearly fifteen years.





# CONTENTS

## 1. The Quest for Communal Peace

1	To H.S. Suhrawardy	3 July	1948	1
2	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	5 July	1948	2
3	To Edwina Mountbatten	5 July	1948	3
4	To Gopichand Bhargava	8 July	1948	4
5	To the Nawab of Bhopal	9 July	1948	4
6	To B.C. Roy	13 July	1948	9
7	To C.M. Trivedi	23 July	1948	10
8	To A.M. Allapichai	6 August	1948	10
9	Id-ul-Fitr	6 August	1948	11
10	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	24 August	1948	12
11	To Sri Krishna Sinha	2 September	1948	13
12	To Vallabhbhai Patel	6 September	1948	15
13	To Mehr Chand Khanna	21 September	1948	16
14	To Mehr Chand Khanna	24 September	1948	16
15	Muslims in Malerkotla	25 September	1948	17
16	To Gopichand Bhargava	26 September	1948	18
17	Shanti Sena	29 September	1948	19
18	To Gopichand Bhargava	3 October	1948	19

## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### I. General

1	Progress of Rehabilitation	19 July	1948	25
2	A Commitment to Rehabilitation	1 August	1948	25
3	To Mohanlal Saksena	2 August	1948	27
4	Muslims who Worked for India's Freedom	10 August	1948	28
5	Duties of Governments and Citizens	24 August	1948	29
6	To Vallabhbhai Patel	3 September	1948	30
7	To Mohanlal Saksena	8 September	1948	30
8	Land to Government Servants	27 September	1948	31
9	To Vallabhbhai Patel	28 September	1948	31
10	To Shankar Prasada	3 October	1948	32

## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### II. The Meos

1	To C.M. Trivedi	5 July	1948	37
2	To C. Rajagopalachari	13 July	1948	39
3	Rehabilitation of Meos	23 July	1948	40
4	Note on Rehabilitation of Meos	27 July	1948	40
5	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	5 August	1948	41

## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### III. Housing

1	People's Cooperation in Resettlement	5 July	1948	45
2	To Mohanlal Saksena	23 July	1948	46
3	Position of Refugees in Delhi	4 August	1948	47
4	Eviction of Refugees in Delhi	8 September	1948	47
5	To Mridula Sarabhai	12 September	1948	49
6	To Mohanlal Saksena	4 October	1948	50

## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### IV. Women

1	To R.K. Shanmukham Chetty	1 August	1948	55
2	Women's Section in Rehabilitation Ministry	1 August	1948	56
3	To Begum Abdullah	21 August	1948	57
4	A Colony for Women and Children	8 September	1948	59
5	To H.V.R. Iengar	29 September	1948	61



## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### V. Relief Work in Provinces

1	To C. Rajagopalachari	13 July	1948	65
2	Migration from East Bengal to Assam	21 July	1948	67
3	To Govind Ballabh Pant	19 August	1948	68
4	To Shankarrao Deo	10 September	1948	69
5	To P.C. Ghosh	29 September	1948	70
6	To B.C. Roy	29 September	1948	71
7	To Vallabhbhai Patel	29 September	1948	73

## 2. Rehabilitation of Refugees

### VI. Facilities to Refugee Students

1	Refugee Students	9 August	1948	77
2	To Mohanlal Saksena	25 September	1948	79
3	To Zakir Husain	28 September	1948	80
4	To Shankar Prasada	28 September	1948	81

## 3. Relations with Pakistan

### I. Protection of Minorities

1	To J.R. Dhar	23 July	1948	85
2	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	25 August	1948	86
3	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	14 September	1948	87
4	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	24 September	1948	88
5	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	24 September	1948	89
6	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	24 September	1948	90
7	To Vallabhbhai Patel	26 September	1948	92
8	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	28 September	1948	92
9	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	5 October	1948	93

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

#### II. Migration

1 To Ahmed Sayeed	1 August	1948	97
2 To B.C. Roy	16 August	1948	98
3 To B.C. Roy	25 August	1948	98
4 To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	9 September	1948	99
5 Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	9 September	1948	100
6 To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	3 October	1948	101
7 Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	5 October	1948	102

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

#### III. Recovery of Abducted Women and Children

1 Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	2 July	1948	107
2 Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	3 July	1948	108
3 Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	13 July	1948	108

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

#### IV. Exchange of Prisoners

1 Cable to Ghazanfar Ali Khan	29 July	1948	111
2 To Rajendra Prasad	31 July	1948	112
3 To Badri Dutt Pande	25 August	1948	113

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

#### V. Conditions in N.W.F.P.

1 To Liaquat Ali Khan	3 October	1948	117
2 To Vallabhbhai Patel	3 October	1948	119
3 To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	3 October	1948	119

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

## VI. The Canal Waters Dispute

1	To Gopichand Bhargava	5 July	1948	123
2	To Gopichand Bhargava	26 September	1948	123
3	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	29 September	1948	124

### 3. Relations with Pakistan

## VII. Other Issues

1	Supply of Electricity to West Punjab	15 August	1948	127
2	Telegram to Akbar Hydari	8 September	1948	127

### 4. Mahatma Gandhi

1	To Lord Pethick-Lawrence	19 July	1948	131
2	The Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi	26 July	1948	131
3	Message for Community Church of New York	5 August	1948	133
4	To David Brynley	3 August	1948	134
5	Gandhi Jayanti	27 September	1948	135
6	Mahatma Gandhi	2 October	1948	135
7	Keeping Faith with the Mahatma	2 October	1948	150

### 5. The First Year of Freedom

1	Which Way Should We Go ?	9 August	1948	155
2	Stay of Executions	9 August	1948	168
3	A Triumph of the Spirit	13 August	1948	168
4	A Day of Rededication	14 August	1948	169
5	Stock-taking	15 August	1948	170
6	Message on Independence Day	15 August	1948	176
7	Greetings to Indians Abroad	15 August	1948	179



## 6. Hyderabad

### I. The Gathering Crisis

1	To C. Rajagopalachari	2 July	1948	183
2	Gun-running	2 July	1948	183
3	To C. Rajagopalachari	3 July	1948	184
4	To Lord Mountbatten	3 July	1948	185
5	To B.G. Kher	3 July	1948	187
6	To R.S. Shukla	4 July	1948	188
7	Gun-running Despite Warning	6 July	1948	189
8	To C. Rajagopalachari	14 July	1948	193
9	C. Rajagopalachari's Letter to Amin Jung Bahadur	14 July	1948	194
10	To Vallabhbhai Patel	23 July	1948	195
11	To Vallabhbhai Patel	28 July	1948	196
12	Message for C.R. Attlee	28 July	1948	197
13.	Charge of Starving the People	31 July	1948	201
14	To Lord Mountbatten	1 August	1948	201
15	To Lord Mountbatten	4 August	1948	205
16	To Baldev Singh	8 August	1948	206
17	To V.K. Krishna Menon	15 August	1948	206
18	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	21 August	1948	209
19	To Vallabhbhai Patel	22 August	1948	211
20	Cable to B. Rama Rau	23 August	1948	212
21	Gun-running through Goa	26 August	1948	213
22	To A. Campbell-Johnson	26 August	1948	214
23	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	27 August	1948	215

## 6. Hyderabad

### II. Police Action

1	To Lord Mountbatten	29 August	1948	219
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	29 August	1948	222
3	To C. Rajagopalachari	30 August	1948	225
4	Governor General's Letter to the Nizam	30 August	1948	225
5	To Lord Mountbatten	2 September	1948	227
6	The Hyderabad Imbrolio	7 September	1948	228
7	Military Action if Necessary	10 September	1948	234

8	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	11 September	1948	242
9	To Vallabhbhai Patel	12 September	1948	243
10	Police Action to End Terror	15 September	1948	244
11	Cable to C.R. Attlee	16 September	1948	247

## 6. Hyderabad

### III. Retorsion of Order

1	The Hyderabad Situation	17 September	1948	251
2	To Vallabhbhai Patel	17 September	1948	255
3	Telegram to K.M. Munshi	18 September	1948	256
4	Telegram to K.M. Munshi	18 September	1948	257
5	The New Hyderabad	18 September	1948	257
6	To F.R.R. Bucher	20 September	1948	259
7	To F.R.R. Bucher	21 September	1948	260
8	To F.R.R. Bucher	21 September	1948	261
9	To Vallabhbhai Patel	21 September	1948	261
10	To F.R.R. Bucher	22 September	1948	262
11	To Asaf Ali	22 September	1948	263
12	To Henry F. Grady	22 September	1948	264
13	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	22 September	1948	264
14	To Kingsley Martin	24 September	1948	265
15	To H.S. Suhrawardy	24 September	1948	266
16	To Sri Prakasa	24 September	1948	267
17	To the Nawab of Chhatari	24 September	1948	268
18	Hope of Communal Peace	25 September	1948	269
19	To P.M.S. Blackett	26 September	1948	271
20	To Eamon de Valera	26 September	1948	273
21	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	2 October	1948	274
22	To Vallabhbhai Patel	5 October	1948	275

## 7. Kashmir

### I. Negotiations with U.N. Commission

1	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	1 July	1948	279
2	To S.M. Abdullah	2 July	1948	280
3	First Meeting with the U.N. Commission	July	1948	281



4	To C. Rajagopalachari	16 July	1948	282
5	Cable to Josef Korbel	17 July	1948	282
6	To Lord Mountbatten	28 July	1948	283
7	To Lord Mountbatten	9 August	1948	284
8	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	12 August	1948	286
9	Issues and Prospects	12 August	1948	287
10	Discussions on Ceasefire Resolution	14 August	1948	289
11	To Vallabhbhai Patel	14 August	1948	290
12	Further Discussions on the Ceasefire Resolution	17 August	1948	291
13	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	18 August	1948	298
14	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	18 August	1948	300
15	Josef Korbel's Discussions with Nehru	18 August	1948	300
16	To Josef Korbel	20 August	1948	301
17	To Josef Korbel	20 August	1948	301
18	Cable to Josef Korbel	30 August	1948	304
19	Cable to Josef Korbel	1 September	1948	305
20	Cable to Josef Korbel	3 September	1948	305
21	Right Action in Kashmir	7 September	1948	306
22	To Sri Prakasa	8 September	1948	314
23	Cable to Josef Korbel	29 September	1948	315
24	No Aggressive Designs	1 October	1948	315

## 7. Kashmir

### II. Internal Developments

1	Muhammad Usman	5 July	1948	319
2	To Ramadhar	31 July	1948	319
3	To S.M. Abdullah	3 September	1948	320

## 8. Letters to the Premiers of Provinces

I		1 July	1948	325
II		15 July	1948	333
III		3 August	1948	341
IV		16 August	1948	348
V		23 August	1948	357

VI	1 September	1948	360
VII	9 September	1948	365
VIII	9 September	1948	366
IX	21 September	1948	368
X	4 October	1948	371

## 9. Congress Party Affairs

1 To Govind Ballabh Pant	1 July	1948	379
2 To Govind Ballabh Pant	8 July	1948	380
3 To Rajendra Prasad	31 July	1948	380
4 To N.S. Varadachari	8 August	1948	381
5 To Jayaprakash Narayan	19 August	1948	382
6 To Pattabhi Sitaramayya	22 September	1948	384
7 To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	24 September	1948	385
8 To Vallabhbhai Patel	25 September	1948	385
9 To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	29 September	1948	387
10 To Hayatullah Ansari	2 October	1948	387
11 To Govind Ballabh Pant	2 October	1948	388

## 10. National Reconstruction

### I. General Perspectives

1 Fundamental Unity of India	24 July	1948	381
2 Duties in a Free India	25 July	1948	396
3 A Social-Minded State	25 July	1948	411
4 The Basis of a True Democracy	6 August	1948	414
5 Towards a Free Press	22 September	1948	418

## 10. National Reconstruction

### II. The Anthem

1 The Anthem after the Cinema Shows	1 July	1948	421
2 To Gopinath Bardoloi	4 July	1948	421
3 The Tune of the Anthem	25 August	1948	422
4 Significance of National Anthem	26 September	1948	425

## 10. National Reconstruction

### III. The Economy

1	To Stafford Cripps	3 July	1948	429
2	To Jairamdas Doulatram	17 July	1948	430
3	To Maharaj Singh	18 July	1948	431
4	To C.D. Deshmukh	18 July	1948	431
5	To Mohanlal Saksena	21 July	1948	432
6	Foodgrains Policy	1 August	1948	433
7	A New Ministry for Economic Affairs	4 August	1948	434
8	Spiralling Inflation	11 August	1948	436
9	The Report of Economists	23 August	1948	442
10	To Asoka Mehta	1 September	1948	442
11	The Economic Committee of the Congress and Government Policy	3 September	1948	443
12	Monetary Policy	3 September	1948	445
13	An Integrated Policy on Inflation	3 September	1948	446
14	To Amrit Kaur	4 September	1948	449
15	Reimposition of Controls	11 September	1948	449

## 10. National Reconstruction

### IV. Industry and Labour

1	To Govind Ballabh Pant	5 July	1948	453
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	5 July	1948	454
3.	Industrial Labour and the Government	26 July	1948	454
4	To B.C. Roy	2 August	1948	460
5	The Right to Work	8 August	1948	461
6	To Gulzarilal Nanda	9 August	1948	461

## 10. National Reconstruction

### V. Development Projects

1	To N.V. Gadgil	3 July	1948	465
2	To C.M. Trivedi	3 July	1948	467



3	To N.V. Gadgil	5 July	1948	467
4	To N.V. Gadgil	8 July	1948	468
5	To C.M. Trivedi	12 July	1948	469
6	To N.V. Gadgil	18 July	1948	471
7	Scientific Research	26 July	1948	472
8	On Housing and Health	2 August	1948	474
9	To V.K. Krishna Menon	9 August	1948	475
10	A Central Statistical Organisation	20 August	1948	476
11	To Harold Hotelling	23 August	1948	478
12	The Indian Statistical Institute	24 August	1948	478
13	To Akbar Hydari	23 September	1948	479
14	Development of the North-East	23 September	1948	479

## 10. National Reconstruction

### VI. State Capitals

1	To Gopichand Bhargava	23 July	1948	483
2	To Gopichand Bhargava	9 August	1948	483
3	To Albert Mayer	24 September	1948	484

## 10. National Reconstruction

### VII. Abolition of Zamindaris

1	To Maharaja of Bikaner	12 July	1948	487
2	To M.S. Aney	14 July	1948	488
3	To Rajendra Prasad	22 July	1948	490
4	To Sri Krishna Sinha	27 July	1948	491
5	To Harekrushna Mahtab	6 August	1948	492
6	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	9 September	1948	493
7	To Sri Krishna Sinha	27 September	1948	494
8	Telegram to Sri Krishna Sinha	28 September	1948	494

## 10. National Reconstruction

### VIII. Personal Laws

1	Special Marriage Act	1 July	1948	499
2	To Rajendra Prasad	22 July	1948	499
3	To Rajendra Prasad	27 July	1948	501

## 10. National Reconstruction

### IX. Linguistic Provinces

1	To M.S. Aney	3 July	1948	505
2	To Rajendra Prasad	22 September	1948	506
3	To Sri Krishna Sinha	24 September	1948	506
4	To B.C. Roy	27 September	1948	507
5	To Sri Krishna Sinha	27 September	1948	507
6	To C. Rajagopalachari	29 September	1948	508

## 10. National Reconstruction

### X. The Language Question

1	To Sri Krishna Sinha	18 July	1948	511
2	Hindustani as the National Language	26 July	1948	511
3	To A.K. Azad	2 August	1948	514

## 10. National Reconstruction

### XI. a. Armed Services

1	To Baldev Singh	17 July	1948	519
2	To Baldev Singh	4 August	1948	520
3	To Baldev Singh	5 August	1948	521
4	To R.S. Shukla	18 August	1948	522
5	To Akbar Hydari	26 August	1948	522
6	The Development of the Navy	15 September	1948	523
7	To F.R.R. Bucher	21 September	1948	526
8	To F.R.R. Bucher	22 September	1948	526
9	Appeal on Flag Day	27 September	1948	527

### XI. b. The I.N.A.

1	To B.C. Roy	14 July	1948	528
2	To Gopichand Bhargava	13 July	1948	529
3	To Vallabhbhai Patel	22 July	1948	529
4	To Vallabhbhai Patel	24 September	1948	530

## 10. National Reconstruction

### XII. Science

1	The Department of Scientific Research	17 July	1948	533
2	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	31 July	1948	533
3	Clearance for Scientific Instruments	1 August	1948	534
4	To M.N. Saha	5 September	1948	534
5	To Joseph B. Chifley	12 September	1948	535
6	To Pattom Thanu Pillai	23 September	1948	536
7	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	27 September	1948	538

## 10. National Reconstruction

### XIII. Art and Culture

1	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	9 August	1948	541
2	Telegram to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad	1 September	1948	541
3	To A.K. Azad	20 September	1948	542
4	To A.K. Azad	20 September	1948	543
5	To A.K. Azad	21 September	1948	544

## 11. Matters of Administration

### I. Cabinet Changes And Coordination

1	To C. Rajagopalachari	8 July	1948	549
2	To B.R. Ambedkar	17 July	1948	549
3	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	8 August	1948	550
4	To R.K. Shanmukham Chetty	16 August	1948	551
5	On the Resignation of Shanmukham Chetty	17 August	1948	553
6	To S. Varadachari	22 September	1948	555
7	Coordination between Finance Ministry and other Ministries	23 September	1948	555
8	To Mohanlal Saksena	25 September	1948	557
9	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	25 September	1948	559
10	To Vallabhbhai Patel	3 October	1948	561



## II. Government Houses And Buildings

1	To Sushila Nayar	5 July	1948	562
2	To N.V. Gadgil	16 July	1948	563
3	To C. Rajagopalachari	31 July	1948	564
4	To K.N. Katju	5 August	1948	565
5	To Sushila Nayar	6 August	1948	566
6	To C. Rajagopalachari	6 August	1948	566
7	To Tara Chand	8 August	1948	568
8	To N.V. Gadgil	11 September	1948	568

## III. Salaries

1	Salary of Governor General	27 September	1948	570
2	To C. Rajagopalachari	2 October	1948	571

## IV. Official Secrecy

1	To Baldev Singh	2 July	1948	572
2	Secrecy of Military Information	15 July	1948	573
3	Leakage of Official Secrets	5 August	1948	574
4	To Devadas Gandhi	5 August	1948	575
5	Action against Leakages of Secrets	5 August	1948	575

## V. Government Service and Appointments

1	To Khurshed Naoroji	10 July	1948	576
2	To C.S. Ranga Iyer	23 July	1948	576
3	To G.P. Hutheesing	30 July	1948	577
4	To Amrit Kaur	4 August	1948	577
5	To Archibald Nye	4 August	1948	578
6	To B.V. Keskar	6 August	1948	579
7	To Vallabhbhai Patel	11 August	1948	579
8	To K.C. Neogy	21 September	1948	580
9	To Amrit Kaur	24 September	1948	580



## VI. Bengalis in Assam

1	To Gopinath Bardoloi	2 July	1948	582
2	To Akbar Hydari	9 July	1948	583
3	To Vallabhbhai Patel	9 July	1948	583
4	To Sudhir Ghosh	29 Septeber	1948	583

## VII. Office Discipline

1	Cleanliness and Discipline in Office	17 July	1948	584
2	To Gopichand Bhargava	31 July	1948	584
3	To Govind Ballabh Pant	31 July	1948	585
4	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	31 July	1948	586

## VIII. Law and Order

1	To Reginald Sorensen	10 July	1948	586
2	To B.C. Roy	31 July	1948	589
3	To B.G. Kher	4 August	1948	590
4	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	10 August	1948	590
5	To Gopichand Bhargava	16 August	1948	591

## IX. Foreign Visits and Assistance

1	To Govind Ballabh Pant	15 August	1948	592
2	To Lakshminarayan Sahu	26 August	1948	593
3	To Keshav Dev Malaviya	27 August	1948	594
4	To Harekrushna Mahtab	2 September	1948	595

## X. Life Imprisonment and Execution

1	Petition of Mercy of Ladlesaheb and Mashak Dastgir	21 July	1948	595
---	--	---------	------	-----

2	Petition of Mercy of Sitaram alias Haddu	21 July	1948	596
3	To the Maharaja of Jeypore	26 August	1948	597

## XI. King's Letter to the Nizam

1	To V.K. Krishna Menon	7 August	1948	597
2	An Apology to the King	7 August	1948	598
3	To C. Rajagopalachari	7 August	1948	600

## XII. Miscellaneous

1	To Govind Ballabh Pant	4 July	1948	601
2	To Baldev Singh	8 July	1948	602
3	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	25 July	1948	602
4	Cooperation between People and Police	26 July	1948	603
5	To Vallabhbhai Patel	15 August	1948	603
6	To Rajendra Prasad	11 September	1948	604
7	To Sardul Singh Caveeshar	12 September	1948	605
8	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	21 September	1948	606
9	To Syama Prasad Mookerjee	22 September	1948	606

## 12. Foreign Affairs

### I. Problems of Policy

1	On External Publicity	23 July	1948	609
2	Basic Principles	12 September	1948	609
3	On Serving of Alcoholic Drinks	21 September	1948	614
4	Role of Communists in South East Asia	26 September	1948	615
5	To Louis D. Gibarti	29 September	1948	618
6	Cable to Virgil Pinkley	1 October	1948	619

## 12. Foreign Affairs

### II. External Relations

#### Britain

1	British Commercial Interests in India	11 August	1948	623
2	Record of Interview with Terence Shone and A.C.B. Symon	13 August	1948	623
3	Review of Indo-British Monazite Venture	22 September	1948	625
4	To George E. De Silva	29 September	1948	626

#### II. The United States

1	Greetings to U.S.A.	4 July	1948	627
2	Implications of Special Treaty with the U.S.A.	12 August	1948	627
3	Disapproval of Alignment	21 August	1948	630

#### III. Burma

1	Cable to M.A. Rauf	16 August	1948	613
2	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	17 August	1948	632
3	To Vallabhbhai Patel	2 October	1948	632
4	To C. Rajagopalachari	2 October	1948	633

#### IV. Sri Lanka

1	Cable to D.S. Senanayake	15 July	1948	634
2	To D.S. Senanayake	17 July	1948	634
3	Cable to D.S. Senanayake	6 August	1948	642
4	Cable to D.S. Senanayake	6 August	1948	642
5	Changes in Citizenship Bill	2 September	1948	644
6	To V.V. Giri	8 September	1948	644
7	To D.S. Senanayake	8 September	1948	645



8	India's Regrets	2 October	1948	646
9	To D.S. Senanayake	4 October	1948	647

## V. Indonesia

1	Indonesia's Case in the U.N.	11 September	1948	647
2	Cable to Mohammad Hatta	20 September	1948	648
3	Communist Revolt in Indonesia	21 September	1948	648
4	To A. Soekarno	29 September	1948	649
5	To Mohammad Yunus	29 September	1948	650

## VI. Malaysia

1	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	24 July	1948	651
2	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	4 August	1948	654
3	To V.K. Krishna Menon	4 August	1948	655
4	Indian Labour in Malaysia	10 August	1948	658

## VII. China

1	To H.H. Kung	1 July	1948	659
2	To Anna Wang	3 July	1948	660
3	To Madame Sun Yat-sen	3 July	1948	661
4	To Madame Chiang Kai-shek	3 July	1948	662
5	To Tai Chi-tao	10 July	1948	663
6	To M.S. Kotnis	12 September	1948	664
7	To K.M. Panikkar	21 September	1948	665

## VIII. The U.S.S.R.

1	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	19 August	1948	666
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	19 August	1948	667

3	Syama Prasad Mookerjee's Interview with Russian Ambassador	11 September	1948	668
4	Note on Interview with the Russian Ambassador	12 September	1948	670

## IX. World Government

1	To T.G. Griessemer	8 July	1948	672
2	To B. Shiva Rao	15 July	1948	672
3	Inevitability of World Government	14 August	1948	673
4	Inter-Parliamentary Union	16 August	1948	675
5	To B. Shiva Rao	22 August	1948	677

## X. Foreign Enclaves

1	Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of Portugal	6 July	1948	678
2	Municipal Elections in French Settlements	16 July	1948	680
3	Elections in French India	2 August	1948	681
4	To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar	2 October	1948	681

## XI. Miscellaneous

1	To Eamon de Valera	15 July	1948	682
2	To Surjit Singh Majithia	31 July	1948	683
3	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	3 August	1948	684
4	To V.K. Krishna Menon	4 August	1948	686
5	To Angelo Poli	8 August	1948	689
6	Cable to Count Folke Bernadotte	19 August	1948	689
7	To Achyut Patwardhan	12 September	1948	690
8	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	21 September	1948	691
9	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	26 September	1948	695
10	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	29 September	1948	697
11	International Cooperation for Health	4 October	1948	699

### 13. Miscellaneous

#### I. Personal

1	To Clare Boothe Luce	1 July	1948	703
2	To J.R.D. Tata	4 July	1948	704
3	To Lady Colleen Nye	4 July	1948	705
4	To Sarojini Naidu	6 July	1948	706
5	To Vaman Tukaram Nigade	10 July	1948	707
6	To Marie Romain Rolland	10 July	1948	707
7	To Reginald Sorensen	10 July	1948	708
8	To Harji Malik	15 July	1948	709
9	To Mrs. Charles F. Brush	21 July	1948	709
10	To Amiya Chakravarty	3 August	1948	710
11	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	4 August	1948	711
12	To Rajan Nehru	4 August	1948	713
13	To Asaf Ali	4 August	1948	713
14	To Louise Morin	26 August	1948	714
15	To Dorothy Woodman	27 August	1948	714
16	To George Bernard Shaw	4 September	1948	715

#### II. General

1	To Ladli Prasad Zutshi	4 July	1948	717
2	A Soldier for Freedom	11 July	1948	718
3	To Lord Mountbatten	21 July	1948	719
4	C. Rajagopalachari	24 July	1948	721
5	The Orissa High Court	26 July	1948	725
6	Popular Government in Rampur	11 August	1948	725
7	To Surjit Singh Majithia	26 August	1948	726



## ILLUSTRATIONS

Jawaharlal Nehru in 1948	<i>frontispiece</i>	
At a refugee camp, Srinagar, 1948		
At Srinagar, 1948	<i>between pp.</i>	48—49
At Rajghat, New Delhi, 15 August 1948		
At Red Fort, New Delhi, 15 August 1948		144—145
With a member of the Kashmir Commission, New Delhi, July 1948		
With C. Rajagopalachari, New Delhi, 12 August 1948		288—289
“Fixed Income and Price Level”, a cartoon from <i>Shankar's Weekly</i> , 11 July 1948		
Addressing Prime Ministers of Provinces, New Delhi, 19 July 1948		352—353
At a children care centre, Madras, July 1948		
Inspecting a rally of women volunteers, Madras, 24 July 1948		400—401
Presiding over a meeting of Board of Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi, 16 August 1948		
On Board H.M.I.S. <i>Delhi</i> . Bombay, 15 September 1948		464—465
Laying the foundation stone of the Institute of Electro-Chemical Research, Karaikudi, 25 July 1948		
At Karaikudi, 25 July 1948		528—529
With the Papal Nuncio, New Delhi, 11 August 1948		
At Palam Airport, New Delhi, 5 October 1948		640—641



## ABBREVIATIONS

A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.R.	All India Radio
A.I.S.P.C.	All India States People's Conference
A.I.T.U.C.	All India Trade Union Congress
B.O.A.C.	British Overseas Airways Corporation
B.P.C.C.	Bombay Provincial Congress Committee
C.A.	Constituent Assembly
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
C-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.P.	Central Provinces
C.P.I.	Communist Party of India
C.P.I. (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
C.P.S.U.	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
C.P.W.D.	Central Public Works Department
C.S.I.R.	Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
C.S.O.	Central Statistical Organisation
D.C.	Deputy Commissioner
D.C.G.S.	Deputy Chief of General Staff
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General
E.C.A.F.E.	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
E.I.R.	East Indian Railway
G.A.T.T.	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G.G.	Governor-General
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government
H.M.I.S.	His Majesty's Indian Ship
H.M.S.	His Majesty's Ship
I.A.S.	Indian Administrative Service
I.C.A.R.	Indian Council of Agricultural Research
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.L.O.	International Labour Organisation
I.M.S.	Indian Medical Service
I.N.A.	Indian National Army
I.N.T.U.C.	Indian National Trade Union Congress
I.P.S.	Indian Police Service
I.S.I.	Indian Statistical Institute
M.E.A. & C.R.	Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly

M.P.	Member of Parliament
M.W.M.P.	Ministry of Works, Mines and Power
N.A.I.	National Archives of India
N.E.F.A.	North East Frontier Agency
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
N.W.F.P.	North West Frontier Province
P.A.F.	Pakistan Air Force
P.E.P.S.U.	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
P.I.B.	Press Information Bureau
P.M.	Prime Minister
P.M.S.	Prime Minister's Secretariat
P.T.I.	Press Trust of India
P.W.D.	Public Works Department
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
R.I.A.F.	Royal Indian Air Force
R.I.N.	Royal Indian Navy
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
U.N.C.I.P.	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
U.N.I.	United News of India
U.N.O.	United Nations Organisation
U.P.	United Provinces
U.P.P.C.C.	United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee
U.P.S.C.	Union Public Service Commission
W.H.O.	World Health Organisation



## THE QUEST FOR COMMUNAL PEACE



1. To H.S. Suhrawardy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd July, 1948

My dear Shaheed,

I am sorry for the slight delay in answering your letter of the 24th June. During the last week I have been constantly away from Delhi.

I am entirely at one with you that something and indeed everything possible should be done to stabilise the position of the minorities and to give them such assurances as are possible. We had hoped to discuss this matter at the inter-Dominion conference but that did not take place and I do not know when it will take place.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, as you will no doubt have noticed, the general situation has deteriorated chiefly because of Hyderabad<sup>3</sup> and Kashmir.<sup>4</sup> It is exceedingly difficult to deal with the problem of minorities independently of this general situation which creates so much suspicion and fear all round. I have told you previously that I am wholly in favour of minority representation in the Ministries in both the Bengals as well as elsewhere, where possible. A beginning could however be made in Bengal; also a beginning could be made with some services. I do not want any migrations in Bengal from east to west or west to east, nor do I want the remaining Hindus in Sind<sup>5</sup> to come away. So far as Sind is concerned, I just do not know what we can do in the matter. We cannot tell the Hindus at this stage that we will not take them back whatever might happen to them. As a matter of fact certain factors are delaying their migration.

As regards Bengal the existing general tension will probably come in the way of any such step as you have indicated and with which I am in agreement. If something can be done, I shall gladly encourage it. I had a

1. J.N. Collection.

2. An inter-Dominion conference scheduled for 15 June 1948 was postponed due to Liaquat Ali Khan's inability to attend. It met at Lahore on 22 and 23 July but no agreement could be reached. At the fourth Inter-Dominion Conference at New Delhi from 6 to 14 December 1948, decisions were taken on such issues as protection of life and property of the minorities, evacuee property and insurance policies.

3. In Hyderabad State the Razakars had taken control of the governmental machinery and were dictating terms to the people. Thousands of the local population had to leave the State.

4. The military situation in Kashmir had changed with three brigades of Pakistan involved in action with Indian forces. On 29 June 1948, Indian troops captured Gurais, a communication junction between Srinagar and Gilgit and Skardu. The U.N. Commission on Kashmir arrived in Karachi on 7 July 1948.

5. From Sind, out of a population of 14 lakhs of Hindus on 15 August 1947, 12 lakhs had left in six months in spite of the assurances of Jinnah and the ministers of the Pakistan Government that they would treat the minorities justly.

talk with Dr. Prafulla Ghosh yesterday and I believe he intends spending a great deal of time in East Bengal to help the Hindus in gaining some confidence and remaining where they are.<sup>6</sup>

I was sorry to find that the Hindi-Urdu controversy was raised in the U.P. elections.<sup>7</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Earlier, in April 1948, P.C. Ghosh in his address at meetings in East Bengal, had appealed to members of the minority community to accept Pakistan as their own, and adjust themselves to the prevailing conditions.
7. During the by-elections to the U.P. legislature in June 1948, the decision of the U.P. Government to adopt Hindi in Devanagari script as the official language of the province was criticised as going against the policy of the Congress.

## 2. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5 July 1948

My dear Mr. Reddiar,

Some time back I wrote to you about the Rashtriya Seva Dal, a volunteer organisation, which had been banned in Madras at the same time as the R.S.S. and some other organisations.<sup>2</sup> This ban has still not been lifted although this organisation has not been banned in any other part of India. In Bombay there are some restrictions on the organisation though there is no ban.

It appears to me that this Rashtriya Seva Dal was probably banned in Madras under some misapprehension and probably in ignorance of its real character. It was started, I think, in the early forties in Poona as a Congress organisation. It was definitely opposed to communalism. It did good work from 1942 onwards though some of its members went a little far in their activities. Later there was some local conflict between them and the official volunteer organisation in Bombay Province, partly, I think, due to the fact that some of the leaders of the Rashtriya Seva Dal belonged to the Socialist Party.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru had suggested to the Premier of Madras to remove the ban on the Rashtriya Seva Dal unless he had some definite evidence that the organisation was a dangerous one. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, pp. 44-45.



## THE QUEST FOR COMMUNAL PEACE

Whatever the merits might be such an organisation does not come in any way among those who should be banned. Most of the people in it are Congressmen and to ban them creates a feeling of frustration. The fact that Madras is the only province that has banned them is also rather unfortunate. I suggest to you, therefore, to reconsider this matter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To Edwina Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5 July 1948

My dear Edwina,

I have not troubled you with the long explanation that the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala sent to his Government about his conversation with you when you passed Ambala. In response to your wishes that subject has been closed after his apology to you.<sup>2</sup>

But your visit to Ambala did one good. It brought to light the policy and practice of the East Punjab Government in regard to Muslims who had been converted.<sup>3</sup> After some correspondence the East Punjab Government at last realised that they were completely in the wrong and they issued an order countermanning their previous instructions. I enclose a copy of that order. We are grateful to you for having brought to light this serious infringement of our directions.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Lady Mountbatten had complained of the discourteous behaviour of Nakul Sen. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, pp. 127-132.

3. Hindus who had been converted to Islam were being forcibly sent away from East Punjab against their will. An order was issued to stop this action.

#### 4. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8 July 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I enclose copy of a report I have received about speeches delivered by Master Tara Singh<sup>2</sup> and Giani Veer Singh<sup>3</sup> in Jagadhri of Ambala District on 24th June.<sup>4</sup> These are brief summaries and I cannot, of course, vouch for their accuracy. I am told, however, that this certainly was the purport of the speeches and they have created a very bad impression on the public, especially Hindus who are worried about their future. Such speeches naturally tend to increase the tension between the Hindus and the Sikhs. I suppose you must have got a fuller report of these speeches....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Master Tara Singh said that he was opposed to the Congress because it wanted to end the separate Panthic entity and that Sikhs were defenders of the Hindu faith.
3. Veer Singh (1872-1957); Punjabi poet and writer who was involved in the social and religious movements of the Sikhs; member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1954-57.
4. Veer Singh spoke of the past glory of the Sikhs and sought to promote separatist feelings.

#### 5. To the Nawab of Bhopal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9 July 1948

My dear Nawab Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st July.<sup>2</sup> I am glad you have written frankly and fully. I appreciate your confidence and I think I owe it to you to write equally frankly.

Do you remember some of the talks<sup>3</sup> we had more than a year ago? I was anxious then to point out to you that India was passing through a

1. J.N. Collection.
2. After a brief discussion with Nehru on 27 May 1948, the Nawab wrote a long letter.
3. For Nehru's notes on the discussions on 20 and 21 April 1946 see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 15, pp.337-350.



dynamic phase of her existence and that unless this was understood any arrangement that might be made would be superficial and would not last. I have a sense of history, and however much I may fail in an appreciation of the moment, I have also some sense of historical forces at play. In India I could see these forces at work, for good or for ill, and nothing surprised me so much as the static view which rulers of Indian States took of the situation then. They talked without appreciating the reality of the situation. It was not a question of what I wanted or what they wanted, but of understanding something which was bound to happen whether we wanted it or not. All we could do was to see that the changes that were inevitable took place in as reasonable and amicable a way as possible.

And yet, the talks we had either privately or in the Negotiating Committee ignored this vital aspect. Did you or did any of your brother princes realise that in the course of a year or so the whole structure of the Indian States system would inevitably collapse at the impact of the new forces that were rising in India? The change in India in regard to the States seems sudden and so it is in a way. And yet, looking at it from another point of view, it is a long delayed change which would have taken place many years ago. Changes delayed have a way of coming unannounced and often in a wrong way, and when they come they upset many things.

Today there is an increasing conflict between India and Hyderabad State. Forgetting for the moment the minor aspects of this conflict, can anyone doubt, for an instant, that the attitude taken up by the Nizam and his advisers can only end in the ruin of the State as it is and of the Nizam's dynasty. For obvious reasons we have tried to avoid this because any such contingency would bring great suffering to large numbers of people. We went to the utmost limits to meet the Nizam's wishes. We have not succeeded in it and the forces of history move on to bring about the inevitable culmination of all this. To any observer it is clear what the result will be, whatever the intermediate stages might be. All this comes from littleness of mind and lack of understanding of the new forces that are shaping India and the world.

It has been our misfortune, and the misfortune of India and Pakistan, that evil impulses were encouraged by people who ought to have known better and for the moment those evil impulses triumphed. You know that I have spent the greater part of my adult life in pursuing and trying to realise certain ideals I had. Only a part of those ideals have been realised and even that realisation has come in a way which has all but shattered me. Can you imagine the sorrow that confronts me when I see after more than thirty years of incessant effort the failure of much that I longed for passionately? Can you realise how I felt during these past years how utterly evil tendencies were set in motion by Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League, ten-

dencies which I know could only bring disaster to India? They did bring disaster not only to India but even more so to the Pakistan of Mr. Jinnah's creation. That disaster has not ended yet, and no man can say whether and how that will end.

I am not foolish enough to say that all the blame lies on one side and that the other is blameless. I know that we have been to blame in many matters, but I do feel that fundamentally we were looking in the right direction and trying to act rightly even though we did not always succeed. Indeed so long as Gandhiji was alive he would not permit us to stray far. Nevertheless certain forces of evil were too strong for us and the poison that Mr. Jinnah instilled into India's public life spread in all directions.

Partition came and we accepted it because we thought that perhaps that way, however painful it was, we might have some peace to work along our own lines. Perhaps we acted wrongly. It is difficult to judge now. And yet, the consequences of that partition have been so terrible that one is inclined to think that anything else would have been preferable. That partition has come, and it brought in its train other vast changes. There can be no going back now to India as it was before the partition. Organic changes have taken place in India which prevent that going back.

Nevertheless, all my sense of history rebels against this unnatural state of affairs that has been created in India and Pakistan. I cannot see it continuing for long as it is. Something that was inherently wrong and unnatural was done and it brought disastrous consequences in its train. There is no settling down to it and conflicts continue. Perhaps these conflicts are due to the folly or littleness of those in authority in India or Pakistan. I feel, however, that it is something deeper than that and not all the wisdom of statesmen could end these conflicts in the present context because they are inherent in the situation. Ultimately I have no doubt that India and Pakistan will come close together and it may be that there is some kind of federal link between them or at any rate certain common subjects. There is no other way to peace. The alternative is an ever-deteriorating situation and incessant conflict. For the present the former seems far off and the atmosphere of possible war thickens.

It is with this background that we have to understand the present situation. No sensible person, I take it, desires war or civil strife. But the very birth of Pakistan and its background was such that till it was worked out somehow, the evil that had pursued us would not settle down. You mention the plan you had in your mind for the formation of a third independent state<sup>4</sup> which would serve as a balance between the two. As a matter of fact

4. The Nawab mentioned that he and certain other rulers had conceived a plan for the formation of a "Third Independent State", which would serve as a curb on the emergence of a "dangerously unstable constitutional structure" and as "a non-communal intermediary between two communally divided states of India and Pakistan."



this idea went completely against the forces of history that were working so powerfully in India. It just could not have happened and could only have led to further strife instead of the stability that you were aiming at.

For my part I have not given up in the slightest the ideals which have moved me during all these past years, though I must confess to my sorrow that I find myself increasingly unable to live upto them. I believe in India being a secular state with complete freedom for all religions and cultures and for cooperation between them. I believe that India can only become great if she preserves that composite culture which she had developed through the ages. I confess however that doubts sometimes assail me whether this is going to happen or not. And yet at the back of my mind I feel sure that whatever might happen in the present, sometime or other, India will have to tread that path to self-realisation and greatness. I am anxious therefore that the Muslims in India as well as all other religious groups should have the fullest freedom and opportunity to develop themselves.<sup>5</sup> I am entirely hostile to Hindu or any other communalism in India.

But you will appreciate that the history of the past few years, and more especially of the last year, has increased communal suspicion and bitterness. Is it surprising that those Muslims, who till yesterday were champions of Pakistan, should be viewed with suspicion when they talk of loyalty to India? It is a little absurd of some of our people to speak incessantly about demanding loyalty from the Muslims<sup>6</sup> or any others. Loyalty does not come by compulsion. I have little doubt that the Muslims in India have undergone a big sea change as soon as the partition came and after they have seen the consequences of this partition. I feel that this process will continue and I want to encourage it. Nevertheless the fact remains that in the present context the sympathy of many of them may well lie with Pakistan and they cannot get out of the habit of mind which they had developed during these past few years. If that is so, then a certain inherent and potential conflict continues and frank cooperation as between colleagues and comrades is difficult.

I know very well that there is a painful tussle of the spirit going on among the Muslims in India. To some extent all of us have this conflict within ourselves, but the Muslims in India have it in a peculiar degree. Of course they have been uprooted in mind from certain conceptions that they had held. They still stick to them because it takes time to get out of the old grooves, and at the same time they know that these old grooves are not good

5. The Nawab said that he was still a strong supporter of Nehru's ideal of developing a composite culture in India.
6. The Nawab wrote: "There have been demands for guarantees from Muslims of India of loyalty to India, but loyalty in its true sense cannot be demanded of any individual, it must be earned and inspired as a genuine sentiment springing from the heart."

any longer. Certainly I wish to help them to get out of the old grooves and to become again parts of the new India. There are many elements among the Hindus who have no such desire and who would rather do without the Muslims. I think that would be a fatal disaster from the point of view of India and I wish therefore to resist it. Whatever some Hindus may think, ultimately the future of the Muslims in India will depend upon themselves. I have no doubt that they can make good if they are clear enough and brave enough about it.

There need be no question about the Government of India giving to Muslims their full rights of citizenship of India.<sup>7</sup> It is true that theoretical pronouncements do not go far unless they are accompanied by tangible results. We can work for these results, but the real results come not from governmental pronouncements or even action, but rather from the general atmosphere that prevails.

One of the biggest obstacles to the creation of the atmosphere we seek is the repeated declaration that Pakistan is an Islamic State.<sup>8</sup> That, I think, is an absurdity in the present world, at any rate for any progressive nation. If Pakistan insists on being what is called an Islamic State it will be backward, narrow-minded and unprogressive just as India, if it seeks to be a Hindu State, would be similarly backward and unprogressive. But at any rate, India claims to be something different while Pakistan goes on insisting on an Islamic State. If it is an Islamic State, then inevitably the conception of nationality, as it is understood today, has no meaning and the Muslims in India or most of them may well look to Pakistan as their homeland. That leads to disruptive tendencies working continuously and to a continuance of suspicion.

You refer to your possible selection as Governor General of Pakistan to succeed Mr. Jinnah when he wishes to retire.<sup>9</sup> That again creates an obvious difficulty in the present context at least. What the future will show I do not know. But we have to consider these matters as things are today when the interests of India and Pakistan are opposed to each other and in conflict. When this conflict has been completely removed, many things would

7. The Nawab urged Nehru to restore the confidence of Muslims by securing and maintaining for them everywhere in the Dominion their legitimate and reasonable rights as citizens of India.
8. For example, in a broadcast to the United States in February 1948, Jinnah said, "I am sure the constitution of Pakistan will be of a democratic type embodying the principles of Islam. Today, they are applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago."
9. Referring to his possible selection as Governor General of Pakistan, the Nawab had stated "there can be no question of it as long as Mr. Jinnah is alive, and I would wish him very long life. If... I am called upon to serve and if I accept the offer, I shall do so with the thought uppermost in my mind of trying to bring about the closest and happiest relations with India and Pakistan".



happen and present difficulties would not exist. But so long as these difficulties exist, it does seem odd that you, a citizen of India and a ruler of an Indian State, should become the Governor General of Pakistan.

I am convinced that sooner or later India and Pakistan must come close together. I am equally convinced that India will function, because of her resources and her geography, as a nation which ties up many other nations of Asia with herself and with each other. That seems to me an inevitable development. To that end those of us who believe in these ideals can work, even though at present they seem rather far off objectives. But the present distress will pass and India will then rapidly fulfil her destiny.

I can assure you that I have not at all misunderstood your letter but have appreciated it. I hope you will equally appreciate this reply of mine. It does not, I am afraid, lead definitely to any practical steps at present, but before we take those practical steps we must be clear in our own minds.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13th July 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have been wanting to write to you for some little time about the Barrackpore case.<sup>2</sup> I suppose you know all about it. Shaheed Suhrawardy spoke to me about it some days back and now I have a representation from a number of persons about this case.

I shall not go into the details as you no doubt know more about them than I do. But I would like you to look into this matter fairly carefully and take such action as may lead to communal harmony and to a removal of any feeling that a discriminatory attitude is being adopted by Government towards Muslims in West Bengal, in regard to certain other matters. This applies not only to the Barrackpore case but apparently to some other cases also. It appears that in regard to the Hindus charged the case has been withdrawn.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. This refers to the detentions made at Barrackpore during the communal disturbances following the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

As you are coming here soon, I am not sending you all the papers on the subject but I can hand them to you here on your arrival.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 7. To C.M. Trivedi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23 July 1948

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your letter of July 20th enclosing a copy of your letter to your Premier. I am glad that you have written to him as you have done. It is best to be frank in such matters.

According to my reckoning the next three or four months are going to be difficult and rather critical not only in India but in the world. We shall have to fight these difficult conditions firmly. In order to do so we must have a grip of what is happening and not try to escape from it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

### 8. To A.M. Allapichai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 6th August 1948

Dear friend,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of the 29th July<sup>3</sup>. In this letter you have made certain

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1903-1984) ; lawyer; joined Muslim League in 1935 and was Secretary, District Muslim League and Madras Presidency Muslim League; later joined Congress; Convenor, Muslim Convention of South India; member, Madras Legislative Council, April-December, 1952, and Deputy Chairman, Madras Legislative Council, 1957.

3. Allapichai had complained that the Muslims in the Madras province were demoralised as the provincial Government and the P.C.C. had not created confidence in them. He appealed for proper treatment of Muslims so that the Congress did not lose their support.



rather vague statements and have not given specific instances. It is rather difficult for me to enquire or take any steps when no specific matters are mentioned. I realise that the main thing you have to contend against is a certain psychological atmosphere. I shall try my utmost to improve this.

I am sending your letter to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the Congress President.

I am also conveying your invitation to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to visit your province. I am afraid it will hardly be possible for him to go while the Constituent Assembly is in session.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 9. Id-ul-Fitr<sup>1</sup>

On the coming Id I send my greetings and good wishes to my fellow citizens, the Muslims of India. It is a day of rejoicing after a long vigil but it is difficult to rejoice after the sorrows and sufferings we have all endured during the past year and more. Yet for this very reason it is all the more necessary that on this great day we should clear our minds of ill-will and rancour and dedicate ourselves to the service of the country. The service of the country means the service of all the people of the country. Those who seek to serve a lesser cause or a particular group only, ultimately fail to serve even that, for all lesser causes and smaller groups are bound up with the great cause of India and her manifold people.

India will only progress when her people of all religions work together for common ends. Therefore, we have to remember the lesson that Mahatma Gandhi taught us, the lesson of communal harmony, mutual forbearance and cooperative effort.

1. Message to *Al Jamait*, official organ of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, on the eve of the Id festival, 6 August 1948. *National Herald*, 7 August 1948.

10. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 24, 1948

My dear Syama Prasad,

A few days ago it was announced in the press that the Hindu Mahasabha had decided to return to the political field.<sup>2</sup> This piece of news obviously has considerable significance and it has been treated as such by the press. In view of our resolution on communalism<sup>3</sup> we cannot approve of any such activity of an organisation which has been and is strictly communal. Even if some minor change in its rules is made enabling others to join it, the organisation must necessarily, in the circumstances, continue to be communal and the Government will treat it in accordance with the directions of that resolution.

The position is made worse by the fact that Savarkar is being tried in the conspiracy to murder Gandhiji. Whatever the result of the trial, Savarkar does not come out well from it.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, reports come to us about renewed activities of the R.S.S. in various provinces. These activities, though outwardly peaceful, are reported to be of a subversive nature and designed to challenge the Government again as was done in the past.<sup>5</sup>

In view of all this, I feel that you should remove any misapprehension from the public mind about your continued connection with the Hindu

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 8 August 1958, the All India Hindu Mahasabha resolved to re-enter politics on a new basis and a new programme and throw open membership to all Indian citizens irrespective of caste or religion.

3. On 2 February 1948 the Cabinet had passed a resolution which banned private armies and announced measures against organisations preaching violence or communal hatred. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 5, pp. 37-39. Later a non-official resolution urging elimination of communalism and calling upon the Government to take all legislative and administrative steps to prevent communal organisations from engaging in political activities was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 3 April 1948. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, p. 33.

4. V.D. Savarkar, who was arrested on 11 March 1948 by the Delhi Police and tried from 27 May 1948 to 10 February 1949, was acquitted and released on 12 February 1949.

5. In his reply dated 28 August 1948 S.P. Mookerjee said that he hoped that Nehru would consider the desirability of utilizing the good and progressive elements and activities of every organization, which was not wilfully working against the interest of the State. He believed that if Nehru and Patel gave the call, all bad elements, wherever they existed, would be segregated and the good elements would stand consolidated.



Mahasabha.<sup>6</sup> That there is this misapprehension has been clear from numerous comments in the newspapers. It is far better to take the public, not to mention the members of the Congress Party in the Legislature, into our confidence. Or else rumours spread and create mischief. Apart from the public, I should like to know myself if you are still connected with the Hindu Mahasabha.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Mookerjee replied : "I have not the least desire to embarrass you in any way. Should you at any time feel that my connection with Government should cease, you have only to mention this to me and I shall readily comply with your desire."

## 11. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2nd September 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I have received your letter of 29th August for which I thank you. There are one or two matters which I should like to deal with immediately.

In my fortnightly letter I have written to you about internal security.<sup>2</sup> I agree with you that there are two aspects of this problem. I think however that by far the more important is the possibility of minority elements being harassed and ill-treated by the majority. The minority, say in Bihar, is in a state of considerable fear and apprehension.<sup>3</sup> From the standpoint of their security it is exceedingly unlikely that they will indulge in any aggressive act. The consequences of that might well mean disaster for them. It is always possible that some mad men or fools might indulge in mischief. But as a whole this kind of thing is highly unlikely.

Of course this does not mean that Government should be careless or unwary. Every care should be taken in any event, but the real problem before us is how to protect the minority from the majority in case of necessity.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. In his fortnightly letter of 1 September 1948, Nehru warned the premiers of provinces to take necessary steps to maintain internal security in view of reports of intrigues by some Muslims and possibility of reaction to events in Hyderabad. See *post*, section 9, item VI.
3. There was fear of disturbances in industrial townships and pockets where the Muslim population was concentrated.

Once the majority gets out of hand it will be very difficult to deal with the situation and apart from the disastrous consequences, our reputation abroad will suffer terribly. The whole Kashmir issue will be affected.

My own impression is that the kind of intelligence reports we get, useful as they are, are often apt to mislead us by exaggerating trivial and isolated instances.

The situation is obviously a delicate one and full of risks. We have to face those risks anyhow, but any precipitate action without sufficient justification might well involve us in greater risks.

I do not quite understand what you mean when you say that many Muslims from Pakistan are employed in vital industries and services. Have these people come back from Pakistan? Obviously there are large number of Muslims in India still. They are Indian citizens and they have in law nothing to do with Pakistan. How then can you say that many Muslims from Pakistan are serving in your province? This is the first time I have heard of any such thing in any part of India. Of course, even an Indian national Muslim may give trouble but we must always remember that we cannot consider a person a non-national or potentially disloyal because he is a Muslim. That would be a basically wrong policy and a wrong approach.

About the Bihar Zamindari Bill, you will appreciate from the letters<sup>4</sup> I have sent you recently that we have to view this entire problem in a completely new way. The economic crisis that is upon us has to be dealt with very firmly and many of our schemes and projects have to be held up. Whatever our views may be in regard to a particular scheme, it is just not possible for us to make very large grants to provinces.<sup>5</sup> I should like you and your Government to look at it from this point of view and then suggest to us what we can do or what you propose to do. We shall, of course, try to find a way out in cooperation with you. It is no good at all promising something which we cannot do.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Nehru had urged Sri Krishna Sinha to proceed with the liquidation of the zamindari system in consultation with Central financial experts. See *post*, section 10, sub-section on zamindari abolition and also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, pp. 290-291.
5. Bihar had appealed to the Centre for a grant of Rs. 64 crores to carry out the Zamindari abolition.



## 12. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a cutting from a Hindi newspaper of Delhi. I have seen at least one other press cutting in a Hindi newspaper dealing with this particular matter.

This cutting refers to a meeting held under the auspices of the R.S.S. on the Janmashtami Day 30-31 August in a place called Didwana in Merwara which is said to be a centre of activities of the R.S.S. The R.S.S., it is said in this cutting, openly carries on its activities there in spite of being declared illegal.

The report gives an account of a speech delivered by Mukand Malaviya<sup>2</sup> in which he says that the Maharana of Udaipur should sit on the Delhi throne, that it is a great injustice to our Rajput armies for Madras troops to be recruited in their place and this must be opposed firmly. The Government of India is severely criticised, more especially I am condemned as being an opponent of Hindu culture.

Mukand Malaviya further says that a Hindu Raj must be established in India, that it is certain that more blood will be shed in India soon than it has been shed during the last two thousand years and the Muslims will be driven out of India.

Mukand Malaviya is a completely irresponsible individual. He is a cousin<sup>3</sup> of Govind's and poor Govind is very much distressed at Mukand's activities. I am drawing your attention to this because this kind of speech under the auspices of the R.S.S. is likely to create a great deal of ferment in people's minds followed possibly by trouble. I do not quite know what can be done in such a case, but something should surely be done.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Third son of Madan Mohan Malaviya; businessman and Congress leader in Bombay; was arrested several times during the freedom struggle; retired from politics after 1947; died in 1962.

3. In fact he was Govind Malaviya's brother.

13. To Mehr Chand Khanna<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 21, 1948

My dear Mehr Chand,

The Governor General writes to me that it would be an excellent way of celebrating Bapu's birthday if we could get the little mosques in Delhi given back to the Muslims. This would be a fulfilment of the definite pledge given to him and would produce a great effect both in India and outside.<sup>2</sup> I wish this was possible. I do not know what the position is, but I feel that some special effort should be made at this juncture. The atmosphere is favourable.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. According to the pledge given by the Peace Committee on 19 January 1948 to Mahatma Gandhi, the mosques in Delhi occupied by the non-Muslims were to be vacated and returned to the Muslims.

14. To Mehr Chand Khanna<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 24th September 1948

My dear Mehr Chand,

This morning Maulana Azad was mentioning to Sardar Patel the case of those mosques in Delhi,<sup>2</sup> about 15 or so in number, which had been converted into some kind of temples with an idol installed inside them. He was anxious that something might be done to them by the 2nd October.

I did not know anything about it. Sardar Patel said that he was most anxious to remove these temple emblems and he could of course do it through the police, but he would prefer that this was done cooperatively. He promised to look into the matter.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In all 381 mosques and *dargahs* were occupied by refugees in Delhi. Between 19 January and 6 April 1948, 221 of these places of worship were restored to the Muslims through the efforts of the Central Peace Committee. By the middle of September 1948, all but fifteen of the remaining mosques were vacated.



It is obvious that this is a matter of great significance, even more important than having the other mosques vacated by the refugees. I hope you will also give this some priority. Naturally in this matter we should proceed in full cooperation with the Delhi authorities.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 15. Muslims in Malerkotla<sup>1</sup>

A number of people (Muslims) have come here from Malerkotla. They are very much exercised and agitated over the political changes that have taken place recently, which have resulted in Malerkotla being merged in the Phulkian States. This is chiefly due to the fact that it is feared that the Phulkian States would be dominated by Sikhs. The Maharaja of Patiala also as the Head of these States frightens them.

Malerkotla was a very small Muslim State and it is obvious that it had to be merged somewhere. I can however understand their feeling of apprehension, however unjustified it might be. In East Punjab, quite apart from Malerkotla or the States, there is some tension between Sikhs and Hindus. There are practically no Muslims there, except in Gurgaon on the borders of Delhi. So the Muslim question hardly arises there. But it is well-known that there is a great bitterness between Sikhs and Muslims. The small Muslim minorities are terribly afraid of the Sikhs who are often aggressive and even violent. So if the relatively small number of Muslims in Malerkotla, most of whom belong to the well-to-do classes, are frightened, it is not surprising. I understand that new Sikh officers have come there.

I suggest that their apprehension might be lessened somewhat by some assurance issued to them by the States Ministry and by instructions being sent to the Administrator to pay some heed to them. It would be desirable not to send Sikh officers there if this is possible. Hindu officers might be sent. If Sardar Patel could send a word of cheer to these frightened people, it would greatly help.

1. Note to the Ministry of States, 25 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

16. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 26, 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I understand that Master Tara Singh presided over an Akali Conference held at Bhatinda on the 22nd September and that he delivered a speech then. I should like to have a report of this speech. The brief report I have seen in a newspaper is so remarkable that I can hardly believe that a sane human being could be responsible for this kind of thing.

I have repeatedly written to you about Master Tara Singh and requested you to talk frankly to him. I do not know if you have ever done so. Matters are coming to a climax now, and it may become quite impossible for Government to tolerate Master Tara Singh's speeches or activities.<sup>2</sup>

When Giani Kartar Singh was taken in the Cabinet we were given to understand that in a sense he represented Master Tara Singh and his inclusion in the Cabinet would lead to the toning down for Master Tara Singh. Evidently it has had no effect, or perhaps it has had a reverse effect. I should like to know what Giani Kartar Singh has to say about Master Tara Singh's activities.<sup>3</sup>

None of us has any desire to add to present day problems. But there comes a time when no Government worth its name can tolerate activities which can only lead to serious trouble.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 2 August 1948, Master Tara Singh demanded the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. On 25 August, he announced five demands of the Akali Dal—recruitment of Sikhs to the Indian Army; formation of a Punjabi-speaking state; safeguarding of Sikh rights and interests in Pepsu; introduction of Punjabi as the official language and its adoption as the medium of instruction in schools and colleges; and grants of land and property to refugees in equal proportion to what they possessed in West Pakistan.

3. In a letter dated 28 September 1948 Giani Kartar Singh suggested the formation of a Punjabi-speaking province to end the growing tension between Hindus and Sikhs. Nehru disagreed.



### 17. Shanti Sena<sup>1</sup>

The Shanti Sena of Calcutta or rather of West Bengal began a little over a year ago, in August 1947. It was one of the fruits of Mahatma Gandhi's peace mission in Calcutta which brought about the miracle of peace and changed an atmosphere of hatred and bitterness into one of peaceful cooperation among different communities. With this worthy patronage much was expected of the Shanti Sena. From all accounts it has lived up to its early reputation and met every test and trial with courage and fortitude. Its record is a good one and I congratulate it upon this record of service. I hope that it will have opportunities of continuing its service in an ever-widening sphere.

1. Message to Debotosh Das Gupta, General Secretary of Shanti Sena (Peace Brigade), 29 September 1948. File No. 2(251)/48-PMS.

### 18. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 October 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I am leaving for Europe day after tomorrow. Before I go I should like to write to you about certain important matters connected with the East Punjab Government and province which are worrying me greatly.

(1) I must draw your attention again to Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. No government worth its name can tolerate activities and speeches which Master Tara Singh is indulging in. Toleration now means greater trouble later. I think this matter must be cleared up once for all whatever the consequences. If Giani Kartar Singh says he is helpless in the matter, then he has no particular reason to be in the Ministry.

(2) I have had a long report from Mohanlal Saksena after his tour in East Punjab and the East Punjab States. I do not know if a copy of this re-

1. File No. 2(157)/48-PMS. Copies of this letter were sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Chandulal Trivedi and Mohanlal Saksena.

port is being sent to you. He has come back disappointed with much that he saw. He writes that he saw distress and destitution writ large on the face of the people young and old. There is uncertainty about the future. In particular he draws attention to the land allotment policy of the East Punjab Government<sup>2</sup> and points out that, in his opinion, this is contrary to the declared policy of the Congress and is not calculated to rehabilitate a large number of people. Under the East Punjab scheme, the land of the evacuees is to be allotted only to those persons who had owned land in West Pakistan, irrespective of the fact whether they were cultivators or not. Further, very large areas extending up to even 400 to 500 acres are being allotted to single persons.

You will remember that the Standing Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly considered the policy of the East Punjab Government in regard to land and a resolution was moved and was referred to you. You promised to examine the proposal and inform the Committee. Any large allotments of land will create new vested interests which will be difficult to dislodge later.<sup>3</sup>

He points out further that the system of land allocation is based on some ideas which are not obvious. There appears to be some mystery about this process both in conception and execution. A great deal of communal and personal considerations seem to enter into the plan, making rehabilitation not only unfair but difficult. There is a certain arbitrariness about the whole business. People who are more or less settled down in one place are uprooted again and pushed to other places. In Kapurthala, it is said that land is available for 4,000 families, but it is reserved, and no part of it is given to thousands of persons, specially Harijans, who are still kept in Jullundur camps. In Jind, there is a large number of persons from Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffarabad, who have been in camps for nearly a year.

It appears that the great bulk of the refugees in camps now are Hindus including Harijans. The great majority of Sikhs have already been settled on the land.

In regard to the land policy I think steps should be taken for a proper enquiry to be made by some competent person so that decisions may be based on a proper knowledge of the situation as it exists today.

(3) I have previously written to you about Harijans. I do feel that to keep them out is not only inexpedient but is directly opposed to Congress

2. The Government of East Punjab has proposed to introduce "group system" and "joint management system" in land allotment. Under the group system fifty families were given 500 acres of land for cultivation. Under the second system individuals were to work within the framework of "joint management."
3. The original policy of the Government of East Punjab was to end vested interests in the land and introduce joint cooperative farming.



policy. I am afraid the policy which the East Punjab Government is pursuing in this and allied matters will lay seeds of future trouble.<sup>4</sup>

In Gurdaspur District, Mohanlal Saksena learnt that Harijans were not allowed to draw water from the wells.

(4) In the allotment of houses and building sites for urban rehabilitation, Mohanlal points out that the common people have suffered. Non-Punjabis, that is people from the Frontier Provinces, etc., have suffered even more than the others, and serious charges of favouritism in the allotment of Muslim evacuees' shops have been made. Sometimes a person has been given more than one shop. You will remember that vast numbers of Punjabis have come to Delhi, U.P. and elsewhere and they are being helped. This is right. But it is not right for East Punjab to consider Frontier people there as strangers who must be pushed out. The result of any pushing out policy of these people will naturally be the growth of a feeling of resentment against Punjabis in other provinces.

(5) In the matter of housing schemes, the East Punjab Government has followed a policy which again is opposed to the policy of the Government of India.

In Amritsar and elsewhere, apparently no steps are being taken for the formation of new townships. No improvement trusts have been formed in spite of a demand for one.

The problem which has been troubling us very greatly is that of the people at Kurukshetra Camp,<sup>5</sup> more specially the Frontier refugees. This is a very urgent matter requiring immediate consideration. Everything is hung up because the East Punjab Government has not yet allotted sites for their rehabilitation. Before I go away to Europe, I should like to have this matter finalised, and I have, therefore, asked Dharma Vira to telephone about it today.

This letter has been dictated in a great hurry in order to draw your attention to certain outstanding matters.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. It had been decided by the Government of East Punjab to allot land only to those who had held land in their own right in West Punjab.
5. It was reported on 16 July 1948 that the Government of India had decided that on no account would any more refugees be admitted into the camps at Delhi and Kurukshetra because they were overcrowded.





## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

### I. General





## 1. Progress of Rehabilitation<sup>1</sup>

I am happy to inaugurate this conference of Premiers of provinces and representatives of States called by the Central Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation.

The general criticism that the Government has done little to help refugees is incorrect. Much progress has been made in the work of rehabilitation, but a lot is still to be done. There are among the refugees thousands of lawyers, doctors, teachers and other professional men who, being generally in demand, should be absorbed in the country's economic life without much difficulty. There are other urban classes too which can be made use of. But the problem of rehabilitation of refugees will be solved only if you work out a proper plan of rehabilitation and implement it.<sup>2</sup>

1. Speech in Delhi, 19 July 1948. *The Hindustan Times*, 20 July 1948.
2. This conference on 20 July passed resolutions on regulation of emigration from Pakistan, settlement of Punjabi refugees in East Punjab, allocation of refugees to different provinces and States, housing, census of refugees, refugee teachers for camp schools, cooperative enterprise, vocational training centres and problems concerning women.

## 2. A Commitment to Rehabilitation<sup>1</sup>

While dealing with the problem of resettlement of refugees, the Government has to keep in view a number of other serious problems facing the country and the effect it might have on them.<sup>2</sup> Problems, like the preca-

1. Speech at a gathering of representatives of refugee organizations and camps, New Delhi, 1 August 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 2 August 1948.
2. There were more than 160 refugee camps all over the country, providing accommodation to 12,50,000 refugees. In East Punjab alone 7,21,396 refugees were accommodated in 85 camps towards the end of December 1947. Out of the remaining, 1,50,000 were in camps at Delhi, 53,000 in Punjab and Rajasthan States, 13,000 in Bombay, 30,000 in the United Provinces, 500 in Madras and 1,500 in the Central Provinces.

rious position of India's economy, Hyderabad, Kashmir and refugee rehabilitation, are interlinked with one another.

The hardships and misery through which the refugees have passed and their right to demand all possible help from the country are facts that cannot be disputed. Besides humanitarian reasons, it is necessary for the welfare of India that the refugees are settled in life quickly. The question today, therefore, is how must they be rehabilitated.

I remember that even during the Bengal famine the task of giving relief in the famine-stricken areas was not so serious and difficult a problem as the one of resettling refugees. A large section of wealth-producing population have suddenly lost their means of livelihood and have become a burden on the rest of the country. It is essential that they are helped in becoming once again producers of real wealth.

The question of giving aid to the refugees cannot be isolated from other problems that we are trying to tackle. Prices are rising. Due to the recommendations of the Pay Commission, the Government expenses have gone up by about Rs. 30 crores.<sup>3</sup> The country is faced with a serious economic crisis. There is a constant demand for higher wages, but India's production level is going down, and without increase in production, increase in wages will mean nothing. Besides this, there are military and political problems of Kashmir and Hyderabad in which the country is involved at the moment.

In an attempt to find a solution of the refugee problem we cannot afford to ignore other problems. The Government must consider carefully what repercussions one problem is liable to have on the rest. We must also make sure that when we solve one problem our position with regard to others does not deteriorate.

It is quite easy to prepare a long list of things that the Government has not been able to do, but if we are fair, we can also draw up an equally long list of the Government's achievements. Generally, people tend to ignore what has been done and stress too much that aspect of the question where the Government has failed.

We have appointed a separate Ministry and later a Development and Rehabilitation Board to make plans for the resettlement of displaced persons.

I admit that we have not been able to work with the speed that is called for by the urgent nature of the refugee question. I admit the hopes, yours as well as ours, have not been fulfilled, but we are endeavouring to achieve what has not been achieved so far, and find a satisfactory way of rehabilitating you.

3. The First Central Pay Commission recommended revised pay scales for Central Government employees in 1947.



The appointment recently of a Minister of State<sup>4</sup> instead of a Minister of Cabinet rank does not mean that the Government does not attach sufficient importance to the subject. It has been done because the Government wants Mr. Saksena to devote all his attention to the problem without being bothered by the routine work of a minister.

4. Mohanlal Saksena.

### 3. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

The 2nd August 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

Affairs relating to relief and rehabilitation of refugees appear to have reached a crisis. The crisis, I think, is chiefly due to a widespread feeling of uncertainty as to what is being done. There are plenty of mischief-makers also.

Recent decisions of the Premiers' Conference, etc., have also rather upset these people. I myself think it rather strange that basic decisions should be taken without even any reference to the Cabinet. In fact, even information has not been sent to me or to the Cabinet and we have to pick up the news casually.

I think the time has come when the whole question should be fully considered by the Cabinet in your presence. Will you kindly, therefore, draft a note on the present position and the various proposals we have before us? This should be sent soon for consideration of the Cabinet. I hope you will attend that meeting of the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



#### 4. Muslims who Worked for India's Freedom<sup>1</sup>

In dealing with the refugee problem we have considered the cases of non-Muslim refugees only. This was natural in the circumstances. But there are some cases of Nationalist Muslims who are certainly deserving of every sympathy and help. The description, "Nationalist Muslim", is rather vague. We may confine it to well known persons who have been in the Congress and suffered for the cause of India's freedom repeatedly.

This matter has come up before me several times. Today again I had a visit from Abdul Ghani<sup>2</sup> who is a prominent Congressman of Ludhiana in the Punjab. Maulana Habibur Rehman is another very prominent person of Ludhiana.

I should like you to consider how we can help these people. Their number is not very great. Perhaps, it is a question of a few hundred persons or less. They do not expect much, but they expect that they should be considered sufferers who deserve our sympathy and help.

We need not make any public declaration, but we can easily get names of such persons through our common friends and assist them in finding accommodation and, sometimes, some employment or some other method of earning their living. I have asked Abdul Ghani to see you about this so that you might have some facts from him. Rafi Ahmed knows most of these people and he can be asked for information about any person.

I am prepared to help these people from my Prime Minister's Fund to some extent, but I would rather that help was given through your agency, even though some of it came from the Prime Minister's Fund.

1. Note to Mohanlal Saksena, 10 August 1948. File No. 29(92)/48-PMS.
2. (b.1907); General Secretary and President, District and City Congress Committee, Ludhiana, 1930-47; imprisoned for about eight years during the freedom struggle; General Secretary, Pakistan-Hindustan Phir Basao (Rehabilitation) Committee; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1952-62 and Rajya Sabha, 1962-68.

## 5. Duties of Governments and Citizens<sup>1</sup>

We have received reports of forcible seizure or occupation of lands and property in West Punjab.<sup>2</sup> The matter has been taken up with the Pakistan Government and I assure those who have left property in West Punjab that unlawful seizure or occupation will not be recognised.

On the question of evacuation of people who have been rendered homeless or those who have suffered otherwise, all possible assistance will be provided by the Government. I am, however, not in favour of wholesale migration of population. Certain people who are stranded have to be evacuated, but it is not in the interest of majority of people to be uprooted from the soil. Their lives and interests have to be protected and both the Governments of India and Pakistan are responsible for the well-being of the minorities in their areas.

Disturbing news has been reaching me from some areas of West Punjab where the situation has lately deteriorated. I appreciate the anxiety of the people regarding the well-being of their people in West Punjab, but I must emphasise that retaliation, in any form or shape, is no remedy. If complete peace is restored in East Punjab their energies can be fully devoted to ensure the safety of minorities in West Punjab.

It is the duty of every citizen to help in creating an atmosphere in which the wrong-doer, whoever he may be, will not be tolerated. It is the duty of the Hindus and Sikhs in East Punjab, irrespective of what happened elsewhere, to protect the minorities. This is how the interests of the minorities in West Punjab can best be safeguarded. Peaceful conditions must be restored and every citizen must share his responsibility.

The responsibility of officials in this respect is great and they must be ever vigilant and impartial in the discharge of their duties.

1. Summary of speeches at informal gatherings in Amritsar, 24 August 1948. From *The Hindustan Times*, 25 August 1948.
2. The Government of West Punjab had been seizing the evacuee property under the confiscatory provisions of the West Punjab Evacuee Property Ordinance and the West Punjab Rehabilitation Ordinance. The non-Muslims in West Punjab, who up to this time had not moved to East Punjab, thought it better to do so.



6. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of today's date about the note sent by my Private Secretary about the removal of refugee stalls. I was astonished to read it because I did not know that any such direction had been sent to the Chief Commissioner. As a matter of fact when a number of these people came to me at my house with a typed statement, I asked them to go to Dharma Vira. I told Dharma Vira to find out what the matter was.<sup>2</sup> I suppose it was Dharma Vira who wrote that note. I shall find out from him. Certainly I issued no directions and had no intention of doing so, because I think it is improper to come in the way of responsible authorities. Indeed I do not know anything about the matter.

Later when Dharma Vira reported to me, I told him specifically to inform Shankar Prasada<sup>3</sup> that he must exercise his own discretion and must not think that any inquiry from me interfered with it in any way. Dharma Vira met him, I think, later and explained this position fully to him. I am sorry that somebody's note should have been wrongly worded and should have perhaps come in the way of the action that the Chief Commissioner was taking.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. About 2000 refugee stall holders and pavement hawkers in Chandni Chowk area were moved to Parade Grounds. However, the military authorities evicted them. After agitation for a week, an agreement was reached between the Delhi Municipal Committee and the stall holders.
3. (b.1905) ; joined I.C.S. 1930; held various positions in the United Provinces from 1930 to 1947; Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, 1947-48 and of Delhi, 1948-54; Chairman, Indian Airlines and Air India International, 1954-58; Special Secretary, Kashmir Affairs, 1958-65.

7. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8 September 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

I wrote to you about the Harijan Section<sup>2</sup> of your Ministry the other day. I do not quite know what you have done about it, but I do feel that this

1. File No. 29(94)/48-PMS.
2. A separate section for Harijan refugees was set up in the Ministry of Rehabilitation in March 1948.



section should not be wound up and should continue, though not permanently. Apart from other reasons, any such winding up would have bad psychological reactions. Already there is a feeling that many of our activities are being wound up or are being slowed down. If we put an end to the Harijan Section that feeling will grow and would be harmful. But positively also I think that such a section should continue. I understand that the Santhanam Committee reported in its favour.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 8. Land to Government Servants<sup>1</sup>

During my visit to Chhatarpur<sup>2</sup> yesterday I was told that a large area of land including mango groves has been given by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to Mr. Randhawa who was till lately the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi. Presumably this was given because Mr. Randhawa had lost some property in Pakistan. I do not know what the facts are and I should like you to enquire. *Prima facie* it is odd that a Deputy Commissioner should be given land in this way in the very area under his jurisdiction. Are there any other cases of this kind in regard to Government servants? Please find out from the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation and the Custodian of Evacuee Property as well as from any other source that you may consider necessary.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 27 September 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. A village near Mehrauli in South Delhi where 35 refugee families were resettled. The Indian Cooperative Union arranged a 400-acre land for cooperative farming by refugees.

## 9. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
28 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Two days ago I went to Chhatarpur, some 10 miles from Delhi, to visit a

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 505-506.

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

cooperative farm, which has been started by refugees. I was told there that adjoining this farm was a large area of several hundred acres which had been given, presumably by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, to Randhawa, who was till lately the Deputy Commissioner here. I was further informed that another several hundred acres had been given in the same way to Datar Singh.<sup>2</sup>

I was greatly surprised to learn of this for a variety of reasons. For Government officials here to be given evacuee land seemed to me improper, for the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, to be given land in Delhi Province also did not seem right, and for these very large areas to be given to a single individual also appears to me to be wrong in principle.

Some one told me that this was done by some kind of exchange for land in Pakistan. That does not seem to be a sufficient justification. When land is so scarce and so many unfortunate people need it, it seems to me very unfair for large slices of it to be given to our officials. I do not know if you have heard about this. I shall be grateful if you could kindly enquire.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Datar Singh (1897-1973); associated with various agricultural and cattle utilization programmes, pioneer in scientific breeding and dairy farming in India; Vice President, I.C.A.R., 1947-1952; Development Advisor for Kashmir, Government of India, 1955-59.
3. Vallabhbhai Patel replied on 29 September that he was not aware of the land transactions and would let Nehru know about them after making enquiries.

### 10. To Shankar Prasada<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 3, 1948

My dear Shankar Prasada,

Reference was made at this morning's conference to the plight of certain Muslims in Delhi Province, more especially in the rural areas. Many of these were dispossessed and compelled by circumstances to leave their homes and returned later to find their homes in a bad condition and their property looted. Some help has to be given to them so that they can start life afresh. This should no doubt be done in the shape of *Thakavi*<sup>2</sup> loans etc. Where however official processes are slow or do not apply, some other help is often

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Advance given to cultivator.

## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

necessitated. I am sending you a cheque for Rs. 10,000/- from the Prime Minister's Fund for this particular purpose. You will spend it at your discretion.

Please send a receipt for this as well as the previous cheque that was sent to you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru





## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

## II. The Meos





1. To C.M. Trivedi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5 July 1948

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your letter of July 3rd sending me a copy of the order issued to Deputy Commissioners regarding the evacuation of Muslims. I am glad this misunderstanding has been corrected. I must say I do not understand how such a misunderstanding could have arisen because the Government's policy has all along been quite clear. Apart from this it seemed very odd that converted Muslims should be compelled to leave while other Muslims were not so compelled.

Today I saw some correspondence between you and Gopalaswami Ayyangar about the Meos who had come back from Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Gopalaswami has already sent you a letter in reply and a telegram after consulting me. Here also I feel that the Punjab Government has not quite grasped the basic policy that the Government of India have laid down. As long ago as November last the All India Congress Committee stated in a resolution that evacuees should return to their original homes.<sup>3</sup> Of course, this was to be a two-way movement. This policy was adopted by the Government. We could not give effect to it by ourselves as Pakistan was also involved. But the result of this policy was that we could not send away people who had returned from Pakistan to their original homes, unless any particular individual is found undesirable. When we discovered that this traffic was one-way we began to take stringent measures to stop it. How far these measures have succeeded is another matter, though undoubtedly they have largely stopped this regular traffic.

But in any event this could not justify us in forcibly turning out the Meos who have somehow managed to return to their homes.<sup>4</sup> That would not only be against our general policy but would have undesirable consequences in many ways. This Meo question has become a test issue and the people of Kashmir are closely following it. If we forcibly push out the Meos who have returned to their homes, this would have a disastrous repercussion in Kashmir where, as you know, the situation is delicate.

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Gopichand Bhargava and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.
2. The population of Meos in Gurgaon had increased suddenly as a result of large scale migration from Alwar and Bharatpur and return of several thousand Meos from Pakistan. The Government of India faced difficulties in their resettlement.
3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 668-670.
4. Some Meos had complained that they were being sent to Pakistan against their wishes.

Apart from this it is not quite clear how people are forcibly sent to Pakistan now without any reference to the Pakistan Government. Suppose, if they refused to receive them, as indeed they have stated on several occasions, how are we to push them across then? All we can do is to take them to the frontier and leave them there.

As you perhaps know a Fact Finding Committee had been appointed in regard to these Meos. We should await their report before taking any step.<sup>5</sup>

I have received a letter from Dr. Gopichand Bhargava about the Canal dispute. This matter has got hung up because somehow our representatives cannot meet Pakistan representatives. I have again suggested a meeting for this particular purpose. But I rather doubt if an early meeting will take place. Our relations with Pakistan are very tense at present.

In view of all this what are we to do? Dr. Gopichand suggests that we should cut off water supply to some of the canals as we did some time ago.<sup>6</sup> I think this should not be done, though I cannot rule out the possibility in future. If we cut off the water supply, we give Pakistan and West Punjab every justification for proceeding with their new channel. They would indeed expedite work upon it and finish it fairly soon. They would be forced by circumstances to make a breach of our embankment and render the Ferozepur Headworks largely useless. So, while we would undoubtedly harass Pakistan, their reaction would be sufficiently harassing to us. These moves and counter-moves at this particular moment might well tip the case in favour of war. For this reason I am strongly opposed to our stopping the water supply suddenly. This would have unfavourable reactions for us and would in fact justify what Pakistan has been doing.

Quite apart from the provincial situation as between West and East Punjab, we have to bear in mind the all-India situation and not take a step which would create great difficulties for us, apart from influencing world opinion against us.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The Joint Rehabilitation Board considered on 25 and 26 June 1948 the resettlement of Meos in Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur in Matsya Union. A fact finding committee consisting of representatives of East Punjab, Matsya Union and the Central Government was appointed.

6. See *post*, section 3, sub-section on the Canal Waters Dispute.



2. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13th July 1948

My dear Rajaji,

You will remember that I told you that an enquiry was taking place about the number of Meos involved in Gurgaon, Bharatpur and Alwar. That committee is going to report in a day or two and I shall send you a copy of their report.

Meanwhile, some figures have been supplied to me by that committee and these might interest you. The pre-migration population of Meos in the whole area that is, Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur. (1941 census figures) was 431,000. The total number of Meos resident in the three areas now is about 208,000. Of these about 11,000 have been converted to Hinduism.

Thus 223,000 Meos have finally migrated to Pakistan. Of these 135,000 went from the Matsya Union i.e., Alwar and Bharatpur.

Among the Meos who are now in Gurgaon there are some who went to Pakistan and came back. The total number of these is about 10,000. They are mostly in Gurgaon.

The Meos at present in the Indian Union are as follows:—

In Alwar	7,038
In Bharatpur	1,685
Total in Matsya Union	8,723
Originally from Gurgaon Distt.	1,13,885
From Alwar	25,109
From Bharatpur	35,121
Total Meos in Gurgaon Distt. now	1,74,115
Grand total of Meos in the Indian Union	1,82,838
Plus	11,000 converts

You will observe that the figures I have given do not tally. That is because I have got rather mixed up with separate figures. The main point is, however, that there are at present 60,000 Meos in Gurgaon district belonging to Alwar and Bharatpur who presumably should go back to these States.

Out of the about 135,000 Meos previously in Alwar and Bharatpur there are now only 8,723 left plus 11,000 converts.

In regard to the land it is said that the Meos in the Matsya Union used to possess 400,000 acres. Of this 116,000 acres have been temporarily leased to refugees and 150,000 acres have been leased to local people also temporarily. Thus a total of 266,000 acres has been leased for the time being to avoid the land lying uncultivated.

There are still 134,000 acres lying empty and uncultivated. But these consist of rather inferior land.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal



### 3. Rehabilitation of Meos<sup>1</sup>

I addressed a note<sup>2</sup> to the Ministry of States in regard to the Meos in Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur two days ago. I have received no reply to that note in which certain enquiries were made. As I am leaving for Madras I wish to emphasise again that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by representatives of the parties concerned, as was done three weeks ago when the Fact Finding Committee was appointed. That committee has now reported and we have got all the data before us. A conference should be arranged as early as possible to consider this report.<sup>3</sup> For this conference representatives of East Punjab and the Matsya Union should be invited. The Minister of States, the Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation and the Minister without Portfolio would also be present. Meanwhile, no step should be taken which may come in the way of any decision that the conference might take. This question has both a governmental and public aspect and any decision is likely to have far-reaching consequences. It is necessary therefore to take that decision after the fullest consideration. At the same time the decision has to be made very soon. It has already been postponed too long. I trust the conference would be held as early as possible. I shall return to Delhi on the 27th July afternoon.

1. Note to Ministry of States and Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, 23 July 1948, New Delhi, J.N. Collection.
2. Not included. Nehru had written on 21 July 1948 that at the conference on Meos, it was decided that the Government would assume the responsibility for rehabilitating all the Meos in Gurgaon, Alwar and Bharatpur.
3. The Joint Rehabilitation Board on 31 July 1948 considered the report of the Fact Finding Committee and the Committee was asked to prepare a detailed scheme for the resettlement of the Meos.

### 4. Note on Rehabilitation of Meos<sup>1</sup>

In this morning's *Statesman* there is a picture of some Sikhs and others sent to the Matsya Union for rehabilitation. I was under the impression that the question of utilising the land vacated by the Meos in Alwar and

1. Note to Ministry of States and Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, 27 July 1948. J.N. Collection.

Bharatpur was under consideration. Some three weeks ago a conference was held for the purpose and a Fact Finding Committee was appointed. This was to report by the 15th July. I was told by one of the members of this committee that the report was ready about the 13th of this month and was going to be sent within a day or two. I have, however, not received it yet and I do not know if the Relief Ministry or the States Ministry have received it.

2. Till that report is received and considered the final decision about Meo rehabilitation cannot take place. If anything is done meanwhile in regard to the lands vacated by the Meos in the Matsysa Union, then there is not much room left for considering the question. The matter is of importance and of urgency. I shall be grateful if both the States Ministry and the Relief Ministry will let me know immediately what the situation is at present, what has happened to the report of the Fact Finding Committee, when a conference is going to be held to finalise this matter, and what, if any, steps have been taken to send refugees or others to the Matsya Union. Also whether the Meos already in the Matsya Union, or those who have recently gone there of their own accord, are still there or are being removed.

## 5. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5th August 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,

I do not yet know what if any final decisions were taken in regard to the Meos at the Rehabilitation Conference which was held some days ago. As you know I am deeply interested in this matter. About from the expediency of any step that we might take I have a feeling that principles are involved and assurances have been given.

Could you kindly let me know how matters stand now. Meanwhile, I enclose a letter I have received from Shiva Rao which discloses a distressing state of affairs. While we talk of sending back Meos to Alwar those who are actually there are being driven out.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Fact Finding Committee drew up a plan in September 1948 for the temporary settlement of displaced Meos, mostly in Gurgaon. They were to be treated as agriculturists and would be given land and loans.





## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

## III. Housing



## 1. People's Cooperation in Resettlement<sup>1</sup>

Sisters and Brothers,

The task for which I have come here is so important that it is surprising that it has started so late.<sup>2</sup> Who is at fault it is difficult to say. In a way we are all at fault.

The work of the Government is complicated and knotty, and big schemes like construction of refugee colonies cannot be carried out without public cooperation.

The people have a right to criticise the Government but such criticism should be helpful. It has been a legacy of British rule that we expect the Government to do everything for us without realizing that big tasks can only be undertaken with the cooperation of people.

Mohanlalji<sup>3</sup> has shown great interest in his work but what I liked about him most was that he himself picked up the spade and started levelling the ground for construction of refugee colonies. I doubt if big officials and Ministers thought of starting the work the way he did. It is wrong to think manual labour as lowly. Any activity undertaken for the good of the community is noble.

There are difficult tasks ahead of us. There is the Kashmir campaign where one of our great soldiers<sup>4</sup> died and where our best blood is flowing. To solve these and other problems we need the cooperation of the public. Let our mistakes be pointed out. But there are two ways of doing it. One is constructive criticism, and the other destructive. If there is constructive criticism, there is always the chance of rectifying one's errors. I appeal to the people to watch our actions with eyes open and tell us our mistakes so that we can rectify them. We shall successfully emerge out of these tests and difficulties if our people offer their sincerest and most active cooperation. *Jai Hind.*

1. Speech after laying the foundation stone of the first refugee colony in Delhi, 5 July 1948. From *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 6 July 1948.

2. This refugee colony of 3,200 houses on Pusa Road in Delhi was part of the scheme for construction of houses in various parts of Delhi.

3. Mohanlal Saksena.

4. On 4 July 1948, Brig. Mohammad Usman was killed in action in Kashmir.



2. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 23, 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

I am going away early tomorrow morning to Madras, returning on Wednesday, 27th afternoon. I am rather anxious that nothing should be done in Delhi city which might lead to further problems. I am referring specially to the eviction of Muslims from the houses occupied by them. I understand that a number of these were evicted and then on further enquiry you asked them to be reinstated in their houses. That was all right. But this shows how wrong action can be taken by inexperienced people. Such action will produce bad results.

Unfortunately there has been all along a certain uncertainty about these houses vacated by Muslims and subsequently reoccupied by them. Our original decision was that certain areas which were then predominantly Muslim should be more or less reserved for them. These areas were not accurately defined and the matter was left to the local authorities. But the principle was clear enough, though the application was not easy. Now practically all the houses are occupied.

The question now arises of pushing out people who may have wrongly occupied the houses. It is not easy to go into the merits of each case deeply in a short time and some rough and ready rule has to be formed. Generally speaking Muslim occupants of those particular areas should not be pushed out. But if people possessing other houses have occupied them, or have spread out into more than one house, or a large house is occupied by just one or two people, then certainly some steps should be taken to get the houses vacated.

I am writing to you because this matter has been causing a great deal of ill-feeling in Delhi and we gave them a guarantee when Gandhiji was alive, and at his instance, that we would protect Muslim houses and as far as possible keep them for Muslims. I do not want that assurance to be ignored or broken not only because it was a promise to Gandhiji but also because we must give faith to the people. In such matters I would advise you to consult Maulana Azad who has been in the picture throughout.

Anyway this matter should be finally decided as soon as possible to remove all doubts. Nothing is worse than indecision and uncertainty in the minds of the people as well as the authorities.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. Position of Refugees in Delhi<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister drew the attention of the Cabinet to the position of the refugees which had become acute to the point of their being driven to desperation. They had exhausted the scanty resources with which they had come to India, and a feeling was growing that little had been done for them in the past and nothing will be done in future. Recently at a conference with the Provincial Premiers a decision was taken that in Delhi housing will be provided for one lakh refugees only as against three lakhs originally proposed. While this decision was basically correct it had further aggravated the feeling of the refugees. The Prime Minister felt that the matter had assumed considerable urgency and its consideration at an early date by the Government had become desirable. He had, therefore, requested the Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation to prepare a note on the rehabilitation of refugees, particularly those in Delhi, for the consideration of the Government.

1. Remarks at a meeting of the Cabinet held on 4 August 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

### 4. Eviction of Refugees in Delhi<sup>1</sup>

I had lunch today at Constitution Club. As soon as I came out of the place, I was surrounded by a number of hysterical men, women and girls who appeared to be in great distress. They gave me a typed note which I enclose. Subsequently I sent my Secretary, Mathai<sup>2</sup>, to see these people and report to me. I enclose a copy of his report.<sup>3</sup>

2. From the typed note you will see that complaints have been made against the police. Firstly, that they were asked to quit at a moment's notice

1. Note to the Minister for Works, Mines and Power, 8 September 1948. File No. 29(25)/47-PMS.
2. M.O. Mathai.
3. Not included.



without any prior notice and when the men-folk were away in their offices. Secondly, that the women were threatened with loaded guns and pushed, chased and beaten. Some damage to property was caused and some people were removed in a truck to some other place.

3. I am drawing your attention to this matter because many complaints have come to me from various sources of the behaviour of the police in such cases. They are very rude and offensive and sometimes violent—so the reports say. Naturally I cannot say whether the reports are correct or not. Probably they are exaggerated. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that this matter has been tackled by the police in an extremely wrong way. Courtesy always pays but more specially in the case of these refugees who have suffered a lot. It is quite true that they have occupied buildings illegally and that they have often to be removed from them, but this process of removal should be as gentle and friendly as possible, and with sufficient notice. Also we can hardly eject any person without providing some alternative accommodation.

4. I am told that some small tents or *choldaris* have been provided for these people. I do not know what these are like, but I was informed that during the very heavy downpour of yesterday these *choldaris* have suffered a lot and are not habitable.

5. I shall be grateful if you will kindly look into this matter and issue specific instructions to the Estate Office and to the police concerned with this work that on no account must discourtesy be shown or violence used. If there are special cases where coercion is necessary, they should be dealt with by some responsible officer present. The recent heavy rains have made conditions a bit more difficult.

6. In view of the serious charges made in the typed note, I think it is desirable to have some kind of an informal enquiry<sup>4</sup> by some responsible person.

4. D.L. Majumdar, Joint Secretary, held an enquiry into the allegations of rudeness and intimidation against the police while evicting refugees from the Curzon Road Barracks, New Delhi, and found them to be untrue.





AT A REFUGEE CAMP, SRINAGAR, 1948



AT SRINAGAR, 1948

5. To Mridula Sarabhai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

12th September 1948

My dear Mridula,

I have seen some papers which deal with houses in Phatak Habash Khan.<sup>2</sup> Apparently some agreement was arrived at amongst certain people and some houses were sealed by the Custodian accordingly. Later Subhadra<sup>3</sup> went and removed the seals of these houses and according to her own report resettled the Muslims who had been evicted from their houses.

I am not concerned at present with the merits of this question as to what should happen to the houses, though it does appear to me that when an arrangement is arrived at by responsible people, including the P.S. to Maulana Azad,<sup>4</sup> it should be considered *prima facie* a right one. But apart from this for any person to break the seals put on by the Custodian is a very serious matter. This kind of thing can hardly be tolerated in any organised community. It will lead to individuals or groups doing just what they like and challenging any authority that may be charged with a particular task.

The Shanti Dal<sup>5</sup> may have been doing good work, as I think it is, but if the Shanti Dal deliberately sets itself against the responsible authorities to the extent of removing seals put on houses, they are offending against the law and normally certain consequences follow from this. At any time this is undesirable. At the present moment it is peculiarly so. Whatever grievance a person has, must be dealt with in a proper manner and not by forcible action of this kind. I am troubled about this matter because I think it will react very unfavourably so far as the Shanti Dal is concerned. We have at present a new Chief Commissioner and a new Deputy Commissioner. We have as Minister and as Custodian well-known Congressmen. If all

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Some refugees made repeated attempts to occupy forcibly vacant houses in Phatak Habash Khan in Khari Baoli area in Delhi. They were lathicharged and arrested.

3. Subhadra Joshi (b. 1919), President, Delhi P.C.C.; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-67 and 1977-80.

4. M.N. Masud (b. 1906); Vice-Captain of the Indian hockey team at the Berlin Olympics, 1936; Chief Secretary of Rampur State, 1946; Private Secretary to Maulana Azad, 1948-52 and 1957-58; Head of the U.N.E.S.C.O. Mission in Indonesia, 1952-57; Adviser, Ministry of Education, 1958-59; Consul-General for the Persian Gulf area, 1959-61; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 1961-65; Secretary, Wakf Council, 1965-68.

5. A Central Peace Committee was formed to establish communal harmony in January 1948 and Shanti Dals were set up in June 1948 when there was general apprehension of fresh communal disturbances.



## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

these people are ignored and their decisions set aside, this can only lead to chaos and trouble. Subhadra is apt to act rashly and unthinkingly. I hope this matter is gong to be settled properly soon.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

### 6. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 4, 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

I had another deputation this morning of refugees who are being turned out of Government houses. I mentioned this matter in the Cabinet also today. I feel that some joint and concerted attempts should be made to meet this problem and I have therefore suggested to Gadgil to discuss this matter with you. He has agreed to do so.

This may be technically Gadgil's responsibility, but really all of us share it. Obviously we cannot be legal and technical about it. Human beings are concerned and they have passed through harrowing experiences. I am not quite sure if I would not be taking possession of an empty house if I was in their position. Generally we try not to upset the *status quo*, say in regard to many houses in Old Delhi.

In New Delhi, the position is somewhat different and undoubtedly we have to get Government houses vacated for Government officers. The only question is what method we adopt and how we can make it as painless as possible.

We are committed to offering alternative accommodation. This cannot normally be as good as the other accommodation. At the same time it should not be so bad as to be next to impossible. For instance, to offer a 6 feet x 6 feet tent to a family of six is patently absurd.

Another question arises. Many of these people have settled down to some work or business. Their children go to nearby schools. To throw them far away would mean uprooting them again and thus creating a new problem. As far as possible this should be avoided.

The real solution of course is, new houses. How long this will take I do not know. But we must hurry through this housing programme. Some

1. File No. 29(25)/47-PMS.

of the men who came to see me said that if they were given some plot they would build mud huts themselves.

I would suggest for your consideration allotting a relatively small number of the new houses that you are building to some of these people with families. The number need not be big, but it would be a gesture which would give them some hope. I realise that others are waiting for those houses and these others have in some ways a better claim. I do not wish to deprive these others and inevitably a very large percentage of the new houses must go to them. The question is whether we could give some of the good houses to persons who are dislodged now.

Another factor that should be borne in mind is that the whole process should be accompanied with as much courtesy and reasonableness as possible. It is no good our going on condemning these people, though undoubtedly some of them may be a bad lot. Another question that should be borne in mind is the arrangement, where necessary, of some kind of public transport.

I wish you and Gadgil to consider all these matters and make the change-over as simple as possible without uprooting the persons who have already settled down to some business or schooling.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru





## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

## IV. Women



1. To Shanmukham Chetty<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
1 August 1948

My dear Shanmukham,

Some days ago I had a visit from Mrs. John Matthai<sup>2</sup> and Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru. They came on behalf of the Women's Section of the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry.<sup>3</sup> They were rather concerned with delays in certain budgets or other proposals affecting their section being passed by Finance. The work of the section was of an entirely novel character requiring urgency and there were few precedents for it.

I am writing to you however more specially about a matter they placed before me. This relates to certain work in regard to the immoral traffic in women and children and the fight against prostitution. This work has been carried on by the Indian Branch<sup>4</sup> of the International Abolitionist Federation, an old organisation which was thus far largely in the hands of some foreign women in India, though one of the principal workers and organisers was Dr. Katayun H. Cama,<sup>5</sup> an experienced and trained worker.

Owing to political and other changes in India the organisation of this branch has also undergone a change or is undergoing such a change. Sir Arthur Dean<sup>6</sup> was the acting Chairman till now. At present the acting Chairman is Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru. Among the members of the Committee are Mrs. Matthai, Mrs. Hannah Sen<sup>7</sup> and Dr. Katayun H. Cama of the Tata School. The organisation is a registered one. It is proposed to add to and re-organise the Committee soon.

A request was made to me to recommend to Finance that a grant be made to this organisation for the next year's work. The sum of Rs. 36,000

1. File No. 29(87)/48-PMS.
2. Achamma Matthai (1898-1977); helped the Governments of India, 1947-50, and of Bombay, 1951-52, in the rehabilitation of women; Chairperson, Central Social Welfare Board, 1962-66.
3. The Women's Section was set up on 24 November 1947 with Rameshwari Nehru as Director and Hannah Sen as Secretary.
4. Named the "Association for Moral and Social Hygiene in India, New Delhi", its present name is "Association for Social Health in India".
5. Research Assistant, Tata Institute of Social Sciences and Psychologist, Child Guidance Clinic of the Institute; appointed, Magistrate, Juvenile Court, Bombay, October 1942; worked with the United Nations for many years in Burma and New York; author of *Comparative Survey of Juvenile Delinquency, Part IV, Asia and the Far East*.
6. Arthur William Henry Dean (1892-1970); Engineer in service of Government of India, 1919-46; Chairman, Delhi Improvement Trust, 1946-48.
7. (1894-1957); Director, Lady Irwin College, New Delhi, 1932-47; Honorary Adviser, Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, 1947-49; President, All India Women's Conference, 1951-53.



was suggested. This is mainly spent in overhead expenses of staff, office, etc. The association has done good work in Delhi where the position has worsened owing to the refugee influx. I think that it is desirable to continue this work and indeed to expand it. I understand that it is greatly appreciated by the people concerned and it has brought relief to unfortunate women.

I put this to you for your consideration. I do not quite know under what Ministry this would come though I suppose it should come under Home. Anyhow I am sending copies of this letter to Home and Relief and Rehabilitation.

I enclose notes which Mrs. Matthai and Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru gave me.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. Women's Section in Rehabilitation Ministry<sup>1</sup>

Some days ago Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru and Mrs. John Matthai came to visit me and they were worried about the future of the Women's Section of the Refugee and Rehabilitation Ministry. While immediate relief operations might diminish quickly, there can be no doubt that the problem of rehabilitating the women affected is a long distance one. It is not merely the question of providing accommodation, etc. There are psychological considerations and a gradual treatment which brings back poise and self-reliance. Therefore, it seems to me that something in the nature of this Women's Section must continue.

2. It may be that this work will not have a direct relationship with Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry later on. If so, some other Ministry might be in charge of it, possibly Labour. I should be glad if this matter is considered. I do not think we can wind up entirely the work of the Women's Section. They are running several homes and institutes for women. These must necessarily continue.

3. I was told of housing difficulties and the necessity for land for building homes and centres for this work. The present arrangements are obviously temporary and rather unsatisfactory. I hope it will be possible to provide them with land where more permanent homes can be built. I understand that some kind of a scheme has been prepared or is being prepared. I have written separately to the Finance Minister about a different matter unconnected with the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry, though this has something to do with the Women's Section. This is the work in regard to the immoral traffic in women and children.

1. Note to the Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, 1 August 1948. File No. 29(21)/47-PMS.

### 3. To Begum Sheikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 21, 1948

My dear Begum Saheba,

I am asking Krishna Mehta to take this letter for you.

Banerjee,<sup>2</sup> the Secretary of the United Council for Relief, has shown me his correspondence with you. I have not quite understood the nature of the difficulties that are mentioned. I can only conclude that there is some misunderstanding somewhere.

I have spoken to Sheikh Saheb and he will no doubt talk to you about this on his return to Srinagar. I have also had a talk with Krishna Mehta. She showed me a letter she had received from the Secretary of the Red Cross branch of Kashmir<sup>3</sup> asking her to become a member of that branch. I told her that she is not expected to join any organisation as she is functioning as a worker of the United Council, I am supposed to be the Vice-Chairman of the United Council, but I am not a member of the Red Cross organisation. The Red Cross itself in India is associated with the United Council which is a kind of federating body for purpose of relief and the like. The work of the Red Cross is somewhat limited in scope.

After Krishna Mehta came here from various refugee camps, she stayed with me for a considerable time. She had had a very gruesome experience for six or seven months. I thought she ought to rest a little before she did anything. Her children struck me as being very bright and I made arrangements for them in a school at Naini Tal. I watched her closely here and saw her do some work also of various kinds. I was very much struck by her capacity for work and her quite extraordinary character. Lady Mountbatten and many other people were also considerably impressed by her.

There is so much work to do here that we can absorb any number of good workers. I felt however that the first place she should go to was Kashmir where she could be particularly useful and where presumably there was plenty of room for such work. So, after consulting some members of the executive of the United Council, I appointed her as a liaison officer for Kashmir and had her sent on to you so that you might suggest to her what work to do. I knew that she was particularly good at quiet constructive work and this is just the type of work, I think, which should be specially organised among our refugees wherever they might be. She has an amazing capacity

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Sheikh Abdullah and Krishna Mehta.

2. B.N. Banerjee.

3. The Jammu and Kashmir branch of the Indian Red Cross started functioning from December 1947 with Begum Sheikh Abdullah as the President and Khan Mohammad Umar Bhat as the Secretary.



to win over people and make them do some work. As a morale builder she is excellent.

Before sending her to Kashmir I had spoken to Sheikh Saheb and taken his permission. Demands for her had come to me from some places, including the camp now being run by us in Jammu. I preferred however that she should go to Kashmir.

I took her there myself and left her. Two or three weeks later I went to Srinagar again and met her there. I found that she had not been able to do anything much partly because responsible people in Srinagar were busy with their work and partly, apparently, because of some kind of misunderstanding. I did not myself quite understand what this was due to, or indeed what it was. I suggested to her that the best thing for her to do was to work quietly in a constructive capacity and get women specially to do such work like spinning or weaving which should be good from the point of view of producing useful articles and at the same time help in cheering up many people. Work is the most excellent medicine for people who might feel depressed or down and out.

After that I was not in touch with her work till Banerjee showed me your letter to him and some other papers. I found from this that Krishna Mehta was doing good work in a charkha centre she had organised. I also found that there was some misapprehension in your mind about her position, etc.

The first thing I wish to make clear is this that if either you or Sheikh Saheb do not wish her to remain in Kashmir, I shall call her back and give her some other work to do here or elsewhere. Her business is to serve effectively and do quiet and unostentatious constructive work. Secondly, she has to do this under your guidance and that of Sheikh Saheb. Sheikh Saheb suggested that the All-India Spinners Association branch in Srinagar or the Charkha Sangh might help her in this. I entirely agree. Indeed they had been helping her and advising her about the technique of the work. Any cost incurred in this work will be our responsibility and the money will be sent to her through you. She belongs to no organisation and she is not supposed to join any organisation, apart from the United Council which has sent her and to which she should report from time to time. Apart from this, she has to work according to your directions.

The practice we have followed here and elsewhere is to encourage every individual or group which wants to do constructive work. There are numerous private and semi-private centres of this kind of work, where spinning etc. are done. These centres may be associated with an organisation or may not, whichever is convenient. I would suggest to you, if I may, that quite apart from Krishna Mehta, it would be very desirable to organise such centres for any kind of cottage work. What is urgently needed in Kash-



mir is production, more specially production of clothing, blankets, etc., for winter which will be soon upon us. The more people do this the better it is. The Red Cross cannot normally do this work as it is slightly outside its purview. But you can be in charge of it directly and should be the guiding spirit.

Thus no question arises about Krishna Mehta starting any new organisation. She is charged not to do so. A constructive work centre is not normally considered a new organisation, though it may well be run by an organisation.

We are very anxious here to produce now, while there is yet time, in the way of clothing, as much as we can in preparation for the winter.

I have suggested to Sheikh Saheb that Krishna Mehta might perhaps be employed occasionally to visit some centres like Baramulla, etc. Her visit, I think, will undoubtedly be good and put heart in the people there.

I have tried to explain in this letter her status and position, that is, as a Liaison Officer between Kashmir and the United Council.<sup>4</sup> We want to help as much as we can in relieving distress in Kashmir State. It is purely from this point of view that we sent Krishna Mehta and would have liked to send others also, if you need them. The work of relief merges into rehabilitation. We shall have to think about this matter fully later and make explicit suggestions.

With all good wishes to you,

I am,  
Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Krishna Mehta organised relief and training centres for women refugees in Kashmir.

#### 4. A Colony for Women and Children<sup>1</sup>

The Women's Section of the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation gave me some time ago a note on the subject of having some kind of a small

1. Note to the Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, 8 September 1948. J.N. Collection. Copies of this note were also sent to Mehr Chand Khanna and Rameshwari Nehru.

women's town round about Delhi. To begin with this was to look after refugee women and children and later widows, orphans and other women who had no home. The idea was a somewhat ambitious one to provide not merely a home for these women and children but training and work of various kinds. It was to be a self-contained colony.

2. I sent these papers to the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation some time ago. I do not know what steps have been taken in this matter. I have looked into these papers again today and discussed the proposal with Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, Mrs. Matthai and Mrs. Hannah Sen.

3. I think the proposal is a very good one, not only from a temporary point of view but as a permanent institution. At the present moment these women are spread out in various odd localities which are not suited for them. To collect them in one place would make it far easier to organise them for productive activity and for some kind of community life. As a permanent institution, a women's town like this is an excellent idea and I think we should encourage it in every way.

4. I am inclined to think that the proposal is on too big a scale involving as it does a population of 10,000 persons with large grounds for gardening, dairy farming and poultry keeping, cottage industry, etc. I should think that it would be better to start on a somewhat smaller scale, say for a population of a quarter of this number or even less. But this matter can be considered more carefully by persons who know more about the problem. It seems to me better to have several centres like this if necessary rather than one very big centre. Of course we should start with one.

5. Such a proposal would require a lot of money, but it is not necessary to provide all these funds to begin with and the women's town can go up gradually. What is immediately needed is land. They have asked for 500 acres. I rather doubt if it is possible to get so much land and even if it can be utilised properly for some time. Possibly a hundred acres should be enough. If the land is found and allotted, it would be desirable to put up tents there immediately and collect all the women and children refugees who are spread out in various localities in Delhi now and to start work with them. This will not involve any special expenditure and will immediately put this work on a more efficient basis.

6. I do not know where this land could be found. It need not be in the confines of Delhi or New Delhi but it should obviously be near Delhi. It might even be as far as Ghaziabad or somewhere between Delhi and Ghaziabad. All these matters can be gone into carefully by the persons concerned, but I do think that a general approval of the scheme should be given and then details worked out.



5. To H.V.R. Iengar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Iengar,

I have been thinking about this business of the arrest of Masud.<sup>2</sup> I do not like the look of it from several points of view. Tonight Mridula came to see me and handed me one of her numerous notes. She must have told you all about it herself. Nevertheless I am sending her note.

I am worried about some aspects of this case:

- (1) The evidence, as you related it to me, appears to be very meagre. In a case like the present, far greater caution should have shown.
- (2) As far as I know, Masud himself was not interrogated. If that is so, it was a very serious omission.
- (3) If such an arrest was contemplated, Rameshwari Nehru, who was in some kind of a charge of that transit camp, should have been informed and consulted. Her evidence was of value from every point of view.
- (4) If a Private Secretary of a Minister is arrested, the Minister should have been informed previously. It is discourteous and improper to take such a step without informing the Minister.

Of course, in a sudden emergency and when the case is serious, it may be difficult to have these consultations and to give this information to the people concerned. But, in the present case, there was plenty of time to do this and no immediate urgency arose.

Apart from the other factors of the case, it is obviously one which may have far-reaching consequences and therefore the police should have effected the arrest with far greater caution than they seem to have shown.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(182)/57-66-PMS.

2. Masud was arrested and freed the same day when the charge of receiving money for securing the release of a refugee woman from a transit camp was found to be untrue.





## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

## V. Relief Work in Provinces





1. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13th July 1948

My dear Rajaji,

I have your letter No. Wel/131, dated 12th July about Choithram Gidwani's request for the extension of relief activities of the United Council for Relief and Welfare so as to cover refugees from Sind also.<sup>2</sup>

There is no reason why the Council's field of activities should be restricted to Punjab refugees. Indeed, so far as I know, it has not been so restricted in theory; in practice they have dealt with certain geographical areas. Most of the Sind refugees are in Gujarat or in Bombay, that is within the Bombay Presidency. The Bombay Government is supposed to look after them and indeed has done a lot to do so. I believe they are spending about a lakh of rupees a day for the Sind refugees in Bombay.

The fact that the Council's expenses have so far been met out of the Congress Punjab Relief Fund should not restrict the activities of the United Council. Probably the Congress Committee in charge of it would agree to Sind being included. If not, some other funds can be obtained, for instance, a sum can be allotted to the United Council from the P.M.'s Relief Fund, but I would not like this sum to be earmarked for Sind or any particular purpose. This should simply enable the United Council to extend its activities where necessary. In fact, the United Council is functioning in Kashmir also to a slight extent.

Dr. Choithram's letter leads one to think that Sind refugees have been neglected in some way<sup>3</sup>. I do not think this is correct. They have had as much attention paid to them as any other refugees. Generally speaking, they have been better off. In Bombay they have not been very peaceful or orderly and there has been a tremendous agitation among them against the Registration Ordinance.<sup>4</sup> This agitation seems to me to be entirely misconceived because no real help or rehabilitation can take place without registration.<sup>5</sup>

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The continued migration from Sind rose in May 1948 to 9,57,389, the highest ever recorded.

3. Gidwani had reported that Sindhis, who had lost much property in Sind, were getting increasingly demoralized.

4. A Sindhi refugee organisation in Bombay held protest meetings and issued statements denouncing the Bombay Refugees Act which called upon the refugees to register themselves.

5. The Government of Bombay stated on 11 June that without the Bombay Refugees Act it would be impossible to remove troublesome refugees to another camp.

The camps for Sind refugees in Bombay are run by the Bombay Government with the funds of the Central Government, I suppose. If necessity arises for the United Council to send its workers, they can certainly do so. But I rather doubt if that type of assistance is necessary there.

What Dr. Choithram wants is money to be placed at his disposal for loans and other help to be given. That is essentially a matter for the Relief Ministry to tackle and indeed they are tackling it in their own way. Some time back Dr. Choithram made a demand on me for Rs. 50,000/- from the P.M.'s Relief Fund for Sind refugees. I decided to send this money to him even without consulting the Committee, though I consulted Vallabhbhai Patel.<sup>6</sup> Now he has written to me saying that Rs. 50,000 has been spent and he wants an additional one lakh of rupees.<sup>7</sup> I have told him that this seems to be a matter for the Relief Committee to consider. A relief fund is not normally meant for this purpose; otherwise it will be immediately exhausted.

As a matter of fact Sind refugees have, I think, received more help from the P.M.'s Relief Fund than anyone else. I gave Rs. 15,000 to Jairamdas Doulatram also mainly for this purpose.

I suggest to you, therefore, that you might agree to the United Council including Sind refugees in its work. But this means that where necessary our workers can be sent or medical or other supplies. It does not mean money grants or loans.

We are having a meeting of the P.M.'s Relief Fund Committee in about a week's time and I am quite agreeable to a sum of money, say Rs. 100,000, being handed over to the United Council if you so desire.<sup>8</sup> This will be for its general work including Sind and not earmarked. I do not think there should be any earmarking. Perhaps you might ask Rajendra Babu about the Congress Punjab Relief Fund being utilised, where necessary, for Sind refugees also. I do not think he or his committee will have any objection.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

6. On 27 March 1948 Nehru granted Rs. 50,000 for disbursement towards relief of the refugees from Sind.

7. Gidwani made this request on 5 July.

8. The Prime Minister's Relief Fund Committee met on 18 July and decided on a grant of Rs. 50,000 to the United Council for Relief and Welfare.



## 2. Migration from East Bengal to Assam<sup>1</sup>

I have had a talk with Mr. Bardoloi, Premier of Assam, on this subject.

It is clear to me:

- (i) That the inter-Dominion conference referred to should be held, preferably at Shillong. The date proposed by Pakistan i.e. the 23rd August is as good a date as any other. But before fixing up the date the Assam Government should be formally consulted. Mr. Bardoloi agrees to participating in this conference.
- (ii) It is also clear to me that it would be improper for us at this stage to issue any Ordinance to control immigration into Assam before that inter-Dominion conference has been held.
- (iii) Without any Ordinance it is presumably the right of the Assam Government, from the points of view of security as well as of internal economy, to regulate and check an influx of large numbers or groups of people into Assam. This need not mean any stoppage of individuals coming in or any introduction of a permit system as we have done on the West Pakistan border.<sup>2</sup> This should really mean what we did or tried to do on the western Pakistan border before this permit system was introduced. What we did then was to inform Pakistan that while individual movement would continue to be free we could not allow large groups to come in without checking and without finding out why they were coming, where they intended to go and what facilities there were for their settling down. Otherwise an unregulated flow created difficulties for us in various towns, etc., where there was no housing accommodation and no other arrangements to absorb them.

Therefore, we might well authorise the Assam Government to take some such steps in order to regulate and check any mass migration (and

1. Note, 21 July 1948, File No. 8-7/48-Pak I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. Permits were issued to persons coming from Pakistan after scrutiny, and in the case of applications for permanent resettlement, only after consultation with the Government of the province concerned. The places proposed to be visited by the applicants had to be specified and a copy of the permit was sent to the Superintendent of Police of the district. Persons without a valid permit and those violating the conditions of the permit were liable to prosecution.



this would include Muslims and non-Muslims) without actually coming in the way of free movement of individuals either way. This has to be done carefully and gradually so as to avoid a new process of mutual retaliation which would injure Assam as much as East Bengal. It would be done naturally after information has been sent to Pakistan and East Bengal. It would be better to do it quietly without fuss or publicity. The details may be worked out in consultation with the Assam Government.<sup>3</sup>

I have talked to Mr. Bardoloi on these lines and he agrees. The matter may be considered by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Minister without Portfolio, and dealt with by him directly with the Assam Government and later with the Pakistan Government. The first thing to do is to fix up the inter-Dominion conference at Shillong.

3. At a meeting on 19 September 1948 the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation decided that the Assam Government should immediately set up camps for refugees from eastern Pakistan. The Premier of Assam also raised the question of preventing this infiltration.

### 3. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 19, 1948

My dear Pantji,

I am writing to you with some hesitation because of the subject. But I understand that Mridula has already contacted you on the telephone and that she and Mehr Chand Khanna are going to visit you within a few days.

They are going to see you about the Frontier refugees at present in Kurukshetra Camp. There are about 5,000 families, that is, nearly 25,000 persons. They are rather isolated in the sense that the East Punjab Government does not care for them at all and thinks they should be pushed out of East Punjab. Nearly every Hindu and Sikh came out of the Frontier Province. Most of them have, with some difficulty, been absorbed somewhere or the other, although a good number hang around Delhi still. These 25,000 in Kurukshetra are the hard core that remains and in a sense are our special charge. They can hardly be sent to any part of India where they will be complete misfits. It is only in some part of northern India that they

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Mridula Sarabhai.

can fit in. From all accounts they are a decent lot and they have not misbehaved as very often the Sindhis and the Punjabis have done. Indeed they have helped in maintaining order in camps. I think that given a chance they will be an acquisition. The problem arises as to where to send them and if the U.P. is a possibility. In any event we want to take them away from Kurukshetra. But there is no point in shifting them to a new place merely as a temporary measure. They should go to some place where they are likely to stay and where they can be rehabilitated. If you think there is a possibility of their rehabilitation in the U.P., then we can send them to begin with to some camp there and gradually they can be settled round about.<sup>2</sup>

On the whole, I think the men from the Frontier have not had much of a chance. Generally speaking, the other refugees have had slightly better treatment. And yet perhaps these people from the Frontier deserve at least as much consideration.

Mehr Chand Khanna and Mridula will give you all the facts. It is for you to decide what is possible and what is not.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Some refugees from N.W.F.P. had suggested that they should be rehabilitated in the western districts of the U.P.

## 4. To Shankarrao Deo<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10th September 1948

My dear Shankarraoji,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th September conveying to me a resolution of the Central Relief Committee about relief work in Bengal<sup>2</sup> and asking for a grant of Rs. 5,00,000/- from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund for this purpose.

The Prime Minister's Fund will certainly help in this relief work, but it is not intended to take the place of governmental assistance, nor can very large grants be made from it for a specific purpose. The Fund will be completely exhausted by one or two such grants. The idea is that it should be used

1. File No. 29(96)/48-PMS.
2. The Central Relief Committee of A.I.C.C. on 7 September 1948 passed a resolution to undertake relief work in Bengal.



for the purpose of giving help in cases where the official machinery cannot easily function. If it took the place of official help it would not go very far and it would be exhausted very soon.

It is not clear to me what organisation is going to function in West Bengal for helping the refugees from East Bengal. The West Bengal Government is primarily responsible for this help, though, of course, every private agency should be welcome. Is Dr. P.C. Ghosh going to organise a special committee<sup>3</sup> and if so, what would be the relationship between that committee and the West Bengal Government's organisation? There should obviously be complete coordination in this work and any private agency must function in cooperation with the Government's activities, which are likely to be much more extensive than those of any private agency.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Central Relief Committee started a Bengal branch with P.C. Ghosh as Chairman.

## 5. To P.C. Ghosh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
29 September 1948

My dear Prafulla Babu,

Sucheta gave me your letter of the 27th September.<sup>2</sup>

I am glad you have formed a committee and are taking the work of relief in hand, specially concentrating on relief through work.

I am afraid I just cannot send you the large sum you ask for. For the present I can only send you Rs. 50,000/- and I enclose a cheque for this amount.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I am sending to Dr. B.C. Roy.

I think you should be helped from the Congress Punjab Relief Fund. The technical difficulty which Sardar Patel pointed out can, I think, be easily got over. I am writing to him about it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 29(96)/48-PMS.

2. Sucheta Kripalani toured East and West Bengal to study the refugee situation.



6. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

Sucheta Kripalani has come to see me and has spoken to me about the refugee problem in West Bengal. She said that over 1,000 persons are still coming in daily. Fortunately, the fear we had that there might be a terrific influx of refugees as a result of the Hyderabad operations and their consequences, has been allayed. That is some relief.

Presumably most of the people who are coming over now are doing so because of the very bad economic conditions prevailing in eastern Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the reason, they are coming over. We should not try to encourage this migration, but at the same time we cannot ignore it. A thousand a day is big enough number to deal with.

I was sorry to learn from Sucheta that the feeling as between people in West Bengal and the refugees from East Bengal is not at all friendly. The former resent the coming in of the latter and to some extent give vocal expression to their resentment. This of course cannot improve the situation. I hope that every effort would be made to lessen this type of feeling.<sup>3</sup>

Sucheta visited some camps in Calcutta. She told me that the only camp or centre which was really satisfactory was the centre run by the All-India Women's Conference in North Calcutta, where a hundred girls were being trained in various ways for productive work. About the other centres she had a poor opinion. In some places there was some little education being given, very little. Medical conditions were also not very satisfactory. She mentioned specially the camp at Kanchrapara.

She told me that Government were paying Rs. 15 a month to each adult refugee and Rs. 10 per month for every child. Where rations were supplied, their price was deducted from this monthly allowance.

Apparently no real attempt has been made, at any rate in the camps she saw, (always excepting the All-India Women's Conference camp), for any training to be given for productive work to be undertaken. I was sorry to hear of this because the very basis for relief must be training in productive work. This relief business is becoming far too great a burden on India to

1. File No. 29(96)/48-PMS.

2. Uncertain conditions in East Bengal led to an influx of non-Muslims into West Bengal, Assam, Orissa and Bihar. It was estimated that about 20,00,000 displaced persons from East Bengal had moved into India.

3. B.C. Roy had suggested that if the migration of non-Muslims from East to West Bengal continued the Government would have no alternative left except to send out Muslims from West Bengal in equal numbers.

bear and there is great danger of our having to give it up simply because we just cannot afford it. Therefore it is quite essential that relief must be on the basis of productive work.

Apart from the financial side, morale requires productive work to be done. Once you allow refugees to do nothing and get the dole in money or kind, they deteriorate very rapidly and there is not enough urge to do any work. Indeed they practically refuse to work even when work comes to them. We have had plenty of experience of this in East Punjab, Delhi, etc. Some months ago we came to the conclusion that relief must not be given unless some work is done, whatever the work. The only exceptions were children and disabled persons. Gandhiji laid the greatest stress on our not giving relief without work.

So far as children are concerned, they should certainly be our first priority both in regard to feeding etc, and education. Whatever might happen to other refugees, no child should be allowed to become a helpless and homeless wanderer. I have suggested to the Education Ministry here to open a special section for the education of refugees' children, and boys and girls. I do not want this business to be tackled just as a relief operation, but to be considered as a human and national problem of training the future generation and not allowing them to run to seed. I suggest that your Government might also do something of this kind. Small doles for a period do not solve any problem. All that they do is to lower the morale of the receiver of the dole and put the Government in increasing financial difficulties.

I do not know how far you have tackled the rehabilitation problem. So far as my information goes, little attention has been paid to it or to any planning for it. I would beg of you not to delay this because the longer you delay the more difficult it will become.

I suppose there are some private agencies giving relief. Unfortunately private agencies now think that it is the Government's responsibility to undertake this and so they do not function as they used to. However, some agencies must be working. If so, it is essential that there should be full coordination between those agencies *inter se* as well as between them and the Government<sup>4</sup>.

I have been told that the Congress Central Relief Committee have started a Bengal branch with Dr. Prafulla Ghosh as Chairman. I am glad to find that they have decided to give relief through work. Also that they will give training in their camps in various handicrafts. It is further their intention to take up rehabilitation work and to set up model villages for

4. The Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation decided on 19 September 1948 that a maximum of 15 lakh refugees would be entitled to rehabilitation benefits in India. A small office of the Ministry should be set up in Calcutta to coordinate the dispersal and relief of refugees from eastern Pakistan.



the purpose. All this is excellent and I only hope that they will succeed in their efforts. They asked me for a large sum of money which, I regret, I could not send them. But I am sending them some money from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund to start work with. The Prime Minister's Relief Fund is really meant for giving help in a relatively small way where Government or other agency cannot function.

I would beg of you again to insist on work being done by all refugees. No-work-no-help should be a definite policy. You may not give effect to it suddenly for all concerned, but that should be the policy proclaimed for all people and it should be brought in gradually but nonetheless expeditiously, excepting only children and such people as are incapable of work. Even in such cases some type of activity is desirable. Doles without work will lead to people getting out of the habit of work and expecting a permanent dole. If you stop the dole later, there will be trouble. Therefore it is as well to start this policy as soon as possible.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 7. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Sucheta Kripalani came to see me this evening and gave me an account of the relief work in Calcutta. She told me that about 1000 refugees from East Bengal were still coming in daily. This was chiefly due to the bad economic conditions in East Bengal.

The account she gave me about relief work by Government or others in West Bengal showed that this work was not being carried on very satisfactorily. Money doles were given and very little attempt had been made to make the refugees to do work of any kind. I am writing to Dr. B.C. Roy about it.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Prafulla Ghosh has now formed a relief committee as a branch of the Congress Central Relief Committee. He asked me for a very big sum from the Prime Minister's Fund. That fund would vanish away if I gave

1. File No. 29(96)/48-PMS.
2. See the preceding item.



such sums. I am, however, for the present sending him a cheque for Rs. 50,000.

I feel that the Congress Punjab Relief Fund should be utilised for giving relief to refugees from eastern Pakistan also. I am told that both you and Bapu felt that this would be beyond the scope of that Fund. That was right of course. Nevertheless, when the fund was collected, other developments had not taken place and I am quite sure that donors would not object to any such use of the Fund. In order to get over the technical difficulty I suggest that a notice be sent to the newspapers on your behalf or on behalf of your Committee controlling the Congress Punjab Relief Fund, stating that the need for relief had arisen apart from the refugees and that you felt that this should be included in the scope of the Fund. The problem is an identical one, whether you see it in refugees from West Punjab, or Sind, or Kashmir, or East Bengal. You may state, therefore, in your notice that you propose to use the money for refugees from all these places. In case any donor does not agree with this, he can communicate with you and tell you about his objection and his money will then be used for refugees from West Punjab or western Pakistan. Such a public notice would put you right technically, legally and morally. I rather doubt if any donor is going to write to you and object. If some do object, their money can be used as they desire.

I hope you will agree with this proposal as this will give you a free hand to use part of the money in Bengal. Most of our Government resources have gone to helping people from western Pakistan. Bengal is coming more and more into the picture and therefore it is desirable to have more resources to help it.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## REHABILITATION OF REFUGEES

## VI. Facilities to Refugee Students





## 1. Refugee Students<sup>1</sup>

The question of refugee students, their education and rehabilitation has come pointedly before the public owing to a certain agitation carried on by some of their number.<sup>2</sup> Quite apart from this agitation however and any merits and demerits that it may have, the question is obviously an important one from the national point of view. At the meeting of the Assembly today many questions and supplementaries were asked in regard to them.

2. This question has to be viewed not only from the point of view of the individual or group concerned but also more specially from the national point of view, i.e., of utilising to the best advantage the human material which we possess and of giving it proper training and opportunities of growth. Some months back I stated in the Assembly as well as in public meetings that Government attach the greatest importance to the younger generation and to their training and education. That was their first charge so far as relief and rehabilitation was concerned. At the same time this question of refugee students has got mixed up with the general scheme of relief and rehabilitation. It should stand on a different level completely and it should be dealt with more from the educational point of view than from that of relief. I am not myself clear what the present position is. I believe the Education Ministry have been interested in this question and have certainly done a great deal in providing employment to refugee teachers and professors, etc. How far they have been concerned with the educational aspect of refugee students I do not quite know.

3. I think that this aspect, that is the education of refugee students from Pakistan, should be put in charge of the Education Ministry. There may be a special board or department created for it under the Education Ministry, and the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry should be associated with it, so that there may be coordination and cooperation between the two Ministries in regard to this matter. But essentially it should be under the Education Ministry.<sup>3</sup> This department need not be a big one. One competent

1. Note to Ministries of Education and Relief and Rehabilitation, 9 August 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. Refugee students had been agitating and holding demonstrations demanding accommodation and financial aid.
3. The Education Minister said on 12 August 1948 in the Constituent Assembly that arrangements for the education of over 10,000 refugee students had been made in the centrally administered areas.

officer should be put in special charge with a small staff. Possibly one or two refugee teachers or professors might be associated with him.

4. The order of priority should be from the lower ages upwards, i.e., school children should be the first charge and then college students.<sup>4</sup> We should make ourselves responsible for free education, wherever necessary, of these students. At what stage this free education should be limited is to be considered. For instance we cannot guarantee free education for all kinds of higher education. Apart from the cost involved, this matter will be a waste of effort. Some means should be devised to pick out promising students who can then be given opportunities of higher studies at State expense if necessary. There may be a rough and ready rule about students obtaining a first class being given this opportunity but it will be better for the rules not to be quite so hard and fast and some selection board should pick out bright students who are capable of profiting by higher education.

5. Generally speaking the help given by the State should be in the shape of free education, that is payment of fees, etc., where necessary and supply of necessary books. Loans of money are to be deprecated. In any event, the Education Ministry should not concern itself with this; that should come under general relief in exceptional cases.

6. I should like the Education Ministry and the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to consider these proposals jointly and then put up their own suggestions. This should be done as soon as possible.

7. Meanwhile, a copy of this note should be circulated to members of the Cabinet for their information.

4. Two camp schools under the Delhi Administration and a Camp College under Punjab University were opened in Delhi.



## 2. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 25, 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

Some time ago Mohanlal Gautam sent me a copy of a letter he had addressed you on the 5th of September regarding the problem of refugees.

There is one suggestion in this letter which, though a little difficult, appeals to me. This relates to the rationing of house accommodation in Delhi and New Delhi. It may not be possible to work it out logically and scientifically but I think an attempt should be made to produce some kind of a scheme. Of course this applies to everybody including Government officials. Could you have this matter investigated and perhaps some suggestions made? I should like to take it up on my return from England. By that time all facts and suggestions should be ready.

Some weeks ago I made a proposal that the problem of refugee students should be handled entirely by a new section of the Education Ministry. Subsequently I heard that you had appointed a Joint Committee for this purpose which included representatives of the Education Ministry.

My own suggestion was rather different. I do not think a Committee would do much good, and I do think that we have not paid sufficient attention to students, that is so far as their education is concerned. I have often declared in public that Government is fully responsible for the education of every boy and girl student refugee. I know that the Education Ministry has done a great deal and that the Refugee and Rehabilitation Ministry has also done much.

But the problem should be looked upon as something far more important than temporary relief. It is a question of providing education and thus building up the youth of the nation.

Therefore, it is the special business of the Education Ministry and not even of that Ministry in the normal way, but by extraordinary steps to be taken in this behalf. The extraordinary steps should be, as I suggested, the creation of a new section or a department of the Education Ministry dealing solely and entirely with the education of refugee youth. They would not deal with relief as such. Where this was necessary it would still be the function of the Relief and Rehabilitation.

I shall be glad to know how matters stand now and what is being done.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



### 3. To Zakir Husain<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 28, 1948

My dear Zakir Husain,

Mridula has sent me your letter of the 28th September.

I remember your telling me something about this work that you are doing many months ago. After that I heard nothing about it.

From the brief account you have given, it appears that the work you and Shafiq-ur-Rahman have done and are doing, is of importance and significance. Mridula suggests that I should let you have rupees one lakh for this work out of the Prime Minister's Fund. I fear I cannot do so. But I am sending you a cheque for Rs. 10,000 for your education centres in Delhi which you have established in the heart of the city at (i) Bara Hindu Rao, (ii) Bhojla Pahari, (iii) Qassab Pura, (iv) Balli Maran, (v) Pul Bangash.

I quite agree with you that the work of moral rehabilitation and reconditioning of children is of the highest importance and I congratulate you and Shafiq-ur-Rahman for the success you have already obtained.

Have you approached the Education Ministry in this connection?

It seems to me that these children's community centres should have some medical help provided in it as well as some refreshments. This will no doubt cost some money. Do you know anything about the Asoka Vihar which the Madras Corporation has started in Madras city? This is rather an ambitious scheme for working class children, where they provide free, full medical facilities as well as education, games, etc.

I shall gladly try to give further help to you in future.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(41)/48-PMS.

4. To Shankar Prasada<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 28, 1948

My dear Shankar Prasada,

I am very much concerned at the condition of numerous children wandering about Delhi city, both refugee and other. They are not only unhealthy looking and rickety but are also probably going to pieces in other ways. I think it should be our concern to look after children first both from the health and education points of view, even though we might not be able to look after the older generation properly.

There are a number of organisations which no doubt are doing good work. There is our Education Ministry, the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry and more specially the women's section of it, which has started some good homes for women and children. There are also some educational community centres started by the Jamia Millia under the leadership of Dr. Zakir Husain and Shafiq-ur-Rahman.<sup>2</sup> I understand that five centres have been started by them at : (1) Bara Hindu Rao, (2) Bhojla Pahari, (3) Qassab Pura, (4) Balli Maran, (5) Pul Bangash. Both Zakir Husain and Shafiq-ur-Rahman are men of great ability and understanding of the problem, and they have already produced good results.

I do not want an overlapping of schemes or a waste of effort by different persons trying to do the same thing. But the field is large and there is plenty of room for work. As Chief Commissioner you should no doubt be interested in this work and help in coordinating it in Delhi. I have given some little help to Dr. Zakir Husain. I should like to place some money at your disposal out of the Prime Minister's Fund, say about Rs. 10,000, for the special purpose of helping these children. You may use it in any way you like, either by giving it to those who are already working in this field or otherwise.

Do you know anything about Asoka Vihar which the Madras Corporation has started. This is an ambitious scheme for working class children. I was greatly attracted by it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No, 40(41)/48-PMS.

2. (1901-1953); a pioneer in community education in India; took part in civil disobedience in 1930s; established Jamia Institute of Adult Education in 1938; Minister for Education, Delhi State, at the time of his death.





## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## I. Protection of Minorities



1. To J.R. Dhar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 23rd July 1948

Dear Dr. Dhar,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of the 13th July.

I do not know about any date being fixed for registration for citizenship of the Indian Union. Some temporary date for a temporary purpose might have been fixed but there can be no final date.<sup>3</sup> It would be for the new constitution that we are framing to finalise this matter.

It is not easy or desirable to introduce a passport system between Pakistan and India, but as you no doubt know a permit system has been introduced as between western Pakistan and India in order to check the flow of people here. We have not included eastern Bengal in this.<sup>4</sup>

I can assure you that all of us are greatly concerned about the position of non-Muslims in East Bengal. Don't imagine that they are forgotten or forsaken. We are passing through a difficult time and it is not easy to adjust ourselves to it. But I have no doubt that we will adjust ourselves. Meanwhile, I am still of opinion that Hindus in East Bengal should not leave the province. I am rather sorry that some of them, and notably some leading personalities, have left it. We must fight the tendency towards disruption and disintegration and hold together.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Jiban Ratan Dhar (b. 1889); Commissioned Officer, Indian Army, 1916-26; member, A.I.C.C., 1930-50; Minister for Jails, Government of West Bengal, 1952-57; President, D.C.C., 24-Parganas, 1958-60; Minister for Health, Government of West Bengal, 1962.

3. Under the Draft Constitution, an immigrant from Pakistan could automatically become a citizen of India if he had some territorial connection with the Indian Union by birth or descent or domicile and had migrated to India before 19 July 1948.

4. As a result of the liberal policy of the Government of India nearly one hundred thousand Muslims came back to resettle in East Punjab, Alwar and Bharatpur. The number of returning Muslims was increasing while no non-Muslim had gone back. Realizing their duty towards the non-Muslims, the Government of India suggested that a planned return of population to their original homes should be arranged. As the Government of Pakistan did not reply in spite of reminders, the Government of India introduced a permit system on 19 July 1948 between the two countries, but restricted it to West Pakistan.



## 2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 3176 dated 23rd August. While I am always prepared to give you any information about happenings in India, and in particular about Pakistan nationals in India, I do not understand the concern of the Pakistan Government in regard to Indian nationals in India, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. We cannot recognise that the Pakistan Government is the custodian of the interests of any Indian national in India, whatever his religion might be. The Government of India are fully conscious of their responsibility in regard to their nationals.

It is difficult for me to deal with vague statements and charges that you have made. In regard to the Agra incident on August 15th, which we greatly regret, the facts you have stated are not correct. Conflict took place there between some refugees and Muslim occupants of a house. Some Muslims opened fire from their houses and there was an exchange of fire between the police and these Muslims. Some refugees took advantage of this opportunity to break open shops and houses and loot them. Six cases of arson and 48 cases of looting shops and houses were reported. The loss of property has not been very excessive and some looted property has been recovered. Total casualties were as follows:

Killed—18 including 14 Muslims, 3 Hindus and one other. Injured—56 including 39 Muslims and 17 Hindus. One Sub-inspector and three constables injured in riot. Number of persons arrested reported to be 972 of whom 721 are non-Muslims and 251 are Muslims.

The situation was brought under control the same evening and there have been no incidents since.

1. New Delhi, 25 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

### 3. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to your telegram No. 3445 dated 10th September.<sup>2</sup> I regret that owing to heavy pressure of business requiring immediate attention I could not answer it earlier.

2. I am sorry to say that there is much in your telegram which is highly controversial. I do not, however, intend that relations between the two Dominions should be exacerbated by indulgence in charges and counter-charges or angry dialectics. I have more than once told you of the vital importance that we attach to the protection of the life, property and honour of all minorities, including Muslims, in India. The pity of it is that incidents, which are not of our making and which we regret and deplore as much as anybody, are misunderstood and greatly exaggerated in order to throw doubts upon our good faith. I think you will agree that, so long as responsible persons in Pakistan think and speak on these lines, there cannot be that measure of understanding between the two Governments on this problem that you and, I assure you, all of us here desire. Tolerance towards all minorities and full rights of citizenship for Muslims as well as impartial enforcement of law and order are our watchwords.

3. I do not quite know what measures you have in mind for devising ways and means for preserving the interests of minorities in each Dominion. If you have any suggestions to make, I shall be happy to consider them most carefully.

1. New Delhi, 14 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Liaquat Ali had claimed that till then Pakistan had been alone in extending the hand of friendship to India.



#### 4. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to your telegram No. 3609 dated the 21st September, 1948.<sup>2</sup> I deeply appreciate your friendly response to my telegram Primin 1591 dated September 14th.<sup>3</sup> I particularly welcome the essentially human approach which you have indicated in your telegram to the solution of the problems that confront us. I agree entirely that only by reasoned and dispassionate discussion between representatives of the two Dominions of the problems that remain for solution would we reach a proper understanding by each of the other's point of view and the establishment of real peace between India and Pakistan.

2. There is no doubt that among the most important of these problems is the creation in the minds of the minorities in each Dominion of the feeling that, irrespective of their numbers and the religion they profess, every one of them will have the same full rights and protection as any person belonging to the majority. The time has come for us to forget once for all the horrors that were perpetrated in the two Dominions before and after partition. I am glad you consider that the position now has greatly improved and that we should set about taking steps to ensure that peace is not disturbed again.

3. I would only add this: while any deviation in one Dominion from just treatment of minorities cannot altogether fail to have repercussions in the other, I and my Government are determined to use all our resources in preventing any such repercussions in India on account of happenings to minorities in Pakistan and to ensure that no member of any minority in India shall be allowed to suffer in life, honour or property merely because minorities in the other Dominion are suffering in these respects.

4. I welcome the idea of an inter-Dominion conference<sup>4</sup> for this purpose as soon as we are able to arrange for one. It will however be necessary, in the meanwhile, for each of us to evolve some concrete suggestions for achieving what both of us have in mind and to see from now that all the agreements that we have already entered into are implemented to the full.

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan said that "It is only by a reasonable and dispassionate discussion of various problems . . . that we can hope to promote peace and understanding between our two countries . . . Regrettable events took place before and after partition resulting in large movements of population. The position has now largely stabilized itself and it should be our aim to see that minorities are completely safeguarded . . ." He assured Nehru that he and his Government wanted "to do everything to protect life, honour and property of non-Muslims as fully as that of Muslims . . ."

3. See preceding item.

4. Liaquat Ali Khan had suggested this.



## 5. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

In my telegram Primin 1619 dated 24th September<sup>2</sup> regarding protection of minorities, I welcomed your approach and assured you of our willingness to cooperate sincerely in finding a satisfactory and lasting solution. You will agree that if your efforts are to succeed the right atmosphere must be created. From this standpoint, I wish to draw your attention to reports which, since 20th August, have been appearing in certain Pakistan newspapers. Following are examples:

- (1) Daily *Inquilab*, Lahore, dated 27th August 1948, referred in its editorial to "Jumma Masjid and Balli Maran in Delhi as scenes of disturbances in which Muslims had paid with their lives".
- (2) Daily *Musalman*, Karachi, in issue of 22nd August, published a front page news item under banner headlines: "General massacre of Muslims in Delhi is going on for the last one week; attacks on Muslims in streets and in trams; JONCM—a plan to surround the Muslims on all sides and exterminate them."
- (3) *Anjam* of Karachi, 25th August, published an item under headlines: "Muslim blood flowed like water in the streets of Delhi."
- (4) *Musalman*, Karachi, dated 8th September published news item: "Excited Hindu crowd fell upon Muslims at Sholapur—16 Muslims killed." Same paper, dated 10th September, published news item: "Bloody clashes among Hindus and Sikhs in Delhi resulted in attacks on Muslims."
- (5) *Inquilab*, Lahore, dated 28th August, alleged that "100 Muslims detaining at Agra were killed by Sikh beasts."
- (6) *Musalman*, dated 22nd August, alleged that "12 to 30 Muslims were being killed every day in Calcutta in solitary attacks."
- (7) Daily *Safina*, Lahore, dated 1st September, published news item under banner headlines: "Communal riots break out in Colaba; District in grip of murder, loot and arson."
- (8) *Ehsan*, Lahore, dated 5th September, spoke of communal frenzy sweeping over States acceding to the Indian Union, and mentioned *inter alia* States of Mysore and Rampur.
- (9) *Sind Observer* of 18th September, talked of over 30,000 Razakars laying down their lives in front of advancing tanks, besmearing angry teeth of these tanks.

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. See preceding item.

- (10) Both *Dawn* and *Sind Observer* spoke of Muslims being gagged and removed to British regime prisons, Indian armies committing inhuman atrocities in name of establishing order and surpassing British treatment of Indians as filth after mutiny of 1857, complaint of maltreatment attracting bullets which silence complainants for ever.

2. Everyone of these reports whether about India or Hyderabad is absolutely without foundation. In Delhi, for example, not a single incident has occurred for months. Razakars were killed in course of military operations and number killed is approximately 1200. There has been no gagging of peaceful Muslims or removal of any law-abiding person to prison, whether in Hyderabad or in India, and atrocities alleged against Indian troops are baseless slanders. Indeed, throughout critical days during which hostilities lasted in Hyderabad, there was not one single communal incident anywhere in Indian Union, and innumerable messages of appreciation received by me from Muslims and Muslim organisations from all parts of India prove that there was no need to 'gag' anyone. In Hyderabad State, no law-abiding citizen, Muslim or non-Muslim, has suffered in any way nor has he any cause for fear.

3. I have mentioned these reports because it seems only natural that they should embitter Muslim opinion in Pakistan and, because of their baselessness, produce similar effect on opinion in India also. You will agree that if we wish to create right atmosphere for better relations between our two countries, including safeguarding of position of minorities, every effort should be made to stop publication of false news. We are and have been doing everything possible on our side to achieve this, and I would appeal to you to use your great influence for similar purpose in Pakistan.

## 6. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

I have read reports of your broadcast from Karachi of 22nd September,<sup>2</sup> with genuine pleasure and appreciation. For my part, I wish to assure you

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. In his broadcast, Liaquat Ali asserted that "Pakistan wants peace and friendly relations with every country in the world and particularly with India. . . . If the Prime Minister of India really wants what he has said in his broadcast, then I assure him that Pakistan's hand of friendship, peace and justice is always there."



that I meant every word that I said in my recent broadcast<sup>3</sup> regarding our sincere desire that India and Pakistan should build enduring friendship on the basis of complete mutual confidence. Not only you and I, but every responsible person in our respective countries has to strive for the fulfilment of this purpose, without mutual reservation, and so to conduct himself by word and deed as to ensure that the unhappy memories of past events give place to a new spirit of friendship and trust.

In the strong hope that you share this view, I have drawn your attention, in another telegram,<sup>4</sup> to the unfortunate trend of news reports and comments in the Pakistan press upon the alleged large-scale massacre of Muslims in different parts of India and, since the entry of our forces into the State, in Hyderabad. I shall not repeat here what I have said on this subject elsewhere. But the same hope of a firm common aim to place Indo-Pakistan relations on their natural basis of complete amity, leads me to draw your attention to that part of your broadcast which deals with threats to Pakistan's freedom from some quarter.<sup>5</sup> Against the background of popular sentiment in Pakistan, as we see it from this side, India is likely to be regarded as the "quarter" from which such threat may come.

You may not have meant it but this is how, I fear, your reference might have been understood by a good many of your listeners. I can only assure you once more that Pakistan has nothing to fear from India. We want to live in peace with Pakistan, now, and always. Is it too much to expect that, after these solemn assurances, it may be possible for you and the people of Pakistan to look upon India not as a potential enemy but a good neighbour, who is ready to grasp the hand of friendship which you say Pakistan stretches out to us?

3. See *post*, section on Hyderabad, item dated 18 September 1948.

4. See preceding item.

5. Liaquat Ali had said that traitors and spies were trying to undermine the morale of Pakistanis and engineer distrust against the Government and its leaders. "In the event of an attack on Pakistan, no matter from which quarter, myself, my colleagues and every Pakistani will shed the last drop of his blood in defending every inch of the soil of Pakistan,"



## 7. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
26 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th September.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact, this morning I sent a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan on this very subject. Or rather I sent him two telegrams, one dealing with his broadcast and another dealing with the effusions of the Pakistan press.<sup>3</sup> I did not have at the time all the material that you have sent me. But I had quite enough for my purpose then.

I entirely agree with you that this matter should be taken up. I also propose to take all this material with me to London and I shall be glad if you could instruct the Information Publicity to send me any additional material they might have. I am likely to meet Liaquat Ali Khan there.

If necessary I shall send another message to Liaquat Ali as soon as I have gone through all the other materials.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 44/4/48-Pol. & K.W., M.H.A.

2. Patel had enclosed a copy of the text of Liaquat Ali's broadcast of 22 September 1948.

3. See preceding item.

## 8. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

In my telegram Primin No. 1624 dated 24th September, I gave you some extracts from the Pakistan press and pointed out that, if we wished to create the right atmosphere for better relations between our two countries, every effort should be made to stop publication of false news. What I said about news applies equally to comments and cartoons. If you will read recent editorials in the *Dawn* and also look at some of the cartoons,<sup>2</sup> you will find that the comments persistently represent me, my colleagues and the people of India as bitter enemies of Pakistan while the cartoons offend every conception of decency. I leave it to you to judge whether journalistic activity of this kind can achieve anything except perpetual estrangement between India and Pakistan or, indeed, produce even worse consequences.

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1948. File No. 44/4/48-Pol. & K.W., M.H.A.

2. *Dawn* had carried vicious cartoons of Indian leaders and continued to speak of atrocities allegedly committed by India.

**9. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>**

I have just received full text of your telegram No. 3859 dated 4th October. As I am leaving for England within few hours, I have been unable to deal with it fully. I quite agree with you, however, that nothing should be done by press on either side which is likely to excite feelings of enmity and hatred between our two countries. In fact, we have already a system of press committees<sup>2</sup> whose business it is to check the dissemination of false and provocative news, and the one in Delhi has been functioning well to my knowledge. However, I agree with your suggestion that both Governments should reiterate their policy in this matter and, after giving adequate warning to newspapers, take stringent action against delinquents. I hope that, after my return from England, we may be able to work out some plan which would be acceptable to both Governments. Meanwhile, I am drawing the attention of the Ministry concerned to your telegram for such action as may be immediately feasible.

1. New Delhi, 5 October 1948. File No. 44/4/48-Pol. & K.W., M.H.A.
2. The Press Advisory Committees, in existence since the war, were expected to ensure restraint in the publication of news likely to affect peace and harmony in the country.





## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## II. Migration



1. To Ahmed Sayeed<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 1st August 1948

My dear Maulana Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th July. I quite understand that owing to the Ramzan fast your day's routine is full up.

On general grounds I regret myself that any system of permits should have been imposed on persons coming from Pakistan to India but we were compelled to adopt this system because of the great misuse of travelling facilities. We found that a large number of persons were coming here with the intention of doing espionage work and we have to check this. Secondly we found groups of persons coming sometimes in large numbers without any permits or arrangements being made for them. They merely added to the refugee problem and the accommodation problem. Therefore, it became important to check this. Right from the beginning we have been in favour of some mutual arrangement for exchange of people from one side to the other. A one-sided arrangement leads to difficulties.

In regard to the special persons you have mentioned, no doubt special consideration should be shown and permits issued wherever possible. Each case will, I hope, be examined favourably on the merits. If you will draw the attention of the authorities issuing permits to the special cases, they will no doubt give every consideration to them. If you have any difficulty I shall enquire into the matter.

Unfortunately there is great tension at present as between Pakistan and India. I hope that in the course of the next two or three months this will improve. If so, present difficulties will largely fade away.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



## 2. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 16, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have your letter of August 14th about the influx from East Bengal. I realise your difficulties and naturally we should do what we can to help you. But as I told you long ago there is no reasonable solution of the problem if there is large influx from East Bengal.<sup>2</sup> That is why I have been terribly anxious throughout to prevent this, whatever might happen. I still think that every effort should be made to prevent it. I think it was a very wrong thing for some of the Hindu leaders of East Bengal to come to West Bengal.

In spite of our efforts, it is difficult to induce most provinces to absorb more refugees. We have been pressing them to do so for a long time. I think that in spite of every difficulty in East Bengal it is far better for our people to face the situation there than to come away.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal

1. *With Dr. B.C. Roy and other Chief Ministers*, by Saroj Chakrabarty, (Calcutta, 1974), p. 107.
2. Migration on a large-scale of non-Muslims and even of some Muslims was taking place from East to West Bengal on account of deteriorating conditions. It was estimated in March 1948 that about 10 lakh non-Muslims had migrated.

## 3. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
25th August 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have your letter<sup>2</sup> dated 22nd August.

If we have to face a catastrophe, well then we will face it even though many of us may be washed away. Nevertheless one tries one's best to pre-

1. *With Dr. B.C. Roy and other Chief Ministers*, by Saroj Chakrabarty, (Calcutta, 1974), pp. 108-109.
2. In his letter, B.C. Roy had said that since the Hindu leaders had themselves migrated to West Bengal there was no use pressing them to prevent the exodus from East Bengal. He had suggested to Satish Chandra Das Gupta that he, the Ramkrishna Mission and the Bharat Sevashram Sangha should draw up a scheme for housing the refugees.

vent that catastrophe. One has to be clear on the issue, or else our language or our action may mislead people. I have been quite certain, right from the beginning, that everything should be done to prevent Hindus in East Bengal from migrating to West Bengal. If that happened on a mass scale it would be a disaster of the first magnitude. Running away is never a solution to a problem. I think the Hindu leaders of East Bengal who have come away have done no service to their people. If, as you suggest, things have gone too far already, then naturally we shall all do what we can but I shudder at the prospect and at the magnitude of the human misery that will come in its train. To the last I would try to check migration even if there is war.

The fact that a man is a Muslim, does not make him a non-national. He may have evil designs in his heart. If so, as an individual we can deal with him. But to say of a group of Indian nationals that we shall push them out because some people elsewhere are not behaving as they should is something which has no justification in law or equity.<sup>3</sup> It strikes at the root of the secular State that we claim to be. We just can't do it whatever the consequences. If individuals misbehave that is a different matter.

I am glad to learn that Orissa and the Indian States which have been absorbed into that province are prepared to take refugees from East Bengal.<sup>4</sup> Certainly they can actually prepare themselves for it as your Government can and should. But any indication that you are doing so would encourage the exodus still more and that must be avoided.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal

3. Nehru was referring to an agitation demanding that Muslims be evicted from West Bengal to make room for an equal number of migrants from East Bengal.

4. In a letter of 16 August 1948 Nehru had said that it was difficult to induce most provinces to absorb a large number of refugees. B.C. Roy replied that the Premier of Orissa seemed agreeable.

#### 4. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 9, 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,

I am just writing to remind you about what I said to you this evening regarding some of the permit holders who have come here from Pakistan. While on the one hand, we have to be careful that this permit system is

1. J.N. Collection.

not used to our disadvantage or injury, on the other hand we should avoid unnecessary harassment to people who have a right to be considered citizens of India. There have been cases of persons who went to Pakistan for a brief visit to some relation, coming back to India with a temporary permit because they could not then get any other kind of permit. I suggest that some instructions might be issued that the cases of any person claiming to have his home or family in India might be examined fully. Even if no final decision is arrived at, if there is a *prima facie* case, the permit might be extended. Doubtful cases might be referred to you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to my telegram No. 1630-Primin dated 26th September. Our Deputy High Commissioner<sup>2</sup> reports from Lahore that with effect from afternoon of 26th September restrictions have been tightened up by cancellation of movement permits already granted and general increase in harassment. Thus our request for the removal of restrictions imposed, which were totally unwarranted, has been met by further restrictions and greater harassment. I confess I am quite unable to understand this attitude of the West Punjab Government, presumably supported by the Pakistan Government, in view not only of the normal behaviour between adjoining countries but also of your repeated and recent declarations that you wish to maintain peaceful relations with India. This surely is not the way to peace.

2. I shall be grateful to you if the restrictions imposed by West Punjab are removed without delay and there is no further harassment of Indian nationals in West Punjab.

1. New Delhi, 29 September 1948, J.N. Collection.

2. Y.K. Puri.



6. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 October 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,

I mentioned to you today at the Imperial Hotel party, that I was troubled about the Jodhpur railway affair.<sup>2</sup> As you know, I have called a conference on this matter on Tuesday morning at 9.30. I am leaving on Tuesday about noon and I have an enormous amount of work to get through before I go. Nevertheless, I have felt it necessary to find some time somehow for a discussion of this matter before I go. Otherwise, I shall have little peace of mind. Indeed I am asking my office people to keep in touch with me by telegram about developments.

I do not know the intricate details of this affair. But I have frequently read the telegrams and discussed the matter with various people during the last two months or more. There has been a growing feeling in me that we have been mismanaging this, indeed that we have not acted quite straight about it. On several occasions I expressed my earnest desire that the matter should be settled, but nothing came of it. Where the obstruction lay, I could not quite make out, whether in the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, or in the Railways Ministry, or in Jodhpur. I have a powerful sensation that no serious attempt has been made on our part to come to a settlement and that probably no settlement was desired.

That is bad enough. But what is really painful is the complete ignoring of the human factor. Large numbers of our people are stranded in Sind and are suffering great hardships because the railway line has ceased to work. Considerable numbers have tried to walk the seven miles gap through very inhospitable country, infested by robbers and dacoits. They have been looted and deprived of their goods, their women have been raped, and they lie in crowds at small wayside stations where even water is lacking. The amount of misery caused has been tremendous. I wonder if people sitting in our offices drafting telegrams or letters pay heed to this human element and misery.

1. File No. 27(40)/48-PMS.

2. The Jodhpur State Railway had been operating the Sind section. In July 1947, Pakistan gave a notice of one year for taking over this section. Meanwhile, on 26 July 1948, the Jodhpur Railway reduced train services between Hyderabad (Sind) and Jodhpur as the number of passengers decreased with the introduction of the permit system. Pakistan made this action an excuse to detain three trains, seize stations and the control office at Mirpur Khas, replace Jodhpur staff by Pakistan staff and take possession of stock worth Rs. 16 lakhs. All train services were interrupted as there was no guarantee of the safe return of trains from Pakistan.

If some high principle was involved, or some great advantage to our country, we have to put up with suffering. But I see no principle or advantage in this business. All that I see is an extremely narrow-minded approach which is almost inhuman and sometimes I feel that it is even worse than that, in fact that it has not been quite straight and above board. I know that all this might be justified by some legalistic interpretation, but that is not good enough.

You know that Sri Prakasa has felt very strongly on this issue and even offered his resignation.<sup>3</sup> Whether he was right or wrong is immaterial. The fact that our representative in Pakistan felt this way after going fully into the matter, indicates at least that our case is not a strong one. If, in addition to all this, one thinks of the suffering of innumerable human beings, then it passes one's comprehension how our Government can act in the way it has done.

As I have said above, I do not know who is responsible for this. I should like to know because, even apart from this particular unfortunate incident, it throws some light on the way our Government departments function. I do not fit into this picture at all and my mind rebels against this method of approach. Probably the Ministry of Railways has had a lot to do with this business and therefore I am writing to you, although you have just assumed charge. I should like you to inform the people concerned in the Ministry how I view this matter and I should like their full justification for what they have done.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mohanlal Saksena because his Ministry is also involved. I hope the Jodhpur people will come here on Tuesday.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Sri Prakasa was the High Commissioner of India in Pakistan from 1947 to 1949.

## 7. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Our High Commissioner in Karachi has been speaking to me about restriction on movement from Pakistan to India of approximately twenty thou-

1. New Delhi, 5 October 1948. File No. 30(68)-Pak-III/49, M.E.A., N.A.I.

sand sweepers, washermen etc., who, coming as they do from Gujarat, U.P., and other Indian provinces, are Indian nationals. He tells me that they are anxious to return to their houses in India but are not allowed to leave Sind under Essential Services Ordinance.<sup>2</sup> Sri Prakasa says that he has represented the matter to your Government several times but without success. Removal of restriction in the movement of such persons appears to me to be eminently desirable on purely humanitarian grounds and I shall be grateful if you will have this matter considered sympathetically and promptly. Our High Commissioner in Karachi, who has already had discussions with your officers, will gladly help with information and in other suitable ways.

2. The Essential Personnel (Registration) Ordinance, 1948, provided that all essential personnel over the age of 18 and under the age of 55 years, residing in Pakistan and not employees of the Pakistan Government or the provincial governments should register at employment exchanges.





## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## III. Recovery of Abducted Women and Children





## 1. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 2425 dated 29th June. I am surprised to read in this telegram that all Hindus and Sikhs from the N.W.F.P. and Frontier States have been evacuated and that there are practically no abducted women left. Our information is otherwise, and in regard to the recovery of abducted women, the fact is that this matter has been repeatedly discussed at inter-Dominion conferences.<sup>2</sup>

For the first time you have made the charge that our representative and his staff in Peshawar have taken active part in political activities directed against Pakistan. In fact we have reduced our staff there to the barest minimum and our principal representative came back some weeks ago. I should like to have specific details of the charge you have made.

We note with regret that, while you are prepared to have a Deputy High Commissioner of the United Kingdom in Peshawar with considerable establishment, you are not even prepared to permit a liaison officer to represent our Government there. We do not think this in consonance with treatment accorded to a friendly neighbouring country. However, as you insist upon our withdrawal of our staff from Peshawar we shall take steps to that end.

1. New Delhi, 2 July 1948. File No. 33(5)-OS-IV, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The Indo-Pakistan agreement laid down that "the responsibility for obtaining information in respect of abducted persons be that of the Recovery Squad of the Dominion in which the abducted persons are known to be residing." Each Dominion, however, might furnish such information as may be available to the other in respect of abducted cases known to be in the other Dominion.

## 2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Reference my telegram 1322 dated 9th June.<sup>2</sup>

In your reply No. 2425 dated 28th June, you said that "there are practically no abducted women left" in the N.W.F.P. We are still receiving information which points to the contrary conclusion.<sup>3</sup> Only today, for example, I have received a list of abducted women, giving not only their names but addresses where they are to be found. These and many others still remain to be recovered. According to the last report of our Liaison Officer in Peshawar, he has not yet heard anything from the Premier of the N.W.F.P. about girls regarding whom the Premier had been addressed. Recovery of abducted women is a matter on which both Governments are in complete agreement. In view of the facts that I have now given you, you might still reconsider your decision that our Liaison Officer and his office should be withdrawn forthwith. It is quite certain that in the event of such withdrawal the effective recovery of abducted women still in N.W.F.P. will become extremely difficult, if not impossible.

This is in continuation of my telegram No. 1379 dated 1st July, 1948.<sup>4</sup>

1. New Delhi, 3 July 1948. File No. 33(5)-OS-IV, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series) Vol. 6, pp. 86-87.

3. Many girls were held by influential Pathans.

4. See *post*, section on Kashmir.

## 3. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

Reference my telegram No. Primin 1383 dated 3rd July 1948 regarding our Liaison Officer in Peshawar. I shall be grateful for an early reply. We continue to receive information regarding names and addresses of abducted women still remaining to be recovered and should therefore like to retain our representative at Peshawar.

1. New Delhi, 13 July 1948. File No. 33(5)-OS-IV, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## IV. Exchange of Prisoners





1. Cable to Ghazanfar Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

I have just seen your telegram No. 2812 dated 27th July addressed to Gopalaswami Ayyangar.<sup>2</sup> I have not been in touch with the previous correspondence to which you have referred and am not aware of it. This will be enquired into by Gopalaswami Ayyangar who will communicate further with you. I should like to say, however, that I deeply regret there has been any misunderstanding and the consequences of it. The only case before me was that of Dr. Qureshi.<sup>3</sup> I find from enquiry that Zulfiqar Ahmed's case was treated in the normal way and all the usual processes of mercy petition etc., were gone through. He was a constable found guilty of murder. Apart from the gravity of the offence a police constable indulging in it made it graver.

I entirely agree with you that we must expedite exchange of prisoners on the widest possible basis so as to put an end to this unfortunate chapter. This basis would include the following areas: On the side of Pakistan: West Punjab, Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan and Bahawalpur; on the side of India: East Punjab, the Punjab States, Delhi, Alwar and Bharatpur. It is important that full list should be prepared on either side of all such prisoners involved so as to avoid subsequent argument and recrimination. I suggest, therefore, that you might have such a list prepared for Pakistan and we on our part are having this list prepared here.

I suggest also that the exchange be on a mutual basis so that there should be as complete a transfer as possible. On the last occasion, you will remember that while East Punjab sent a large batch of prisoners to West Punjab, the latter held over their prisoners and did not send them. This naturally created a great deal of ill-feeling. Anything like this should be avoided on both sides. There may be some prisoners here whose families continue to reside in the Indian Union or who themselves do not desire to be transferred. In such cases their wishes should be acted upon.

I notice that some newspapers announced today that Dr. Qureshi's date of execution has been fixed. This is completely unauthorised and wrong.

1. New Delhi, 29 July 1948. File No. 16-4-/48/Pak-I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. This related to exchange of prisoners.
3. Abdul Ghani Qureshi, a surgeon of Delhi, was sentenced to death on the charge of murdering Dr. N.C. Joshi during the communal riots in Delhi in September 1947. The execution of sentence was suspended at the request of the Government of Pakistan which soon afterwards asked the Government of India to include Qureshi in the prisoners from India to be exchanged. This was done in November 1948.

We shall strictly adhere to the assurance given to you. I might inform you that we are prepared to consider the transfer of Dr. Qureshi also to Pakistan as part of the larger agreement referred to above.<sup>4</sup>

Gopalaswami Ayyangar will deal with these matters more fully. I hope that every step will be taken on both sides to expedite these transfers.

4. Ghazanfar Ali, in his cable of 31 July 1948, expressed satisfaction at this agreement.

## 2. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31st July 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of 23rd July about Hindu and Sikh prisoners in Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> This whole matter has been hung up because of Dr. Qureshi's case.

I do not think the question of sending a few juvenile prisoners has made the slightest difference.<sup>3</sup>

We have decided now to transfer even Dr. Qureshi, but we shall only do so when it is perfectly clear that all our prisoners on the other side are coming over. In effect, therefore, the request made in the enclosed letter that you sent me has been acceded to.<sup>4</sup> We are anxious to expedite this matter.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that Pakistan held 800 Indians as prisoners as against 100 Muslims in India. Many of them would be executed by way of retaliation if the death sentence on Qureshi was carried out.
3. Rajendra Prasad also mentioned that as the Government of Pakistan had adopted an uncompromising attitude towards exchange of prisoners, Gopichand Bhargava was not willing to restore the juvenile prisoners and "he carried out your instructions reluctantly."
4. The friends and relatives of Hindu and Sikh prisoners in Pakistan who wrote this letter to Rajendra Prasad requested the release of Qureshi for fear of reprisals by Pakistan.
5. Replying the same day Rajendra Prasad cautioned Nehru that in view of many experiences of agreement being made and not carried out, India must "be careful to see that all our prisoners from other side do actually come over before we complete our part of the agreement."



3. To Badri Dutt Pande<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
25th August 1948

My dear Badri Duttji,

Your letter of the 21st August. Long before Dr. Qureshi's case was considered, an agreement was arrived at between Pakistan and India about the exchange of prisoners.<sup>2</sup> This included all persons and convicts, even those sentenced to death. As a consequence, several hundreds were exchanged and this number included on both sides some persons sentenced to death. Later this agreement was extended to certain additional areas both in Pakistan and in India. It is difficult to make exceptions when an agreement has been arrived at. It must be remembered that what we do on this side has its immediate reaction on the other. There are at present nearly 800 Hindu and Sikh prisoners in Pakistan. If we insist on carrying out the sentence of death on Qureshi we put hundreds of our people in great danger.

There is no doubt that Dr. Joshi was a very noble soul and his murder was a peculiarly horrible one, but large numbers of people have doubted whether Qureshi was the actual person who did it.

We have considered all aspects of this matter very carefully and it does seem to us more important that we should try to save large numbers of people than to punish one person ourselves.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. According to this agreement between the East and the West Punjab Governments, it was decided that the Muslim and non-Muslim prisoners should be exchanged with effect from 5 April 1948. The number of non-Muslim undertrials and convicts in West Punjab was 4,088 and that of the Muslims 3,761. The number of non-Muslim prisoners was 300.



## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## V. Conditions in N.W.F.P.





1. To Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 3, 1948

My dear Nawabzada,

I am writing to you after considerable hesitation. Indeed it is only after some weeks of thought that I have at last decided to write to you on this subject. I hesitated because I was afraid that I might be misunderstood. But I feel so strongly on this subject that I am impelled to write to you.

I am writing about conditions<sup>2</sup> in the Frontier Province which, from all accounts, are very bad. I have no desire whatever to interfere in any way in Pakistan's internal affairs. But I would be less than human if I was not powerfully affected by the kind of news, that is reaching us, of the oppression and persecution of the Khudai Khidmatgars in the Frontier Province and more specially of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Saheb and other old colleagues of ours, who have played such a notable part in the struggle for the independence of this country. Men of their stature compel respect and if they are treated with cruelty, all those who respect them and have affection for them must necessarily suffer pain.

Allegations have been made by the Pakistan Government about the Khan Brothers and the Khudai Khidmatgars keeping contacts with us here, receiving money, and being encouraged by us to adopt a rebellious attitude towards Pakistan. These allegations have been made without any reference to us or enquiry from us. If you had enquired, we would have told you that these allegations are completely without foundation. Even before the partition took place, our advice to them was to accept it fully and to function in accordance with it. Since the partition there have been no contacts at all between us and the Khan Brothers. Because of old friendship and comradeship I would have liked to write to them and receive letters from them. But I refrained from writing as I thought this might lead to misunderstanding. Whether you believe it or not, I can assure you that there have been no contacts between them and us.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Khudai Khidmatgars refused to collaborate with the Frontier Muslim League and became the volunteer corps of the Pakistan People's Party which had been founded in March 1948 and which elected Abdul Ghaffar Khan as its President. The Frontier Government arrested on 15 June Ghaffar Khan and his son, Wali Khan, on charges of sedition, and sentenced them to three years' imprisonment. On 8 July 1948, the Government outlawed the Khudai Khidmatgars and imprisoned a thousand of them. The police opened fire on their demonstrations and gatherings and in one incident alone over a hundred were killed. Dr. Khan Saheb and Abdul Ghani were arrested soon after. With such repression unrest spread in Waziristan where the Pathans, while accepting Pakistan, sought autonomy.

But contacts or no contacts, we cannot forget old friendship, nor can we remain unaffected that our old comrades should be subjected to unfair and harsh treatment. The accounts that reach me of the state of affairs in the Frontier Province amaze me, for this appears to be worse than at any time under British rule.<sup>3</sup>

You have often addressed me in regard to reports of persecution of Muslims in India. I do not know what sources of information you may have. But I do know that the situation in India has improved beyond recognition and there is no persecution of Muslims anywhere in India. Petty incidents may occur in some places and they are dealt with immediately and sternly. I am happy to say that Hindu-Muslim relations in India have stabilised themselves after the shock of the events that followed partition, and that they are improving with marked rapidity. I have no apprehension on that score, though even so we keep vigilant.

I have denied in public and I wish to deny again in private that India has no aggressive intentions against Pakistan. It grieves me to see baseless reports made about conditions in India, or India's intention to be aggressive. The Pakistan press is full of these baseless reports put forward in a manner which is astonishing. One has the impression of a deliberate campaign being waged to worsen Indo-Pakistan relations and perhaps to bring about a conflict. So far as we are concerned, our policy is entirely opposed and we shall avoid conflict. All this, however, leads to distrust, ill-will, fear and an excited state of mind. This is not a good background for any country.

I would repeat again that I am full of apprehension and am greatly concerned about the Khan Brothers and the Khudai Khidmatgars. I am writing to you in my personal capacity and I am thinking of this problem not as a political one but as a human one. I trust that you will take this letter in the spirit in which it is written and will pay attention to the conditions in the Frontier Province, which cannot redound to the credit of Pakistan and which may well lead to very grave bitterness and the consequences of such bitterness.<sup>4</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 8 July 1948, the N.W.F.P. Government, by an ordinance, assumed extraordinary powers to deal with persons and organisations suspected of subversive activities. Indiscriminate arrests were made on the basis of false allegations.
4. In his reply dated 15 November 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan stated that the action against the Khan Brothers and the Khudai Khidmatgars by the local authorities had been taken "after the most careful consideration" and also having in view the internal security and integrity of Pakistan.



## 2. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 3, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose copies of letters I am sending to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>2</sup> and Gopalswami Ayyangar.<sup>3</sup> They will speak for themselves. I do hope we will be able to do something to help the unfortunate people of the Frontier. Perhaps we could at least give some publicity to conditions there through radio or otherwise. We have, of course, to be careful in this matter and not to rely on rumours alone.

I understand that a number of Red Shirts have tried to escape from the Frontier in order to come to India. Under the present permit system they cannot do so. I think we should relax this system in their favour.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to Gopalswami Ayyangar and Mehrchand Khanna.
2. See preceding item.
3. See next item.

## 3. To N. Gopalswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 3, 1948

My dear Gopalswami,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Liaquat Ali Khan.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps I might meet him in London.<sup>3</sup> If so, I shall certainly speak to him on this subject. Meanwhile, it seemed to me desirable to send a letter to him about it.

I wonder if we can do anything else to help. May I suggest that you might keep in touch with Mehrchand Khanna who, being himself a man from the Frontier, is intensely interested in this business. I should like you to do what you can to help our old comrades in the Frontier. It might be worthwhile

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See item 1.
3. Nehru met Liaquat Ali Khan on 20 October 1948 in London during the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

to have a talk with Sardar Patel about it also. I am sending a copy of this letter of mine to you as well as a copy of my letter to Liaquat Ali Khan to him and to Mehrchand Khanna.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## VI. The Canal Waters Dispute





1. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 5, 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I have your letter of the 2nd July. I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to your Governor.<sup>2</sup> This deals with the point you have raised in your letter. As I have pointed out, our stopping water supply to West Punjab will not lead to a settlement but rather to desperate measures and possibly it may lead to war itself.<sup>3</sup> In these circumstances the sooner our engineers tackle the problem in some of the ways that had already been suggested, the better it would be.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. For letter to C.M. Trivedi, see *ante*, pp. 37-38.

3. Water was allowed into Pakistan canals through canals and works in India early in May 1948 in accordance with the Inter-Dominion Agreement of 4 May 1948. Under the agreement Pakistan had, in return, to deposit a small sum in escrow with the Reserve Bank of India. But Pakistan disputed the amount fixed, and meanwhile, the East Punjab Government wanted the supply of water to cease.

2. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 26, 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I have received a telegram from the Pakistan Government at Karachi, in which it is stated that they have heard that the East Punjab Government intends stopping supply of canal waters after September, unless something happens. I do not quite know how matters have reached this climax. I shall enquire into the matter and call for the papers. But I am quite clear that you should not stop the supply of canal water at this stage or in the near future. In existing circumstances that would be very harmful from many points of view. I am going to London on the 5th October and it would be most unfortunate if a complaint of this kind is made at the Dominion Premiers' Conference.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

**3. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,

I enclose a letter from Chandulal Trivedi and a copy of my reply. I do hope you will be able to take full interest in these negotiations and to attend the inter-Dominion conferences on this issue. I find that sometimes some of our representatives are not smart enough for the Pakistani people. Your presence there is very desirable.

I am particularly anxious about the canal waters dispute. It may be that no final settlement is arrived at soon, but steps towards a settlement might be taken from time to time. In any event, I do hope that there is going to be no cutting off of the water supply on the part of East Punjab. This will give rise to a great outcry against us all over the place.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(19)/47-PMS.



## RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

## VII. Other Issues



## 1. Supply of Electricity to West Punjab<sup>1</sup>

The East Punjab Government is technically and in law justified in sending the notice which they have done to the West Punjab Government. The actual cutting off of electric energy must however be dependent on certain other factors, which are largely governed by inter-Dominion considerations. No such action should be taken by the East Punjab Government without specific reference to and approval of the Government of India, who will be in a position to judge it from various points of view.

I think Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar might send a telegram to the Pakistan Government drawing attention to this matter. On receipt of a reply to this telegram as well as to the East Punjab notice to the West Punjab Government, the matter should be considered fully by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar who is in charge of inter-Dominion relations. If no replies come within a reasonable period, then also the matter will be considered. Perhaps then a final notice might be sent by the Government of India to be followed by action in case payment is not made. In such cases an adherence to strict law is not very helpful and at the present moment specially when there is a precarious peace between the two Dominions, every step should be carefully considered.

I suggest therefore that the East Punjab Government should send them their notice, if they have not already done so, and Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar should communicate with the Pakistan Government. Meanwhile, it is clearly understood that electric energy will not be cut off till a final decision is arrived at by the Government of India.

1. Note, 15 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

## 2. Telegram to Akbar Hydari<sup>1</sup>

Intelligence reports show that East Bengal Government are assembling military forces at several points within easy reach of Patharia Forest Reserve. Their intention seems to be to take forcible possession of the entire forest reserve in anticipation of breakdown in the deliberations of the

1. New Delhi, 8 September 1948. File No. 57/35/48-Poll. M.H.A.



Boundary Commission.<sup>2</sup> We must resist any attempts by Pakistan to secure forcible possession of the area of the reserve forest which has been in Assam's possession, and I trust you will make necessary arrangements to that effect. Please report what assistance, if any, you require from the Government of India.

2. On 15 March 1948, a Joint Boundary Commission was set up to settle the question of the disputed areas of the Patharia Forest.







## 1. To Lord Pethick-Lawrence<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 19th July 1948

My dear Lord Pethick-Lawrence,  
Thank you for your letter of July 10th.<sup>2</sup>

I am quite prepared to accept your statement that in some ways you understood Gandhiji better than many of my own countrymen. To understand a person, a mere intellectual appreciation is not enough. There has to be some kind of an emotional appreciation or even, in some cases, a spiritual one. Obviously vast numbers of people in India who revered and followed Gandhiji had little of that appreciation of him or his teachings. And yet I think it is true to say that instinctively they did appreciate the basic thing for which he stood, although they might have found it difficult to follow. He represented something deep down in the Indian spirit and was completely in tune with the better side of the mind of the Indian masses. Hence his influence over them.

I shall look forward to reading what you are writing on Gandhiji.<sup>3</sup>  
With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Pethick-Lawrence wrote; "In some ways I understood Gandhiji better than most of my countrymen and even (dare I say it ?) better than many of yours. For though I was one of the leaders of the suffragette campaign, I too am a mystic and a devotee of no one religion; and to me the progress of the human spirit is infinitely more important than any material or political advance however essential that may be."
3. *Mahatma Gandhi*, (London 1949), written by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, H.S.L. Polak and H.N. Brailsford. Each author contributed one section. Pethick-Lawrence dealt with Mahatma Gandhi's last years, 1939-1948, and likened him to the Hebrew prophets who played an active part in the politics of their day.

## 2. The Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi<sup>1</sup>

Friends and comrades,  
When a few days ago Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar asked me to associate myself with this function I first hesitated, but when a function is asso-

1. Speech after unveiling a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi at Vivekananda College, Madras on 26 July 1948. From *The Hindu*, 27 July, and *National Herald*, 28 July 1948.

ciated with Mahatma Gandhi and the Ramakrishna Mission, I find it difficult to say no. So I have come. I am sorry I have only a few minutes before me as I have to fulfil other engagements. Nevertheless, I am glad to associate myself with this ceremony. On such occasions, I wonder what exactly is the meaning of such functions. I have a fear in my mind that most people imagine that by doing such things, they have done their duty. We admire great men but we seldom follow them. The real question before us should be whether we have followed the teachings of these great men or not.

It is almost six months now since Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated. Immediately after the assassination there was tremendous grief and shock and sorrow not only all over India but all over the world. I think it is correct to say that there is no historical parallel or any other example of a man's death causing so much sorrow and upheaval all over the world. Why was this so? There were those who were against the policies which Mahatmaji laid down. I have rather a doubt today if there are some in whom that feeling still persists. We, of course, respect Mahatma Gandhi. We put up pictures and statues. We refer to him in glowing terms, but somehow we have not related this to our thinking and action. I am making these remarks for the people as a whole and not referring to individuals, and there are a large number of people who have acted in the right way. It is not a fair way of dealing with a man like Mahatma Gandhi nor is it a fair way of dealing with ourselves. We must be clear in our mind as to what we are after. There is no good troubling and deluding ourselves by paying lip-homage and not trying to understand the basic teachings of the person. I cannot refer in detail to the numerous things with which he interested himself. Even if I try to make a list, it will be an incomplete list of what he has done. Even what some people might call trivial things, he took them up seriously and thoroughly. He has left a big mark on everything he undertook. Therefore, the most important thing in such matters should be the fundamental approach we make. It does not matter much whether in a particular matter we agree with him or not. The point is whether you accept that fundamental approach to things, the basic approach, call it what you may, the ethical approach, the peaceful and non-violent approach. All must mean the same thing.

In doing anything you should not stray away from the right path. You should maintain your integrity. You should always look at the means and the ends will look after themselves. The more I see the political events in India today and outside, the more horrified I become by the lack and lapse of integrity. This is a most dangerous thing. This kind of lapse is taking hold of the public mind and affecting private morality. I see now what I saw during war-time. War degrades morality and it is a terrible thing that after the war that atmosphere continues. What pains me and what



troubles me in the present is that I cannot easily get a grip on it. It is easy enough to denounce. But the problem is how to get rid of it.

Then there is another type of idea which is a more insidious thing and which ultimately led to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. These narrow-minded and limited ideas have led in the past to the downfall of India. Oddly enough, this narrow-mindedness persists, and one cannot understand the past nor the present and much less the future. This type of idea has spread very greatly among young people and it amazes me to see its sheer, utter idiocy. I can deal with a criminal, but I cannot deal with an idiot or a fool. If there is such an outlook in the country, it is bad. It is up to us, up to those who do not accept that type, to fight it and uproot it. It is exactly similar to the ideas that led to the establishment of Pakistan and the like which was fathered by the Muslim League and its founder. They have left a legacy of such thinking in the minds of some over here. This is an extraordinary phenomenon.

When you talk of Mahatma Gandhi, you think of his basic ideals and try to realise what he has done for our country. Many of you who are young have only an emotional conception of Mahatma Gandhi's work. You might have seen him in the later days, addressing prayer meetings. But those of us who have worked with him throughout these thirty years and who saw him moulding the mighty mass of Indian humanity, trying to bring together the disunited elements and make them function in a cooperative way in a common task and in the common struggle, know what he is to us. It is a wonderful thing what he did for the country. You cannot realise, however much as you may read or hear his speeches, the wonderful nature of his work. Such an experience comes to a nation once in long ages. It came to us, and those of us who were intimately connected with him can never forget it.

Looking at this portrait, think of what he stood for. Nations do not become great if their people engage themselves in petty things. If India is to be great, as no doubt she is bound to be, it is essential that you think in a big way and keep your integrity of purpose. *Jai Hind*.

### 3. Message for Community Church of New York<sup>1</sup>

I send my greetings and good wishes on the occasion of the dedication of the hall of worship of the Community Church of New York which has stood

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1948. File No. 9(37)/48-PMS.



for these many years for the service of all without distinction of sect, class, nation or race. I do so with special pleasure because I have the privilege to know Dr. John Haynes Holmes<sup>2</sup> who has interpreted Mahatma Gandhi's teachings in the United States of America. In these days of strife and conflict all over the world it is more necessary than ever to hold to our anchor and to adhere to the basic principles for which Mahatma Gandhi lived and died. The Community Church has stood for some of these principles in an age when almost everything seems to be fluid and changing. I trust that the idea and the message for which the Community Church has stood will spread and give stability to men's minds in these days of storm and strife.

2. Dr. John Haynes Holmes was Pastor of the Community Church of New York from 1907 to 1949.

#### 4. To David Brynley<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 August, 1948

Dear Mr. Brynley,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th July and the two photographs of Clare Leighton's<sup>2</sup> portraits of Mahatma Gandhi. I like these pictures very much and I would certainly like them to come to India. I have not heard from Clare Leighton and I am not sure of her present address. As soon as I hear from her I shall write to her myself. Meanwhile, I shall be grateful to you if you would kindly let her know how much I appreciate these portraits and my desire that India should have them. I have no idea whatever of what payment we should make for them. I should like her to give me some indication.

Thanking you once again.

I am,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(270)/48-PMS.

2. Clare Leighton (b. 1899); English artist and cousin of Winston Churchill. She painted these portraits during Mahatma Gandhi's visit to London in 1931.

## 5. Gandhi Jayanti<sup>1</sup>

For many years we have celebrated the Gandhi Jayanti Week in the sunshine of Gandhiji's presence with us. This year that light is not present. Yet perhaps the light is there and only our eyes have grown dim. The week comes again to remind us of that great presence and his noble message. We shall celebrate it, no doubt, with formal and ceremonial meetings. But how many of us will see that light or feel again how vital this message is.

Let us think of him more specially during this week and try to make our little selves respond to the old teachings. That is the best way to celebrate the week.

But in addition to this some more visible symbol is necessary and that is offered by the Memorial Fund which has been raised to further that message. I hope therefore that each one of us will contribute to the best of his ability to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Fund.

1. Message on the occasion of the Gandhi Birthday-Week, 27 September 1948. From *National Herald*, 28 September 1948.

## 6. Mahatma Gandhi<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, brothers and sisters,  
In three days' time I am leaving India for a few days. After a long interval I am going to visit some foreign countries. I am not going for a rest or for entertainment but as a representative of the Government of India, to participate in some important talks to be held in London and Paris. Earlier, every time I went abroad people would ask me various questions about India, and I would answer them freely and with some pride. A large part of the questions and answers would invariably be about Mahatma Gandhi, because in the eyes of the world India was and is still regarded as Gandhi's country. Mahatma Gandhi's name was a household word among the poor and the rich alike, even if they did not know where exactly India was loca-

1. Speech at a public meeting in Delhi on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, 2 October 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.) Maulana Azad presided.



ted on the map. Therefore, whenever India was mentioned, they would ask about Mahatma Gandhi, his principles, his personal life, etc. Well, I was not particularly qualified to speak much about his philosophy. Still I used to tell them whatever I had understood of his philosophy.

Why is India given so much respect in the world today? Some of us may be under a mistaken impression that it is because of some great feat of ours that India is so well known and respected. The fact is that, if we leave aside our ancient wealth, which constitutes culture and civilization for which India has been held in respect by intelligent people all over the world for a long time, the respect which India commands in today's complex world is because of Gandhiji's work and the message that he gave to the world through India. We have been living on that treasure, that wealth, and thus instead of increasing it, we have then spent out of it and thus decreased it. The treasure is still lasting because it is a big treasure. But it is obvious that however big it may be, if you do not put in anything in it but keep drawing from it, it will go on dwindling. So the question before us is how we can increase that wealth. It cannot be done merely by holding meetings and praising Mahatma Gandhi. We have to put his teachings into practice as a nation, as a community and as individuals to increase that wealth.

Another strange thing is that while judging India's actions, whether they are right or wrong, foreign countries do not use the yardstick of ordinary countries but judge from this viewpoint as to what Mahatma Gandhi would have done in a particular circumstance and what yardstick he would have used. Well, it is open to debate whether it is permissible or desirable for any country or individual to put before us a thing which he does not practise himself or in which he himself does not believe and judge us from that yardstick. It is not a very reasonable thing. For instance, the United States and the countries of Europe follow their own peculiar paths, but judge our activities from a different standard. Whether it is proper or not, I am prepared to accept that too. I want that we should be measured by the same high standard which Gandhiji set before us. It is also obvious that we fall a bit short of that standard because we are really short from that standpoint, though because of him we grew, the nation grew, the country made progress and became free, and we did many big things by following his instructions. It is also clear that the big things which he wanted and the very high lessons which he taught us, we could not put them into practice fully. In spite of this, I would like if some other country or some one in our own country constantly reminds us of those high standards and measures us by them to see whether we attained those standards or not.

Well, I said to you I am leaving in three days' time. Whenever I went abroad earlier, I used to tell the people there about our struggle for freedom, our principles and the basic principles kept before us by Mahatma Gandhi.



He gave us those principles but in fact the whole world can benefit from them and use them to find a way out of the present-day world which is full of conflicts. People are sick of this and are looking around for a way out. They are inclined sometimes to think that perhaps the way shown by Mahatma Gandhi to India and through India to the world is the right way. I used to tell them all this. Now the question arises in my mind, what shall I say in reply to the questions that will undoubtedly be put to me? I cannot say many things with the same clarity as I used to say earlier. You have bestowed honour upon me and made me the Prime Minister, which is a position of respect and responsibility, and said so many things about me, though some of them do not make any sense. But the fact is that when I go abroad this time, I do not know how I can repeat what I used to say in the past, because it is not proper that I should speak highly of my country or its present policies if they are not completely true. It would be presumptuous to say such things because whatever the facts, they are all known and anyone can see them or read about them. If I say anything beyond that I will be proved a liar and a boaster, which is not proper. Then the question before me is, what should I say? Because the pre-independence period was different; it was an old period when these new responsibilities had not come to us. We used to make mistakes even then, and we used to accept them also, more or less. But now we have responsibilities which have to be shouldered not only by me and my colleagues in the Government but by every citizen—man and woman—in the country as it happens in every free country. The responsibility for running the country rests to some extent on all of you. In a country which is not free, or where there is an autocratic rule, or where all the powers are concentrated in the hands of an emperor or a king, there you can say that all the responsibilities rest with him, even though his responsibilities are shared by other people also who with bent heads tolerate their slavery. But when a country calls itself free, the responsibility is divided among all the individuals. So we have to see whatever we have done how far it fulfils those things and how far we have followed those principles which we admire very much but perhaps pay very little attention to them and practise them still less. When such a question arises it is obvious that I have to accept that we have made many mistakes and strayed from our path, so much so that we have hurt very much the feelings of that man whom we praise so much. The last few years of his life were full of grief and pain because he saw his life's teachings crumbling, and people around him behaving in a manner wholly opposed to his teachings. So he was too much hurt and troubled and death for him was a happy event. Though we were shocked and grieved, he even through his death proved his firmness to adhere to the principles which he had followed throughout his life.

However, I shall go to other countries and tell them something about the affairs in India and also try to answer their questions as truthfully as possible. If there is any weakness in us, I shall accept it because it cannot be hidden however much I or anyone else may try to hide it. I shall stick to the principles that I have always been taught. But I would like to say at least one thing that though we made many mistakes and showed much weakness, that light is still before us which guides us like a beacon. We stumble and fall, but we get up again and march forward towards it. I must say that a time came when many people strayed from the right path. In fact, they, all of us, the entire country and even other countries were under the grip of a kind of madness, which led to many evils. But we came out of that difficulty too. We picked ourselves up and slowly we are going along the right path. I have a right to say at least this much, and you and the people of India can assure me on this point. If it is not true to say that we look in that direction and make efforts to the best of our ability to move along that path, then I and other people who are in some responsible posts are faced with two questions. One is that we may have to accept that due to some reason or other, looking at the prevailing circumstances in the world, we find it difficult or impossible to adhere to those principles, and so we should take another path, which means we should abandon those principles. Thus we should think on this line and be clear about it. Or, secondly, if the country wishes to go in another direction, then why should we take the responsibility for it? We must continue to abide by those very principles and try to combat the new trend, even if we have to operate from a new place and adopt new methods. Therefore, this question must be cleared up. I put this question to you and to the nation, not as an individual, not as Jawaharlal, but as the Prime Minister of the country, so that this thing should be cleared up, because in regard to this matter I and my government hold the same view, that we must always keep the fundamental principles taught by Mahatma Gandhi before us and follow them, though we may sometimes show some weakness in doing so. But that is a different matter. And if the country does not hold this view then it should make some other arrangement. But we will follow the same path. It is my feeling that, in spite of the many voices which are raised in the country, in some newspapers, speeches, etc., trying to divert people's attention in a wrong direction, and, in spite of the fact that lots of irrelevant things are being said in the country today, India's millions are still in favour of the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi. So this gives me strength to say both in India as well as outside what the majority of the people think. Many people may not agree with me because they are carried away by what others say or what the newspapers report. So I would like to say that the moment I lose the right and have no permission to say this on behalf of India, I



will stop saying it on behalf of India, but will continue saying it on my own behalf.

I keep thinking on those fundamental lessons which Mahatma Gandhi kept before us, and not only kept before us but practised them himself for thirty years and tried that the whole of India should follow them. We have grown up in his shadow. We did not even realize the full extent of his influence on us because one gets accustomed to everything. We became accustomed to Gandhiji also and to living with him and working with him, and slowly his influence grew in us—some people were influenced more and some less. Well, what is the great lesson that he taught? I will not repeat it because as you know, it has been repeated so many times. Maulana Saheb also said something about him just now. The question is of the basic principle. If I and you have grasped that principle then even mistakes can be rectified. Please do not think that Mahatmaji was such a man that he never committed any mistakes. He made so many mistakes. I dare say this to you. But if a man adheres firmly to a right principle and truth then his mistake also does not remain a mistake. His mistake is a small thing, a superficial thing because his basic root is strong, it is one of truth. A mistake is an outer thing which anybody can commit. And this mistake does not cause any harm. So the question is whether we adhere to those fundamental principles and truth or not. Even if we adhere to them we will make mistakes, but those mistakes will not harm us.

Mahatma Gandhi taught us the lessons of non-cooperation and satyagraha. The world saw us following that path but in its opinion we were not fully successful. We were unsuccessful, it is true. But if you think about it carefully then you will realise that though outwardly we were unsuccessful in reality we were successful, because we were following the right path, the path of truth, although the British Government used to put millions of people behind the bars, imposed repressive laws and took many other such measures and completely put an end to the political life of the nation. Seeing this some people felt that the Congress was finished and completely crushed. But the very next day you saw the same Congress standing up again with redoubled vigour. What was the reason for it? It was because fundamentally we were going along the right path under Mahatma Gandhi's guidance, and however much we were suppressed, the real strength of the nation did not decrease; in fact, it increased. So in following the right path we do not have to worry about immediate results. But if we follow a wrong path it may bring us some temporary gain but will not take us very far. Even an ordinary person, by adopting devious ways, is not benefited for long. If nations or countries adopt such methods they fall and ultimately are ruined. However, such nations do not become great nations. Therefore, we have to follow the principles taught by Mahatmaji.



Independent India is young, though, historically speaking, it is an ancient country. It is again and again rejuvenated. We have to decide in which direction the young India which is really only a year old should go, whether we should accept certain principles or not? Please put this question to yourselves and search its answer because the answer should not only be uttered but it should influence your lives, your minds, your thinking and actions. A country is not built up in parliament or assembly buildings where laws are made but by the ideas and feelings of the hundreds and thousands of its people, and by their application. That is how a nation is built up gradually, brick by brick, and each one of its citizens is responsible for its building or breaking up. Laws only express something which is already decided in the people's minds, and if they do not reflect the people's thinking, then they are useless and cannot last because it is difficult to implement such laws as are imposed from above. Therefore, it is your and our duty to do something every day for the development of the young, for independent India, by our ideas and actions.

Please do not think that ideas are of no use. Ideas or thoughts are very important and can achieve a great deal. As Gautama Buddha said, a man's thoughts shape his personality. A man's actions do influence others, but if his heart is full of hatred and revenge then gradually his personality is moulded accordingly and the feelings of others also similarly turn against him. If a nation or country harbours such thoughts then it starts moving in that direction and every day it treads that path more and more. Thus we can mould the attitude of the country by our day-to-day activities and thinking.

Just now Maulana Saheb mentioned two, three things. Talking about Hyderabad, he was happy because of the fact that in those few delicate days the people of all the religions lived quite peacefully and there were no quarrels or fights or tensions anywhere though there were a large number of people ready to instigate and incite. So it was something deserving of congratulations. But apart from that, there is another big aspect of it: suddenly a thin curtain which had covered our eyes was removed. As a matter of fact even we had doubts in our hearts as to where do the people of India stand, what do they think and how shall they react? Nobody could say with confidence what the reality was because the events in the recent past have created barriers among peoples and so they cannot see each other's heart and understand each other's mind. However, that curtain was removed and we saw that the people of India were still firm on certain basic principles and had not strayed so much as we had thought. And if they had strayed they came back and assumed their former selves. So we became reassured and our strength also grew with it, and the people of the country—Hindu, Muslim and Sikh—regained their confidence. Thus the fear—fear

of each other—which is a most dangerous thing for a nation or country was removed.

Fear is a peculiar thing. In my opinion, there is nothing more dangerous and harmful than fear. Almost all the evils are because of such fear and often crimes are also committed because of it. Long years ago—almost thirty-five years ago—when Mahatma Gandhi entered the political arena, he said something which was extremely simple and uncomplicated. You and I may present complicated arguments but Mahatma Gandhi was a man of a few words and his words were pointed and would present the essence of an argument. He did not enter into long arguments like some of our leaders did in those days, both in the Congress and outside. I remember I was deeply impressed, for being young I was more impressionable. He began telling the simple farmers to abandon fear. He said to them, “Why are you afraid? Do not be afraid. What is the use of being afraid? It is possible you may be punished, there may be some loss to you, but face it. If you are afraid, you harm yourself more than others and kill yourself a thousand times before your actual death”. Thus his magic chant—“Do not be afraid”—spread all over India. The poor as well as the rich, the ordinary farmer, worker and the zamindar, everybody lived in fear those days. Even our greatest leaders would not dare say things openly against the government at meetings and elsewhere. They said them in whispers. This was the situation. I do not think that it was wholly due to fear or that all of them were cowards. But it had become a way of life, a complicated and secret way. If a matter went to the court, and there was a charge of sedition the person concerned would deny having said it or would say that he did not mean to say so. Mahatma Gandhi came and taught us a lesson—“fear not, face everything with truth, admit your mistake”. It was a small thing but behind it there was a man greater than a mountain in strength and energy. That little thing changed the entire atmosphere—it was not changed by any law or any other thing. After all, the starving population continued to starve and the weak did not gain any physical strength, but that little thing generated a kind of inner strength in them and thus the whole atmosphere changed. This was most visible not among the educated people but among those poor people and in their thinking who had suffered beatings and other indignities throughout their life. Their backs were straightened and their heads raised a little and they began to respect themselves.

Well, I reminded you of the past. But these days wherever you look, towards India or Pakistan or anywhere in the world, you will find that the greatest thing in the world today is fear. Undoubtedly no one in the world today wants any major war because everyone fully knows that if there is a major war there will be so great a destruction that it is difficult to imagine. But everybody is preparing for war even at a great price. Why? Because, every country is afraid of what might happen tomorrow and it is afraid of



its neighbouring country. So it prepares for war. Big conferences and meetings are held to find out a solution but because of mutual fear there are no frank discussions in those meetings. Fear dominates the whole world.

I just mentioned Hyderabad. Earlier, what did people say about it? I was confident that nothing untoward will happen. Many people and specially foreign newspapers used to say that if the Indian Union took any action in Hyderabad there would immediately be terrible communal riots between the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs all over the country<sup>2</sup>, that it could even lead to a war between India and Pakistan, and that many other things would happen. They were all trying to create fear in us and we were somewhat worried also as to what would happen. All this would happen because of fear. A man can face a wild animal but it is very difficult to face an imaginary fear because there is no limit to it and it changes every day. Now, what did the incident of Hyderabad show? What were its consequences? What were the feelings of the Hindus? I am speaking frankly because these are not things that can be hidden. The Hindus were scared that a large number of Muslims who were in sympathy with Hyderabad might react and cause them harm. It was baseless fear. But some less intelligent people specially among the Muslims thought that as they were in a minority—though there are millions of Muslims and they are a minority only when compared to the rest of the population—there would be reprisals and atrocities. They were afraid that if Kasim Razvi misbehaved in Hyderabad, the non-Muslims would take revenge elsewhere.

Thus the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, all are afraid of each other and this vicious circle of fear goes on. Each community fears that another community will do something against it. This kind of fear makes a community do wrong things and then another community also commits such things.

Now, I give you another example. Long ago there was a time when I was interested in hunting. Whatever my interest in it, I did not gain much success in that field. Well, apart from hunting I had always been interested in wild animals and still am interested in them. And though it is rather odd for me to say so, yet somehow I find more humanity in wild animals than in human beings. This is also a reason why I sometimes try to escape from human beings and go to wild beasts. But believe me, there is no wild animal which would attack another, or even a human being, except in two circumstances—one, when it is hungry and, secondly, when it is faced with fear. If an animal is hungry and its food is another animal then the former will attack the latter. If you leave aside the question of hunger, then no animal would attack another animal except because of fear. A snake bites a man because it fears an attack from him and so it bites in self-defence. All ani-

2. *The Times* (London) and many other papers had predicted widespread communal disturbances.



imals, including tigers, fear human beings and rightly so because the latter are wilder than the former.

So fear is a very strange thing. As I was mentioning, by the example of Hyderabad, the fear in the people of India suddenly disappeared, be they Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs. Almost 90 per cent of the fear has gone and mutual confidence has been restored. Each community feels reassured that its fear is unnecessary and that the other community is not interested in harming it. So the picture of India has changed completely and the people's hearts are lighter and calmer. This has immediately increased the strength of the country and the nation and every individual has gained by it. Such events have a magical effect on communities. As I told you, forty years ago, Mahatma Gandhi produced such a magical effect. Please remember that this effect of Hyderabad has been felt not only here but also in Hyderabad itself to a great degree. So there is no doubt that something which has such a good influence is desirable.

Well, our fear has been lessened, but even now, I would say, there are some people, though not many in number, who sometimes fear in their hearts that Pakistan would attack India. They are actually always looking for something to fear and thus carry a burden of misery. They go on saying. "Be prepared to face an attack by Pakistan; do this, do that for it, build a strong barrier like the Great Wall of China between India and Pakistan; and take all precautionary measures". They always talk like this. So naturally some people who hear such things become panicky. The general public also, when it hears that some danger is imminent, becomes full of fear. Thus these people, instead of making the country stronger, make it weaker. Fortunately, the number of such people is less or it has become less because our country has started realising its strength and as mutual relations improve the fear also is lessened. But I am sorry that some such people are still there; and they always say wrong things.

But if you look at Pakistan and read its newspapers and the speeches of its leaders, as I do, you will be surprised to find out what the matter is. In which world are Pakistan and we living? Leave aside their feelings and emotions. Take the facts. The news that are published in their newspapers about India, Delhi and Hyderabad do not have any connection with facts; they were all concocted. I do not know where from they got a treasure of lies out of which they go on distributing them. About five weeks ago, in the last week of August—I think it was 24th or 25th or 26th of August as far as I remember—all the newspapers of Pakistan, in Lahore and Kashmir, were suddenly filled with reports under big headlines that large-scale killings were going on in Delhi and that streams of blood were flowing on the streets of Delhi. This I am telling you happened about a month ago. You are residents of Delhi and so you know very well what happened and what did not happen in Delhi last month. Similarly, when the Hydera-

bad incident took place, there were reports every day in their newspapers that there was bloodshed all over India, while the fact is that no period in India passed more peacefully than that. As you know, in the case of the intervention of Hyderabad our army did not get a chance for a big battle. It went on advancing and whatever little opposition there was it overcame it and moved forward. If anybody had read the Pakistani newspapers in those days, he would have thought that the Indian forces were meeting reverses every day, that they had been thrown out from there and that the Hyderabad State forces were moving towards Bombay and Madras. Please note that the military action was started by us—on the 13th of September at four o'clock in the morning. From the 16th the other side became very weak and on the 17th they surrendered completely, though we had come to know on the 16th itself as to what was going to happen. And till the noon on the 17th or rather till the one o'clock news it was being propagated in Pakistan through the newspapers and perhaps through the radio also—but I am not sure about the radio—that the Indian forces were losing and that the Hyderabad forces had marched into the land of the Indian Union. Whereas in India on the 17th at four o'clock for the first time it was announced that the Hyderabad forces had laid down arms and surrendered. So you can imagine what the millions of newspaper readers in Pakistan would think. After all, they had to believe what they read in the newspapers or heard over the radio. So they could not be blamed for that. Suppose they realized that the news was exaggerated, but if anybody or even you read the same thing every day, it was bound to have an impact on the mind. I would like to warn you that many of our newspapers too cannot claim to adhere to the truth strictly. Even a truth can be expressed in a distorted form and it generally happens so. But no Indian newspaper can compete with the newspapers of Pakistan in this respect. You can very well imagine the mental condition of those people who read one thing till 12 o'clock and at 10 o'clock just the opposite of what happened. They were completely bewildered and shocked and worried as to where they stood. Their world was turned upside down. There was a wave of anger too against their newspapers and radio for deceiving them.

I am telling you all this in the context of fear. Their newspapers are filled with news that India is about to attack. When they read the same thing every day, they naturally feel panicky. Some of them start making some preparations in their own way and thus day by day the atmosphere gets vitiated. Not only their newspapers, even their leaders talk of such things in their speeches. Thus because of fear their eyes closed and so they can neither see a right thing nor understand it. Thus fear causes ruin.

Well, my voice cannot reach Pakistan and even if it does, I do not know what effect it will have there. But the main point which I wish to tell you and the people of India is that we must cast off fear completely, fear of one





AT RAJGHAT, NEW DELHI, 15 AUGUST 1948





AT RED FORT, NEW DELHI, 15 AUGUST 1948

another and of Pakistan or any other country. Please remember that fear can mean two things. First, a man is stunned out of fear. Second, a man who shouts much and calls for an attack on Pakistan, if you examine him closely you will find that there is a fear in his mind which makes him say such things. It is not a sign of bravery. If a man makes a great deal of noise, it means that he has lost some of his moorings. A strong man does not react in this way. For example, if a child throws a stone at you, you do not start jumping about like a mad man. You treat it as an act of an innocent child and ignore it. But if there is a weak man he might possibly make much noise and try to emulate the child. What I mean is that we have to look at these things dispassionately. First, because it is consistent with our tradition and knowledge and, secondly, our strength remains intact by this. Shouting is not a sign of strength but of weakness.

I would like humbly to point out to the newspapermen also that there is a way of presenting news or expressing views on them. They can be written in such a manner as if one is shouting. It is done so perhaps in the hope that the newspaper may sell more. But it is a sign of weakness. Take, for instance, motor cars. Powerful, big and costly cars make very little noise. They run silently with their own power. But if you buy a secondhand, cheap Ford car, it will make a terrible noise but that does mean that there is strength behind it. That noise, is a sign of extreme breathlessness and poor strength. Similarly, when an individual or a nation or a newspaper makes much noise and says something by shouting, whether by mouth or printed headlines, it is a sign of weakness. It is not a sign of dignified nations or newspapers. Yes, sometimes a nation or an individual has to say something forcefully. Then it should be said forcefully, but by shouting it does not become more forceful, rather it becomes weak. Many of you saw and heard Mahatma Gandhi. Did you ever hear or see him speak loudly or shouting? His voice was always even, in grief as well as in happiness. Even if he wished to explain something very forcefully, his voice was never raised. He used select words. Therefore, we should give up the habit of shouting, whether in speeches or discussions or in newspapers, because after all it is a sign of weakness. I would like to say to the people of Pakistan also, whether my voice reaches them or not, that today Pakistan may be a different country and it may be opposed to us, but after all till yesterday they were Indians. Political changes and even conflicts should not affect this relationship.

So I wish to tell the people of Pakistan, if my words can reassure them, that they should remove fear from their hearts. Nobody is going to attack them. There are many reasons for that. But I want to tell you quite clearly that we do not at all want to attack Pakistan and invite trouble. From every point of view it is a useless effort. So I wish to say quite clearly that India has no intention at all of attacking Pakistan. It would be better for them and for us if they, instead of creating a war hysteria out of fear, devoted them-



selves to peaceful activities. It is true that in Kashmir, the Indian forces are fighting with the Pakistani troops; please remember that the fighting is going on not in Pakistan but in Kashmir, that is, on our land, the land of the Indian Union. It is a complicated matter but behind all the complexities, a few things are quite clear. First, the fighting is going on on our soil and so we are not the aggressors; the other party who has come is the aggressor. Secondly, this fact was first denied. Pakistan had denied it. Later on they had to accept that their troops had come in. Thus when these two things are certain, it becomes clear that they are guilty, however much we may argue about it. This is the basic thing.

As I said yesterday in Srinagar at a public meeting,<sup>3</sup> it is strange that we, the followers of Mahatma Gandhi, should have got entangled in so many problems and internal feuds, and had to undertake, in the very first year of our life, a war in Kashmir and some military action in Hyderabad. It is difficult to understand how we went on getting involved in such things. I deeply regret that so many mistakes have been committed by us in India in the last one year. But I have no qualms about Kashmir and Hyderabad. I felt that they were not only necessary but, if we had not interfered in them, it would have been an act of cowardice and extremely harmful.

So we have to look at the Kashmir issue in this light, that we are not the aggressors and that all the long statements and threats that are published repeatedly in the Pakistan newspapers saying that Pakistan cannot exist without Kashmir and that it is a matter of life and death to them are meaningless. An argument is given that there are certain rivers which have their origins in Kashmir and which flow through West Punjab, and if Pakistan does not get Kashmir, perhaps the course of those rivers will be changed. Science, no doubt, is a very powerful factor today and can work miracles, but changing the direction of rivers and diverting them upwards, towards the sky, is beyond comprehension. It is said so either to deceive the people or out of sheer panic, which is absurd. After all, there is tension at present in Kashmir, Pakistan and in some other places. It is obvious that a time will come, if not today, six months or a year hence, when these developments will come to an end and there will be normal relations as between two neighbouring countries. There will be trade relations, people will visit each other's country and all other things will happen specially between such countries as have mutual relations for a thousand years. So all these things are bound to happen and it is absurd to say that there will be mutual rivalries.

Leave aside Pakistan. Kashmir is an extraordinary place. India and Pakistan are on its borders and the Soviet Union, China and Tibet are also close to the border. All these are big countries. Kashmir will have trade

3. See *post*, section on Kashmir, item dated 1 October 1948.



relations with all these countries. It had trade relations with them in the past also and they will be maintained. It may be a part of India, it is another thing. But that is not going to make any difference in its trade relations and other connections. Therefore, why this fear and panic? So it is not proper for the newspapers of Pakistan to exaggerate the importance of this issue by saying that it is a matter of life and death, etc. At the beginning of the military action in Hyderabad also they misled the people, and so it was a big shock to them when they heard the news of the surrender by the Hyderabad forces. Therefore, I say it is not proper to exaggerate things and incite the people.

One thing is quite clear that during the last one year, or eleven months, the aggressors came over to Kashmir and committed great atrocities, and we faced them and stopped them. So it is certain that we will in no case allow them to come there again. It is also clear, if you think about and consider it, that India is strong enough to be able to stop them and defend Kashmir. So why say such things as do not serve any purpose but increase the problems for them and others? We have to remove this fear.

Just now I heard Maulana Saheb telling you about the mosques of Delhi. I was also very sorry about this. Though the Maulana said that, after all, a place of worship was a house of God whether it was a mosque or a temple, the reality is that when a mosque is converted into a temple or a temple is converted into a mosque it is not done in the name of God but out of a feeling of revenge and for a showdown. How can it remain a house of God then, whether it is a temple or a mosque? Such things are done only with a view to creating conflicts and so are bad. Otherwise also it is bad. To bring religion into it is to discredit religion.

As you know I am not much of a religious man but at least I do follow certain principles. I cannot understand how a Hindu can think that he has rendered service to his religion by forcibly converting a mosque into a temple. It is not the way of following the principles of one's religion or promoting them. I want to tell you that the conversion of mosques into temples has discredited us much in India and outside. It pricked like a thorn. I want to congratulate all those people who helped in accomplishing this work of rebuilding the mosques. The Maulana mentioned the names of several people including that of Sardar Patel who helped in this task a great deal. The officers of Delhi also worked very hard for it. There is a special committee for this work, whose Secretary Mehrchand Khanna and others, also made great efforts. All these people deserve congratulations. But the people who really deserve congratulations are the refugees who had taken shelter here and who willingly did this work with their hands, because, please always remember, doing a right thing in life is good. But only doing a right thing is not enough. A right thing has to be done by right means. This is a fundamental thing. And the fundamental lesson taught by

Mahatma Gandhi is that it is not enough to say that our end is good. The means to attain that end also should be good. If you want to attain a good end by bad means, then that good end also becomes bad. The manner of doing this job has been good and so I am happy about it. This has also strengthened us. There are still some such mosques in Delhi. But refugees are living in them. We have to get all of them vacated and show that we do not do any such thing in future. It is our responsibility to give them some other accommodation. Maybe that accommodation is not very good. It may be merely a tent. But we shall certainly make some arrangement. I wish today we could finally decide that this work would be done in a week or ten days' time. But I am sure that this work will be done and done properly and that we will get help from you and from the people of Delhi.

Yes, one thing comes to my mind in this connection. I am going to London and then to Paris. In Paris, as you know, there is a big conference of the U.N. General Assembly. The U.N.O. came into being after the Second World War to maintain peace in the world and to prevent further wars. It was based on very high ideals but there is always a suspicion as to how far they can be adhered to in practice. This suspicion is not unfounded but at the same time it has to be kept in mind that any big work, which involves millions of people and their emotions and quarrels between dozens of countries, becomes extremely complicated. People meet at the U.N. and make efforts to settle the problems of the world, but nobody can predict how far they will be successful. There is talk of another war, and if that comes about it will engulf the whole world and no one knows which area will be safe. My own feeling is that for some time there will be no major war, though no one can say so for all the time. In fact, at this time no big power is prepared for a war. But every country is in the grip of the same fear. Each thinks that if it does not reply back in a louder tone it may perhaps be considered a weakness on its part. So every country speaks loudly, and there is so much noise that one cannot understand what talk is going on.

There are a great many problems<sup>4</sup> before the United Nations but no such atmosphere has been created in the world so far which could settle those problems. Of course, we feel bad and we may criticize the U.N. from afar, for we have the right to do so, but we must look at ourselves too and see how, in spite of the great lessons and ideals put before us by Mahatma Gandhi, we indulged in rioting and killing before his very eyes. Human emotions are very strange. So we have to bear all this in mind, but should not think that nothing good is going to happen in the world, nor that it is the fault of any one nation or individual. I have no doubt in my mind that

4. Indonesia, Indians in South Africa, the Greek question, the problem of admission of new members, Trieste, Palestine, the Czechoslovak question, British troops in Egypt, Spain, Korea's independence, and voting procedure in the Security Council were among the issues before the Security Council.



a day will surely come, if the whole world is not destroyed by that time, when there will be a world order, because there is no other way left for the world. If the world continues to exist in fragments and if those fragments have the power to fight among themselves, the world will be destroyed. So, a world order is bound to emerge at some time or other, but we do not know when, because it cannot be brought about by an order. It has to come about through the efforts of men all over the world.

What is the use of pointing a finger at others? We have to examine ourselves and ask whether we are worthy of it at this time. Is India worthy of it? Is Pakistan worthy of it? When we see our present condition we feel a bit ashamed of ourselves. The fact is that all the nations of the world desire peace, nobody wants a war because war brings ruin. But they get involved in war because their leaders and the media incite them and thus they die in lakhs and crores. So I feel that whatever the weaknesses in the United Nations, after all it is the idea behind it which counts, because it is a great idea which can take us towards peace. Even if we evolve some other way to maintain peace in the world, we will have to have something similar to the United Nations. So even if we feel disappointed, we have to pin our hopes on the United Nations and continue to make efforts to make it strong because if it collapses what will happen after it? Then there will be an open field. There will again be wars and feuds; there is no intermediate path. So on behalf of India we gave respect to the United Nations. The United Nations took some action against India too, which we did not like, still we respected that organization. You may remember that we took the Kashmir issue to the U.N. We did not quite like the way the U.N. Council dealt with it, but we showed to the world how much we tried to depend on such a big panchayat of the world. I feel we were right at that time and we should continue this process. It does not mean that we should present legal disputes there. What I mean is that we should try to increase the strength of the U.N. It is easy to find fault with almost anything and there are, no doubt, weaknesses and shortcomings in the United Nations, but the question is what else is there which can probably save the world and lead it to the path of peace? I cannot perceive an alternative, so we will have to push it forward slowly and make the organization grow. If it does not grow, it will mean trouble for the world. This has been our policy towards it and in future also we shall follow the same policy.

I shall have the opportunity of meeting the representatives of various big countries at the U.N. in Paris and I shall say to them that even if the U.N. was not there India would always want peace in the world. We want freedom in the world for every country and nation, and we want a world organization of such countries. As the United Nations is there we have the satisfaction that at least some organization is there which sometimes may



commit mistakes, but the fundamental principles on which it is based are right principles. We believe in those fundamental principles and want to help that organization in following those principles. We want other nations also to do so, because if we do not do so there is no other way left except that of war. So this is the message I want to carry there; and this is a message which is somewhat akin to the principles of the Mahatma, and is not wrong, though his principles were very high and had far-reaching effects. So I can give this message there with a sense of strength. *Jai Hind.*

## 7. Keeping Faith with the Mahatma<sup>1</sup>

Friends and comrades,

What shall I say to you on this day which is especially dedicated to the memory of him whom we call the Father of the Nation. I shall not speak to you today as Prime Minister of India, but as Jawaharlal, a pilgrim like you in India's long journey to freedom, and one whose high privilege it was to learn the service of India and of truth at the feet of the Master. Nor will I say much to you about the problems of the day, which fill our minds and demand continuous attention. Rather I would like to speak about those basic things which Gandhiji taught us and without which life would be superficial and empty.

He taught us the love of truth and straight dealing, not only in our individual life but also in public affairs and in the intercourse of nations. He taught us the dignity of man and of man's labour. He repeated the old lesson that out of hatred and violence, nothing but hatred and violence and destruction can result. And so, he taught us the way of fearlessness, of unity, of tolerance and of peace.

How far have we lived up to this teaching? Not very far, I fear, and yet we learnt much, and under his guidance we achieved our country's freedom by peaceful methods. But at the very moment of deliverance, we became forgetful and strayed into evil ways, causing infinite pain to that great heart which throbbed continuously for India and for the great truths that India has embodied through ages past.

What of today? When we remember him and praise him and sometimes childishly talk of putting up his statues, do we give thought to the

1. Broadcast from All India Radio, Delhi, on 2 October 1948 at 8.30 p.m. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

great message for which he lived and died? I fear all of us are still very far from living up to that message. But I do believe that the great forces that he set in motion are working silently, but powerfully, to move India in the direction he had desired. There are other forces also, forces of disruption and untruth, violence and narrow-mindedness, which work in the opposite direction. Between the two there is an unceasing conflict, as between the forces of good and evil, there is conflict all over the world. If we honour the memory of Gandhiji, we must do so actively, by working ceaselessly for the causes he represented.

I am proud of my country, proud of my national inheritance and proud of many things. But I speak to you not in pride, but with all humility. For events have humbled me, and often shamed me, and the dream of India that I have had has sometimes grown dim. I have loved India and sought to serve her, not because of her geographical magnitude, not even because she was great in the past, but because of my faith in her today, and my belief that she will stand for truth and freedom, and the higher things of life.

Do you want India to stand for these great aims and ideals which Gandhiji placed before us? If so then you will have to think and act in accordance with them, and not allow yourself to be carried away by the passion of the moment or by thoughts of petty advantage. You will have to root out every tendency that weakens the nation, whether it is communalism, separatism, religious bigotry, provincialism or class arrogance.

We have said repeatedly that we will not tolerate any communalism in this country, and that we are building a free secular state, where every religion and belief has full freedom and equal honour, where every citizen has equal liberty and equal opportunity. In spite of this some people still talk in a language which smacks of communalism and separatism. I want to tell you that I am entirely opposed to this, and I expect you likewise to oppose it, with all your might, if you have faith in Gandhiji's teachings.

Another evil is that of provincialism, and of that we see a great deal today, running riot and forgetting the larger issues. That also has to be opposed and combated.

Some people have recently called India an aggressor nation. I can only say that they spoke out of ignorance. If India took to the ways of aggression against any other nation, there would be no place left for me, and for many of my colleagues in the Government of India. If we indulged in aggression, we should be false to all that we have stood for and all that Gandhiji taught us.

Pakistan, our neighbouring country, has exhibited a strange kind of psychology during the past few weeks. I have been astonished to read its newspapers and the public utterances of its leaders. These are utterances which have no relation to fact, but they succeed in fostering wild fears and fantasies. If the people of Pakistan have to read this literature of hatred and



fear from day to day, I am not surprised that they should form a picture of India in their minds which is completely divorced from reality. I deeply regret this, because as I have said before, I cannot think of the people of Pakistan as strangers. They have been our countrymen, and neither they nor we can rid ourselves of the past, or forget our close kinship, however much momentary passions may seem to divide us.

I would like to utter, in all earnestness and friendship, a note of warning to those who are carrying on an unscrupulous propaganda against India in Pakistan. They are doing an ill-service to their own country and to their own people.

I can assure the people of Pakistan that India has no aggressive designs against any country, least of all against Pakistan. We want Pakistan to live in peace, and to progress and to have the closest ties with us. There never will be any aggression from our side.

But, there has been aggression of a brutal and unforgiveable kind, aggression against the people of Kashmir and against the Indian Union. We met that aggression as any self-respecting country was bound to meet that. Memories are short, and it is well to remember what happened a little more than eleven months ago in Kashmir. Pakistan denied its complicity and, even in the face of incontrovertible facts, continues to deny it. It built up its case in the Security Council of the United Nations on this denial, and now it has had to admit that its armies are operating in Kashmir, which is Indian Union territory. History offers few parallels of a case built up so greatly on a complete denial of truth. The United Nations Commission proposed a truce. We accepted it. Pakistan in its pride and arrogance rejected it.

I want to tell you, as well as the people of Pakistan, and now I speak to you as the Prime Minister of India, that under no circumstances are we going to submit to this aggression. We shall fight it to the utmost, for it involves not only the freedom of Kashmir but also the honour of the Indian people and respect for the law of nations.

Many things have happened in India during the past year or so which have deeply pained me because they were evil and showed how we had failed in following the teachings of the Master. But I have no regret for what we did and are doing in Kashmir and Hyderabad. Indeed, if we had not done what we did and are doing in Kashmir and Hyderabad, then there would have been infinitely greater trouble, violence and misery. I would have been ashamed of India, if she had not run to the rescue of Kashmir, or gone to the aid of the people of Hyderabad, who were being crushed by an unscrupulous clique.

Whatever may happen in other countries, let us remain calm, and let us try to remain true to Gandhiji's teachings. If we keep faith with him, we shall keep faith with ourselves and with India and, all will be well with this country, so dear to us. *Jai Hind.*



## THE FIRST YEAR OF FREEDOM



## 1. Which Way Should We Go?<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President,<sup>2</sup> sisters and brothers.

Nearly a year ago, India was declared independent and in a manner she did become independent. We acquired the power and we have used it for good or bad. Often a doubt crosses my mind as to whether this freedom is complete in every sense. If it is freedom merely from foreign domination, it is true that we have got it. We are free to go which ever way we like, whether it is good or bad. But freedom does not mean only this. Freedom is something deeper, fuller in every sense, I am not sure how far we have achieved that kind of freedom. It is obvious that we cannot achieve it by changing a law or signing on a piece of paper. It has to come from within. I often wonder how far we have been able to create that sense of freedom within ourselves and even now, nearly a year later, all sorts of questions haunt my mind.

What was the last year like? Where are we now and in which direction shall we go? It is proper that we should take into account the good things that we have done for the development of the country, because it is not good to harp continuously on our mistakes and shortcomings. But at the same time it is extremely important for all of us, and especially for those who are in positions of responsibility and hold the reins of government in their hands, to pay attention to the things which remain to be done and to those things that have been done and the mistakes that we have made. It is dangerous to look at our good points only and feel that the bad that happens is the responsibility of others. So on this day and in the week beginning today, I want you to examine our mistakes and shortcomings and think how to eliminate them. I am trying to do so myself.

When we look back upon the past one year, we find that freedom came, and we, in this city of Delhi and all over India, celebrated its coming with great jubilation. But at the same time, even as the celebrations were going on, terrible events were also taking place, and you already know how they changed the complexion of the country and how much ruin they brought in their wake. Even now, a large number of our brothers and sisters are in the grip of those hardships which began at that time. So these things happened.

in positions of responsibility and hold the reins of government in their hands, to pay attention to the things which remain to be done and to those things that have been done and the mistakes that we have made. It is dangerous to look at our good points only and feel that the bad that happens is the responsibility of others. So on this day and in the week beginning today, I want you to examine our mistakes and shortcomings and think how to eliminate them. I am trying to do so myself.

When we look back upon the past one year, we find that freedom came, and we, in this city of Delhi and all over India, celebrated its coming with great jubilation. But at the same time, even as the celebrations were going on, terrible events were also taking place, and you already know how they changed the complexion of the country and how much ruin they brought in their



and many people were not aware of the price that had been paid long years ago. The price that had been paid, as well as those who had paid it, had been forgotten. The newcomers had not paid much of a price and hence when freedom came they did not value it as they should have done because they had got it, in their view, easily. So they neither realized fully its importance nor accepted the responsibilities that went with it.

The first thing to be understood is that freedom brings certain responsibilities and burdens with it and the nation which is incapable of shouldering them cannot remain free for long. Under foreign domination, responsibilities are shouldered and burdens are borne by foreign rulers. The loss, as well as the gain, is theirs and the people have no responsibilities; they are responsible neither for the good nor for the bad that happens. Hence they become irresponsible and develop habits of irresponsibility, and when they become independent, unless they learn to change their habits, they cannot run the country smoothly. Now in the last one year, we have been tested as to how far we have understood the responsibilities of freedom, how far we can shirk them, and also how far we can build up the nation and prevent the trouble-makers from destroying it.

Look around you and see what the situation is. It is obvious that the country has gained in strength since independence and we have been able to face tremendous difficulties and overcome them successfully. This alone shows how strong the country is, because the dangers which beset our newly independent country were tremendous, and I do not know if any other country in the world could have borne such an ordeal and come through it alive and free. What we have achieved is by no means something small. We have done other things too — we have changed the map of India and in many ways the map of the States. Gradually a new map of India began to emerge and an entirely new chapter in history was written, which you will have to read about in schools and colleges. You will have to study new maps, for the old ones are no longer valid. All these things happened, and it was not a small thing that we emerged from the shackles of 150 to 200 years of bondage and set our face towards a new direction. India showed remarkable strength of character, but at the same time her weaknesses were also very much in evidence and those weaknesses, as you know, were a result of the people's inability to understand that the times had changed and that they were required to function in an entirely new way. Those who have been irresponsible from the beginning are wilfully trying to destroy this new edifice. You should understand all this.

What was the biggest event of this year? The biggest event was not, in a sense, the fact that India was declared a politically independent country on the 15th August. The biggest event was, for this nation as well as the world, the passing away of one of India's and the world's greatest men and leaders on the 30th January. We were shocked, and not only India, but

the whole world was plunged into grief. I shall not talk of our grief, for the more I think about it the more it seems to me that, considered by the standards of today or any other time, the way Mahatma Gandhi died was a fitting end for him. I say it was fitting because, though you and I were heart-broken, historically speaking it was proper for a man to die like that. We, who are mere mortals, may die in bed because of sickness and old age. But a man like him had to die in this way so that even after death as in life he would remain true to his principles in the eyes of the world. His principles have been engraved in the hearts and minds of the people of the world and they will never be able to forget them. So it was fitting that he should have died in this way. But it is not proper for us to merely shed tears and make a show of great grief or shout slogans of "Mahatma Gandhi Ki Jai" and then to forget those very principles for which he lived and died. This is the question before us because though Mahatma Gandhi is greatly praised in this country, people often stray away from the path shown by him and tread on wrong paths. So, the real, fundamental question to be decided by us on this day or any other day, and especially when a year of freedom has been completed, is what should be our objectives and which way should we go? Maybe that on some political or internal matter we may take a decision from the point of view of expediency or immediate gain, but if we wish to achieve anything big, and especially if a nation wishes to do something big, it can be done only by following certain principles. The people and countries that go on quarrelling cannot become great. The nations which are constantly involved in small matters continue to remain small.

Long years ago we dreamt of a free India. We wanted not only freedom from British rule but we wanted to lift up four hundred million people and build a new nation with new vigour, new thinking and an internal resurgence which would create a grand nation. We wanted to be a strong country, but not to dominate or vanquish others. We have seen enough of slavery, how can we wish others to become slaves? We wanted India to hold aloft the flag of freedom for herself and the world, and follow the great principles taught by Mahatma Gandhi. But that dream remained unfulfilled, and in an effort to fulfil that dream Mahatma Gandhi also died and fittingly so. What then is our duty? We must consider seriously whether we wish to follow those principles or not and what sort of a country we would like India to become. India is a large country with great latent and potential powers and not a country of ordinary sheep-like mortals. But all that strength and ability and courage will be wasted if we adopt a wrong path or quarrel among ourselves. Thus we will become weak in the world.

India's position in the world is by no means low today—it is quite high. There are various reasons for it, but if you search for the most important reason, which has raised India in the eyes of the world, you will once again come round to Mahatma Gandhi's name. Mahatma Gandhi raised India's



stature in the world. He did not merely get independence for India but he raised her in the eyes of the world and that too thirty years ago; and now he has raised it once again through his death. So we take advantage of all these achievements, but often many of us, or rather all of us, forget the fundamental principles which he believed in.

So on this day and in the following week I would request you to cease thinking about what your enemies or other people do. To curse one's enemies and to be filled with bitterness is what normally people do. I want you to search your hearts and see how far we are on the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi. Are our ways right, and if so, how far are we truly following them or making an effort to do so? I want you to ask this question deep down in your hearts, not in a superficial way, because we have embarked on a long journey. We have travelled a long way and reached one destination, of which 15th August is the symbol. But the journey is by no means over, for there is no rest for a nation. You and I will continue the journey throughout our lives and when our time is up, we will hand over the torch to others and pass on. This is quite natural. A nation's journey never comes to an end. But our present journey which started in the days of our freedom struggle has to be completed by us only. We cannot leave it to our successors. I have no doubt that we will complete this task but often there is laxity, weakness and wrong thinking, which weaken the nation, and time is wasted. As a result, India is not able to achieve rapidly what she wants. So you must consider all this.

I do not want to present you with a long list of complaints about our opponents and others. But I would like to speak about certain matters today as I have the opportunity to do so. I would like to talk to you about the grave present-day problems. It is necessary for you to understand these problems because the world including our country is in a terribly complicated situation. When a nation is passing through a crisis, no problem can be solved by shouting slogans or expressing anger. Therefore, we have to understand the situation clearly and take firm steps to deal with it. In this connection, I would particularly like to humbly request our journalists and newspapermen to do so because they exercise great influence on the people's minds. All of us read newspapers and are often influenced by the news and views published by them. If wrong news or views are printed, the effect is harmful. I often observe that information is printed without the slightest regard to their veracity, perhaps merely with a view to exciting the people's minds or feelings. Newspapers want to appear that they are fearlessly hitting out against big people. But this is not the responsible way of doing things, neither by you nor by newspapers.

Today I happened to glance over a Hindi newspaper of Delhi, which is



published from Calcutta too, and perhaps from one or two other places.<sup>3</sup> I was aghast to read a four-column story talking of war, war with Pakistan, war in India, repeating the word 'war' five times, and then associating my name with it. I was completely taken aback. Where from they could have got that news? It was certainly not the way for a responsible newspaper to behave. Any person reading it would immediately feel that I had made some announcement to the effect that we should march towards Pakistan with guns and swords in hand. Is this an act of responsibility? You can realise how such an action can affect the lives of so many people. If you are a shopkeeper or a trader, immediately you would panic, thinking a war is imminent. Others too will react similarly and unnecessarily create tensions, the reason being that some sub-editor is pleased to write the word 'war' four times and then attribute it to me. It is wholly improper and irresponsible, and I want all newspapers to understand this: that by doing so, instead of serving the country, they do incredible damage to it, and, in fact help our enemies. Please remember that if there was complete peace and no danger to the country, then it would not matter much if some people made a noise or even if something wrong was said. But when the situation is grave, it is necessary for us to be extra-cautious about what we say and write because its effect may be far-reaching. At such a moment people should not be misled and carried away. If you have an enemy confronting you, you must behave with the discipline of an army. Slogans and noise cannot help at such a time. If we have to fight, we will fight like an army, silently, and courageously. Even if we are not an army, there are certain good qualities in an army which an independent nation must cultivate like discipline, unity, the ability to cooperate. We must not run helter-skelter like hysterical women, shouting and screaming. That is not the sign of a courageous nation. I read such statements in newspapers which can be described as hysteria. So, I request them to take note of this and behave in a responsible manner. I regret to say that even our enemies, who wish to harm us, cannot harm us more than our bosom friends. This is such a case. This newspaper talks of war when I have neither made any announcement regarding war nor am I likely to do so easily. But we have to understand that the situation is critical. It is unlikely that a war will break out. But in warlike conditions any government has to be prepared to face any danger. Whether there is war or not, if we are not prepared, that itself becomes an invitation to start one. If we are prepared, it is an excellent way of avoiding war and preventing it from breaking out. So in our official capacity, it is our duty to be fully prepared, militarily, as well as politically. But it is also the duty of every government to try to avoid warfare. Sitting in my office in the secretariat

3. The reference is presumably to *Vishwamitra* which was published from Calcutta, Patna, Kanpur and Bombay but not from Delhi.

in Delhi I may discuss matters. But if a war breaks out, no one can say where it will stop, how many young men will have to be sacrificed and what far-reaching effects it will have, and how many homes will be ruined. Being carried away by momentary passions we blurt out something. But no responsible person in the modern world easily opts for war. At the same time no responsible government silently can tolerate an insult to the nation or damage to it. If a time comes, when perforce it has to face war, then it is obvious that it has to be faced with courage and bravery. So let us not get into this talk of war. Newspapermen should refrain from inciting the people unnecessarily and creating panic among them and harassing them, because no one gains very much from all this except that the sale of their papers increases a bit.

At present there are a great many important problems before us. There is the problem of Kashmir and the problem of Hyderabad especially, and, in a sense even more important is the problem of soaring prices,<sup>4</sup> of inflation, the effect of which is felt in every home. It affects especially the people with fixed incomes. They have to bear a tremendous burden. Inflation is extremely dangerous for a country if it is not brought under control. You must have seen that a few days ago the control on cloth was revived.<sup>5</sup> I am fully prepared to admit our mistake. The problem is that one learns from one's mistakes. We learnt our lesson in the matter of cloth quite late when a great harm had already been done by the action of removing the control on cloth. It benefited a few people, but a large number of people were hit by it. Well, anyhow, we made mistakes and now we are making an effort to rectify them. All these problems are being considered seriously and discussions are taking place, and I hope that in this month, when our Constituent Assembly is sitting, we will be able to take some big step, on the advice of the members of the Constituent Assembly to curb this inflation and rising prices.<sup>6</sup>

4. The rise in the general price index numbers had been 80 points between August 1947 and June 1948. Prices of food articles had risen from 297.8 in August 1947 to 370 in June 1948. Prices of manufactured articles had risen from 280.2 to 366.6 for the same period. The steep rise had been attributed to the decontrol policy of the Government.
5. Cloth was decontrolled partially in January 1948 and completely in April. Prices rose very steeply in May and the Government reinforced controls on 30 July 1948.
6. The Constituent Assembly decided on 24 September to reimpose controls on prices and distribution of essential commodities as a short term measure. The Government announced on 4 October a comprehensive scheme which included: 1. deficit finance to be avoided by the Centre and provinces, 2. a Cabinet committee to determine the relative priority of projects, 3. the provincial governments not to seek from the Centre financial help for the abolition of zamindari or the introduction of prohibition, 4. provinces to raise public funds through local taxes, 5. the Government to reduce the prices of essential commodities by controls, 6. small savings to be promoted and incentives to industries for increasing production to be given.



Then there is the problem of refugees<sup>7</sup> which is again extremely important because millions of people have been rendered homeless. There has been an agitation in Delhi during the last few days.<sup>8</sup> First of all, I would like to tell you that the methods adopted by the students and others were wholly wrong as they benefited no one. At the same time, I would like to say that the students should not think that because of their methods of agitation we will become indifferent and stop doing our duty. That would be childish. We have to complete the task before us with your help and advice. Sometimes opinions may differ. You may not always have all the facts that we have. We look at the entire picture of India and all her problems and difficulties, but individuals think only of their own immediate problems. We cannot afford to take such a narrow view of things. At the moment the problem of refugees looms large. We have to help them in settling down. But our responsibility towards children and youth, boys and girls, is greater because the children and students of today are going to be responsible for governing India in the future, whereas the problems of others are mainly humanitarian problems. If we do not take care of our children and students today, how will the India of tomorrow carry on? Therefore it becomes even more important. We may make mistakes, that is a different matter. But we do realize our responsibilities and wish to fulfil them, as far as possible, in consultation with you and others.

Now I would like to say a few words about Kashmir and Hyderabad. Recently I was in Madras where I gave a long speech.<sup>9</sup> In that speech I said that Pakistan's policy in regard to Kashmir had been based on lies and deceit. These were strong words. I have made an effort not to use strong language, and especially today and in the following week, but I am only relating the facts. Immediately there were long editorials in Pakistani newspapers and the leaders of Pakistan issued lengthy statements criticising me. What was it that I had said? I had said only that, with regard to Kashmir, the entire policy of the Pakistan Government had been based on lies. Do you remember what we had said when the Kashmir question had cropped up for the first time? We had said that it was obvious that the tribesmen had come into Kashmir with the help and connivance of Pakistan; when their route lay through Pakistan, how could have they come without the help of

7. The refugee population was estimated at 24,65,243. The total expenditure on refugees from 15 August 1947 to March 1948, excluding the amount spent by private organizations, was Rs. 2.2 crores by the Central Government and Rs. 62.1 crores by the East Punjab Government.
8. On 4 August 1948 over 600 refugee students of the Camp College of the East Punjab University hijacked a bus, stopped vehicular traffic and demonstrated outside the residence of the Minister for Rehabilitation. They demanded loans and hostel accommodation. The police had to resort to a lathi-charge and use tear gas. Sixty students were arrested.
9. See *post*, section on National Reconstruction, item dated 25 July 1948.



Pakistan ? We repeated the same thing when we took the matter to the United Nations. Our simple submission was that these things were happening with the connivance of the Pakistan Government. Therefore the Pakistan Government ought to be warned not to help them or they should prove that what we were saying was wrong. The strange thing is that this fact was never enquired into by the United Nations; instead, a great many other things were said there for about six or seven months in this regard. However, the Pakistan Government had been constantly denying in India, Pakistan and New York what we had been saying about them. They maintained that what India said about their helping the *mujahids* and sending in their armies was absolutely false. You might have read in the Pakistani newspapers of Karachi or Lahore a few days ago, that is immediately after my speech at Madras, a vehement declaration that Jawaharlal told a lie when he claimed that we had been sending our troops into Kashmir. It is a coincidence that within 48 hours of the publication of these editorials one of the Pakistani newspapers that is published from Lahore carried the news<sup>10</sup> that the Pakistan Government had made a statement before the visiting United Nations Commission accepting that their troops were in Kashmir, and not in small numbers either—there was a division or so—and had also given various reasons for that. They said that the troops had been sent in May, that is three months ago, because there was a danger that India might attack Pakistan through Kashmir. They said they had proof that there was a secret understanding between the Government of India and the Fakir of Ipi, who lived in Waziristan, that there should be a two-pronged attack to cut off Pakistan from the middle. This was the reason they gave for sending in their troops to Kashmir.

The first thing you have to note is that they fully admitted what they had been denying for the last seven, eight or nine months. Thus what they had been saying regarding Kashmir all along had been proved false by their own statements, not ours. So what was wrong about what I had said in Madras ? I had said it deliberately because I had evidence that the Pakistani troops were present in great numbers there. Moreover, Pakistan knew that if their case was proved to be false as based on lies, then it was obvious that the whole edifice that they had built up in New York before the United Nations and elsewhere would collapse completely. Their own statement that appeared in the newspapers there was that they had sent in their troops in the month of May. The fact is that their troops had been sent not only before May but they were there from the very beginning. But they were not

10. The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore stated that in an interview with the U.N. Commission Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, had said that three brigades of regular Pakistani troops were in Kashmir since May 1948. They were moved in self-defence to protect the canal waters and in the interest of Pakistan's security.

in their uniforms. From May onwards there was no attempt at concealing their identity and they started coming along with their officers in vast numbers—full brigades and divisions—with guns, cannons and all other equipment. If you see their own statement, the question arises, where did the troops go ? Of course, they were sent into Kashmir which is legally a part of the Indian Union, whatever may be decided about its fate in the future. So the fact is that the troops were sent into the Indian Union which they were denying earlier. Was it not their duty to inform us, our government, that they were sending in their troops, rightly or wrongly ? They could have given any reason they liked; they could have said they feared an attack by us, given any other excuse. It was certainly their duty to inform us about the movement of their troops. They could have told us that they had heard rumours of a plan for an attack by us and that if we attacked, they would send in their troops. They could have said something. But, instead, they kept quiet after sending in their troops and admitted it three months later before the United Nations.

Why are they admitting it now ? It is obvious that it is no longer possible to conceal the fact. When they realized that concealment was impossible and that they would be caught, they admitted it with some flimsy excuse. Just think: if a responsible government follows such methods, how can there be peace in the world ? Often in times of war and on some other occasions also some governments resort to lies and deceit. But there is some limit to them. I am amazed at the method Pakistan had adopted in regard to the Kashmir issue, which was a complete tissue of lies, from start to finish and even now they are making desperate efforts to draw a curtain over their misdeeds. Their attempts to conceal their activities raise a great many complicated and dangerous questions which you have to understand. We sent in our troops into Kashmir with no attempt at concealment. We sent them openly and everyone knew about it. We informed the United Nations about it. We sent a telegram to Pakistan the day we dispatched the troops.<sup>11</sup> Our action, whether right or wrong, was done in the open. It is they who tried to conceal their activities but now the curtain has been removed. It means that Indian and Pakistani troops are arrayed against one another in Kashmir. We always knew about it but now the matter has come into the open. It is obvious that the effects of this will be far-reaching because, when India and Pakistan are involved in an armed conflict, it is not likely that the conflict will remain restricted to one corner and that peace and friendship will flourish in the rest of the areas. The two things cannot go together. Therefore, we asked Pakistan clearly whether what had appeared in the newspaper was correct. We did not ask this for any confirmation but we wanted only a statement in accordance with diplomatic practice. We told the United Nations Commis-

11. See *Selected Works*, (Second Series) Vol. 4, pp. 288-289



sion about it. What was their reply ? Please listen carefully. When our High Commissioner went and put this simple and straight question whether the newspaper report was correct or not, their reply was that it was a complicated matter and so the question should be asked in writing. As there was no other way the High Commissioner came back, wrote a note and sent it immediately to them. The reply came which is a secret and cannot be divulged. After all, diplomacy is not a child's play. I am amazed to see that the elder statesmen of Pakistan seem to regard the whole thing as a joke. It is certainly irresponsible behaviour on the part of an individual who holds the fate of millions of people in his hands.

What does all this mean? It means that the reports were correct but they are trying to evade the issue as far as possible. Most people try to tell the truth and may occasionally have to tell a lie due to some constraint. But sometimes when an individual slips up, he even tells lies unnecessarily. So we are finding it very difficult to get a proper reply from them. But they cannot go on like this indefinitely. The dangerous thing is that Pakistani troops are openly engaged with our forces in Kashmir. And please do not think that their troops are small in number. They are present in great numbers and fighting is going on on a large scale. So under such circumstances the *status quo* cannot be maintained. We are trying our best to avoid doing anything in haste even if the other side is in the wrong, which might bring disaster to millions. Our action has to be well considered. But it is obvious from Pakistan's behaviour that it is compelling us to take strong actions all round.

Please remember, when I talk about taking steps, I do not mean distributing pamphlets and taking out processions which incite people and weaken the nation. Therefore, if you wish that our country should become strong and capable of defending its honour and independence, then your petty problems have to be set aside so that they do not take the place of the really large and important issues. Your problem may seem very large to you, but when it is a matter of life and death for the nation and when we are confronted with the choice between freedom and slavery, all other problems are negligible.

Now I would like to say something about Hyderabad and clear up the misunderstandings which prevail. First of all, if you look at the map of India—you must have seen it but if you look at it again—and if you are a little acquainted with the history of India and know about her economic condition then you will inevitably come to the conclusion that it is impossible for Hyderabad to exist independently of India. The State of Hyderabad cannot be an independent country as long as India is a free country. If India loses her freedom or is destroyed, then it does not matter what happens. You will not find a single instance in the whole world, either in the present or in the past, as far as I have read history, of a small country which is



surrounded on all sides by a bigger country and which has no access to the sea or to any other country except through the country surrounding it, existing as a free country. Such a country can never be free. Yes, there are such countries in Europe. For example, there is Switzerland which has no outlet to the sea but has common borders with several countries, which makes a difference. But a country which has no common borders with any other country except with that which surrounds it can enjoy independence only in one circumstance, and that is, when the surrounding country is not independent. This is a basic fact which everyone must know, if he is not aware of it already.

Proceeding from this basic premise, the fundamental question that arises is, whether Hyderabad will remain free or India. It is obvious that my answer can be only one and that is, India will remain free, and, I am sure, you will also say the same thing. Well, then this clamour by some people<sup>12</sup> in Hyderabad for independence is meaningless or it can mean only this that they, through trickery or in collusion with others, want to shock India and thus, by harming India, they want to gain something for themselves. So the conclusion is that there is no other way for Hyderabad except to accede to India and to be a partner in the Indian Union. Please remember what accession means. Accession does not mean that India will make Hyderabad a slave. That is absurd. Hyderabad after accession will have the same status as any other Indian State or a big province. It will be a partner in a big concern and will have autonomy and complete freedom in its internal affairs as well as the right to participate in the nation's affairs on equal terms with others. Its status will in no way be less. It will enjoy the same amount of freedom as Madras or Bombay or any other State. So nobody should be under any misapprehension about the meaning of accession. We want to give equal freedom to every individual, whatever his religion, and to every part of India, whether it is a former State or a province. This is our basic principle. So there is no other way for Hyderabad except to accede to India. This is the second thing.

The third thing is that we do not have any intention of taking military action to secure Hyderabad's accession. Please remember that we do not want to force Hyderabad at the point of the sword to accede to India because we know that we can always do that. The accession is bound to take place ten or twenty days later or earlier. You may ask, then why all this talk about military preparations? It is true that we have made certain preparations, not to force accession, but because we are worried that the disturbed conditions on our borders with Hyderabad, riots, etc., are becoming dangerous

12. The Nizam of Hyderabad by a *firman* on 4 June 1947, following the 3 June declaration, stated that Hyderabad would remain an independent sovereign state. The Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen took up this claim and repeatedly said that Hyderabad was an independent Islamic state.

and extremely troublesome for the people living in those areas and it will not be possible for us to sit by and watch millions of people being ruined.<sup>13</sup> There are two reasons for that. One is that stormy conditions like these on the borders are bound to spread to the neighbouring provinces like Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces. The whole of South India will be affected. We cannot tolerate such a conflagration which can spread to the other parts of India.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, we cannot tolerate such happenings inside Hyderabad like murders, arson and an increase in crime and oppression day by day. These things force us to take some steps. Had there been peace in Hyderabad, there would have been hundreds of ways of bringing it round gradually to the idea of accession without resorting to any kind of force or pressure. But the picture changes if there is no peace and a storm rages there which brings ruin to millions of people and forces them to run away. There is a mighty conflagration in Hyderabad which is ruining the people there and may even affect the other areas in South India. We cannot tolerate that. When any part of our country becomes a victim of such a disaster, we have to perforce take steps against it. So all these things have to be weighed carefully. This propaganda abroad that we are standing with swords in our hands against innocent Hyderabad and forcing it to accede to India,<sup>15</sup> and that we are starving the population of Hyderabad by laying an embargo on the movement of goods, is totally absurd. There is no question of starving them because there is plenty of food in Hyderabad and more than enough has already been sent there during the last six months apart from their own large produce. In fact they export their surplus. There was a great hue and cry that we had prevented medicines from being sent to Hyderabad. Plenty of medicines have already been sent there. Just three months ago, two hundred-wagon loads of salt were sent there. So all the necessities for life have been taken care of. Of course, we have stopped the movement of arms, which can be used for creating violence, and some other items which can be used for producing arms. This embargo will continue.

You may be aware that military equipment and other goods have been

13. Between 1 January and 22 July 1948 the Government of India had protested to the Nizam Government about 82 serious violations of the border involving looting and killing by the Hyderabad army, police and Razakars—31 in the Bombay border area, 18 in the Central Provinces border area and 33 in the Madras border area.
14. On 10 August a White Paper of the Government of India stated: "If the law and order situation in Hyderabad, which already shows signs of collapse, further deteriorates and thereby imperils peace and good order in India, the Government of India would unquestionably be involved."
15. Churchill told a Conservative Party rally "We have witnessed the violent action of Mr. Nehru's Hindu Government against Kashmir... It may be that soon this same Government, using the modern weapons we left behind, will attack the ancient State of Hyderabad with its 17 millions of people and overthrow the Government of the Nizam."



somehow smuggled into Hyderabad by plane.<sup>16</sup> In that too you can see Pakistan's connivance because those goods were brought in secretly from Karachi at night. So now you can understand why we are making certain preparations. At the same time we do not want to just make an announcement and start a war unless we are forced to. We have also to keep in mind that whatever we do we should do it effectively. We have to look at the entire picture of India and not get carried away emotionally and take steps which we may regret later. That is not the way for a responsible government to function. We have to consider all this.

I have given you a broad picture of the two problems facing us. There are various other problems too. But I shall once again repeat what I said earlier, what are our principles and goals and in which direction are we going? This is the fundamental question because all our actions depend upon that. And if fundamentally our principles are to be the same as those of Mahatma Gandhi, then we have to build India accordingly and put an end to communal and religious feuds and take a different view of things. We have to realize that no country can make friends by threats and making sarcastic remarks and waging wars. We can make friends only by behaving in a friendly manner. If an enemy attacks us then certainly we have to fight. But that too only in the end. If we wish to take India far and make her a great nation then we should never adopt wrong methods and wrong means. This is my firm conviction. I tell you from the bottom of my heart that no nation and ultimately no individual can progress by deceit and lies. Therefore, I am fully convinced that Pakistan's policy which is so fully based on lies will do great harm to Pakistan. No individual or nation can escape from the consequences of his or its bad acts. So my concern is that our country should not get involved into wrong and false action because of anger and excitement, and imitate others. Please remember we are not angels in this country. There are many bad people also in our country. Terrible developments have happened here and we have suffered and are still suffering from their consequences.

Well, today and at least in this week, let us control ourselves, our hearts and minds, somewhat. That great man who lived in our country for a few years, in his light, he passed on we also shine. We slipped into some darkness and reverted to our former selves. Our real mind which was a weak mind was revived. Still his reflected glory is there, and not only for today, it will ever be there. Let us remember him, derive strength from him and follow his path. *Jai Hind*.

16. Sydney Cotton, an Australian, was alleged to be gun-running from Pakistan to Hyderabad.



## 2. Stay of Executions<sup>1</sup>

A member of the Central Assembly has suggested that definite orders should be issued to the effect that no executions of persons sentenced to death should take place on the 15th August. I understand that some such orders have already been issued by the Home Ministry. However, to make sure I am sending this note. It is desirable not to have any such executions for two or three days round about the 15th. This refers of course to all executions all over India.

1. Note to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 9 August 1948. File No. 2(178)/48-PMS.

## 3. A Triumph of the Spirit<sup>1</sup>

I send my good wishes to the great meeting at Albert Hall which is being held to celebrate the first anniversary of India's independence. During the long past of our struggle for freedom many people in the United Kingdom stood by us and helped us in that struggle. India has become the symbol of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Those who helped us did so because they stood for freedom everywhere. It is fitting that on this occasion Indians and non-Indians alike in England should meet together not only to think of the past, but even more so of the present and of the future.

Political freedom came to us but was followed by terrible happenings and disasters. We struggled against them and have overcome many of the dangers that faced us. As elsewhere in the world, there has been in India a conflict of the spirit between various forces. It was that conflict that led to the supreme tragedy of the past year—the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. And yet that very death was a triumph of the spirit and a pledge that India will never allow the forces of evil and reaction and disruption to break the structure of freedom which the Father of our Nation had built so laboriously. We have passed through black days and we have still to contend against

1. Message read at a meeting at Albert Hall, London, to celebrate the first anniversary of India's independence, 13 August 1948. File No. 2(178)/48-PMS.

the darkness. But we have faith in our country and in the message which Gandhiji gave us. That message was not for India only but for the world also. We believe, in spite of the conflict that surrounds us, that the world will never gain peace or settle its problems through methods of evil and violence, that freedom and democracy are essential for human progress. We have stumbled often, but we have had the strength to get up again and march ahead. We may stumble again. Even so, we shall go ahead towards the objective which was laid down for our nation and our people many years ago. In this great task we pledge our cooperation and we seek the cooperation of all others who work for peace and freedom.

India cannot and does not wish to isolate herself. No nation can do so, for freedom becomes more and more indivisible. So to the men and women of goodwill assembled in Albert Hall in London, I send my comradely greetings and my hope that we shall all work together for the great cause of peace and freedom all over the world.

#### 4. A Day of Rededication<sup>1</sup>

The 15th of August came and we rejoiced at our achievement in spite of the pain of partition. We looked forward to the sun of freedom, and the opportunity that freedom brings. But though the sun rose it was hidden from us by dark clouds, and for us it remained a twilight hour. It has been a long twilight and the brightness of the day is still to come. For freedom is not a mere matter of political decision or new constitutions, not even a matter of what is more important, that is, economic policy. It is of the mind and heart and if the mind narrows itself and is befogged and the heart is full of bitterness and hatred, then freedom is absent.

Another August 15 has come and it is a solemn day for us in spite of all that has happened. The year has considerable achievement to its credit and we have gone forward some distance along our long journey. But the year is also full of unhappiness and humiliation and of a betrayal of that spirit which has been the redeeming feature of India. This year has seen the triumph of evil in the assassination of the Father of the Nation, and what greater shame and sorrow could there have been for anyone of us than this?

1. Message on the eve of the first anniversary of independence, 14 August 1948. *National Herald*, 15 August 1948.



We celebrate this solemn day as we should, but our celebration cannot be one of vain glory and pious platitudes. It must be one of heart-searching and a fresh dedication to our cause. Let us think not so much of what we have done, but of what we have left undone and what we have done wrongly. Let us think of the millions of refugees who, deprived of all they possessed, are still homeless wanderers. Let us think of the masses of India who continue to suffer and who have looked to us with hope and waited patiently for a betterment of their unhappy lot. Let us think also of the mighty resources of India which, if harnessed and utilized for the common good, can change the face of India and make her great and prosperous. To this great task let us address ourselves with all the strength in us. But above all let us remember the great lessons that Mahatma Gandhi taught us and the ideals that he held aloft for us. If we forget those lessons and ideals we betray our cause and our country.

So on this anniversary of our independence we dedicate ourselves anew to the great cause of free India and her people. May we prove worthy! *Jai Hind.*

## 5. Stock-taking<sup>1</sup>

It is a year since we assembled here last. A year has passed and all sorts of things happened in this one year and we suffered a great deal. Many a great storm came and many people floundered in the stormy seas. Even so India managed to face the ordeal and cross the seas by making use of its strong arms. Many good and bad developments took place in this one year. But the greatest event that happened this year and caused the greatest shock to us was the passing away of the Father of the Nation. Last year when I addressed you,<sup>2</sup> my heart was light and I had said that whatever problems and difficulties might confront us, we had a tremendous power to support us which would always show us the right path and give us courage. So we were not worried. But that support is no longer there and we have now to rely on our own strength and intellect. It was proper that many of us went to Rajghat this morning and paid our homage at that sacred place. In fact we should not go there only on particular days like these to remember him.

1. Speech after hoisting the national flag at the Red Fort, Delhi, 15 August 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L., and *Hindustan*, 16 August 1948. (Original in Hindi.)
2. See *Selected Works*, (Second Series) Vol. 3, pp. 137-138.



Rather the proper thing would be that his teachings should be impressed on our hearts and we should follow them and take India also along that path. For about thirty years he led India on the path to freedom and gradually increased the strength of the nation. He eradicated fear from the hearts of the Indians and ultimately achieved freedom for India. He completed his work.

How far have we done our duty? We had to face many dangers and troubles, but I feel that if we had stuck to the path shown by him these dangers would not have arisen, and even if they had, they would have quickly disappeared. So the first thing that I want to tell you is this that you should always remember, and specially today, the principles by following which you and we made India free. We should also see whether we are still following those principles or want to adopt some other path. As far as I am concerned, I want to tell you that the more I have thought about it, the more convinced I have become that, in order to maintain India's independence and enable her to make progress, and in order to make her a great country, not in terms of length and breadth but in deeds for which she would be respected in the world, in order to do all these things, we ourselves will have to grow in stature and tread the path shown by Mahatmaji.

India is a tremendous phenomenon with a history of thousands of years. But after all, what is India today apart from you and I and the millions of people who live in this country? If we are good and strong, India is strong and if we are weak, India is weak. If there is strength and courage and ability in us, then they become India's strength. If we are disunited and weak, then India is also weak. India is not a thing apart from us; we are little pieces of India. We are her children and at the same time you must remember that what we think and do today that shapes the India of tomorrow. There is a great responsibility on you and me and the inhabitants of India. We shout *Jai Hind* and *Bharat Mata Ki Jai* but *Jai Hind* is possible only if we follow the right path and serve the country rightly and do nothing which might affect its honour or make it weak.

In the last one year we have overcome great difficulties, but there is no doubt that we showed great weakness, made numerous big mistakes and strayed away much from our right path. We forgot India and began to think of our own communities and provinces and became selfish. If we indulge in selfishness, hatred and quarrels, the country goes down. Yet we endured all this and after this one year we are not only alive in this free India but are vibrantly alive and strong and full of courage.

So in the present-day world when in some places war is going on and in some other places there is a talk of future war or on which side should we be

and what should we do.<sup>3</sup> I do not wish to talk of wars to you especially on this day. But I would certainly say that those who want freedom should be prepared to defend and protect their freedom and sacrifice themselves for it. The moment a nation becomes slack it becomes weak and falls. Therefore, we have to be always prepared. At the same time, I would also like to tell you that we do not maintain an army or produce military equipment in order to dominate any other country but to protect our freedom, and if necessary, to help defend freedom in the world. We have been in bondage for so long that it has bred in us a feeling of hatred for it. Therefore, how can we think of subjugating others? I would therefore, specially today, like to talk to you about peace because the fundamental lesson taught by Mahatma Gandhi was one of peace and non-violence. It is perhaps true that because of our weakness we could not tread the path of peace and non-violence fully but more or less we did walk along that path and so today India commands great respect in the world. I and you did some work—sometimes good and sometimes bad. But if the world bows before India today and respects it, it is due to one man—the great man who led us to freedom. He made the world bow before him. Is it proper for us to forget the lesson of such a man? The fundamental lesson that he taught us was that we should work together, adopt peaceful methods, there should be unity among us, and there should be no communal or religious feuds in our country or the world. Do you know what emerges from the thousands of years of Indian history and what is fundamental to the Indian culture? It is tolerance, it is not to indulge in religious feuds. Whoever comes here we deal with him with love and adopt him. At a time when we have won our freedom, shall we forget the lesson of thousands of years of our country? And if we forget it, India will not remain a big country, it will become small.

You and I had dreamt of India's freedom. What was there in those dreams? It was not merely that British rule be removed and that we should again live in a lowly state. Our dream was that the millions in India should be uplifted, their poverty and unemployment should be removed, and they should get food and clothing and houses to live in. We dreamt of providing education to every child and opportunity to every Indian to take care of himself, make progress and serve the country, and thus the whole country should rise. A nation does not progress by a few people occupying seats in high offices. A nation grows when its people are well off and capable of

3. By the middle of 1948 the division of Europe into two blocs was complete and the cold war was in full swing. There was a deadlock over disarmament and control of atomic energy. A prolonged struggle was on in Greece and each bloc accused the other of aggressive intentions. Their relations worsened over the question of rail traffic to Berlin. Meanwhile, fighting broke out on three fronts in Palestine on 9 July after a truce of one month, in spite of a U.N. appeal for extension.



making progress. We also dreamt that when the doors were opened for India's millions, hundreds of thousands of them would come up as first-rate people who would earn name and fame and have an impact on the world. All those things are still far away because we got entangled in disputes and quarrels. But we have to complete that task and until we do that our freedom is not complete. Until then we cannot whole-heartedly say even *Jai Hind*. You and I are faced with serious problems. In this city of Delhi and in many other places in the country, our numerous refugee brethren are faced with great hardships. Some arrangements have been made for some of them, but there are many who are still suffering. Prices are also rising, which is another cause of great hardship to the people. These are all big problems. No doubt, it is our responsibility to whom you have given the seats of power, but you must also remember that in an independent country no problems can be solved unless there is full cooperation and help of the people. You have the right to criticize and raise objections. It is correct, because no country can be run by its people always remaining quiet and accepting everything blindly. But if you are a free nation, then mere criticism is not enough. You have to bear the burden and extend your help and cooperation. And if all of us do so even the biggest problems can be solved.

You are assembled here in hundreds of thousands. Each one of you—man and woman, boy and girl—may please ask yourself what service you have rendered to India, what big or small work you have done for the country each day. For it is the foremost duty of each one of us to do some service to the country. If each one of us does even a little, the sum total will become quite large. But if we think that the responsibility is entirely of a few officers or of those who are sitting in the seats of power, then it is wrong. Free countries do not function in this way—it is only slave countries which think like this and are run in this way. When alien rulers rule a country, they may do what they like but in a free country, if you want freedom and its advantages, you have to take on the responsibilities of freedom also. You should also accept the consequences of freedom as well as its discipline. We have not yet been able to get rid of our old habits of slavery and want that everything should be done from the above without any effort on our part. Therefore, I want you to understand that, if you have become free, you must behave like a free nation and be prepared to accept its burdens and responsibilities.

I would like to say something to our bureaucrats too—both the old and the new. The old method has many good points which they must keep but give up its several bad points. Now they cannot work in the old way because they have to help in building up the country and cooperate with the people. They have also to seek the support and cooperation of the people. As you are aware, these days everywhere the working of our Government is looked down upon. Therefore, I want all our officers, high and low, to



consider this to be a period of trial for them as well as for us who are in power and positions of responsibility. They should do this work honestly and with a sense of responsibility and without showing partiality to anyone. The moment an officer or a responsible person takes sides, he is no longer fit to be in that post. We need able people to undertake the big tasks before us but even more important than ability are honesty, truthfulness and the spirit of service. If we do not serve well and there is no honesty in us, then where will our ability lead us to? Ability alone can even cause harm to the nation. So the first lesson to be borne in mind is that we have to lead this country on the path of truth and honesty which is a fundamental lesson taught to us by Mahatma Gandhi and which we followed more or less for the last so many years, because of which India gained respect in the world and even today, though we are still weak and often stumble, the people of the world look towards India. It is also because we gave a new method to our politics. It is generally assumed that politics is a matter of trickery and acts of telling lies. But the politics in India, as taught by Mahatma Gandhi, had no scope for trickery or lies. Even now people think that nations make progress by unscrupulous methods. But neither an individual nor a nation makes any progress by cunning ways. May be sometimes they may gain something. Especially those nations which claim to be great in the world cannot go very far by deceiving and misleading others. They advance by their courage, honesty, bravery and service. Therefore, this lesson has to be borne by us in mind, especially at this time, and the feeling of bitterness and retaliation which is in our hearts has also to be eradicated. Well, if there is any danger from an enemy, we will certainly face it. But by harbouring feelings of bitterness, resentment and anger we become weak, our energy is wasted and we cannot do any big work.

What is politics? And what is the work of a country? Politics is based on some ideology. But ultimately a country goes the way its millions go. The work of a nation is the sum total of the small bits of work of its millions. What is the wealth of a nation? It is what is earned by you, by everybody and by the people of the country by their labour. Wealth after all does not come from above. The work of a country is the sum total of the work of its millions. If we have to remove poverty from the country we can do so by doing work and producing wealth thereby. People think that wealth should come from outside which we can distribute. We get demands from all over—from princes as well as institutions. But from where does the money come? It comes through the work of the people and what they earn by their labour. What the farmer earns from his land, the worker in his factory and the shopkeeper from his shop, constitute the wealth of a nation. And this is how the wealth of a nation increases and the country progresses. If we want that the country should make progress, then giving advice to others is of no use. For this we have to see what we ourselves are doing for the

progress of the country, what work and service we are doing and thus how much wealth we are producing. If we think in this manner, we will advance our country rapidly, make it a strong and great and prosperous country in the world. And if we think only in terms of quarrels among ourselves and with others, then we will remain weak and the world, which shows respect to us because of Mahatma Gandhi, would also respect us less.

Today is a good day for us to take stock of the situation and see the manner in which we managed to overcome difficulties during the past one year. We can certainly take a pride—a national pride, not the pride of an individual—over what we were able to accomplish during the year that has passed. But it is even more important to pay attention to our weaknesses, to those tasks which remain undone and to our mistakes committed in the past and to their rectification. We have specially to remember those fundamental principles which we have followed in the past and not let them grow dim, and continue to follow the path shown by the Father of the Nation, and not let the poison of communalism, which wrecked so much havoc upon India and led to its break-up, spread again. I really want to warn you about this because we once slackened and that poison spread and caused great damage to the country. Ultimately a great shock came to us when it caused the murder of the Father of the Nation. It had a terrible effect on the country which was inevitable. But people's memories are short and things are forgotten quickly, and I see that some people are again straying away. I find that some undesirable people are again raising their heads, and their voices can mislead the people. Therefore, I want you to think about it and consider it because it is a dangerous phenomenon. Not only today, but since I started serving India, I have had full confidence that India will be a great independent country and that no power can ultimately check her because the strength which we have been developing is an inner strength—the strength of the heart; it is not merely an external strength of the arms. I had this faith and worked with this faith and conviction and continue to do so even today. But when I see some people leading others astray or inciting them to think and act in a narrow-minded way and inflaming communal passions, I feel very sad that some of our own brethren should go astray to such an extent. These people claim that they will make India great, but as a matter of fact they are digging at the very roots of her existence and sully the honour of India.

We don't face any danger from external enemies at the moment. We are strong enough for them. But if we allow the poison of communalism to spread, we will do an irreparable damage to ourselves. This poison has lowered India's prestige in the world and we feel ashamed because of this. Today let us take this pledge before our Flag that we will forget our differences. Only then this will be an auspicious day. If we continue to fight, then this will not be an auspicious day for us.



A great man lived in our country and made not only India but the whole world great. Let us ask ourselves whether we are following the path shown by him or not.

Nobody can progress without getting out of the rut. The path of truth is the only path for progress and prosperity for us. Thereby our strength will increase and no enemy will dare confront us.

So far as we are concerned we have held aloft the torch of Indian freedom given to us by our elders. But now our times are also passing. So now the responsibility of looking after it and keeping it aglow has fallen on your shoulders. Every child of India has to see to it that this torch of freedom is always brightly lit. People come and go but countries and nations are immortal. If one hand becomes weak and is unable to hold the torch aloft, thousands of more hands should come forward to hold it. *Jai Hind*.

## 6. Message on Independence Day<sup>1</sup>

Fellow countrymen, comrades and friends,

A year ago on this very day and at this very hour, I broadcasted to you from this place. Free India is one year old today, but what trials and tribulations she has passed through during this infancy of her freedom. She has survived in spite of all the peril and disaster that might well have overwhelmed a more mature and well-established nation. We have reason to be thankful for this achievement and for the many other achievements that stand to the credit of our people.

Let us not belittle our record or forget the courage, the hard work and the sacrifice with which our people have faced and overcome many of these perils, during this fateful year. But let us also not forget where we have failed or where we have erred, for our failures and errors have been many, some of these are obvious enough, but the real failure has been a failure of the spirit and a falling away from the high standards set by the Father of our Nation, under whose wise guidance we had struggled and marched for over a quarter of a century. He had taught us, that worthy ends can only be achieved through worthy means, that ideals and objectives can never be divorced from the methods adopted to realise them. He had told us to cast out fear, for fear is not only ignoble, but is also the parent of hatred and violence.

1. Broadcast from Delhi, 15 August 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.



Many of us forgot this lesson and fear gripped us. Fear, not of some distant adversary, but fear of one another, and evil deeds followed in its train. The master who guided us and inspired us is no more. We have to shoulder the burden ourselves, and now the first question that we have to put to ourselves is this: do we stand by this teaching and message or do we stray into new paths? I want to tell you that this year of hard trials has convinced me, more than ever, that if India is to prosper and grow in stature, as she must and will, it will be through adherence to that message and teaching.

I know I am feeble and have often proved unworthy of India to whose service I have pledged myself so often. But, however unworthy we may be of India, we have still something of the strength that the master gave us. That strength comes not only from him but from his message, and so, to-day, I pledge myself anew to the service of the motherland and of the ideals that Gandhiji placed before us!

All of us talk of India and all of us demand many benefits from India. What do we give to her in return? We can take nothing from her beyond what we give her. India will ultimately give us what we give her out of love and service and productive and creative work. India will be what we are. Our thoughts and action will shape her. Born of her fruitful womb, we are children of hers, little bits of the India of today, and yet we are also the parents of the India of tomorrow. If we are big so will India be, and if we grow little-minded and narrow in outlook so also will India be. Our troubles during the past year were largely the result of this narrowness in outlook and pettiness in action, which is so foreign to India's great cultural inheritance.

Communalism threatened to crush the free spirit of us; the communalism of the Muslim, of the Hindu and of the Sikh. Provincialism came in the way of that larger unity which is so essential to India's greatness and progress. The spirit of faction spread and made us forget the big things that we have stood for.

We have to find ourselves again and go back to the free India of our dreams. We have to rediscover the old values and place them in the new setting of a free India. For freedom brings responsibility and can only be sustained by self-discipline, hard work, and the spirit of a free people.

So let us be rid of everything that limits us and degrades us. Let us cast out fear and communalism and provincialism. Let us build up a free and democratic India, where the interest of the masses of our people has always the first place, to which all other interests must submit. Freedom has no meaning unless it brings relief to these masses from their many burdens.

Democracy means tolerance. Tolerance not merely of those who agree with us but of those who do not agree with us. With the coming of freedom, our patterns of behaviour must change also so as to fit in with this freedom. There is conflict and there are rumours of greater conflict in India

and all over the world. We have to be ready for every emergency and contingency. When the nation is in peril, the first duty of every citizen is to give his or her service to the nation without fear or expectation of reward.

But today I do not wish to speak of conflicts and wars but rather of peace and cooperation. I want to say to all the nations of the world, including our neighbouring countries, that we stand for peace and friendship with them. The only war that we want to fight with all our might is the war against poverty and all its unhappy brood.

All the world suffers from the after-effects of the world war and inflation, and rising prices, and unemployment oppresses the people. In India, we have all these and, in addition, the care of vast numbers of our brothers and sisters, who have suffered untold hardship and have been driven away from their homes to seek a new life elsewhere. It is this war we have to fight, the war against economic crisis, and to rehabilitate the disinherited. In this war there is no hatred or violence, but only service of our country and our people. In this war, every Indian can be a soldier.

This is no time for individuals or groups to think of a narrow self-interest, forgetting the larger good. This is no time for wrangling or the spirit of faction, and so I appeal to all my countrymen and countrywomen, who have the love of India in their hearts and the passion to raise her masses, to cast aside the barriers that separate them and to join together in this historic and magnificent task worthy of a great people.

To all those in our services, civil and military, I would appeal for a single-minded devotion to the cause of India and for integrity, hard work, efficiency and impartiality. He who fails at this critical hour, fails in his duty to India and her people.

To the youth of the country, I would make a special appeal, for they are the leaders of tomorrow and on them will be cast the burden of upholding India's honour and freedom. My generation is a passing one, and soon we shall hand over the bright torch of India, which embodies her great and eternal spirit to younger hands and stronger arms. May they hold it aloft, undimmed and untarnished, so that its light reaches every home and brings faith and courage and well-being to our masses. *Jai Hind.*

## 7. Greetings to Indians Abroad<sup>1</sup>

I send my greetings to our fellow-countrymen abroad on this anniversary of our independence. The past year has been full of difficulty and full of sorrow for us. We have overcome many dangers, but we have failed also in many ways. On this day we dedicate ourselves anew to the service of our country and our people.

Those of our countrymen who are abroad represent India in some way or other, whatever their calling. They are bits of India in foreign lands and they must always remember therefore that they have it in their power to bring credit or discredit to India. In these days of difficulty and crisis not only in India but all over world, each one of us must remember his duty and service to India and resolve afresh to be worthy of this great country of ours. *Jai Hind.*

1. 15 August 1948. *Indian Information*, 15 August 1948.





6

## HYDERABAD

### I. The Gathering Crisis





1. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 2, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter sending me a copy of Richard Symonds' letter.

I do not like Symonds making any kind of approach to you and I do not see why he should be encouraged in any way. When the Commission comes, I have no doubt, that they will call on you. You can then invite them all including Symonds to tea some day or some other meal. This would be a strictly social affair.

K.P.S. Menon gave me a message today about the Agent-General of Hyderabad. Zain Yar Jung<sup>2</sup> is a decent man, but at the present moment any talks with him are likely to lead to misunderstandings. As it is, I am annoyed at repeated references in the press to the effect that negotiations are continuing with Hyderabad. This is bad both from the point of view of our public as well as the possibility of some settlement being arrived at. Zain Yar Jung has absolutely no authority and is in no position to speak officially to us.

I am therefore sending a message<sup>3</sup> to him that I shall always be happy to meet him if there is anything specific and definite to be said. Otherwise there is no particular point in my seeing him now.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Former Deputy Prime Minister of Hyderabad and its first Agent-General in Delhi at this time was trying to reopen the negotiations for settlement between the Union of India and the Hyderabad State.
3. Not printed,

2. Gun-running<sup>1</sup>

I do not know if you have drawn the attention of the U.K. High Commissioner to the reports we have had of foreign aircraft, probably British, carrying on gun-running trade with Pakistan, in contravention of our rules

1. Note to Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, 2 July 1948. J.N. Collection.

as to flying over India.<sup>2</sup> I think this should be done and he should be told some facts about it which we have in our possession. This is a very serious matter and he should inform his Government of the grave view we take of it.

Our High Commissioner in Karachi sent us some markings of Lancasters. He promised to send the numbers of the aircraft. If these have not been received yet, he might be reminded. If these markings and numbers are obtained by us we could immediately trace these planes. Air Marhsal Elmhirst said he would very much like to have these numbers for immediate inquiry. Those numbers should be communicated to our High Commissioner in London for such an inquiry.

2. Gun-running from Karachi through the blockade to Bidar in Hyderabad State was effected by a Lancaster aircraft which was registered in Canada and had been brought over by British pilots. The Government of India protested to the Government of Pakistan on 20 July for having given a clearance certificate and petrol thus helping to violate the Chicago Convention on air transit from one country to another.

### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 3, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for sending me Dickie Mountbatten's letter to you. I am returning it.

I am really worried about the Hyderabad situation<sup>2</sup> and today's telegrams have made matters worse. We seem to be heading for a major conflict. I do not think the conflict can be avoided, because the people in Hyderabad have gone off their heads completely. All that can be done is to delay the conflict in the faint hope that something might happen. That delay is becoming more and more difficult.

We are having a small conference tomorrow to consider this Hyderabad situation and what action we should take. When Vallabhbhai comes here on the 6th, very probably we shall have to consider and take rather vital decisions.

I am sending a letter to Dickie today. I enclose a copy of it.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. There were daily raids into Indian territory, attacks within Hyderabad territory on non-Muslims and Muslims opposed to the Razakars and stopping of trains with attacks on passengers and looting of goods. These incidents had created widespread anarchy within the State and anxiety in the neighbouring areas of the Indian Union and intensified communal feelings.



4. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 3, 1948

My dear Dickie,

We have been missing you and Edwina, and of course Pamela, greatly since you left. It is extraordinary how the Mountbattens seemed to fill Delhi and without them there is a kind of vacuum. We follow with interest your doings in London, or such of them as are reported in the press.

I am looking forward very greatly to the prospect of visiting England in September or October. Of course the high point of that visit will be, I hope, some days at Broadlands. But a fear seizes me that perhaps that visit might not come off. Events in India are marching rapidly and marching in a wrong direction.

This applies more specially to Hyderabad. Daily we are receiving telegrams from the provincial governments of Bombay, C.P. and Madras, complaining bitterly of the deteriorating situation on the borders and inside the borders. There are continual raids and conflicts on the border or near it. Yesterday, we received a long communication, sent by special messenger by the C.P. Government, which gave a ghastly account of what had been happening recently. It was not a vague account but one giving specific details with dates, names of places, etc. I have just received a message from the Home Minister of Bombay giving instances of Razakar raids in the Sholapur area<sup>2</sup> and saying that his Government's patience had reached breaking point.

You know of the gun-running by air that was taking place. For the moment it has been checked by energetic action on our part, but even now occasionally a Halifax goes through. Inside Hyderabad there is talk of war and Kasim Razvi delivers bellicose speeches threatening the Indian Union.<sup>3</sup> You can well imagine what the effect of all these is on Indian public opinion. It is a state of extreme anger and tension and our Government is bitterly criticised for its inaction.

The Government of India has taken some steps to stop air traffic between Hyderabad and the rest of India. Some trains still run because we did not wish to stop them. The Hyderabad Government, in spite of its promise

1. J.N. Collection.

2. About one lakh people had crossed into Sholapur from Hyderabad State and 63,000 had come into Berar because of these raids.

3. Kasim Razvi, in his speeches, urged the Muslims of Hyderabad State not to sheathe their swords until Islamic supremacy was achieved. He claimed that he would raise the Nizam's flag on the Red Fort in Delhi. He also said that the waves of the Bay of Bengal would soon wash the feet of the Nizam. He rejoiced that negotiations between Hyderabad and the Union of India had failed. "Accession is dead."



made sometime back, was arranging to make some money available to Pakistan. The idea was that part of the old 20-crore loan, which was represented by stock, should be converted into government promissory notes which are easily negotiable. This was availed of to get over the difficulty of cashing the stock. Apart from our desire to prevent this, any such major conversion would have affected the money market. We have therefore issued an ordinance preventing any securities held by the Hyderabad Government or the Nizam from being transferred or cashed without the permission of the Reserve Bank.

All this seems to lead inevitably to conflict on a major scale. Some of our reports indicate that the Hyderabad authorities are eager to precipitate this conflict before the economic blockade<sup>4</sup> weakens them much more. Indeed we have been informed of some plans of invading parts of the Indian Union territory. All this is sheer lunacy. But mad men are in charge of Hyderabad's destinies.

One aspect of this matter distresses me greatly and that is the part that a number of Englishmen seem to be playing both in Hyderabad and Kashmir. We have enough information to leave little doubt in my mind of this in Kashmir. So also in Hyderabad. The reality is not good from our point of view, but the exaggerated stories that circulate are of course worse. What Winston Churchill said the other day may have little importance, but because it fits in with this public reaction, it does a lot of harm.<sup>5</sup> It creates an impression that powerful groups in England are backing Hyderabad and Pakistan in Kashmir, and that in fact they are bent as ever to oppose and injure India. This is sad, after all that you have done for Indo-British relations in India.

Today our Cabinet decided to accept the proposed sterling balances settlement for three years.<sup>6</sup> It was not welcomed or liked, as the release of sterling was far less than the minimum we had set. I fear we shall be criticised very much in public when an announcement is made. Nevertheless we decided to accept it for two reasons. Firstly, because we felt that the U.K. had to face great difficulties and had tried to meet our view point, though it could not come very near it. Secondly, because we felt that an agreement would lead to a better understanding and better relations between the two countries, while lack of agreement would have had the opposite result.

4. The economic blockade was intended to prevent the smuggling into Hyderabad of arms. The entry of necessities such as salt, medicines and drugs was never prohibited.
5. Churchill charged that the "Hindu Government" of Nehru had entered "on the coercion of Kashmir and would soon launch an all-out attack on Hyderabad which it was trying to browbeat."
6. Under a three-year agreement with Britain, sterling balances would be released to India to the tune of £80 million to which was added another £80 million which was carried over from the last releases. There was a provision that £15 million would be available for conversion into hard currencies.

Vallabhbhai Patel intends returning to Delhi on the 6th July. Events in Hyderabad are moving so fast that by that time the situation might hardly be within control. I realise fully all the dangers and risks of a conflict, and yet I do not know how it can well be avoided if the present state of affairs continues.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 5. To B.G. Kher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3rd July, 1948

My dear Kher.

Your letter of the 21st June.

The Hyderabad affair is being given continuous and earnest attention here. There is no question of our ignoring it or minimising it. Indeed some of the public comments rather appear to minimise various aspects and consequences in regard to Hyderabad. Two or three things should be made clear. One is that we have passed the stage of negotiation unless of course the Hyderabad Government climbs down completely; secondly, that we are taking every step to intensify the economic blockade; thirdly, that we are making all preparations for a large scale military action. But no Government can start such a thing without the most careful balancing of all factors. Such action once begun leads to far-reaching consequences and might involve us in war elsewhere. So necessarily we have to be careful.

As regards the United Nations Kashmir Commission, there is no question of their going beyond the Kashmir issue and even in regard to that issue, they can only confer and advise. They have no other authority and we propose to recognise none other. We intend being firm with them on this issue. It will be desirable, however, for the press or public men to take the Commission as such. Some foolish persons are talking about noncooperating with it. This is an absurd approach because they have come after all, because we agreed to their coming. Their relations will be with the Government only and not with the public. There is no point in attacking them and alienating them.

Echoes of the agitation against the Bombay Refugees Act have reached us and even the Congress Working Committee dealt with the matter. I have

1. J.N. Collection.



no doubt that registration, etc. is necessary from every point of view. Perhaps the manner of putting this forward was not very tactful.

It is perfectly true that an Indian Union subject cannot owe allegiance to Pakistan, but in the fluid state of today it is a little difficult to say who is going to be finally a Union subject or a Pakistan subject. What Isaq Seth has done has been done by other men on the other side. For instance, Kiran Shankar Roy, leader of the opposition in the Pakistan Assembly, suddenly becomes Minister of the West Bengal Government. It is thus a little absurd for us to raise objection, and I do not quite understand what you mean by saying that it is high time that the Union Government decided this question of allegiance once for all. It is not the Union Government but the Constituent Assembly that will ultimately decide it. Of course, the fact that Isaq Seth has become a Pakistani Ambassador definitely puts an end to his Union nationality and there can be no going back upon that.

Whether Mr. Jedhe<sup>2</sup> and Mr. Nalavade,<sup>3</sup> having resigned from the Congress, can continue their membership of the Constituent Assembly, is not clear. Legally they can continue but whether morally they should do so is quite another matter. It is open to their constituency, i.e., the members of the Bombay Legislative Assembly, to ask them to resign.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. K.M. Jedhe (1896-1959); participated in the satyagrahas of 1930, 1932 and 1940 and was a detenu in 1942-43; president, Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee, 1938, 1946-48; member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50; leader of Peasants and Workers Party, 1948-53; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52 and of Lok Sabha, 1957-59.
3. R.M. Nalavade represented the Bombay State in the Constituent Assembly and was a member of its Steering Committee.

## 6. To R.S. Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 4, 1948

My dear Shuklaji,

This is a belated acknowledgement of your letter of June 22, which I read with interest.

We had your Chief Secretary's letter about Hyderabad two or three days ago and immediately we sent H.M. Patel to have a talk on the subject with

1. J.N. Collection.



you and others. I learn from him that there was considerable exaggeration in the reports received by us. Also that it is rather difficult to find out who the raiders and aggressors are. Sometimes the State Congress people are responsible for these raids etc.

This Hyderabad business, as you well know, has to be looked at not only from the local point of view but also from its all-India aspects and to some extent the international repercussions. We are fully alive to the position and to our responsibilities. But it may be harmful for us to take a wrong step which will entangle us and which might produce widespread consequences in other provinces and specially in East Bengal. Both in military and other sense we have to be prepared for all consequences. Many people do not take these other factors into consideration.

Let me congratulate you on the success of your social education scheme.<sup>2</sup> I think other provinces might well profit by this.

We have got a difficult time ahead. But I am glad to know that your Government is carrying on its work with efficiency and with full confidence. Unfortunately some people have a way of getting panicky. That is the worst possible method of facing any critical situation. But your Government has kept its head and I am sure that you will control the situation in your province whatever happens.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Shukla had introduced the Vidya Mandir scheme in C.P. and Berar.

## 7. Gun-running Despite Warning<sup>1</sup>

At a conference today attended by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Minister without Portfolio and the Commerce Minister as well as Commander-in-Chief, the Air Marshal, the Chief of the General Staff and some other officers and Secretaries to Government, a discussion took place about the position in Hyderabad and what steps should be taken in regard to it. After a prolonged discussion it transpired that no definite decisions could be taken without a full examina-

1. Note to Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, 6 July 1948. J.N. Collection.

tion of all our commitments. Army and Air Headquarters were asked to prepare a full appreciation of the situation in all its aspects so that the Government might be in a position to decide about future action. It was pointed out that not only was delay injurious but it was not desirable to keep the public in suspense. It was even worse to delude the public in any way. At the latest the picture must be perfectly clear and if necessary action taken or begun before the next Assembly session next month. Therefore, the appreciation must be ready as soon as possible. July 15th was mentioned as a provisional date when this appreciation might be ready for consideration by the Defence Committee.

2. In the course of the discussion the question of gun-running by air into Hyderabad was fully considered. Air Marshal Elmhirst gave it as his view that after full enquiry he had come to the conclusion that five Lancasters 4-engined aircraft, which had previously been bombers but had subsequently been altered for civilian use, were being used for this gun-running business between Karachi and Hyderabad. (He was not quite sure whether the number was five or possibly six). Of these five Lancasters three had British registration marks and two had Canadian marks.

3. A well-known British airman Bennett<sup>2</sup> was in command and Cotton<sup>3</sup> was apparently second in command. Bennett had a reputation during the war for ability as an airman and was of a somewhat adventurous type who would not be deterred by scruples.

4. These five Lancasters were continually making trips by night from Karachi to Hyderabad and back the same night. They could carry enough petrol for the double journey. It was not known what kind of cargo they carried, but evidently this must be of considerable value to those who wanted it as they were paying heavily for it. Probably it was arms as reported. There may be some fuel or aviation spirit also carried. Each Lancaster could carry about five tons of load.

5. This was obviously a smuggling racket and big money was being made by the smugglers out of Hyderabad. It was clearly against international law and the regulations made by the Government of India. This risk was deliberately taken by the parties concerned and no doubt they were heavily paid for it.

6. The Lancasters were not using the Pakistan airfield at Mauripore or the civil airfield but were using another airfield nearby which had been constructed during the war but was not now in regular use.

2. D.C.T. Bennett (b. 1910); served with R.A.F. and Royal Australian Air Force, 1939-45.  
3. Sydney Cotton, an Australian.



7. It was next to impossible for our aircraft to intercept these Lancasters during their night flight. We had no facilities or aircraft suitable for the purpose. Only by the rarest chance could we come across them and even then it would be difficult to take any action as the Lancasters flew very fast, about 250 miles an hour.

8. It was learnt that the Pakistan Government had asked for facilities to be given to these Lancasters by the Pakistan R.A.F., but the British Commander of the Pakistan R.A.F. had not agreed. In effect however, facilities in the shape of use of the airfield and petrol were being given. The only facilities that were perhaps not being given were the loan of mechanics etc. The Lancasters, however, had brought some mechanics with them.

9. These Lancasters could not be easily converted into regular bombing planes as they originally were. This would require a heavy under-carriage being attached which could not be done here. But it was easy enough to use the Lancasters for make-shift bombing by dropping the bombs through a hole or through the door. Bennett was a very capable man and could easily fix this up.

10. The whole operation was carried through very secretly. But it is obvious that five Lancasters cannot function nightly without people getting to know about it. The Pakistan Government still formally deny all this but their denial is of no value at all when anyone can see these Lancasters and when even the markings of the Lancasters are known.

11. The London *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Douglas Brown,<sup>4</sup> has apparently sent a story to his paper giving full details including markings on planes and names of the crew. This story has not appeared yet in the *Daily Telegraph* but it may appear in a day or so. The Pakistan Government have been annoyed with Douglas Brown because of this story and it is said that they are going to ask him to leave Pakistan.

12. The British High Commissioner in Karachi is in the picture and knows about this air-smuggling that is going on. Probably he has reported to the U.K. Government about it.

13. The whole operation of going to Hyderabad and back to Karachi is done during the night hours. No Lancasters have been noticed in the airfields of Hyderabad at day time.

14. It is clear from the above information that a regular breach of international law is being committed night after night by these Lancasters. The

4. (b. 1907) ; correspondent of *Daily Telegraph* in India, 1947-49 and from 1960 assistant editor for a long period.



crews are apparently British, Canadian, Irish, Czech etc. As stated above, the Lancasters bear British and Canadian registration marks. Air Marshal Elmhirst was of opinion that the British and Canadian Governments should be immediately addressed on this subject so that they might take away the licences from those persons who are engaged in this smuggling business and who are committing breaches of international law. Enquiry should be made as to what firm or firms are concerned and in whose names is the registration. It should be pointed out to the British and Canadian Governments that we may have to shoot down these Lancasters.

15. (The airman Bennett who is referred to above stood as a candidate for election to the House of Commons some time last October. He was defeated by the Labour candidate<sup>5</sup>).

16. The information given above as well as below was derived from enquiries carried out in Delhi as well as Karachi. Commander-in-Chief Bucher, Air Marshal Elmhirst and Defence Secretary H.M. Patel, went to Karachi two days ago for some Inter-Dominion Conference. They had occasion to meet the Army and Air Chiefs in Karachi as well as others and discussed these various matters with them. Although no formal admission could be obtained on behalf of Pakistan Government, it was clear from their talk that they knew all about this.

17. General Bucher had a long talk with Gracey, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, in regard to Pakistan troops in Kashmir. In effect Gracey admitted that Pakistan troops were there, though he did not specifically do so. His argument was that a large number of Muslims have been driven out of Kashmir State territory by the advance of the Indian Army, and that there were large camps of these refugees from Kashmir in Pakistan. Apparently this was to him sufficient justification for the Pakistan Army to march into Kashmir State territory. There is no doubt that there are these large numbers of refugees from Kashmir. That is not the fault of the Indian Army. It has been the practice of the "Azad" Kashmir forces to drive away the Muslim inhabitants of any place from which they are retiring, and in addition to kill many of the non-Muslims there. The result is that when the Indian Army enters the place when it is captured, such as Rajauri, it finds it deserted. Some people gradually drift back from the hills but most of the Muslim inhabitants are simply driven by the "Azad" Kashmir people into Pakistan. Presumably this is for a political reason, that is to show that the Indian Army

5. Bennett stood as a Liberal candidate.

is liquidating the Muslim population. Where the Pakistan frontier is some distant away, this is a little more difficult and the Muslim refugees drift back, as at Handwara, and settle down again. Sheikh Abdullah recently visited this Handwara region and found a great welcome.

18. Whatever may be the truth about the refugees, it is not at all clear how this justifies the entry of the Pakistan Army into Kashmir State territory.

19. The Pakistan Army has a large number of British officers and if that army is functioning within Kashmir State territory, undoubtedly the British officers are also functioning there or at least are directing operations from behind. It is not quite clear under what conditions the British officers are serving in the Pakistan Army. Most of them are ex-Indian Army officers who have been pensioned off from the old Indian Army and have joined the Pakistan Army afresh. However that might be, they are British officers serving there and taking part in operations against the Indian Army. This matter should be put clearly before the U.K. Government.

## 8. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 14, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Your letter of the 14th enclosing a letter from Nawab Amin Jung Bahadur. I do not know why you have asked me to draft a reply as you could have done it much better. Anyhow I send you a draft and return the original letter.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.



## 9. C. Rajagopalachari's Letter to Amin Jung Bahadur<sup>1</sup>

Dear Nawab Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of July 7th. I appreciate your writing to me and putting the difficulties in your mind before me.

As a constitutional Governor General I should not dabble in politics or express any opinion about them. I am supposed to be the spokesman of my Government. Nevertheless, I shall endeavour to explain what I think is the position of my government in this matter.

If you will read carefully the terms of the draft agreement<sup>2</sup> which was settled in Delhi between the representatives of the States Ministry of the Government of India and the representatives of the Government of Hyderabad, you will find that it amounted to a little more, so far as the three subjects mentioned by you are concerned, than what the Standstill Agreement had envisaged. In view of the fact that the Standstill Agreement had not been given effect to in many matters, it was desirable that there should be full clarification in regard to these three subjects.

Regarding responsible government all that was mentioned in the draft agreement was that responsible government would be established. The details were left to be settled later by the representatives of Hyderabad themselves in a constituent assembly elected for the purpose.

You will observe that while the Government of India stand for full responsible government in every part of India, and indeed have gone a long way to establish it in all the States excepting Hyderabad, they left the details to the representatives of Hyderabad to work out.

This answers your questions. But something else has to be borne in mind. During the past ten months or so the attitude of the Hyderabad Government has been aggressive, provocative and evasive. Their representatives sent to Delhi have repeatedly accepted certain terms which were subsequently rejected in Hyderabad, although those very representatives were continually in touch with Hyderabad on the telephone. The Hyderabad Government has been making every effort to procure munitions of war from abroad and in India, and increasing its regular armies and irregulars. Why should they do so ? What enemy threatens them ? This can only be a preparation for war with India. In the same connection they have encouraged and built up a large

1. Drafted by Nehru. J.N. Collection.

2. The Government of India was prepared to settle with the Government of Hyderabad on the basis of accession in respect of defence, external affairs and communication, preserving the internal autonomy of the State in other matters on the basis of responsible government. The Nizam had turned down this offer.



volunteer force called the Razakars which has been misbehaving not only in Hyderabad but across the borders.

Suppose that something infinitely smaller than this had been done by the Government against the old British Government in India, what would have been the reaction of the latter ? You know very well that the British Government would have immediately taken strong steps against the Hyderabad Government. The present Government of India have been astonishingly patient in spite of all this provocation. The speeches that well-known leaders in Hyderabad deliver are so offensive in tone and content that few governments can tolerate them.

So far as a plebiscite is concerned it is entirely agreed to.<sup>3</sup> But it must take place under fair auspices. Let a properly elected constituent assembly determine. In existing circumstances, while the Razakars terrorise the population, there can be no proper plebiscite.

Yours sincerely,

3. The Government of India suggested as early as 27 August 1947 testing the will of the people by sending British officers to conduct a referendum. The Nizam replied that "the problems of the constitutional position of Hyderabad are such that the question of a referendum does not arise." The suggestion was repeated to Laik Ali on 17 April 1948, and again rejected. The proposals for plebiscite formed part of the Government of India's offer in June 1948 to the Nizam and was once more rejected.

## 10. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd July, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You are aware of the fact that there is every chance of the Hyderabad State Government referring their dispute with us to the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> We should not wait for this reference and then think about it. We should, therefore, take immediate steps to prepare our answer and to clear up our own minds as to the attitude we should take. I hope, therefore, that the States Ministry is thinking about this and preparing for it.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In September 1948, the Nizam sent a delegation to the Security Council with a complaint that the situation between Hyderabad and India had become grave and constituted a threat to peace.

Two issues arise: one is a strictly legal issue as to what Hyderabad is, that is to say whether as a State it has a right to go to the United Nations; secondly, the facts as they have developed and the consequences of what has taken place during the past year. We should take legal opinion in the first matter and in regard to the second, it is for the States Ministry to prepare its case. I do not know whether the White Paper is ready.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that it should be carefully vetted before it is issued as this may have to be used if any reference is made to the United Nations.

External Affairs will give all help in this matter, and it would perhaps be desirable if there was constant consultation between the States Ministry and External Affairs in regard to it.

Meanwhile, we are informing our representative at the United Nations to keep his eyes and ears open. We are also sending him some background material. The High Commissioner in London is also being kept informed.

Very probably Hyderabad has been intriguing with the Arab and other Muslim countries and possibly borrowing moneys into their coffers.<sup>4</sup> We are asking our Ambassadors there to do what they can to counter this. It is rather difficult for them to do much in the circumstances. Nevertheless they have to be on the alert.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. It was contended in the White Paper, published in August 1948, that sovereign rights which reverted to the States on the lapse of paramountcy vested in the peoples of those States and conditions should be created in every State "for the free and unfettered exercise of those rights". This had already been achieved in 500 States where the process of integration and democratization had been completed.
4. It was reported that an arrangement had been made with the Nawab of Makalla for the import of Arabs into Hyderabad; agreements had also been reached with some of the West Asian countries for buying arms and ammunition and storing them at Makalla. King Farouk of Egypt assured the Nizam of the support of Muslim countries in case Hyderabad was attacked.

## 11. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
28 July 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am sending a rough draft of the reply that might be sent to Attlee through the U.K. High Commissioner. This has been rapidly dictated and should be carefully revised. If you will kindly revise it yourself and send it back to me, I shall then ask Bajpai to put it in proper shape and send it to Shone.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



## 12. Message for C R. Attlee<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the letter<sup>2</sup> of Mr. Attlee addressed to the Nizam of Hyderabad which you handed to the Prime Minister yesterday, I am to inform you that his letter has been sent by telegram to the Agent-General for India in Hyderabad. He has been asked to have it delivered immediately to the Nizam. As it was Mr. Attlee's desire communicated by you to the Prime Minister that his letter should reach the Nizam as early as possible, it was decided to telegraph the text. The original text as given by you to the Prime Minister is being sent by air mail to the Nizam.<sup>3</sup>

2. The Prime Minister does not at this stage wish to comment on the Nizam's letter<sup>4</sup> dated 4th July to Mr. Attlee except to say that it contains a false and perverted account of events. The Government of India have made repeated attempts to arrive at a peaceful settlement in regard to Hyderabad. These attempts have come to the verge of a settlement with the representatives of the Hyderabad Government who came to Delhi. But the provisional agreements arrived at have been repudiated by the Nizam and his advisers. The fact that on the conclusion of the Standstill Agreement the Government of India withdrew the contingent of Indian armed forces which were stationed at Secunderabad, is itself proof of their desire to avoid the use of force. Nothing could have been easier than to maintain these forces in the heart of the State and thus to control the situation in the State from the military point of view.

3. The statement made by the Nizam that the State had been denied supplies of medical stores, chlorine for the purification of water supplies, and salt,

1. J.N. Collection. Draft by Nehru. Major changes are indicated in footnotes.

2. In his reply dated 28 July to the Nizam's letter of 4 July Attlee stated that the Government of the United Kingdom had "no status to intervene in the dispute between your Government and the Government of India with whom you have concluded the Standstill Agreement of 29 November last. . . . We much regret that your Government did not find it possible to accept the terms of settlement which were offered to you by the Government of India".

3. This para was the text of a covering letter that G.S. Bajpai, Secretary General, External Affairs Ministry, was to write to Terence Shone, the U.K. High Commissioner, through whom the message was sent to Attlee.

4. In his letter to Attlee the Nizam alleged that a serious situation had arisen as a result of India's attempt to force Hyderabad to accede to the Union. He appealed as "a staunch friend and faithful ally of British Government" for help in the difficulties with which "I am now confronted."



is completely untrue, and large quantities of medical supplies and chlorine have been sent to Hyderabad. A very large supply of common salt has also been sent and it is believed that the stock of common salt in Hyderabad is considerable.

4. The Prime Minister appreciates the message<sup>5</sup> that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has sent to him.<sup>6</sup> He can assure him that the policy of the Indian Government remains fundamentally what that Government declared on the 15th of August, that is, to preserve peaceful conditions and to resolve differences by peaceful and democratic methods. Such a policy however cannot be adhered to if there is aggression and violence from the other side. In the case of Hyderabad there has been a consistent attempt to prepare for war against the Indian Union, and as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is aware, every device to smuggle arms and munitions of war has been adopted, not only in infringement of the Standstill Agreement but also of the rules and regulations of the Government of India. Responsible authorities in Hyderabad have repeatedly and publicly challenged and insulted the Indian Union, and there have been innumerable raids from the Hyderabad State territory into the Provinces of Bombay and Madras, resulting in large scale of arson, loot and killing. Recently an Indian Army convoy going peacefully into an enclave of the Indian Union territory in Hyderabad was suddenly attacked by Hyderabad Razakars who function as a volunteer part of the Hyderabad Armed forces.<sup>7</sup> This was a well-organised and premeditated attack resulting in some casualties among the Indian troops. The Indian troops thereupon went into action and cleared the place of the Razakars. Such incidents indicate how dangerous to peace is the present situation in Hyderabad State.<sup>8</sup> No Government can tolerate a continuance of these attacks and warlike preparations which affect its own security and terrorise its citizens.

5. The internal conditions of Hyderabad State have become a scandal of the first magnitude and the people of the State have to suffer terrorism of

5. The message of Attlee communicated to Nehru on 28 July stated: "We trust that the Government of India will exclude from the execution of their policy for reaching a settlement with Hyderabad the use of military force and so justify in this field the high hopes founded on their first declaration of policy."
6. The revised text read. "The Prime Minister appreciates the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the consideration shown by the Government of India to the Government of Hyderabad through the prolonged negotiations of the last nine months."
7. On 24 July, a military convoy on the Sholapur-Barsi road was attacked with gun-fire and hand grenades by about 50 men near the village of Nanaj in Hyderabad. The Indian Army unit thereupon surrounded and occupied the village and learnt that the Razakars had occupied the village the previous evening with the intention of attacking the column. To cover up the raid, the Nizam's Government protested to the States Ministry against the occupation of Nanaj by Indian troops.
8. It was revised as "such incidents indicate how dangerous to peace is the present attitude towards India of the Hyderabad State."

the worst type.<sup>9</sup> Large numbers of these people are migrating from the State into Indian Union territory. Recently a Minister of the Hyderabad Government, Mr. J.V. Joshi, who has been closely associated with the present Government in Hyderabad, has resigned.<sup>10</sup> In his letter of resignation he has stated from personal observation that a complete reign of terror prevails in some districts which he visited. He describes scenes of devastation, people being killed and their eyes taken out, women raped and large numbers of houses burnt down. The long statement that this Minister of the Hyderabad Government has made is a final condemnation of the gangsterism that is prevailing over the State.<sup>11</sup>

6. Hyderabad is the only State that still has no trace of self-government or responsible government. A feudal regime<sup>12</sup> persists there and this has been made far worse by the encouragement given to the Razakars who kill and rape, burn and loot. You will appreciate that this state of affairs has produced very great reactions in the Indian public and the Government of India have been strongly criticised<sup>13</sup> for not taking effective action to put an end to these atrocities.

7. This is an intolerable position affecting not only the honour and self-respect but also the peace and security of the Indian Union.<sup>14</sup> The Government of India are convinced that Hyderabad must necessarily accede to the Indian Union. Both history and geography lead inevitably to this conclusion. No land-locked territory completely surrounded by one State can remain independent of it or have any separate foreign relations.<sup>15</sup> The Government

9. The Razakars completely dominated the administrative machinery. Officials and even ministers took part in Razakars rallies and processions which preached *jehad*. While the Hindus who constituted a large majority of the State population, had been systematically disarmed, the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Razakars were armed to the teeth. They moved about freely terrorising the Hindus.
10. J.V. Joshi resigned from the Hyderabad cabinet refusing any more to lend his name to "a Government which is powerless to prevent heart-rending atrocities. The police and the military who are paid from the public revenues to maintain law and order and protect the life and property of the people pay little heed to curb the growing atrocities."
11. The last sentence was deleted in the final draft.
12. The Nizam, besides a privy purse of Rs. 50 lakhs, received Rs. 3 crore annually from his personal jagirs extending to about 40 per cent of land in the State. The officials formed a communal caucus.
13. The Government was criticised as following a policy of appeasement and making excessive concessions.
14. The revised draft read: "The Prime Minister hopes that the foregoing will satisfy Mr. Attlee that the Hyderabad Government has created an intolerable position which affects not only the honour and self-respect but also the peace and security of the Indian Union."
15. This sentence read in the revised version: "Hyderabad must also, in response to the exigencies of the present times and in conformity with the example of other Indian States introduce responsible Government. There can be no peaceful or lasting settlement between India and Hyderabad on any other basis."



of India have also repeatedly expressed their willingness to have a referendum of the people. But there can be no fair reference to the people so long as gangsterism and terrorism prevail and so long as there is a feudal and authoritarian rule. They never sought to coerce Hyderabad State into accession by military operations. But when the internal situation in the State and the border situation deteriorate to the extent indicated above, some action has to be taken to give protection to people on both sides of the border. Or else the poison will spread and the whole State will be reduced to a welter of anarchy, affecting all the border regions as well.<sup>16</sup> But if anything of this nature far less than this, had happened prior to August 15th, the then Government of India would have taken swift action. The present Government, impelled by its earnest desire to seek a peaceful settlement, has tried its utmost to avoid military action. It is essential, however, that the terrorism prevailing in Hyderabad State must end<sup>17</sup> so that the people there may have security of life and property and for this purpose the Razakars must be banned and their activities completely stopped, and the present Government of Hyderabad which is dominated by the Razakars should be replaced.<sup>18</sup> Only then will an opportunity arise for a peaceful consideration of the problem.

8. In conclusion, the Prime Minister feels constrained to express his surprise at the decision of His Majesty's Government to agree to the Hyderabad issue being debated in the House of Commons. He is not aware of any occasion in recent history when the affairs of a self-governing member of the Commonwealth have been discussed outside its own Parliament. Tomorrow's debate in the House of Commons is without precedent and the Prime Minister cannot but observe that they regard as most unfortunate what would appear to be a deviation from an established convention.<sup>19</sup>

16. The last two sentences were deleted in the final version.

17. From here the rest of the sentence read, "if a welter of anarchy is not to overwhelm both the State and India's bordering territory. With the utmost desire for peace the Government of India cannot indefinitely defer action to end the present state of affairs and its menace to India."

18. The revised text read, "and the present Government of Hyderabad, which is dominated by Razakars, is replaced by one truly solicitous of and in tune with the wishes of the people."

19. This paragraph was added in the final text.



### 13. Charge of Starving the People<sup>1</sup>

Repeated charges have been made against us about starving the people of the Hyderabad State and depriving them of medicines, salt and chlorine supplies for the purification of water. This was again mentioned in the House of Commons in yesterday's debate. We have denied these charges and pointed out that there is ample food in Hyderabad and that medical supplies, salt and chlorine have gone there in considerable quantities.

2. I have felt, however, that these vague denials are not quite enough and hence I have asked for full details of the supplies sent, dates and quantities and nature of the supplies. I think this is an important and urgent matter and we must get these full particulars as soon as possible and give publicity to them. I believe the States Ministry has already approached the Bombay, Bengal and Madras Governments on this subject and they might have received replies. If full information has not come yet, kindly obtain it very soon. We shall then give publicity to it here and communicate with some of our foreign establishments.<sup>2</sup>

1. Note to the Ministry of States, New Delhi, 31 July 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. It was stated that there was no ban on the movement of normal quantities of any commodities to Hyderabad. A fixed import quota of 20,000 tons of foodgrains had been allotted to Hyderabad for 1948 on the same principles as supplies to other provinces and States in India. There was no ban on the export of medicines and medical stores to Hyderabad. Supplies from Bombay and Calcutta had continued. In fact there had been such heavy purchases by the agents of Hyderabad from these markets recently that it had been necessary to regulate their exports so as not to disturb the supply position in Bombay and Calcutta. A monthly quota of 8000 lbs of chlorine had been fixed for supply to Hyderabad. Not a single application for the supply of chlorine to Hyderabad had so far been rejected. In May 1948, when difficulties of transport of salt were pointed out 190 wagons of salt were despatched to Hyderabad in June.

### 14. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 1, 1948

My dear Dickie,

Thank you for your two letters of the 27th and 28th July.<sup>2</sup> I was glad to hear your voice on the telephone the other day and to have from you a first-

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. In his letter of 27 July Mountbatten assured Nehru that "H.M.G. are genuinely doing everything in their power to help India on a number of vital questions, and in fact have taken quite strong action." In his letter of 28 July Mountbatten stated that Ghulam Mohammed's attack on him had "damaged Pakistan in the eyes of all." Hyderabad's misinformation about medical supplies should be refuted.

hand impression of the debate in the House of Commons. Attlee certainly spoke well and with a certain warmth. His speech has been greatly appreciated here.<sup>3</sup>

The Hyderabad affair continues to simmer. The Razakars have become quite rabid and nobody seems to be able to control them. There are petty conflicts on the border frequently. You must have heard of a somewhat bigger conflict near the Barsi enclave, when an organised attack was made on our troops who were going in lorries. An investigation was made by an English officer (Lt. Col.) of the Hyderabad Army and a Brigadier of the Indian Army. Both presented a joint report to the effect that the whole attack was premeditated, organised and well prepared.

I do not see how this kind of thing can go on for long. I hear vague rumours that Edroos<sup>4</sup> is rather fed up with the state of growing disorder and anarchy that prevails in many parts of the State. There are a considerable number of British Officers in the Hyderabad Army. They have begun to feel a little nervous of their position since Attlee's speech, and I think some reference has been made by them to the U.K. High Commissioner.

One of the ministers of the Hyderabad Government, Joshi, who has been hand in glove with Kasim Razvi and the Razakars, resigned recently and made a long statement. This statement gives a ghastly account of happenings in Hyderabad State and of the atrocities that the Razakars are committing. All this points to a steadily deteriorating condition both internally in the State and in regard to Hyderabad's relations with the Indian Union. Sir Mirza Ismail has been here for the last two or three days and

3. On 30 July, Attlee denied in the House of Commons Churchill's charge of breaches of promises made to Hyderabad. The British had warned the princes that paramountcy would lapse with their withdrawal from India. He also said that the Kashmir controversy was not referred to the U.N. "What occurred was that the Union of India protested against encroachment on its territory after Kashmir had acceded."
4. Though the earlier report that Laik Ali, the Prime Minister and General Edroos, the Commander of the Hyderabad State Forces, had resigned proved false, it was evident that there was political instability. Two of the non-Muslim Ministers had resigned and the Agent General at Delhi, Nawab Zain Yar Jung, was later replaced. The Prince of Berar, who functioned as the Commander-in-Chief, had also submitted his resignation.



has seen Rajaji, Vallabhbhai Patel and me.<sup>5</sup> He had absolutely nothing constructive to say and he had no authority from the Nizam at all. He came apparently just to find out how the land lay. Our position briefly put is that it is impossible to carry on any negotiations till two things happen, the banning of the Razakars and a new government in Hyderabad. We cannot deal with the Laik Ali Government after all that it has done. Members of this Laik Ali Government are almost daily throwing out challenges to the Indian Union.

I have satisfied myself that large quantities of medical stores and salt have gone to Hyderabad during the last two or three months. Some chlorine also has gone for purifying water. As for food supplies there has never been any question of food being sent to Hyderabad because they export food. So all this talk of starving Hyderabad and depriving it of medical stores is just bunkum.

Yesterday, for the first time, the Pakistan Government admitted having sent their troops into Kashmir.<sup>6</sup> They did so after they knew that the U.N. Commission were convinced of the fact and had told them so. Pakistan now say that they sent the Pakistan Army across the border in May last in order to protect their frontiers and prevent the Indian Army from invading Pakistan. The story is, according to them, that the Indian Army was going to carry out a pincer movement in cooperation with the Fakir of Ipi. It is astonishing how Pakistan flourishes on lies and fabrications. Their whole case in regard to Kashmir has been built on that foundation and now that they have been found out, they try to produce another set of lies.

There is thus, admittedly now, a war going on between the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army in Kashmir. If this is so, it is a little difficult to understand how otherwise India and Pakistan can carry on with their normal peaceful relations. The whole affair is fantastic and Gilbertian.

Even according to the Pakistan authorities they have had their troops in Kashmir for some months now. During this period I have repeatedly challenged them about it and they have consistently denied it. Till two days ago their newspapers indignantly denied it. Obviously all these operations could only be carried through under the directions of the General Staff

5. Mirza Ismail had come to Delhi with the consent of the Nizam to reopen negotiations with the Government of India. His attempts failed owing to the opposition of the Razakar-controlled ministry of Hyderabad and of Laik Ali in particular, who threatened to resign if Mirza's efforts were not abandoned.

6. This was on 4 August 1948.



which means Gracey and other high British officers in the Pakistan Army. Also numerous other British officers must have taken part. According to our information a full division at least of the Pakistan Army is in Kashmir.

We are thus in open, though formally undeclared, war with Pakistan in Kashmir. The Indian Army is fighting the Pakistan Army and British officers are taking part on the other side both in planning and in operations. This, according to the official Pakistan statement, began in May last. As a matter of fact it began much earlier, only then the Pakistan Army did not come so openly. I do not myself see how this situation can remain as it is.

The question of proportionate pensions will be decided according to your advice. We are working out the scheme and soon we shall make a formal announcement to this effect.

Regarding the letter addressed to the King, which was opened here by our Customs., I should like to point out that in any event it was an error of some junior officers of the Customs Department. None of us knew about it till much later when we were informed of what had taken place. It is true that information had been received by the States Ministry that Cotton was trying to smuggle some things on his return journey and instructions had been issued to the Customs to keep a careful watch. Nobody, of course, could possibly think that there was a letter to the King. I saw the envelope as well as its contents. The address in the envelope was so badly typed and the whole appearance filled one with suspicion. No properly run office could have done that. You know, I suppose, that inside this cover addressed to the King was a letter addressed to Monckton apart from a copy of a letter which had previously been sent to the King. I can understand the reactions of some people about a letter addressed to the King being opened. But in any event no responsible government official was concerned in this business and it is clear that no one meant the slightest discourtesy to the King.

I am informed by Indira that I have to go to the new house tomorrow morning. So I am going there, though without the least enthusiasm. We have decided to discuss the internal arrangements of the house later on with the Governor General's staff.

I am glad you are going to Eire and Canada. That I hope will be a real holiday for both of you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 4, 1948

My dear Dickie,

I have received your letter of the 28th July, enclosing the telegram which Rust<sup>2</sup> of the *Daily Worker* has sent you.

I do not myself know anything about this special incident. But I do know that the Communist papers in Bombay and elsewhere have been writing the most vicious stuff.<sup>3</sup> I have not the least feeling against communism or against Communists as such. As you know, the British Tory press often describes me as a pal of Stalin. But I must confess that the way the Communists are carrying on in India in the shape of the most violent activity and writing is enough to disgust anyone. There is a complete lack of integrity and decency. Some of their activities in Malabar have been brutal in the extreme. Of course whenever there is disorder all kinds of anti-social elements take part in it with a view to personal profit or aggrandizement.

Sir Mirza Ismail has been here making vague approaches about Hyderabad. He started off with a measure of enthusiasm and Zain Yar Jung dashed off to Hyderabad, returning full of optimism. The Nizam had seen him and told him to send Mirza Ismail to Hyderabad, promising to be very reasonable.

That same evening a message came from Hyderabad asking Mirza Ismail not to come because the Razakars had so ordered and in fact had threatened his life. So the Nizam caved in. He counts less and less in Hyderabad. It is the Kasim Razvi-Laik Ali junta that controls the situation. El Edroos is not too happy about it.

Everything seems to march to a climax here whether it is Hyderabad or Kashmir or the economic situation. The recent admission of Pakistan that they had sent large armies in May last to Kashmir has brought matters to a head. Either those armies are withdrawn or we cannot have any relations with Pakistan now. I hope the U.K. Government appreciates this position and the fact that British officers are carrying on this war against India.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. William Rust (1903-1949); Secretary of Young Communist League, and Editor of *Young Worker*, 1924; imprisoned for twelve months in 1925 on charge of incitement to mutiny; Editor of *Daily Worker*, 1930; correspondent with International Brigade in Spain, 1937-38; Communist candidate, Hackney South, 1945, and Hackney North, 1949; author of *Britons in Spain* (1939). He later left the Communist Party.

3. For example an editorial in the *People's Age* stated that it was "blasphemous lie to assert that freedom has been achieved. . . national leadership has accepted sham freedom."



In spite of all this I still think of coming to England. Indeed I should like to come about the 3rd week of September so as to spend two or three days in Paris at the time of the U.N. Assembly meeting.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 16. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8th August 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 6th August.

I agree with you that instructions should be issued to have two alternative plans ready, as suggested. That is to say, that in case a serious situation arises internally in Hyderabad some thing may have to be done immediately, of course on orders from here.

This morning's papers referred to an attack on a train coming from Bezwada into Hyderabad territory.<sup>2</sup> I trust that action is being taken. It appears desirable that the particular station where this occurred should be occupied by Indian troops.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 7 August armed gangs attacked a train bound for Hyderabad.

## 17. To V. K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15 August, 1948

My dear Krishna,

Your letter<sup>2</sup> of the 13th August dealing with Bajpai's telegram No. 8533 dated 6th August.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Krishna Menon had talks with Herbert Morrison and Noel-Baker, during which he was told that the withdrawal of diplomatic representation from Pakistan would be "a mistake". Expressing his agreement with Morrison, Menon wrote to Nehru against any declaration of war against Pakistan as it would reflect badly on India diplomatically and militarily. If there had to be a war, let Pakistan declare it first.



We have tried to keep you informed of the position here. It is quite possible that we take a slightly exaggerated view of things being very near. Nevertheless, I feel that we have not quite succeeded in explaining the situation as it is. After all it is the situation as viewed here that will largely influence further developments. It seems to me a little absurd to talk of India indulging in aggression. There are plenty of people in India who might do so and who have been clamouring for military action. But for a variety of reasons, we have avoided any such action against Hyderabad and Pakistan, except for petty border incidents in Hyderabad. I think we have a sufficient realisation of the consequences of such action and would like to avoid it as far as is possible. We have discussed this matter from every point of view, political and military, with our advisers.

In Hyderabad, we have never intended any military invasion unless internal happenings in Hyderabad forced us to do so. As a matter of fact, the gun-running into Hyderabad, the blood and thunder speeches delivered by members of the Hyderabad Government, the constant intrigues with Pakistan<sup>3</sup> or others against us and the open preparation for war against us, are ample justification for us to take action in a military sense. We avoided this not so much for love of Hyderabad, but because of the possible consequences all over India and Pakistan.

What is forcing our hands, apart from an almost universal demand, is the progressive deterioration of the situation inside Hyderabad. Our reports indicate that some kind of terrorism prevails in parts of the State. Murder and arson are committed by the Razakars and forcible conversions are taking place. The European residents there are themselves getting frightened at these developments. We had recently a letter from British missionaries there appealing for help. It is frightfully difficult for us to look on while this kind of thing is happening on a considerable scale in Hyderabad State. I doubt if any Government can sit tight in view of this developing situation. Even our British military advisers are coming round to the opinion that Hyderabad must be dealt with in a military way fairly soon.

Cotton is back in Hyderabad and is totally unabashed. He is very thick with Pakistan authorities.<sup>4</sup>

As regards Kashmir or Pakistan, again there is no question of aggression on our part. The aggression is entirely on the other side. Pakistan,

3. Laik Ali paid a secret visit to Karachi where he consulted Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed and Zafrullah Khan. He asked if Pakistan could come to the help of Hyderabad in case of a conflict between India and Hyderabad. Jinnah was seriously ill at that time. So the Pakistan leaders could not give any definite answer to Laik Ali. However, Zafrullah Khan advised Laik Ali to take the Hyderabad case to the Security Council.
4. On 1 August, the British Government had suspended Sydney Cotton's flying licence.

it is admitted, has sent very large forces in Kashmir and is fighting the Indian Army there. Surely we cannot look on at this and merely go on appealing to the U.K. Prime Minister or some one else. The normal way to repel the Pakistan invasion is for us to cross the Pakistan border and get at their bases.

Nobody here is anxious to cut off diplomatic relations. But I do not understand why we are supposed to put up indefinitely with a state of affairs which involves Pakistan armies functioning in our territory and fighting our troops. That too very largely with the help of British officers. If we once accept this position passively, then what are we to do later?

My own experience for the past nine or ten months has been that Pakistan gets away with it easily because they shout a lot, lie a lot and generally adopt a very vehement attitude. Over the Kashmir issue they have been lying all the time, but because they speak vehemently and threaten dire consequences, therefore an attempt is made to accommodate them. That generally appears to be the attitude of the U.N. Commission here also.

I think it is grossly unfair for the U.K. Government to permit British officers to go on assisting in the war in Kashmir. The position of British officers in Pakistan and in India is entirely different and I do not see why they should be treated alike. But, as I have told you, if they are treated alike, that is, both are withdrawn, I would prefer that to the Pakistani officers continuing.

The situation here is definitely critical both in regard to Hyderabad and Pakistan, and I do not see myself how it can be indefinitely prolonged as it is. We may not declare war formally, but the fact of military action being taken will be obvious enough. When the word, 'war', was used in our telegrams, it did not necessarily refer to formal war after declaration. As a matter of fact war is going on today, even though it is undeclared.

I appreciate what you say about coming to terms with the U.K. You should also appreciate how delicate the matter is at this end and any false move on our part may upset the applecart completely. However, we shall keep what you have said in mind. Before I go to England, I shall try to discuss this matter with most of the people who count here. As you are likely to come here fairly soon, we can discuss this matter further then. I agree with you that you should come here towards the end of this month.

I shall just like to say that your reference to the I.N.T.U.C. is not factually correct.<sup>5</sup> I did not like the formation of this organisation and I think there are some wrong elements in it. But I think it is totally wrong to say that it is a boss-sponsored trade union. It has some of our most earnest trade union workers, it has met with great success, and the bosses and employers do not like it at all.

5. Menon had referred to the I.N.T.U.C. as a "boss-sponsored" trade union.



Your two letters of the 13th have been so badly typed that sometimes it is a little difficult to understand what you have written.

Yesterday we received a copy of a resolution passed by the U.N. Kashmir Commission here. This embodies certain proposals. I do not like some of these proposals. However, we are considering them. If I can manage it, I shall send you a copy with this letter and write to you more about it later.

I am sending you a large packet of newspapers, chiefly the Independence Day issues. I should like you to send these to the Mountbattens who might be interested in them.

The position in Kashmir is that large scale offensives are being organised by Pakistan and we are on the defensive. If they attack us in this big way there, the question arises of our going for their bases.

This letter was dictated last night when I was very sleepy.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 18. Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

We have been considering situation in Hyderabad State with constant care and grave concern. Border raids, attacks on trains and atrocities on non-Muslims within the State are of daily occurrence and constantly multiplying. Doubtless realising that our patience had come to an end, and the consequent inevitability of military action by us, Hyderabad have informed us that they propose to refer matter to United Nations.<sup>2</sup> Our latest information is that this might be done within the next few days by bringing it before the Security Council. We have no intention of allowing matters to drift and situation to worsen pending long drawn out arguments before Security Council.

1. New Delhi, 21 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Laik Ali, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, had communicated to the Prime Minister of the Union, the Nizam's intention to have U.N. moved on the Hyderabad-Union differences. The charges against India were mainly alleged breaches of the Standstill Agreement; the intention of the reference was said to be to achieve a peaceful settlement with India.



2. Bajpai has already telegraphed to you legal position as it appears to our advisers. We shall take line that Council has no jurisdiction and Hyderabad has no *locus standi*. Paramount need of protecting non-Muslim majority within Hyderabad and preserving peace in South India and safeguarding Muslim minorities in India may compel us to take police action. There are, however, certain factors affecting world opinion which we have to take into account. These are :

(1) Attlee's appeal to us: I feel that U.K. Government should be kept informed of our intentions.

(2) Fact that U.N. Commission on Kashmir is now considering our and possibly also Pakistan's reply and must soon give its decision: If both parties agree to ceasefire proposals, the situation in Kashmir will ease to some extent from military point of view. On other hand, if we accept and Pakistan rejects, we shall be diplomatically in stronger position vis-a-vis Pakistan.

(3) Effect of action by us on Security Council : Such action may be represented as act of discourtesy to Council and as instance of our aggressive mentality.

3. We shall keep both internal and international aspects of this question constantly under review and shall also keep you informed. Meanwhile, this is intended for your own information. Of course, when you see Attlee, you can, if you consider necessary, broadly explain present position to him.<sup>3</sup>

3. In his cable dated 23 August, Krishna Menon stated: "Attlee's mind was firmly fixed on the ceasefire and he argued that if the other side accepted ceasefire the continuance of British officers will assist honest maintenance of ceasefire and if on the other hand Pakistan did not accept this an entirely new situation arose in which stern action would be taken."

19. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd August, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As was decided yesterday, it is necessary for me to send an immediate reply<sup>2</sup> to Laik Ali. His telegram reached me two days ago and there should be no further delay in replying to it. I am waiting for a draft from the States Ministry. I shall be grateful if this is expedited.

We have had a message from Pillai, our representative at the United Nations, in which he refers to the rumours about the Hyderabad case being presented before the Security Council. He asks for directions. Pillai is not specially suited to deal with this difficult, technical and rather legal matter. Nevertheless he will have to say something. I do not like the idea of his merely asking for time till someone else goes to represent our case. I think the proper course will be for him to make a relatively brief and concise statement of our case to the Security Council. He need not enter into any further argument. Something must be said on our behalf at the earliest moment in the Security Council. If after that the Security Council want more detailed arguments, we shall have to consider what further step we have to take, that is to say whether we have to send some expert to represent us.

The statement that Pillai should make there on the first occasion cannot be left to him. It has to be carefully drafted and sent from here. In anticipation of what might happen we cannot wait till we get some notice from the Security Council as this might not give us time to prepare and send that statement. I suggest therefore that such a statement should be prepared immediately and sent to Pillai; with instructions to use it only in case necessity arises. In any event that statement will enable him to know what our case is. The statement will necessarily be a legal and constitutional one and will hardly deal with any other facts. May I suggest therefore that the preparation of the statement may be taken in hand immediately by the States Ministry? We shall of course help in every way. Our Legal Adviser is at your disposal, as also the Secretary General.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Government of India, in its reply to the Hyderabad Government, on the latter's decision to refer the issue of Indo-Hyderabad relations to the U.N. contended "the Government of India regard the differences between them and Hyderabad as a purely domestic issue and cannot admit that Hyderabad, considering its historic as well as its present position in relations to India, has any right in international law to seek the intervention of the U.N. or any other outside body for the settlement of the issue."



The question arises as to whether it will be necessary or desirable for us to send some special person to the Security Council to deal with this matter. I am not at all clear in my mind about it. I naturally depend on other developments. I found out yesterday that B.N. Rau was reaching London today from Holland. He intends coming back to India soon. In the event of our possibly requiring his services in this connection I have sent a telegram to our High Commissioner in London asking him to inform B.N. Rau to stay on in London pending further instructions. We are writing to him to this effect also by air mail. Whether his services are utilised in this connection or not is a matter to be decided when the time comes. In any event I am asking him to prepare a full note on the legal and constitutional aspects and if necessary to consult eminent constitutional lawyers in London.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 20. Cable to B. Rama Rau<sup>1</sup>

Report of State Department reaction to Hyderabad's effort to refer dispute between us and State to U.N. is interesting.<sup>2</sup> I hope you will do everything possible to consolidate American opposition to a move of which primary purpose is to gain time for further arming Razakars by smuggling of arms which is in full progress and, generally, for preparing Hyderabad for all out war against India. Terrorism against non-Muslim majority in State is at its full height. Cry of intended aggression by us is designed merely to divert attention from these atrocities. Had we been inclined to coerce Hyderabad into accession by force, we should not have withdrawn our troops from Secunderabad Cantonment nor carried on negotiations for nine months in persistent effort to reach peaceful settlement. In these negotiations we went to the limit of concessions and were prepared to

1. New Delhi, 23 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. In its reply to the Nizam's request the U.S. Government stated that the U.S. was not in a position to consider "the extension of its good offices in the present situation in the absence of agreement of both India and Hyderabad to settle their differences in this manner."



extend to Hyderabad treatment which no other acceding State has received. Even now, in the face of gravest provocation and pressure of our own public opinion to put end to prevailing reign of terror in Hyderabad, we are holding our hand. That should convince all impartial persons of our forbearance and our desire for peaceful settlement. Hyderabad's own acts, and no desire of ours for aggression, can compel us to take police action to save the non-Muslim majority in Hyderabad, and also Muslim within the State, who are opposed to Razakars, from pillage, bodily injury or murder, and to preserve the safety of South India as well as the life and property of the large Muslim minority throughout the Union which must be in jeopardy if the communal excesses of the Razakars continue. Ministry is telegraphing to you separately B.N. Rau's opinion on competence of Hyderabad to refer its dispute with us to United Nations.<sup>3</sup> If you use it at all, it should be done in general way as we do not wish to reveal in advance of the event whole of our argument before Security Council or Assembly, should matter come up before either.

3. The Government of India regarded the differences between them and Hyderabad as a domestic issue and could not admit that Hyderabad had any right in international law to seek the intervention of an outside body. The Security Council had no jurisdiction and Hyderabad had no *locus standi*.

## 21. Gun-running through Goa<sup>1</sup>

This telegram<sup>2</sup> is too vague and indefinite. As a matter of fact we have received more or less definite information from a number of sources—including an eyewitness account—about the use of the aerodrome at Goa for traffic to Hyderabad. Cotton is said to have stopped there. This must be enquired into thoroughly.

Seen other accounts of gun-running—and of Goa port being extended and fortified as a result of an arrangement with Pakistan. And of additional

1. Note to Secretary General, 26 August 1948. File No. 19(71)/Eur I/49, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Concerning reports of gun-running through Goa.

troops (African) having been brought there by the Portuguese. The suggestion is that Hyderabad is paying for all this.

Goa may also be used for a convenient place for smuggling other articles.

All these and other like matters should be fully enquired into. Another telegram should be sent to Baig<sup>3</sup> drawing attention to this.

3. M.R. Ali Baig reported on 10 September that Sydney Cotton had visited Goa to inspect the sunken German ships in the harbour. He made an unsuccessful bid for the salvage contract.

## 22. To A. Campbell-Johnson<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

26th August, 1948

My dear Campbell-Johnson,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th August giving me an account of the debate on Hyderabad in the House of Commons. This gave me a more intimate picture than the newspapers had given. I have shown your letter to V.P. Menon.

I am afraid the Hyderabad issue has reached a climax now and it is a little difficult for it to remain where it is. The people in charge in Hyderabad, the Nizam, Laik Ali, Razvi, etc., function on a mental and emotional plane which it is difficult to understand or to deal with. They are totally irresponsible. Meanwhile, from all reports conditions in Hyderabad continue progressively to grow worse and law and order in many parts have vanished. Razvi continues to talk wildly and issues threats of implanting his flag on the Delhi Fort. Gun-running by air continues and the whole apparatus of the State is concentrated on military preparations.

As you know, Sir Mirza Ismail's effort ended in failure because Razvi vetoed him.<sup>2</sup> Zain Yar Jung is in fear of his life in Hyderabad.

On our side resentment has reached a certain pitch. There is a feeling that on the one hand the mass of the population is suffering very greatly and secondly the military resources of the State are being augmented fairly rapidly.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mirza Ismail stated that his efforts to bring about a settlement between India and Hyderabad were "nullified by the influence of extremist elements in Hyderabad, more particularly by the Ittehad members of the Council who prevailed on the Nizam to reject my advice." He further said that left to himself the Nizam would have come to terms.



The U.N. Kashmir Commission has for the present finished its labours in Delhi and is more or less satisfied with our reactions to their proposal. Pakistan's reaction has irritated them considerably. They are going to Karachi in a day or two for final talk. Meanwhile, Pakistan armies have entered Kashmir in large numbers and there is a great deal of talk of major attacks on various fronts.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 23. Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 9044 dated 24th August.

1. Hyderabad: Situation inside State is getting intolerable. Razakars stopped train the other day and attacked and looted passengers. Large party of villagers moving in bullock carts from interior of State to seek shelter in our territory was attacked; menfolk were beaten up and women abducted. One village which resisted Razakar onslaught for three days had to give up fight when munition gave out. Razakars then indulged in indiscriminate massacre and village headman, whose spirited leadership had inspired defence, was beheaded and his head carried about on a pole. Apart from growing demand of public opinion in India for action by us due to multiplicity of such incidents, they reveal mounting brutality by Razakars and consequent anarchy which might well, if unchecked, create state of lawlessness throughout Hyderabad State and neighbourhood. As we have already told you this we cannot allow to happen. Police action against Razakars and their sympathisers in Hyderabad cannot, therefore, be postponed much longer.

#### 2. British Officers in Pakistan Army :

You have done your best and we do not suggest that you press Attlee further for withdrawal of such officers. It is important, however to point out to him two fundamental differences between our position and that of Pakistan in respect of the use of British officers :

1. New Delhi, 27 August 1948. J.N. Collection.



(i) Except for the Commander-in-Chief, we have no British officer on the operational side of our Army. On the other hand, a considerable percentage of the Pakistan High Command as also officers at lower levels are employed on the operational side. The participation of the latter, therefore, even though it may be indirect in the Kashmir operations, is far greater than that of any British officer in our Army.

(ii) We are fighting in Kashmir against aggression. Pakistan, especially now that its troops are fighting against us on what is Indian Dominion territory, is an active aggressor. Surely, the British officers helping an army to resist aggression are not acting wrongfully while British officers functioning in aid of the aggressor are.

6

HYDERABAD

II. Police Action





1. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

August 29, 1948

My dear Dickie

You must be still in Canada, but I suppose by the time this letter reaches London you might be on your way back.

We have been having a very difficult time here and I have felt more than ever the weight of responsibility that has been cast upon me. Grave decisions have to be made by us and the alternatives between which we have to choose are equally undesirable. So, as often in life, we search frantically for the lesser evil. We try to look into the future and to provide for it, but that future is full of uncertainty. And so, we try to do what, in the context of things today, appears right.

What is right and what is wrong is a question that is never easy to answer except by those people who are happily in a position to see only a small part of the picture and who are full of a sense of their own rectitude.

In spite of your very generous praise of me on various occasions, I have myself no such sense of self-complacency or rectitude, and so, I grope rather blindly for the light. Fortunately, in spite of certain sensitiveness, I have grown essentially thick-skinned, and a certain element of vagabondage in my make-up saves me from too much oppression of the spirit.

Rajaji was away for about 10 days, wandering about Madras, Bangalore, Travancore and Nagpur. I rather missed him, for I find a talk with him always helpful. He returned last night and I have had two long talks with him today. That gave me a sense of relief, although it did not solve any problem.

The Kashmir Commission of the U.N. has gone off to Pakistan taking with them our acceptance of their ceasefire proposal.<sup>2</sup> They presented this proposal simultaneously just a fortnight ago today, to us and to Pakistan. We accepted it after some elucidation within a few days. Then they went into long conferences and discussed our letter to them at length. Ultimately they accepted our acceptance.

Meanwhile, Pakistan, according to ancient habit, has refused to say yea or nay. They go on arguing and asking questions. I do not think it is quite fair to us that we should be made to commit ourselves as early as possible and the others should hold up matters. The present position is that either Pakistan agrees to the ceasefire, which leads to a ceasefire and truce, or they do not agree. In the latter event, presumably, the U.N.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. On 20 August 1948, the Government of India announced their acceptance of the ceasefire proposals "animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace."

Commission report to the Security Council that we have agreed and Pakistan have not agreed. That is certainly advantageous to us. Of course, it depends how they say it. I can't make out this Commission or how they function. They have a way of saying things to one party and something entirely different to the other. On the whole we have found the Czech representative, our nominee, the most intelligent and sensible of the lot. Of the others, the American, who is the U.S. Ambassador in Rangoon, appears to be most unfavourable to us. Why the U.S.A. should persistently behave in this manner, I just can't make out.

It has been as clear as the mid-day sun in India that a regular war is being carried on by the Pakistan Army in Kashmir State on an ever-growing scale. The U.N. Commission admits it. In their ceasefire proposals, although this is not stated in clear words, it is a presumption on which their proposals are based. They ask for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from Kashmir. Yet, in spite of all this, they are reluctant to say anything about it. I suppose they have informed the Security Council of it and I hope that in their report they will make it still more clear. Meanwhile, it is a Gilbertian situation, though without much humour. At any moment a mass attack by the Pakistan Army might take place on the Jammu side via Mirpur and Sialkot. You know that Sialkot is only about 28 miles from Jammu. In case such an attack is made, the only possible course open to us is to march directly on to Sialkot. We have issued instructions accordingly.

I should like to make it perfectly clear to you, as there appears to be a misapprehension in your last letter, that there is no question of our declaring war against Pakistan or against anyone else. Further that it is not our intention even now, to march our armies into Pakistan territory unless Pakistan armies march towards Jammu, or invade the East Punjab. Even then it is not a question of declaring war, but of taking military action against this move by crossing over into Pakistan territory near Sialkot or elsewhere. You will remember that it is an acknowledged fact now that Pakistan troops are fighting in our territory all over the Kashmir State. Legally or morally we have every right to cross into their territory to protect ourselves. But we shall not do so except in the circumstances mentioned above, that is Pakistan further invading our territory. Even then, I repeat there is no question of declaring war. Indeed I do not quite understand how legally war is declared between a dominion against another. That would mean the King on behalf of one dominion declaring a war against himself in another dominion.

So much for Kashmir and western Pakistan. Hyderabad has nothing to do in law or otherwise with Pakistan, though there are, of course, intimate contacts between the two. Hyderabad has been a running sore for a long



time, but now it has become an intolerable nuisance or something much worse. It is ten weeks now since you went away. We broke with them then and normally various consequences would have flowed from that break. We have tried our utmost to avoid those consequences in spite of grave and continual provocations. The daily gun-running by air has exasperated Indian opinion tremendously. What is worse is the steady deterioration inside Hyderabad and near the borders. Stories of Razakars' misbehaviour pour in, migration<sup>3</sup> from Hyderabad is increasing, and these poor people who come away are often looted by the Razakars and there have been instances of fairly large scale abductions of women from these parties trying to escape from Hyderabad by road. (Edwina is not here to take charge of this new lot of abducted women).

You know how Sir Mirza Ismail's efforts ended in failure. He made it clear in the statement that he issued that the fault lay with the Nizam's advisers. Zain Yar Jung has been dismissed from his office here. Altogether the Hyderabad administration is in the charge of the worst elements in the State who have no conception of responsibility and who talk wildly and continually rattle their sabres. We get the pitiest appeals against them.

In view of all these, it seems just impossible for us to look on. I have tried my utmost, and not without success, to avoid and postpone any large scale action against Hyderabad. The result of this has been that, in so far as this matter is concerned, I am completely distrusted by large numbers of people here. I do not worry much about this, but I do worry about the situation as a whole and I am quite convinced now that there can be no solution of the Hyderabad problem unless some effective punitive measures are taken. When and how they should be taken is relatively a matter of detail. If these measures have to be taken, then there is not much point in indefinitely delaying them. The very reason for our not taking those measures, that is the possibility of communal troubles in various parts of India, does not apply with much force if there is just some delay. In fact the communal situation as a whole worsens by delay. My own impression is, and people who are in a good position do judge, like the Premiers of Provinces etc., agree with this impression, that there is no particular likelihood of any widespread communal trouble in case we have to take punitive action against Hyderabad. But there is a growing likelihood if we do not take any such action and Hyderabad continues to be a seething cauldron.

All this leads to the conclusion that some military action must be taken fairly soon and fairly swiftly against Hyderabad, if we are to save a

3. Thousands of people had to leave Hyderabad State because of danger to their lives. Attacks on the people continued. The Government machinery had broken down. Laik Ali himself admitted that fifty to sixty thousand Hindus had fled to the Union of India.



deteriorating situation. Our old demands of Hyderabad are rather out of date and have grown stale by repetition. I feel that the only demand now can be that Indian troops should be stationed at Secunderabad as they used to be last year. That is the only way to ensure certain security and stability. Mirza Ismail himself made some such proposal to the Nizam.

Please rest assured that, whatever the provocation, we are not going to declare war against anybody. But we may well have to take what we call police action against Hyderabad State in the near future. We do not wish to take any decision without the fullest consultation with all our colleagues and advisers. We are therefore consulting these people separately. But it is clear to me that while opinions may vary in regard to minor matters there is a very widespread agreement in regard to the basic proposals.

I have written to you a long letter because I want you to keep in touch with all the developments that are taking place in India. We miss you here.

As you know, Krishna was to come here and I was looking forward to his visit. But in view of developments, we thought that Krishna's presence in London was desirable. I hope, however, that he will be able to come here fairly soon.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal

## 2. To V. K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
29 August, 1948

My dear Krishna,

I was glad when you wrote to me that you wanted to come here for a consultation. I sent you a telegram immediately that I would welcome your visit to India and I was looking forward to meeting you here soon. Subsequently we asked you to postpone your departure by few days as your presence in London might be required during these next few days. It was difficult to decide whether you would be more useful in London or in India during this critical period. You have made yourself so indispensable in London that it is a little difficult for us to do without you there during a period of crisis. So we asked you to stay on, but I would like you to come here fairly soon. I cannot just say when at present. We shall keep in touch with you by telegram and indicate to you the date when you might come here,

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

or you can judge for yourself. In any event I hope that the delay will not be much more than a week from today.

I have been rather overwhelmed by a variety of grave problems and I have never more felt the need for frank talks with a person whose judgement I value. Even Rajaji has been away from Delhi and only returned last night after 10 days' absence. So I would particularly like you to come here, even though for a brief period. However busy I might be, I shall, of course, find enough time for you.

The Hyderabad situation has been developing rapidly, as you will no doubt have realised from our successive telegrams. There is something like a passionate desire among large number of people in favour of effective action being taken against the Hyderabad State. Conditions within that State have been bad and progressively deteriorating. Stories of Razakar atrocities come to us frequently. All this gun-running business, which apparently is going on still, has been a constant irritant to public opinion. There is a general impression among people all over India that I am the one person that comes in the way of action being taken against Hyderabad. I do not mind that of course and I am merely stating it to make you realise how things are moving here.

I am myself convinced that it is impossible to arrive at any solution of the Hyderabad problem by settlement or peaceful negotiations. Military action becomes essential; we call it, as you have called it, police action. We certainly do not call it here or elsewhere war, though soldiers will be involved. The question then limits itself to the time and manner of doing it. Any marked delay would have, as it is having, a very bad effect on our people and a feeling of desperation, and utter frustration will seize hold of them.

The reported reference of the Hyderabad issue to the U.N. produces a certain complication, but that is hardly reason for our holding up any action that would otherwise be justified. There is no point in holding it up because of this for a short period, because, if the U.N. goes into this matter, it will be a somewhat prolonged affair as it usually is. A prolonged postponement would certainly have very bad results in many ways.

The United Nations Kashmir Commission and its activities have also to be considered. We have arrived at a stage when we have given an answer to the Commission to their ceasefire proposal. We have accepted that proposal after a certain elucidation by the Commission, and they have accepted our acceptance. Yesterday they went to Karachi. Pakistan was given the original proposal at the same time as it was given to us. They have not given their final answer yet, but they sent a kind of questionnaire to the Commission. It is obvious that they do not wish to accept the proposal as it is and ultimately their qualified response, whatever it might be, may



amount to a rejection. Obviously, we would like this matter to be finally settled this way or that way as soon as possible. But Pakistan are experts in delaying answers and in not committing themselves. We have made it clear to the Commission that it will be grossly unfair to us if after taking our answer, they delay their decision indefinitely because Pakistan will not say yes or no. Normally speaking, some final decision should be made by the Commission well within a week. That decision can either be the ceasefire decision or a report to the Security Council that while India has accepted their ceasefire proposal, Pakistan has been unable to do so. In either event we stand to gain.

We are having intensive conferences with our military advisers, some governors of provinces and other people concerned. We are exploring every aspect of the question and, in so far as possible, preparing for the probable consequences of any action that might be undertaken. We may come to a more or less final decision pretty soon.

It is our intention, after we have come to a decision, to send a kind of an ultimatum<sup>2</sup> to the Hyderabad Government asking them to agree to Indian troops being stationed in Secunderabad cantonment as previously. Nothing short of that was going to bring a sense of security for the people of Hyderabad. I might mention that some such proposal was made by Sir Mirza Ismail to the Nizam recently. Thus, our demand is not going to be a repetition of previous demands.

We have naturally given the fullest attention to what you and Dickie wrote and the message that Attlee sent. It is after that full consideration that we are inclined to the conclusion that no further considerable delay is possible. I shall not here go into all the reasons. It will not be with a light heart or without the fullest consideration of all aspects that we will take any step. There is a sense of desperation in the minds of many people here and a strong urge that this present state of affairs must be ended almost at any cost.

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Dickie Mountbatten.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

2. The Government of India sent an ultimatum to the Nizam's Government that the Razakars should be disbanded and all facilities should be allowed to re-stationing Indian troops at Secunderabad. The Nizam's Government replied that they had no intention of complying with the demand. Indian troops crossed into Hyderabad on 13 September from three sides as the police action began. The Nizam surrendered on 17 September.



### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
30 August 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for sending me your draft. I think it is perhaps a bit too long and contains some matter which might be left out. Vallabhbhai telephoned to me, even before I had read your draft, saying that he did not like it at all.

I am enclosing another draft<sup>2</sup> for your consideration. I am also returning your original draft.

We are having a Defence Committee meeting at 9 tomorrow morning. I shall try to see you after that meeting.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See next item.

### 4. Governor General's Letter to the Nizam<sup>1</sup>

I thank Your Exalted Highness for your telegram acknowledging due receipt of His Majesty the King's letter<sup>2</sup> sent by me from Bangalore. I need not assure you that I am entirely in favour of a peaceful settlement of all conflicts wherever they may arise. I have been greatly distressed by the course of developments in Hyderabad and the repeated failure of attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement.

It is for my Government to deal with this, as well as other matters, and as a constitutional Governor General I have to follow their advice. But I would have no hesitation to do all in my power to help in a peaceful settlement. The problem, as I see it, and as I believe my Government see it, does not at present so much relate to the constitutional issues before us, but rather to the present internal state of Hyderabad. That is the urgent

1. Drafted by Nehru; 30 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. In his reply to the Nizam who had asked for his intervention in the Indo-Hyderabad dispute, the King thanked the Nizam for his letter and hoped for a peaceful solution.

issue. Allowing for all exaggeration, there is no doubt that the untrained activities of private armies, allowed to be armed with weapons and enjoying the support of official authority, have created a state of terror for the vast majority of the people in Hyderabad and on the borders thereof. There has rapidly grown a feeling of utter insecurity among all classes of people and a demand for intervention by the Indian Union. It is morally impossible for the people of India to ignore the conditions prevailing in Hyderabad and affecting its people, as well as endangering the peace of South India.

While it is possible to wait for a settlement of the constitutional issue, it is not possible to allow this sense of terror and insecurity to continue. The disturbance of civil economy consequent on this, movements of migrating people, breakdown of trade and commerce and communications that has followed as a necessary corollary of insecurity of life and honour and property, are intolerable in view of the position of Hyderabad right in the centre of India. It appears to me clear, and it must be equally clear to Your Exalted Highness, that to allow this to go on would spell ruin.

This situation requires immediate and effective action by Your Exalted Highness in order to restore confidence and public security and to terminate the reign of terror. If such a step is taken the Government of India would gladly cooperate. I would urge Your Exalted Highness to ponder over what was advised by Sir Mirza Ismail who came here with your Exalted Highness' encouragement and on your behalf. He is a statesman of wide experience and balanced judgement with intimate knowledge of affairs relating to Hyderabad, and what is more, is as concerned in the welfare of Your Exalted Highness as in the welfare of the people of this land including Hyderabad. It is important to remember in the confusing context of today that there is no conflict between the interests of the people of India and the people of Hyderabad. In the present, as well as in the future, the interests of all concerned are common. The Government of India have repeatedly given assurance that in a political solution Your Exalted Highness' prestige and position would be safeguarded. I would request Your Exalted Highness to ponder over the situation and to do something courageous and wise to terminate the present state of alarm and insecurity and to restore full confidence and normal conditions of life and business. There is no loss of dignity involved in doing what the happiness of the people demands.

I feel that the state of alarm which has made public opinion so clamorous for armed intervention must be immediately and drastically treated. I would endorse the suggestion made before for this purpose that Your Exalted Highness should ban the Razakars and, as Sir Mirza Ismail advised, invite the re-posting of an adequate military force of the Government of India at Secunderabad so that there may be no doubts left in the



public mind in Hyderabad and outside as to the security of person and property and the basis for friendship might be laid. This should be entirely on Your Exalted Highness' own initiative.<sup>3</sup>

The steps you have recently taken serve only to add to the irritation of previous dilatory procedure, without bringing any substantial good. What is required is speedy decision and friendly trust, not controversy and delay.

This letter is purely personal and from one whom it has pleased Your Exalted Highness to trust as a true friend.

The happiness of our people is within easy reach. May God guide us both.

3. In his reply of 5 September the Nizam interpreted this advice as overriding his Government, denied that there was any insecurity of life in Hyderabad and added that the matter of allowing Indian troops to be stationed in his territory was out of question.

## 5. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2 September 1948

My dear Dickie,

Krishna telegraphs and the newspapers announce that you have returned to Broadlands from your Canadian trip. I had asked Krishna to delay his coming to India by a few days as he might be required in London. But now I have suggested to him to come here soon and he might start before this letter even reaches London.

I sent you a few days ago a long letter trying to explain the situation here. I do not know how far I have succeeded. We have to face simultaneously a number of grave problems, the chief among them being Hyderabad and the economic crisis. With Hyderabad, is tied up, of course, Kashmir and our relations with Pakistan.

In connection with the economic crisis, we have had urgent consultations with a number of prominent persons in various walks of life—economists, labour and trade union men, industrialists, bankers, representatives of peasant organisations and others. During the next few days we are going to consider all these mass of memoranda and reports which sometimes overlap and sometimes contradict each other, and then come to some decision.

1. J.N. Collection.



The economic position of India is basically sound, but owing to various causes a certain uncertainty has crept in and inflation and rising prices have suddenly brought matters to a head.

In Hyderabad the position is as bad as it can well be and the general feeling in India has reached fever point. There is continual talk of war in Hyderabad and progressively the Nizam fades out. Gun-running by air continues. Railway travelling is a dangerous pastime as trains are sometimes attacked by Razakars.

We have considered this position again and again at almost daily meetings. In Cabinet, in Defence Committee, and in smaller groups, we have considered every phase and aspect. We have discussed it with Rajaji. As a result of all this it seems that it is no longer possible to delay action in Hyderabad. In fact the position is such that delay brings about the very conditions in regard to the communal situation which we wish to avoid. Almost without exception everybody, including the mildest of us, feels that we are betraying India's cause and security by repeated delays.

Rajaji sent a letter<sup>2</sup> to the Nizam, a copy of which must have reached you. I understand he is writing to you more on the subject.

I still nurse the hope of reaching London in the first week of October.

Ever yours,  
Jawaharlal

2. See preceding item.

## 6. The Hyderabad Imbrolio<sup>1</sup>

I shall now address the House, Sir, on an entirely different topic, unrelated completely, but it is difficult really to separate things in the organic life of the country. So one thing affects another. But in effect what I am going to say now in regard to Hyderabad is something which stands apart from what I have said about Kashmir and does not bear any relation to it.

For over a year now, we have been making earnest attempts to come to a peaceful and satisfactory settlement with the Government of Hyderabad.

1. Statement in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 7 September 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VII, Pt. II, 1948, pp. 1137-40.

In November last our efforts led to a Standstill Agreement for a year. We hoped that this would be followed up soon by a final and satisfactory settlement. In our view, this settlement could only be based on the establishment of responsible government in the State and accession to India. That accession meant of course, that the State would be an autonomous unit in the Indian Union enjoying the same powers and privileges as other autonomous units. What we offered Hyderabad was, in fact, an honourable partnership in the great brotherhood of the Indian Union.

2. Popular responsible government in Hyderabad or in any other State or province of India has long been our objective and we are glad to say that it is very near fulfilment all over India, except for the State of Hyderabad. It was inconceivable to us that, in the modern age, and in the heart of India which is pulsating with a new freedom, there should be a territory deprived of this freedom and indefinitely under autocratic rule.

3. As for accession, it was equally clear to us that a territory like Hyderabad, surrounded on all sides by the Indian Union and with no outlet to the rest of the world must necessarily be part of that Indian Union. Historically and culturally, it had to be a part, but geographic and economic reasons were even more peremptory in this matter and they could not be ignored, whatever the wishes of particular individuals or groups of individuals. Any other relationship between Hyderabad and the rest of India would involve continuing suspicion and, therefore, an ever-present fear of conflict. A state does not become independent by merely declaring itself to be so. Independence connotes certain relationships with independent states and recognition by them. India could never agree to Hyderabad having independent relations with any other power for that would endanger her own security. Historically, Hyderabad has at no time been independent.<sup>2</sup> Practically, in the circumstances of today, it cannot be independent.

4. Further, in conformity with the principles that we have repeatedly proclaimed, we were agreeable that the future of Hyderabad should be determined after a reference to its people, provided that such a reference was made under free conditions. It cannot possibly be made under the conditions of terror which prevail in Hyderabad today.

5. Our repeated attempt at a settlement, which came near to success on one or two occasions, ended unfortunately in failure. The reasons for this were obvious to us; there were sinister forces at work in Hyderabad State

2. Hyderabad's geographical situation in the heart of India made it impossible for Hyderabad to have any separate "relations of peace and war" so long as India was an independent state. Under articles 1, 15 and 16 of the perpetual treaty of 1800 between the Nizam and the East India Company, the Nizam parted "with all capacity for separate relations of peace and war" and Hyderabad accordingly ceased to be a state in the eye of international law. The articles and provisions of the treaty were still in force by virtue of the Standstill Agreement of 29 November 1947.



which were determined not to allow any agreement with the Indian Union. These forces, led by completely irresponsible persons, have progressively gained in strength and now completely control the government. The resources of the State were and are being mobilised for war in every way. The State army has been increased and irregular armies have been allowed to grow up rapidly. Arms and ammunition were smuggled in from abroad; this process, in which a number of foreign adventurers have been taking a prominent part, is continuing. No country, situated as India is, would have tolerated these warlike preparations by a state in the very heart of India. Nevertheless, the present Government of India patiently continued negotiations in the hope that they would lead to some settlement. The only other step they took was to prevent, in so far as they could, the flow of warlike material into Hyderabad.

6. The private armies that grew up in Hyderabad, notably the Razakars, have become more and more aggressive and brutal within the State and sometimes across its borders in India. I do not propose to give a full account of this here as full particulars are available partly in the White Paper on Hyderabad which the Deputy Prime Minister presented to the House earlier during the session, and partly in other published documents. This growing terrorism and frightfulness inside Hyderabad State against all those, Muslims and non-Muslims, who are opposed to the Razakars and their allies, both official and non-official, has produced a very grave situation and has had its repercussions on the bordering areas of the Union and in India generally. At the present moment, our immediate and most anxious preoccupation is this mounting wave of violence and anarchy inside Hyderabad State.

7. A full account of Razakar activities will take long. I shall mention only some recent incidents and a few figures. The inhabitants of a village inside the State, which, under the spirited leadership of its headman, had offered stout resistance to these gangsters, were, when resistance became impossible owing to the exhaustion of ammunition, put to the sword and the village itself burnt. The brave headman was decapitated and his head carried on a pole.

In another village, men, women and children were collected in one spot and shot dead by the Razakars and the Nizam's police. A large party of villagers fleeing in bullock carts to some haven of safety in India, was brutally attacked; the men were beaten up and the women abducted. A train was held up, the passengers looted and a number of coaches burnt. The House is aware of the attacks on our troops seeking to enter our enclaves within State territory and of Razakar incursions into our own villages along the border.

According to reports received yesterday, Razakars and a unit of the



regular Hyderabad army with armoured cars went into action against Indian troops on Indian territory. They were repulsed; one armoured car was destroyed and one officer and 85 other ranks taken prisoner. The incident further illustrates the mounting aggression against India.

Since this provocative campaign of violence started, according to information which has so far reached us, over 70 villages have been attacked inside the State, about 150 incursions have occurred into our territory, hundreds of persons have been killed, a large number injured and many women raped or abducted, 12 trains attacked, property worth over a crore of rupees looted. Hundreds of thousands have fled the State in order to seek refuge in the neighbouring provinces of India.

8. The House will agree that no civilised government can permit such atrocities to continue to be perpetrated with impunity within the geographical heart of India; for this affects not only the security, honour, life and property of the law-abiding inhabitants of Hyderabad, but also the internal peace and order of India. We cannot have a campaign of murder, arson, rape and loot going on in Hyderabad without rousing communal passions in India and jeopardising the peace of the Dominion. Let the House consider what our predecessors in the Government of India would have done in these circumstances. For far less, they would have intervened drastically; the lapse of the paramountcy of the British Crown cannot alter the organic inter-relation of Hyderabad and the power whose responsibility for the security of India as a whole is, and should continue to be unquestioned, or the mutual obligations of the one to the other. We have been patient and forbearing in the hope that good sense would prevail and a peaceful solution be found. This hope has proved to be vain and not only is peace inside the State or on its borders nowhere in sight but peace elsewhere in India is seriously threatened.

9. We have been criticised for having been too patient and too forbearing.<sup>3</sup> That criticism may have some justification. But we have tried to act on the principle that no effort should be spared at any time to avoid conflict and to secure a settlement by peaceful methods. Except in the last resort, any other course would be a sad contradiction of the ideals and principles to which we have repeatedly pledged ourselves from the beginning to the termination of our struggle for freedom from foreign rule. But we cannot blind ourselves to cruel facts or shirk the hard responsibilities that such facts might impose. At the present moment, let me repeat : the issue that compels immediate priority is that of security of life and honour in Hyderabad and the stoppage of the brutal terrorism that persists in that State. Other

3. The press in India accused the Government of inaction in the face of violation of Indian territory. Meanwhile, the Socialist Party of India called for immediate army action to end the feudal rule in Hyderabad State.

issues may well be taken up later, for indeed peace and order are essential for the consideration of other questions.

10. The Hyderabad Government have demonstrated both their unwillingness and their incapacity to put down the terrorism that has made the life of the law-abiding citizens of the State so extremely insecure that large numbers of them are fleeing to the neighbouring provinces and States. We feel that internal security in Hyderabad will not be assured at this stage unless our troops are stationed at Secunderabad as they used to be until India withdrew them early this year. In reply to a recent letter from the Nizam, His Excellency the Governor General made this suggestion to His Exalted Highness who has replied that no such action is necessary as conditions in Hyderabad are entirely normal. This, of course, is contrary to all known facts and we have now asked the Nizam for the last time to disband the Razakars immediately and, as suggested by His Excellency the Governor General, to facilitate the return of our troops to Secunderabad, in such strength as may be necessary to restore law and order in Hyderabad State.<sup>4</sup> If they are so stationed, there will be a sense of security in the people and the terrorist activities of private armies will cease.

May I add a few words more. First of all I should like to state to this House and place before this country that we have tried to look upon this question of Hyderabad as far as possible entirely away from the communal point of view and I should like the country to look upon it in this non-communal way. I know, as I have just stated, that communal passions have been roused. But it should be the business of all of us, to whatever religion or community we might belong, to lift this question away from the communal plane and to consider it from other, and, I think more valid and more basic points of views.

We wish to send our troops to Secunderabad to ensure security in Hyderabad, the security of all the people there, whether they are Hindus or Muslims, or they belong to any other religion or group. If subsequently freedom comes to Hyderabad, it must come to all equally and not to a particular group. Therefore, I would like to lay stress on this, and I would like those organs of public opinion who can influence the public so much at any time, and more specially during times of stress and strain, always to lay stress on this non-communal aspect. Also, whatever steps we may have to take in the nature of police action or other, our instructions are going to

4. In implementing the Standstill Agreement the Government of India, as a gesture of goodwill, withdrew their troops stationed in Secunderabad Cantonment, but the Nizam's Government had acted in violation of the Agreement from the very moment of its conclusion. For example, by show of force, the Chhatari delegation was stopped from proceeding to Delhi to conclude an agreement. Later, the Nizam replaced Chhatari Ministry by a ministry of his choice.



be definite and clear that any kind of communal trouble from any side will be most sternly dealt with.

There has been, as I mentioned to this House, a large migration from Hyderabad of terror-stricken people. I do not know how many have come out, but in the Central Provinces even now there are large camps of tens of thousands—probably several hundred thousand people may have come out in the course of the last two months. Now, if I may give advice—although the giving of this advice means the assumption of a certain responsibility—I would give this advice and take the risk, that people should not migrate from Hyderabad or from any part, wherever they may be.

A Member : And get butchered?

Jawaharlal Nehru. Somebody said get butchered. I can only speak in my own terms. If I am there I would not migrate, whatever happens, butchery or no butchery. I think that when we have to face a serious situation, nothing can be worse than running away from it; and especially in the present instance I see no benefit in regard to that matter. Because, the person who runs away exposes himself to that very danger more than a person who sits or stands normally speaking. Of course, I am not considering exceptional cases and some things may happen here and there. But my general point is this, that we may be on the eve of grave happenings in this country, and because of that our Government has paid the greatest and the deepest attention to these matters. We have discussed them, not only amongst ourselves but with our advisers; we have considered various possible consequences, for every action has to be judged from the possible consequences thereof. We cannot just take an action in the air. So we have done that. And having done that, we have come to certain conclusions which I am placing before you. At any time I would have advised the country to be calm and poised and I refuse to be panicky and refuse to run away from any difficult situation. At this time particularly I do call upon with all the earnestness in me that we should maintain our peace and calm, and face any situation that might arise not only in that calm and collected and disciplined way, but also always remembering the fundamental principles and lessons that our Master placed before us.<sup>5</sup>

5. The Government of India decided on 9 September that it had no other alternative except to despatch Indian troops into Hyderabad territory in order to save Hyderabad and its neighbouring provinces from chaos. So an ultimatum was delivered by V.P. Menon, Secretary to the Ministry of States, to the Nizam on the evening of 10 September 1948.



## 7. Military Action if Necessary<sup>1</sup>

Well, gentlemen, I must warn you right at the beginning that I have nothing very sensational to say. I have often addressed these press conferences and you have also suggested that we might meet more often. Well, I am glad to meet you more often. Whenever there is this kind of press conference it is so big that we lose all touch of sensitiveness. I do not know how it is possible to hold smaller press conferences. But I would really like to meet you all occasionally in an off-the-record way and discuss matters and you can use the information but not as a kind of a statement or as "quotation marks" etc. I can deal with a subject matter in that way, but when there is a large crowd, it becomes difficult to function that way. Yesterday, it struck me that it might be a good thing for me to meet some representatives of the press more specially in connection with the Hyderabad situation.

Although, as I say, I really have nothing new to say after my speech in the Assembly,<sup>2</sup> I have also nothing to add to that. But it might be in your minds there may be some questions or some doubts, and I may try to remove them. I shall only say this about the Hyderabad situation that what has moved us greatly in the past few weeks has been the mounting wave of disorder inside Hyderabad, and in some places acts of terrorism have occurred. I shall say this that everything that appears in the newspaper is not always correct. There has been tendency to exaggerate events there. We have found on examination that some very lurid accounts, which have been given big headlines, had been greatly exaggerated.

But allowing for that, there is no doubt that the state of affairs in Hyderabad has been very bad and progressively worsening. Any person who does not openly submit to any demands from the Razakars plays with his life. Of course, if you surrender and submit, you can live more or less in peace for the time being. You might have in mind at least two cases—that of a young Muslim editor of a paper who was shot down; of another young Muslim, you may have noticed, his hands were cut off.<sup>3</sup> It so happened

1. Statement followed by a question-answer session at a press conference in New Delhi, 10 September 1948. This full version is based on the text available in J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See preceding, item.

3. On 19 August Kasim Razvi commemorating the 'Nanaj Day' condemned the Indian leaders and uttered threats to the "so-called puppets of India." "The hand that rises against the Muslims should either drop down or would be cut off." This speech was literally taken by one Munim Khan and his associates who on 21 August 1948 shot at Shuebulla Khan, the editor of *Imroze* which criticised the Razakars, and when he fell down attacked him with swords and cut off his hands.

that a little before in a speech at a Razakars meeting, a speaker had demanded that hands be cut off of a person they considered a traitor to them. And this poor Muslim's hands were cut off and we have seen gruesome photographs of this man minus hands. So, you see that the state of affairs in Hyderabad is sinking into a state of barbarity. Of course, where you have a kind of feudal autocratic regime, you have a strange mixture of certain old world courtesies on top, and soft living, and even some kind of culture to talk of which is very pleasant, but if you go a little below the surface you find other things which are completely different. And when this static state of things changes into a dynamic stage, then all the worst passions come out. In a more or less democratic system, there are plenty of evils, and there is no doubt about it, but on the whole, these extremes are avoided on either side. So, the real reason which impelled us at last to decide upon taking action was not fundamentally a political reason, although political reasons are important of course; it was this reason that inside Hyderabad and on the borders conditions were worsening and this was affecting the whole of South India.

Naturally, we have been anxious to avoid anything happening or doing anything which might lead to a communal conflict. We have treated this question, as far as we could, apart from the communal tint, but we can't entirely avoid facts of course, but we do want to continue treating it apart from the communal aspect. And I should very much like the help and co-operation of the press in that matter, that is, not to treat it on the communal plane, and lay stress on the political and other aspects of it and not give too much prominence to anything which might excite communal passion on either side. I think it is most important to remember that any person who at a moment of crisis when the passions are roused does anything which leads to or increases communal excitement does a great disservice to this country and to his people. That is one appeal I should like to make to all of you and through you to all the people of this country. That applies not only to comments, but to the presentation of news as well—to both. I am afraid that factor has not been borne in mind by some newspapers at least who have given great prominence and publicity to not only certain happenings in Hyderabad, reports of which have reached them, but certain reports which may not even have a basis in fact, or may have a much less basis in fact. Perhaps it was thought that this might induce the Government of India to take action. Of course, the Government of India appreciates what the press says, but it has to take a hundred factors into consideration, and the dominant factor is to see that in the short term, as well as in the long term view, what we do is for the good of India and the Indian people as well as, I hope, of other people beyond the confines of India. No responsible Government can let itself to be flung into action which may



lead to disastrous consequences without the gravest thought given to the matter. We gave all this thought to this matter and it was only after that that we came to the conclusion that any further delay would lead to the very consequences that we wished to avoid. Inevitably, we had to come to this conclusion that we must put a stop to this business. And the way to do it we thought was for Indian troops to be stationed at Secunderabad where they were till February last, not very long time ago. So that is the position and that is the appeal I should like to make today. It was really to make that appeal that I wanted to meet you.

Now, if you wish to ask me anything about this matter, I shall be happy to endeavour to answer your questions.

Question: On Monday when you addressed the Assembly about Hyderabad and Kashmir, you emphasised very strongly the necessity for avoiding the communal aspect of the issue in dealing with it. But this morning's papers carry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah's statement which has just been the other way.<sup>4</sup> Would it be possible for you to tell us something—to assure the public—that so far as the Union Government is concerned all precautions will be taken to keep this issue away from communal plane?

Jawaharlal Nehru: That is just what I have been saying. However much we in India might wish to avoid passion or prejudice, the essential fact is that the Indian Government's approach and the Pakistan Government's approach to these problems are entirely different. I mean to say that the whole of the Pakistan Government is based on the theory which led to partition, on a communalist approach, on their idea that Pakistan is going to be an Islamic and theocratic State and all that. So, inevitably, their interpretation of any event is communal and religious in that sense of the word. Whether it is Hyderabad, whether it is Kashmir, they can only talk and interpret in those terms, while our approach, in spite of the fact that we occasionally go wrong, we do go wrong and let us admit that, still our fundamental approach is different. It is not a communal approach. As far as Sir Zafrullah Khan's statement is concerned, it is there; it has been there, but so far as the Government of India is concerned we will do our utmost to avoid that approach and the consequences of that approach and we are not going to tolerate any development of communal action in any part of India, by whichever side it may be started.

Q: Sir, in your Assembly statement you mentioned that Secunderabad will be garrisoned by Indian troops. Usually, these things are announced after the troops actually arrive there, since military secrets are not given

4. Zafrullah Khan said that "aggression" against Hyderabad by India would plunge "its own country into a communal bloodbath".



in advance. So my reaction is that our troops are already there. If it be not a military secret, may I know what is the real position?

J.N. : No. It is not a military secret that our troops are not there, except a few guards for our Agent General's house, a handful of persons.

Q : Have you received any reply to the final letter that was written to Hyderabad?

J.N. : We have received an acknowledgement of it, but not a reply.

Q : Has any time limit been given to this?

J.N. : This is a question which it would not be proper for me to reply.

Q : Was any time limit attached by the Government of India?

J.N. : No. In the letter we sent we had merely asked for this and that to be done immediately. There was no time limit.

Q : Is it a fact that in the event of Nizam being overthrown, the Government of India favours putting up the Prince of Berar as Ruler?<sup>5</sup>

J.N. : No. No such question has arisen for us to consider. Our own information is that the Nizam at the present moment is not functioning with any authority, but other authorities are functioning and he is very much under the control of those other authorities.

Q : Have you made any arrangements to give us correct information about Hyderabad? How can we check whether the news is correct or not?

J.N. : It is a very good question. I think the idea is to make some arrangements. That might be discussed by your representatives with the Ministry of Information. We always wish to help you to get correct information.

Q : When operations actually begin, I believe the distribution of news will be under the G.H.Q. Is it not? If so, we do not want the Information Department to be a second post office.

J.N. : I agree that the machinery set up for this should be such as to avoid delay.

Q : In view of what you say about Nizam not functioning, do we take it that you will let him continue after this?

J.N. : These questions do not arise. So far as we are concerned, right from the beginning we have stated that the constitution of Hyderabad and its internal functioning is a matter to be determined by the people of Hyderabad. Our objective at the moment is to put an end to this disorder and brutality that are taking place in Hyderabad. And we propose to station our troops in Secunderabad. Now, all of this is a dynamic operation and when you launch any dynamic operations numerous consequences follow which you cannot foresee; and you have to decide then, in view of these

5. Growing disgusted with the situation the Prince of Berar gave up his position as the Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's forces, while the second son of the Nizam, Prince Moazzam, advised him to be on good terms with India.

resultant consequences, as to what should be or can be done. But the fundamental thing will be that the people of Hyderabad should have a change to decide their own future.

Q : According to information received here, does the Nizam still retain any active control over the Army ?

J.N. : Are you asking me if the Nizam has control over his Army ?

Q : Yes.

J.N. : How can I tell you exactly what the internal position of Hyderabad is, to what extent control is, to what extent it is not, with the Nizam? Generally speaking, one might say that his control over most public activities in Hyderabad is excessively limited - to what extent he can influence it I cannot say.

Q : Does the letter of acknowledgement promise a further reply from Hyderabad?

J.N. : Yes.

Q : In view of your desire to put an end to the state of disorder in Hyderabad, would you propose to station troops in Hyderabad, in the face of opposition from the Nizam?

J.N. : You mean Secunderabad ?

Q : Yes.

J.N. : I said we intend to place troops there.

Q : Even in the face of opposition from the Nizam ?

J.N. : Well, we did not quite expect an easy march to Hyderabad or Secunderabad.

Q : May I know what have the Government learnt in their handling of the Razakar problem from the past handling of Hurs, Khaksars and R.S.S.?

J.N. : I do not think you can compare these at all. Of course, one learns from everything if one is wise enough to learn, but the thing is that this is really completely different.

Q : What would happen if the Nizam refuses to accommodate or allow the troops to occupy Secunderabad ?

J.N. : With great regret we shall still occupy Secunderabad.

Q : You stated, "We did not expect any opposition" and so on. Do we take it that the Army has started to move ?

J.N. : I do not say that. What I said was that we did not expect to have an easy march to Hyderabad, which means the exact opposite of what you state. No Indian Army is there.

Q : How soon shall we occupy Secunderabad ?

J.N. : That I do not know.

Q : About the status of the Prince of Berar, is he in disgrace or under surveillance?

J.N. : These are vague bits of information emanating from private apart-



ments, of course, as to what the relationship between father and son and husband and wife is. One gets news, but you don't expect me as a Member of Government to dole out this news.

Q : In the event of the Nizam refusing to offer facilities for our troops entering Hyderabad, do we force our troops or we wait for the decision of the U.N.O. ?

J.N. : We march.

Q : The non-nationals were removed from Hyderabad, were they removed by their desire or with the permission of our Government ?

J.N. : They were removed by our consent, but at their desire.

Q : Supposing the subjects of the Nizam themselves set up some provisional government in the border territories, is it the intention of the Government to help them on the border ?

J.N. : We do not know anything about a provisional government.

Q : We understand that the Communists are in possession of about 2,000 villages. How do you propose to deal with them?<sup>6</sup>

J.N. : That I do not know. Surely that depends on what they do at the time.

Q : It is stated in certain quarters, which news has appeared in the press, that the Nizam's tactics at the moment is to delay the thing till the end of November when the Standstill Agreement with the Government of India ends, and that after that through the intermediary of some friendly foreign power, he could bring up the case at the next session of the U.N. Assembly.

J.N. : You mean in 1949 ?

Q : Probably, because after the next November session, if any foreign power raises the question the presumption is that the Government of India cannot take any military action. Has the Government of India taken any note of that position, or is it just a speculation ?

J.N. : It is both. We have taken no speculation in that respect.

Q : Has the Government ever officially denounced the Standstill Agreement? That statement says that nothing in it should be taken to allow the entry of Indian troops to assist the Nizam in restoring internal order excepting in war time. May I take it that the Indian Government will denounce this agreement before sending troops ?

J.N. : There is a clause safeguarding our own right of action. You see under Paramountcy there was a certain mutuality, that is the then Government of India undertook to give aid to the Nizam against his own subjects

6. The Communists in Andhra entered into alliance with various subversive groups, and in the middle of 1948 two districts of Hyderabad were practically controlled by the Communists with headquarters at Vijayawada. A parallel government was set up which distributed all land to the cultivators, cancelled all debts, fixed agricultural wages, and controlled the rates of interest which might be charged by moneylenders.



if necessary, and in return exercise the right of Paramountcy over him. In this Standstill Agreement when we say that, it is something which is not an infringement of the Nizam's right. But we did not want to help the Nizam in putting down his subjects, which the old Government used to do; if the Nizam asks us for aid to shoot down his people who might be agitating for some kind of free government, we are not prepared to help in that way.

Q : Can the Nizam really say, "I accede to Pakistan", and then further complicate the situation as our troops march ?

J.N. : I do not think so.

Q : May I know how is your statement just now that the Government of India is not going to do anything to the Nizam, compatible with Sardar Patel's statement that the Nizam will go the way of Junagadh ?

J.N. : If I understand it, the Nizam is a person—Junagadh presumably is a place.

Q : Presumably he meant the Nawab of Junagadh. You know sometimes a place means a person.

J.N. : Yes, as I said it is our object at the present moment a definite object. What happens afterwards depends on so many uncertain factors—you cannot say what exactly; but fundamentally, it will be the people of Hyderabad, we hope, that will decide various issues in regard to Hyderabad.

Q : If India decides to march into Hyderabad in spite of opposition by the Nizam's troops, there is widespread apprehension that Razakars would wreck their vengeance upon the Hindu population there. Have the Government of India thought over the problem and decided on certain steps to protect the population, if it is possible ?

J.N. : All such factors have to be considered in so far as is possible.

Q : By merely moving troops into Secunderabad how do you propose to quell the atrocities unless you take police action throughout the State and wipe out the Razakars for ever ?

J.N. : If any police action is necessary in certain parts of the State, it will be for those troops to take it.

I might say that I was asked if possible development in regard to Hyderabad might interfere with my programme of going to attend the Premiers' Conference in London. My reply was that I still intended to go to that Conference.

Q : Is it not a fact, Panditji, that the statement you made in the Assembly has already had a steadying effect and the exit of Hindus from Hyderabad has slowed down ?

J.N. : I am glad to hear it.

Q : Does the Indian Union have, under the Standstill Agreement, a right to inspect Hyderabad forces which it had under the old arrangement ?

J.N. : I believe it has. I do not remember the exact wording, but I think it has.

Q : Then why did we not try to inspect or check the strength of the Hyderabad Forces?<sup>7</sup>

J.N. : We have tried many things in the past. Some of them did not come off. Otherwise, these difficulties would not have arisen.

Q : I first raised the question and again I impress upon you that since your statement there have been rumours; some say that Secunderabad has already been occupied; some say we are only seven miles away; some say 20 miles; some say the Hyderabad Radio itself said it.

J.N. : I am really surprised that wide awake newspapermen should believe anything and everything that is said.

Q : If there have been military operations, there should be an announcement.

J.N. : Of course, none.

Q : If there is no operation, then also there should be an announcement. These rumours give rise to fears.

Q : Will you be able to say why the Europeans and Americans are leaving Hyderabad?

J.N. : There is no question of my being able to say anything about it. They are leaving because of the progressive disorder and possible apprehension that it might grow worse.

Q : If there is no question of your being able to say anything about it, I hope there is no question of fear on the part of the H.M.G. that they may get involved. Possibly, I think, they are leaving for the safety of their lives?

J.N. : Most of the Europeans there—I understand a large number of them—are missionaries. I understand also that a fair number of them have decided to continue there in spite of possible danger, but it was right that people should be informed and for those who wish to come away arrangements should be made for coming away. Nobody forces anybody to come away. If you want to stay, you can stay. But for those who want to come away, arrangements are being made.

7. The armed forces of Hyderabad were rapidly being put on a war footing. The authorized strength of the Hyderabad Forces under the State Forces scheme was 7,000. This had been raised to 13,000 in 1947. By April 1948, the strength of the Regulars was 22,393, while 7,000 more men were under training and an additional force of 4,870 men was undergoing training under different names such as the Customs Constabulary. The strength of the police force had also been raised to 38,000 men. There were 15,000 Home and Civil Guards.



Q : Is there any information as to whether there are any British officers or British personnel in the Nizam's Army ?

J.N. : I believe there are some officers. I am not quite sure whether they are retired officers. Probably they are people who belonged to the British Army before and who still continue.

Q : Their services are not being utilised, I hope ?

J.N. : I hope not.

## 8. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

I thank you for your telegram of 11th September (No. 3464)<sup>2</sup> just received and appreciate the friendly spirit in which it is conceived.

2. You may have seen the statement on Hyderabad which I made to Indian Parliament on the 7th August.<sup>3</sup> Our High Commissioner in Karachi is being instructed to send you a copy.

3. We have no aggressive designs on Hyderabad and such action as we may be compelled to take to restore law and order within the State will not be of our seeking, but the result of the refusal of the Government of Hyderabad to respond satisfactorily to the many proposals for a settlement made by us during the last one year and, more recently, to listen to repeated appeals made by the Governor General to His Exalted Highness the Nizam in response to the latter's request for his personal intervention<sup>4</sup> and by the Government of India to listen to reason and make a genuine effort to reach a peaceful settlement.

1. New Delhi, 11 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. In his cable dated 11 September Liaquat Ali referred to the press conference the previous day Nehru had addressed and added that "your intention to march your troops into Hyderabad State to occupy Secunderabad. . . . I apprehend that communal disorders far worse than those witnessed in autumn of 1947 will develop in the sub-continent. . . . I urge you to persevere in the path of peace."

3. See *ante*, pp. 228-233.

4. The Governor General, on 10 September, had pointed out to the Nizam that it was impossible for India to resume negotiations for a settlement unless the Razakar organisation was banned and his government agreed to the reposting of the Indian Army at Secunderabad at least for a temporary period till such time as law and order was restored in Hyderabad.



4. We have taken every possible precaution to prevent communal trouble in India and are determined to safeguard the life, property and honour of the minorities to the best of our ability. Indeed, such action against Hyderabad as may be taken by us will have been forced on us largely by the necessity to prevent a further deterioration of the communal situation of which, due to the feeling roused by Razakar atrocities, there has for some time now been grave risk. I sincerely hope that, in Pakistan, you will take all possible steps to ensure communal peace.

## 9. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th September, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have just received from the Governor General a copy of a telegram<sup>2</sup> he has received from the Nizam in answer to his letter dated the 10th September.

Rajaji would like to send a reply immediately. He has drafted a reply which Bajpai and I considered and slightly varied.

I am enclosing copies of the Nizam's telegram and the draft reply. I think it would be a good thing for this reply to be sent immediately. Not to reply to it might perhaps produce some impression against us later. Rajaji hopes that you will also agree to this being sent. Would you kindly get in touch with him by telephone and speak to him about it? If you agree then immediate arrangements can be made to have it sent in the normal way by telegram.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Nizam stated once again that the Governor General should bring about an amicable settlement between India and Hyderabad on the basis of Hyderabad's right to enjoy complete economic and fiscal independence.

10. Police Action To End Terror<sup>1</sup>

Our first year of freedom has seen much sorrow and suffering throughout the country. During this critical period, the Father of our Nation was snatched away from our midst, leaving us in deep anguish and sorrow. He was a constant source of strength to us and we always sought his guidance in solving all grave problems facing us. The goal set before us by Gandhiji can never be forgotten, whatever the difficulties the country may face in reaching the goal. What was this goal set out before the people of India by Gandhiji? He entrusted us with the noble mission of carrying peace to the war-weary world. He repeatedly warned us against swerving from this path; he had devoted his whole life to this noble mission. His martyrdom in the cause of our unity should only inspire us with greater courage and strength to face the future and build it up on the structure of equality, fraternity and unity.

Our country has a great past and her potentialities as an industrial country is unlimited. India as an advanced and modernised country in Asia can play a tremendous role in shaping international affairs. Our country had a hoary tradition and with this glorious past, can we not shape our future as planned and set out by Bapuji? Let every man and woman in this country do his or her duty and serve the nation to the best of his or her ability—do not fritter away your energy in discussing minor issues, unite in building up a great India whose interest should always precede any other selfish motive.

In Hyderabad, our army is doing a magnificent job.<sup>2</sup> They are rapidly advancing on all fronts. This is an indication of our armed strength. I hope

1. Speech at a public meeting, Bombay, 15 September 1948. Based on reports from *The Bombay Chronicle*, *The Times of India*, and *Indian News Chronicle*, 16 September 1948.
2. Since the Nizam and his Government refused to disband the Razakars and other private armies and to facilitate the return of Indian troops to Secunderabad, where they used to be stationed before, in order to restore law and order, Indian troops entered Hyderabad territory at 4 a.m. on 13 September from three sides, Sholapur, Bezwada and the north. In five days Hyderabad was freed from the control of the Razakars.



the operation will end soon. I am pleased to see the absence of communal trouble ever since we entered the State.<sup>3</sup>

As you all know, we tried for long to persuade the Nizam to join the Indian Union. But he was not prepared to do so. Time and again we tried to reach a peaceful settlement, but in vain. Finally, we entered into a Standstill Agreement in December last, but the Nizam's Government repeatedly violated the clauses of this Agreement. With the legacy left to India by Gandhiji, who led our freedom struggle in a nonviolent manner, the Government of India could not think of a violent fight with any part of the country. Meanwhile, a handful of men spread their tentacles on the State and let loose a reign of terror there. The situation in the State deteriorated rapidly, and almost everyday we received reports of acts of violence and atrocities perpetrated on innocent inhabitants of the State and of the border areas. Our patience was finally exhausted, and since Hyderabad was in no mood to come to an amicable settlement, we decided to act. I may add here that I am a man of peace and it was with the greatest reluctance we sent in our army.

There has been much criticism of our Hyderabad policy—particularly the delay in sending in the troops. Well, if action had not been taken earlier, it was certainly not because we were weak. On the contrary, it is proof of the confidence in the strength and the power we had. There is no gainsaying the fact that militarily Hyderabad is not a big question. The Hyderabad issue had other implications which we could not ignore. We did not want a recurrence of the communal trouble which the country has passed through a few months ago. The rapid progress of our army is no doubt indicative of our military strength. But it is more important for us to have a clear conscience.

I have been asked why I have come to Bombay — a place which was likely to be bombed. I will not be sorry if Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were bombed. I am saying this because the people have forgotten that the world is a wicked world and a calamity such as has been suggested might help the people face realities.

The younger generation does not seem to realise that swaraj has been won with great difficulties. Although there are a number of distressing

3. India's intervention had the support not only of such British-controlled newspapers as *The Statesman* and *The Mail* but of leading Muslims in India, including the Nawab of Rampur State, Mahamed Usman, a former member of the Governor General's Executive Council, Begum Aizaz Rasul and Abdul Halim Ghaznavi, members of the Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Abdullah spoke of the "tyranny in Hyderabad". Mohamed Ismail, president of the Indian Union Muslim League, said on 15 September: "The duty of the Muslims of India, as loyal citizens, at this juncture, is clear beyond any doubt whatever, and they are unreservedly with their other brothers in stoutly supporting the Government and its action."



experiences in the country at present, the younger generation has no idea of the trials and tribulations involved in the achievement of freedom. Perhaps, if our cities were subjected to bombing, it would awaken the people from their slumber to the grim reality of a wicked world. The alternative of leaving the city and relieving the housing shortage is always open to them.

We have a grave financial crisis facing us. The Central Government is in consultation with the provincial governments in evolving a scheme for arresting the rising prices. I appeal to those engaged in trade and commerce not to exploit the interests of the common man for selfish gains. I also appeal to the workers to keep aloof from hartals and strikes so that supplies can be kept up steadily and hardships avoided. I am also glad to see the recent statement made by Jayaprakash Narayan offering complete cooperation to the Government in solving the problem. I hope they will all sink their differences at this juncture and help in building a mighty nation.

There are many other disruptive forces which are weakening the potential strength of our country. The issue of linguistic states is a very controversial issue. The Congress has already accepted the principle of linguistic provinces. But the question is whether it is opportune to raise the issue at the present moment, to create passions, sow seeds of dissensions and fritter away the strength and energy needed for the vital tasks of reconstruction of the country. This issue will have to wait until major issues are solved and then all attention could be diverted to these matters.

I would also appeal to you all to give no place to communalism in your thinking. In the last communal riots in Bombay, as many as 50 people were killed within an hour or so.<sup>4</sup> It pains me to find one Indian stabbing another for no reason except that he belonged to another community, and bring a bad name to our country. Unlike Pakistan, we do not subscribe to communalism. Our approach to all problems is purely political, and those who indulge in loose communal talk only help Pakistan in their vicious propaganda against India. The Government is trying their level best to give full protection to the minority communities and grant their legitimate demands. If major issues like the future of the Maharaja of Kashmir or the police action in Hyderabad is viewed on communal lines, it would only complicate the matter. I appeal to all of you to have faith in the Government's sincerity in tackling every issue on its merit.

Let each one of us resolve to follow the path laid down by the Father of the Nation and remember his dying wish that India should be the torch-bearer of peace with her immemorial message of nonviolence for the guidance of the world.

4. An outburst of communal rioting in Bombay on 4 July resulted in the death of over 50 persons and injury to 43.

## 11. Cable to C. R. Attlee<sup>1</sup>

During debate on Hyderabad in House of Commons yesterday, Mr. Bevin is reported to have said: 'I regret, as everyone must, that in this new Dominion — India — a warlike spirit has developed'. If Mr. Bevin has been correctly reported, I should like to express my surprise and to make most emphatic protest against wholly unwarranted and incorrect assertion. It is Hyderabad, not India, which has shown warlike spirit, witness bellicose and provocative utterances of members of Hyderabad Government and Razakar leaders and warlike preparations against India, e.g., smuggling of arms by air of which you have knowledge.<sup>2</sup> We have unimpeachable evidence that as early as last October, Hyderabad was negotiating with certain Americans for purchase of military planes and training of war pilots. In spite of all this and mounting brutality of Razakars inside State and on our borders, we carried on negotiations for months with utmost patience in hope that peaceful solution might be found. As sign of our goodwill towards United Kingdom, we kept His Majesty's Government informed, at every stage, of both factual development and our intentions. I can only deplore that our forbearance in the face of persistent provocation from Hyderabad and attitude of friendly confidence in your Government should have been so misunderstood by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to evoke, in Parliament, a statement which is not only contrary to facts but prejudices the issue now before the Security Council and is calculated to prejudice us by marking India as aggressor in the eyes of the world.

1. New Delhi, 16 September 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. The Hyderabad Government had been financing and encouraging illicit import of arms and ammunition by air, road and rail. Spies and agents of the State were operating at many centres in India and abroad arranging for the purchase and transport of war materials to Hyderabad. The Cotton episode had brought to light organised attempts by paid agents of the Nizam, with the connivance of Pakistan to send arms to the State. Reports had also been received of the seizure by Indian police of arms, ammunition and other essential goods which were being smuggled into Hyderabad. In Pune, the railway police seized a large consignment and arrested two persons suspected of being spies of the Nizam's Government. In Bombay, the police stopped 12 trucks loaded for Hyderabad containing spare parts of machinery. A parcel of daggers and knives were found.





## HYDERABAD

## III. Restoration of Order



## 1. The Hyderabad Situation<sup>1</sup>

The recent developments in Hyderabad are compelling us to come to certain decisions in the near future. It is therefore necessary to consider every aspect of this question so that any decision we may make should be wise and beneficial. There is always a slight chance of people being swept into hasty action in a moment of success.

2. The first thing to remember is that our action was supposed to be a "police action" against a recalcitrant State. We did not call it war and we must not therefore do anything now which might indicate that we consider it as a war against a foreign state. Indeed, we do not consider it as a foreign state, whatever its strict legal position might have been since August 15.

3. In view of this we cannot treat it as a conquered territory which used to be a foreign independent state. If we do so, our previous assertions would be doubted and our conduct challenged and criticised.

4. What have we gained from these operations in Hyderabad? We have achieved our principal objectives, that is, the stationing of our troops at Secunderabad, Bolaram, etc., and the banning and disbandment of the Razakars. We have further gained something that is even more important, that is, the establishment of the fact that the Government of India is the dominant and paramount authority so far as Hyderabad is concerned, and in fact so far as all states in India are concerned. That is a great gain which cannot be challenged now anywhere.

5. Our troops are going to remain in Secunderabad, etc. Therefore, it is not possible for any major trouble to arise in future in Hyderabad. We are in a position to control any development there. Not only are our troops there, but they are there as a result of a complete defeat of those opposed to them. There can be no question of any other elements in Hyderabad rebelling or creating trouble on a large scale against us.

6. Therefore we have firmly established our position and our paramount status. Everything else is rather secondary to this and need not affect the situation much.

7. Having secured this position for ourselves, we should look at all other matters in this context, and we can afford to consider them from the larger

1. Note, 17 September 1948. J.N. Collection.



viewpoint of the present and future good of the people of India as a whole. We have in fact a certain latitude and a certain choice. That choice should be exercised in a way to strengthen our basic position in India and abroad, and to improve and stabilise the communal situation in India. The victory in Hyderabad itself has contributed to this, and if we follow it up in the right spirit, we can go far in strengthening India's position and solving some of our present problems.

8. We can thus afford to be generous, as all our essential interests are safeguarded, and the so-called generosity is really a furtherance of our self-interest. Any narrow-minded and vengeful approach would lead to a certain amount of bitterness and ill-will in India and criticism abroad. We would lose the stature when we had the chance to impress the world. On the other hand, a far-seeing and generous approach would, far from weakening us, strengthen us in every way and redound to our credit. It would go a long way in reducing the communal tension not only in the Indian Union but also in Pakistan. It will give greater security to the minorities wherever they might be. It would undermine the policy which Pakistan continues to pursue against us and I think that it would improve our position in Kashmir. Abroad it would mean a feather in our cap.

9. The strictly legal position is that the Nizam continues to be the ruler of Hyderabad with all his old powers, but he cannot exercise these powers in view of the military situation that has arisen. Though in law and theory he is still the fountain of authority, in fact he is powerless and can only function within the limits we lay down. If we so choose, we can depose him or make any other arrangement. But so long as we do not depose him or he abdicates, he continues to be the Nizam. If we depose him, we have to put someone else in his place, or we have to take some other and more radical step. In the present context probably any more radical step would not only produce complications but would also appear vengeful and unwise. The Nizam's telegram<sup>3</sup> to the Governor-General and his broadcast this evening were good and wisely worded.<sup>4</sup> Who was responsible for their wording, I do not know. But they did show that he was not half-hearted in his conversion (due undoubtedly to military pressure) and was prepared to fall in line to any directions from the Government of India. We should at least appear to be as wise as he has shown himself to be at this moment and not

3. The Nizam in his telegram of 17 September stated that he had ordered a ceasefire and the disbandment of the Razakars and was allowing Indian troops to occupy Secunderabad.

4. The Nizam said in his broadcast: "In the very nature of things, Hyderabad, 86 per cent of whose population are Hindus, cannot possibly become an Islamic state." A ceasefire had been ordered for his forces from 5 p.m. He would be forming a new government and Indian troops were free to enter Secunderabad and the Razakars would be banned.

appear to be childish. Difficulties will continually arise in the course of the next few days or weeks and so long as we do not take clear decisions. The Nizam has banned the Razakars. We are all in favour of their banning. But do we recognise the Nizam's authority in this respect? Undoubtedly in law he had that authority, and in fact our army was still far from him when he issued the order. Are we to say that he had no business to ban them and that we shall ban them afresh? He is forming a provisional or caretaker government. Are we to allow it to remain in being, though without authority, or are we to put an end to it and say that no such thing can be appointed by the Nizam or can function? This is quite apart from any wrong step that the Nizam or that Government might take.

10. A somewhat comparable case is that of the Mikado in Japan.<sup>5</sup> He suffered final and full defeat in a terrible war. He was the ruler of an independent country which was defeated by another country. That other country or countries were in a position to deal with him and with Japan as they liked. They chose to keep the Mikado though his powers were strictly limited. A new legislature was elected with the normal powers of a legislature. At the same time MacArthur<sup>6</sup> apparently had the right, as the General of the occupied forces, to take such action as he considered necessary for the security of the country and to veto any action taken by the legislature. (I am not quite sure of the position).

11. The present case of the Nizam in Hyderabad is different in many ways from that of the Mikado and Japan. But all the differences are in favour of the Nizam and Hyderabad. We were not at war. Hyderabad was not, according to us, independent but in some subordinate position to India and military operations lasted just four and a half days before surrender. Here I might add that the surrender is only of the Hyderabad State Army to our army. I do not quite see how the Nizam as such can surrender to us, that is the Paramount Power.

12. With this background in view, let us consider what we should do. It appears to me that we should say or to do nothing which might be interpreted to mean that we are treating Hyderabad as a conquered territory which we can dispose off as we wish, even during a temporary period. We are committed to giving an opportunity to the people of Hyderabad to decide their future. A certain time might elapse before they can do so. During this period we have to be careful not to function as conquerors. For a

5. Hirohito (b. 1901); 124th Emperor of Japan; Regent, 1921-26; succeeded to throne in 1926; author of several books on marine biology.

6. General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964); Commander-in-Chief of the American and Filipino forces in East Asia, 1941-51; after Japanese surrender in 1945 became Allied Commander of Japan till 1951; Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, 1950-1951.



short time, of course, the Military Commander will be in charge, but even during this time our mind should be clear about the next step towards which we should work. I think that if any major change is to be made in regard to the deposition of the Nizam or the removal of his dynasty, this should be left to the Constituent Assembly. Our action at this stage would mean prejudging the issue and would be too intimately connected with our military victory. At the same time I feel that it would probably not be proper for the Nizam to continue as Nizam.

13. While, therefore, I would hesitate to depose him, I would like him to abdicate. (All this is subject to development and the possibility of our getting some concrete proof of the Nizam's misbehaviour).

14. It should be possible, I think, to induce the Nizam to abdicate. A commission or a council of regency might then be appointed to function till such time as elections are held and a constituent assembly formed. This commission or council of regency should have, I think, a son of the Nizam, the elder one, as its president and some other members who may be drawn from Hyderabad or outside. But a number of them should be Hyderabadis. This commission or council can function in civil matters subject to the veto of the Military Commander till such time as reasons of security demand this. There would also of course be the inherent authority of the Paramount Power in regard to any major matter.<sup>7</sup>

15. I think some such solution would be in keeping with our previous statements and would impress the people generally in India with our bona fides. It would create a good impression in the Middle East countries which have been rather exercised over this affair. It would also be received as well in other foreign countries.

16. Any other approach would be tantamount to treating Hyderabad as a colony or a conquered foreign possession. We claim the people of Hyderabad as Indians, even though some of them may have rebelled against us. Because of that rebellion we cannot treat the whole of Hyderabad State as if it was beyond the pale.

17. Unless some new development takes place or some incriminating evidences found against him, I would treat the Nizam with full courtesy and give him every protection. I would however issue definite order for the arrest of Kasim Razvi and his chief lieutenants, who should be put up for trial.

18. Insofar as possible, and it should be possible to a very large extent, the internal structure and functioning of the State should not be interfered with. Only where military necessity or security reasons make it essential,

7. The legal position was that the Nizam continued to be the ruler of Hyderabad with all his old powers, but could not exercise those powers because of the military situation that had arisen.



should any variation be made. The old functionaries should continue, except in very special cases where they are considered definitely harmful and occupied key posts. The changes made by or through the military regime should be as few as possible.<sup>8</sup> Changes in these matters should come a little later from some internal authority which has been established with our goodwill.

19. This is a note for consideration so that our minds might apply themselves to certain aspects of the questions that face us in Hyderabad.

8. The Army Commander announced that the Administration would be carried on according to existing laws under his control, subject to such modifications as may be considered necessary from time to time to meet exigencies of changing situation.

## 2. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17th September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Very important developments are taking place in the Hyderabad situation and I think it is necessary for some of us to meet as soon as possible to consider them and lay down our line of action. Indeed it may be necessary for the full Cabinet to meet. But in any event, I think, a committee of the Cabinet should function to consider day to day development in the Hyderabad situation.

The broadcast<sup>2</sup> that Laik Ali made last night addressed to me requires some kind of a reply. What that reply should be will have to be considered by us and the reply should be made as early as possible, possibly tonight.

Then against the intercepted message that we have got from El Edroos has also to be considered and our action determined. For the present that action can only be a continued advance of our forces but avoiding all firing unless they are opposed.

The legal and constitutional position of our civil administrators in Hyderabad is a delicate and ticklish matter. We have to avoid any appearance of conquest as such or of any kind of incorporation of these areas in the Indian administrative machine. We have said that we have gone for the

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In his broadcast Laik Ali pinned all hopes on the United Nations which admitted the Hyderabad case on 16 September. He referred to Nizam's offer of plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations to decide accession.

sake of law and order and inevitably we have to look after the civil administration.<sup>3</sup> The question is a difficult one and will require very careful handling. For the present it should be made clear that the responsibility is that of our Military Commander and any civil administrator functioning in the area deals with him and only through him with the Government of India. That is a military solution of a temporary character due to the exigencies of the situation. As soon as the military situation is eased the matter will have to be considered in a different light. Every step that we take has to be considered with a view to external reactions and the Security Council.

The civil life in Hyderabad has to continue as normally as possible. What arrangements, financial or other, have to be made for this have to be seen to.

I am inviting some members of the Cabinet to meet me in my office in External Affairs at 6 p.m. today to consider all these matters as well as any others that may be necessary. I hope you will be able to come then. Among our officers I am asking Bajpai, V.P. Menon, H.M. Patel, and H.V.R. Iengar to come. The Ministers invited are—yourself, Baldev Singh, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Matthai and Neogy.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. The Government of India had stated that its approach to the problem of Hyderabad had been governed by their general policy towards Indian States. The proposed return of troops to Secunderabad was for restoring law and order. The entry of troops into Hyderabad State was essentially police action rather than a military operation.

### 3. Telegram to K. M. Munshi<sup>1</sup>

In the course of his broadcast yesterday, Nizam said that he had ordered representatives of his old Ministry, who are now prosecuting appeal on behalf of Hyderabad before U.N. Security Council, not to press it as he is opening a new chapter of friendliness with India. Grateful for information as to what action has been, or is being, taken in this matter in Hyderabad as well as by Hyderabad Delegation in Paris.

1. New Delhi, 18 September 1948. File No. 3(7)-UN-I/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.



#### 4. Telegram to K. M. Munshi<sup>1</sup>

Received your telegram of 17th. We would like you and General Rajendra Sinhji to visit Delhi after few days for consultations with us and to inform us of local situation. Till then we do not propose to come to any final decisions and present provisional arrangements should be carried on without any commitments.<sup>2</sup> Please keep us informed and tell us when you think both of you can conveniently come to Delhi having regard to local situation.

1. New Delhi, 18 September 1948. File No.3(7)-UN-I/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The Indian Army command proclaimed to the people of Hyderabad: "As soon as our task is completed the people of Hyderabad will be given the opportunity to decide their future, both as regards the internal government and the relation with India."

#### 5. The New Hyderabad<sup>1</sup>

Comrades and friends,

I am going to speak to you about Hyderabad. You know already the swift developments that have taken place there, in the course of the last five days. You know that the action that our Government undertook in Hyderabad has achieved its object. Our troops are in Secunderabad cantonment. The Razakars, who did so much mischief during the past few months, have been banned and are being disbanded. New problems now face us, and we shall have to deal with them wisely, keeping in view the well-being of all the people of India, including Hyderabad.

It is natural that we should rejoice at this swift termination of this action, that we undertook after prolonged and painful thought and much deliberation. As I have repeatedly said, we are men of peace, hating war, and the last thing we desire is to come into armed conflict with any one. Nevertheless, circumstances, which you know well, compelled us to take this action in Hyderabad. Fortunately, it was brief and we returned with relief to the paths of peace again. We rejoice at the splendid way in which officers and men of our armed forces have carried out this work like true soldiers, with

1. Broadcast from New Delhi on 18 September 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.



skill, expedition and forbearance, strictly observing all codes of honour. What has pleased me most during these past six days is the splendid response of our people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to the call of restraint and discipline and the test of unity.<sup>2</sup> It is a remarkable thing, and one which is full of good augury for the future, that not a single communal incident occurred in the whole length and breadth of this great country. I am deeply grateful for this. I should also like to congratulate the people of Hyderabad who, during these days of trial, kept calm and helped the cause of peace.

Many persons warned us of the risks and dangers that we faced and of the communal trouble that might besmirch our land, but our people have falsified these prophets and demonstrated that when crises come, they can face with courage, dignity and calm. Let this be an example and a pledge for the future. Henceforth, let there be no talk or hint of communal antagonism. We must bury the false doctrine and the ignoble urges that have given rise to this antagonism and build firmly the united India for which we laboured for long in the past, and in which every Indian, to whatever religion he might belong, has equal rights and opportunities. We rejoice today and rightly, but let us remember that a great nation and a great people do not lose their balance, whether in adversity or in success. We have faced many adversities and overcome them. We have to face success also without getting intoxicated by it. We must take this opportunity to consolidate our real gains, those gains in unity, goodwill and mutual forbearance.

I should like, at this moment, to appeal to the people of Pakistan, our countrymen till yesterday and still as near to us, to cast aside fear and suspicion and to join us in the works of peace.<sup>3</sup>

To the people of Hyderabad, both Muslim and non-Muslim, I should like to send my greetings.

It has been a sorrow to us that there should have been armed conflict among the people of this country. Happily, that is over, an evil course was followed by the ruling clique in Hyderabad, and that led to this unfortunate conflict. I am glad that His Exalted Highness, the Nizam, realised that he had acted wrongly and had been misled and that he wisely retraced his steps.<sup>4</sup>

2. Muslims in the Indian Union welcomed the step and rejoiced that the trouble had ended without bloodshed. There was not one single communal incident over the whole of India for a week. The Nawab of Rampur said that the Government of India had been compelled to take action against the forces of evil in Hyderabad.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan cabled to Nehru on 11 September : "Intense feelings have been aroused in Pakistan and in tribal areas by attitude of your Government towards Hyderabad. Actual military action and inevitable chain of reactions and repercussions which it will produce will create an exceedingly difficult and explosive situation."
4. The Nizam stated that the Indian Army had "restored my freedom to deal with Hyderabad's destinies." He dismissed Laik Ali's Government and announced the withdrawal of the Hyderabad complaint from the Security Council.

He is to be congratulated for acting rightly, even at this late hour. Much misery and complication of issues might have been avoided if this right action had been taken a little earlier. But I do not wish to speak of the past now, and I do not wish any one to harbour ill-will any more.

We have stated clearly that the future of Hyderabad will be determined in accordance with the wishes of her people. We shall stand by that declaration that future, I am convinced, lies in the closest association with India. History, geography and cultural traditions bear witness to this fact.

For the present, our Military Commander will be incharge of Hyderabad, for much work has to be done before normality is restored. He has been charged by us to interfere as little as possible with the normal life of the people of the State, in town and village alike, which must go on as before. As soon as this immediate task is over, other arrangements will be made and later steps will be taken for the election of a constituent assembly which will determine the constitutional structure of Hyderabad.

I would repeat that we do not consider, as we have not considered in the past, Hyderabad as something different or alien from us. Our people, whether Hindu or Muslim, are our kith and kin, and sharers with us in the great heritage of India. *Jai Hind*.

## 6. To F. R. R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

20 September 1948

My dear Roy,

I saw somewhere that the Razakars who had been arrested in Hyderabad were not being treated as prisoners of war but as ordinary prisoners. That, I suppose, is right. Still I hope that the treatment given to these people in prison will be decent and no attempt will be made to harrass or otherwise humiliate them. It is a bad policy to hit people who are down. It should be our attempt to win over the people of Hyderabad in every way.

I was surprised to see in the papers the figures of casualties in Hyderabad. I do not know why it was considered necessary to publish them.

I am sorry to learn that you have been unwell. I hope this was temporary.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



7. To F. R. R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st September 1948

My dear Roy,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th September.

I entirely agree with you that the task in Hyderabad entrusted by Government to the Armed Forces has been both speedily and successfully concluded. I have already expressed my appreciation to Lieut-General Rajendrasinhji and his officers and men but I know that in a task of this kind the staff work at Army Headquarters is of the most vital importance. What subsequently appears simple is really the result of very hard work previously done. You as Commander-in-Chief and your headquarters staff were responsible for this fine piece of organisation and Government have appreciated this greatly. I shall be glad if you will convey my appreciation and the Government's to your staff and all others concerned.

I give below the message which I should like you to convey to your staff:

The successful operation in Hyderabad has evoked appreciation and admiration all over the country. On behalf of Government I have expressed our appreciation to Lieut-General Rajendrasinhji and his officers and men, but the real appreciation has come from every quarter of India and from every class of our people.

While we appreciate the work done by the Army in the field, it is well to remember that such an operation requires staff work of the highest order. The burden of this staff work fell on the Commander-in-Chief and his General Staff and they carried out this work with an efficiency that has been amply demonstrated by subsequent events. The public does not see this work and it can only observe the subsequent consequences resulting from that work. The success of an operation however depends primarily on the careful planning and the appreciation of every aspect of a complicated undertaking. Our General Staff under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief did this planning with a care and thoroughness which resulted in a difficult and complicated operation appearing and actually becoming in practice relatively simple. There is a certain artistry about such planning which results in complete cooperation and coordination of various activities. On behalf of Government and myself I should like therefore to congratulate the Commander-in-Chief and his General Staff at Army Headquarters on this very fine piece of work.

I should like to express again our satisfaction at the behaviour of our troops which, according to all reports, was beyond reproach, and which

1. J.N. Collection.



showed a sustained discipline and restraint. This applies to our Air Force also. The Defence Forces have added yet another example worth following to their fine traditions.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 8. To F. R. R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st September 1948

My dear Roy,

This morning's papers announce that Kasim Razvi is likely to be sent to Delhi for trial. I do not know whose decision this is. I think it would be better for him to be kept somewhere in Hyderabad State preferably not in Hyderabad city, for the present. His transfer to Delhi will give him greater notoriety. I think that even when a trial takes place it should be in Hyderabad State. But this matter can be considered later. For the present it would be better for him to be kept in Hyderabad State.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

## 9. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

This morning's papers announce that Kasim Razvi might be sent to Delhi. I hardly think this would be wise. Certainly, for the present it would be desirable to keep him in Hyderabad State, preferably not in Hyderabad city. Later it might be decided what steps are to be taken against him. His trial should also, I think, later take place in Hyderabad State and should be a relatively short one. We have got entangled in the intricacies of the Godse trial<sup>2</sup> here, which is unfortunate.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 7, p. 249.

2. It took nearly four months since the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi to complete the preparations for the trial of Godse.

I have just received a letter from Rajaji<sup>3</sup> in which he suggests that it will be very unwise to bring Razvi to Delhi or to have his trial at this stage. He should be kept detained for the present.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. Rajagopalachari advised against trying Razvi. He felt that Razvi should be detained until the time Hyderabad got a proper form of Government. "We hand him over to that Government. He should be a military prisoner somewhere in C.P. or Madras and treated courteously."

## 10. To F. R. R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd September 1948

My dear Roy,

In less than two weeks from today I shall be leaving for England. I am anxious that before I go certain matters should be cleared up and some loose ends should be tied.

About Hyderabad, I have suggested to Rajendrasinhji to come here with Munshi for consultation. Munshi is lying ill and may not be able to come for some little time. Meanwhile, officials of our States Ministry as well as H.M. Patel have visited Hyderabad and presumably they will be coming back soon with some first hand news. Even so I think it necessary that Rajendrasinhji should come here when V.P. Menon and others present their report. I hope, therefore, that you will explain this to him and point out that V.P. Menon's visit to Hyderabad does not in any way make Rajendrasinhji's visit to Delhi less necessary. They need not wait for Munshi to get well.

About Kashmir, it is clear that we must carefully consider the situation and possibly issue fresh directives. For some time past we have been purely on the defensive, except in the Zoji La sector where we had a setback. Sitreps daily announce petty offensive activity of the enemy. In another two months' time or so winter will gradually set in and we have to be clear in our minds as to what we have got to do in these two months.

I think we should have a meeting of the Defence Committee fairly soon to consider this question. But before we have the Defence Committee meeting

1. J.N. Collection.

or round about that time, we should have a consultation with our commanders in Kashmir. Thimayya and Sant Singh<sup>2</sup> might be sent for and a meeting arranged at which of course General Cariappa would also be present.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Sant Singh (b. 1903); commissioned in the Indian Army, 1925; served in the Punjab Regiment in the North West Frontier, 1926; commanded the 2nd Bihar Regiment in World War II; commanded the 4th Indian Infantry Division, 1948; Master General of Ordinance at Army Headquarters; G.O.C. Eastern Command, 1953-56.

## 11. To Asaf Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22 September 1948

My dear Asaf,

I have just received your letter of the 19th. The Hyderabad operation was a miracle in many ways and it has achieved very real results. It was a miracle chiefly because of the calm that prevailed everywhere. The gains are a very substantial cooling down of the communal tension and the fading out of the fear that consumed people. I think also that the ever-present possibility of war with Pakistan has also faded out.

On the other hand it has been amazing how the foreign and specially the British press have attacked us. The expectations were falsified, their prophecies proved untrue, and they were angry.

It is now almost certain that I go to London on the 5th October and later to Paris. There is not much time left now and these 12 days are going to be terribly busy for me. I want to settle many things before I go. So, much as I would like to see you, I would not advise you to come here just now.

Love,

Yours,  
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.



## 12. To Henry F. Grady<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 22, 1948

My dear Dr. Grady,

It was a great pleasure to receive your letter of August 20 and to have news of you and Mrs. Grady. We have missed both of you very greatly since you left, and not only we but so many others in New Delhi.

As you must be aware, we have had rather exciting times here. We have been criticised in the American and British press for our action in Hyderabad. We took that action after the most careful thought and when we were convinced that to delay it would be to injure not only the cause of India but the cause of peace generally. Subsequent events justified us. This speedy action has resulted in some solid gains. A difficult problem, which might at any time have led to grave consequences, has been solved. Communal tension in India is far less than it has been during the past year, and there is a feeling of security and stability. As you know, there was sometimes a vague talk of war between Pakistan and India. The possibility of this has become remote. Thus the situation in every way has become more stabilised and the whole atmosphere of India is more peaceful. I am quite sure that what we did was right.

I am thinking of going to London on the 5th October by Air India. Unfortunately, this line does not pass through Athens, otherwise I would have had the opportunity of meeting you and Mrs. Grady again. However, I hope that sometime or other we shall meet again. From London I may go to Paris for a few days. I expect to return by the end of October.

With affectionate regards to you and Mrs. Grady.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

## 13. To O. P. Ramaswami Reddiar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 22, 1948

My dear Mr. Reddiar,

You gave me a letter dated 17th September,<sup>2</sup> when you were here, in which it was suggested that power should be taken to retire compulsorily

1. File No. 7(118)/48-PMS.

2. Ramaswami Reddiar asked the Central Government for emergency powers to compulsorily retire public servants, especially the Muslim employees whose loyalty to India was suspect.

undesirable public servants. You had in mind specially Muslims [having sympathies with Hyderabad. That particular question does not arise now at all after the conclusion of the Hyderabad operation. Indeed it should be our endeavour now to be as generous as possible and not to take any steps which might be criticised as being communal. The last ten days have shown that we have little to fear from any Muslim intransigence in India. We should therefore try to win over Muslims to our side even more than before.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 14. To Kingsley Martin<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 24, 1948

My dear Kingsley,

Thank you for your letter of September 3.<sup>2</sup>

I am sorry I was hard on you and perhaps unfair in my letter<sup>3</sup> to Dorothy.<sup>4</sup> We are living through difficult times and it is often difficult to see things in proper perspective.<sup>5</sup>

I shall be going to England soon and I look forward to meet you there.

This might interest you. I sent to Rajaji, our Governor General, Low's<sup>6</sup> cartoon<sup>7</sup> about Gandhiji and me which appeared in *The Evening Standard* of September 15. This is his reply :

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kingsley Martin wrote that "your remarks in your letter to Dorothy makes me want to assure you on one point. I certainly do not take information from anyone hostile to India. I am far too fond of India and too concerned with her welfare to do that. I am sorry you should have found factual errors in anything we have published."

3. See post, Miscellaneous section.

4. Dorothy Woodman, companion of Kingsley Martin; author of *The Republic of Indonesia* (1956), *The Making of Burma* (1962) and *Himalayan Frontiers* (1969).

5. Kingsley Martin had stated in an article on Hyderabad in *New Statesman and Nation* that the Indian Union should look "benevolently" at the legal position of the Nizam.

6. David Low (1891-1963); cartoonist and caricaturist; worked for *The Bulletin* (Sydney) 1911-1918, *The Star* (London) 1919-26, *The Evening Standard*, 1927-50, and *The Daily Herald*, 1950-53; joined *The Manchester Guardian* in 1953; author of several books including *Low's Annual* (1908), *Lions and Lambs* (1928), *A Cartoon History of Our Times* (1939), *Years of Wrath* (1949), *Low Visibility* (1953), *The Fearful Fifties* (1960), and *Autobiography*.

7. In this cartoon on Hyderabad the shadow of Mahatma Gandhi was beckoning Nehru and saying: 'Not that way, my son.'



"It is a very good cartoon even for Low. Keep it with your curiosities. But we are in a sad pass. If the substance is in our favour, we are up against legalities, paramountcy, lapse and all that. If the law is in our favour, then morality is brought up against us. If both are right, then they say our non-violence is against us. Every way or some way we are wrong. We have put Bapu aside. So the western democracies have taken him up. There is some compensation."

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 15. To H. S. Suhrawardy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 24th September 1948

My dear Suhrawardy,

Thank you for your letter of 21st September. The events that have taken place in Hyderabad have suddenly opened out a new picture of communal peace and harmony. The Muslims of India deserve every congratulation for the part they took in this business. I think that the main result of the Hyderabad affair has been this consolidation and a great lessening of the fear complex all round.

People in Pakistan may feel hurt and angry, but I am sure that even our relations with Pakistan will tend to improve now.

As for those Muslims who were arrested or kept in detention during this period, I hope that they will be released if this has not already taken place. General instructions to this effect were issued several days ago. In the event of any cases coming to your notice where this has not been done, please draw my attention to them and I shall enquire. Ultimately it is the provincial government's responsibility and we advise them only but we have emphasised this matter.

As for the Nizam, we have no desire to be unjust or ungenerous to him personally. The situation, however, is full of revolutionary possibilities and we have to proceed cautiously anyhow.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



16. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

The 24th September, 1948

My dear Prakasa,

Thank you for your letter of the 17th September and your cheque for Rs. 250/-, which has been sent to the Flag Day Fund.

I have already suggested to you by telegram to come here on the 3rd October. I intend leaving Delhi on the 5th forenoon. Inevitably I shall be very busy during the last few days. Nevertheless I would like to meet you and I am glad you are coming. If you are not keen on staying anywhere else I would like you to stay with me. I have suggested the 3rd as I may be out of Delhi on the 1st and a part of the 2nd.

The dramatic events which took place in Hyderabad have had far-reaching consequences. Probably most people do not appreciate all these consequences and are just full of the sensation of a military victory. As a military victory it was not much in the sense that there was not much fighting. It was, however, a remarkable piece of organisation and coordination.

Once for all we have solved the problem of the paramount authority of the Central Government in India all over India. Of course, we do not want any paramountcy in the old sense of the word but it is clear that no dissident element is going to be permitted to challenge the Central Government.

The biggest gain, however, is in the communal sphere. Suddenly the communal temperature of India has gone down very greatly and both the Hindus and the Muslims feel easier in mind and more secure. The sense of fear of strange and disastrous happenings is gone. I do not think we have had that sensation for the last year and a half at least. I have received a vast number of telegrams of congratulation; a very large number of these have come from Muslims in India. They are genuinely relieved.<sup>2</sup> All this is a great gain.

Then again we have demonstrated that even in case of external stresses and strains the communal situation can hold. This is important not only from the practical point of view but even more so from the psychological. We are relieved of a nightmare. There is now no great chance of any very

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Non-communal nature of the action had been proved by the absence of communal trouble in India and Hyderabad. Statements and messages had been sent to the Prime Minister and the Governor General by Muslims, responsible individuals and organisations, throughout India and Hyderabad. Restoration of order and public confidence in Hyderabad had been welcomed by Muslims all over India. The communal situation which threatened deterioration due to the Razakar atrocities had improved.

big exodus from East Bengal to West although some kind of exodus continues largely due to economic reasons.

The possibility of war with Pakistan has become remote. Perhaps you who are in the heart of Pakistan do not quite appreciate this when you see the wild propaganda that is going on there. That wild propaganda may lead to conflict, but I am quite sure that the chances of conflict have receded greatly.

So we have good reason to congratulate ourselves over for this affair. My only fear is that we may overstep the mark as people do in a moment of success.

You recommend to me earnestly that we should adhere to the 15th June drafts.<sup>3</sup> I am afraid your proposal is completely divorced from reality. The June 15th position was a highly unsatisfactory position and full of the germs of future conflict. It would be folly at this stage to agree to something which may mean future conflict. It is indeed impossible to do so for any individual or Government of India. Even the Nizam does not suggest any such thing. If we try to do it there would probably be an internal revolution in Hyderabad and we will have to use our Army against our own people. No, I am quite convinced that this June 15th position is totally inapplicable now.

But I agree with you that we should move cautiously and act with generosity subject always to certain basic principles and positions. We are trying to do this in spite of a popular outcry for extreme steps.

Love,

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. The Government of India had on 15 June drawn up two drafts of agreement which were subsequently rejected by the Nizam. Under the proposed agreement, the Indian Union was prepared to settle with the Hyderabad Government on the basis of accession in respect of defence, external affairs and communications, preserving the internal autonomy of the State on other matters by a responsible government.

## 17. To the Nawab of Chhatari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
24 September, 1948

My dear Nawab Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of September 19th. I entirely agree with you that the events in Hyderabad have been most gratifying. The most hopeful

1. J.N. Collection.



feature has been the way complete peace was maintained all over India, during a time of stress and trial. This is a good augury for the future. I am quite sure that the communal situation has greatly improved and the old sense of fear is disappearing. I hope we shall build upon this an enduring edifice of peace and security for all.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 18. Hope of Communal Peace<sup>1</sup>

Friends and comrades,

I do not know whether it is intentional or by design that we have fixed this function for today. Be that as it may, it is a great day. It is good that we are opening this market<sup>2</sup> on this auspicious occasion. Today is the first day of Mahatma Gandhi's *jayanti* and we should remember him today particularly.<sup>3</sup>

The complete peace in the entire country during the police action against Hyderabad has shown the world that we have expunged communalism from our midst.

It is wrong to suggest that the Government took a hasty step in Hyderabad. A great responsibility was put on the Government, particularly on me in taking the decision. For months we considered the matter. There were even complaints that we were delaying and lenient. In flagrant violation of all international conventions arms were smuggled into Hyderabad by air. No country with any sense of self-respect would have tolerated it. But we kept quiet because we did not want to do anything which might even slightly upset things.

Conditions however worsened. There was a fear of great disturbances. Then we realised that we had to view the problem from a new angle. We knew that if we did not take any action conditions would worsen. The result of the operation shows that our action was timely.

1. Speech at the opening ceremony of the Lajpatrai Municipal Market, Delhi, 25 September 1948. Based on reports in *The Hindustan Times* and *Indian News Chronicle*, 26 September 1948.
2. The market, built at a cost of Rs. 11 lakhs, had 1933 stalls for refugees.
3. The Mahatma Gandhi birth anniversary celebrations started on 25 September for a week ending on 2 October.



Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs wholeheartedly supported the Government decision. Still more gratifying was the fact that, contrary to all wishful thinking that there would be communal bloodshed in India and Hyderabad, not even a single major incident was reported from any part of the country on military action in Hyderabad. It clearly shows that our people stood behind us.

I congratulate the people, particularly the Muslims, for exemplary behaviour, and a commendable sense of understanding. I also congratulate the refugees who forgot, at least for a while, all their miseries, and stood as one man behind the Government.

Some foreigners criticized the police action in Hyderabad for being in contravention of Mahatma Gandhi's principles and teachings.<sup>4</sup> I am glad that they have so much regard and praise for Gandhiji and his ideology, but I am constrained to observe that they did not care to understand India's point of view. Had we waited any longer the poison of communal hatred and fear would have spread in the whole body politic of this country.

The greatest danger which affects a nation is fear. When a nation is full of fear, it does many wrong things. Fear makes us cowards and also aggressive. Just as a wild animal attacks a human being only when it is afraid of him, nations who are afraid do a lot of detestable things.

A sense of fear had gripped India and Pakistan. It was more acute in Pakistan. That sense of fear made us do many acts of bestiality. A great and strong nation would never have committed the acts of August 1947.

That sense of fear still seems to grip Pakistan. Read the Pakistan papers. They are full of lies and falsehood. All of you are residents of Delhi. Do you remember if anything untoward occurred in your city on August 25, 26, 27 and 28? So far as I know conditions were normal. But in Pakistan papers it was reported that there were serious disturbances and the streets of Delhi were flowing with human blood. Columns were written on the subject. The main object of these stories is to spread terror among the people.

Have you read Pakistan papers on the Hyderabad question? While communal peace prevailed in India and Hyderabad during the police action, it was written in Pakistan papers that a bloodbath was going on.

I want to draw the attention of outsiders, who criticize us for our action in Hyderabad, to a few facts. Do they know that a great change has come in our country as a result of our police action? The operation saved countless lives and eliminated a great part of the poison which was affecting our body politic. It has not only benefited us but will benefit the people of Pakistan,

4. The American press was critical of India on account of the police action. *The Washington Post* under the title "Soiled Victory" on 19 September stated "superior force had decided the issue in Hyderabad in favour of the invading Indian Army. But if the issue of might has been decided, the issue of right has not."

if they think coolly. It goes without saying that, if India is well and purified of this poison and fear, it will also have its effect in Pakistan.

Millions were ruined as a result of the disturbances last year. It may be that we were not able to do much for them because of our weakness or because circumstances were beyond our control. But slowly we are marching ahead. *Is tarah tai ki hain ham ne manzilen, gir gae, gir kar uthe, uth kar chale.*<sup>5</sup>

I want to take your minds to last year's events. In those months there was darkness all around us. There was only one brilliant star—Mahatma Gandhi—lighting our path and showing us the right way. I know that but for his light we would have gone astray. But though that light is no more with us in the physical sense it can never be really extinguished. In our ignorance we may not see it. Whatever respect and influence we command in the world during modern times, we owe to him. We can hold our heads high in the world because of Gandhiji's name. So long as we remember that and look to that light for guidance, we will be able to overcome our difficulties.

I am glad that I am inaugurating this market today. We have done enough of destruction in our time. Now is the time to devote ourselves to constructive activity. *Jai Hind.*

5. We have crossed many a milestone. In the process, while we stumbled and fell yet we got up and resumed the journey.

## 19. To P. M. S. Blackett<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

September 26, 1948

My dear Blackett,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 20th September. It was a great pleasure to have you and your wife to stay with us, though I am afraid I was an absentee host for most of the time.

I happened to see your report soon after you gave it. The Defence Minister had just received it and he and I were going by air to Bombay to

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1897-1974); British physicist, awarded Nobel Prize for Physics, 1948; Professor of Physics at University of Manchester, 1937-53, at Imperial College of Science and Technology, 1953-65; President, Royal Society, 1965-70, author of *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, *Lectures on Rock Magnetism* and *Studies of War*.



welcome the new cruiser<sup>3</sup> that had come in. So I had time in the plane to read the report and I did so. I am very far from being any kind of an expert in such matters. But I must say that I liked your entire approach to the problem as well as the general conclusion you arrived at. I am glad that you gave reasons for your approach and your conclusions.

The Hyderabad affair has been very successful from many points of view, apart from the military aspect, There are three substantial gains:—

(1) All the Indian States and their rulers, as well as all other feudal and semi-feudal elements in India, have fully realised that they cannot oppose in any way the central authority. Quite apart from Hyderabad, we were having plenty of trouble with some of these rulers, although it did not receive much publicity. Many of them were just waiting to show their hand and were secretly intriguing. What had happened in Hyderabad has suddenly pricked their bubbles, and they are very cooperative indeed now. Many of these States are full of petty feudatory chiefs and big landowners with executive powers. These people were very troublesome.

(2) This is the most important gain of all. The religious-communal situation has suddenly improved very greatly. Both the Hindus and the Muslims were full of fear and apprehension of each other. The Hindus suspected the Muslims of sabotage and other misdeeds. The Muslims in India, and you will remember that there are 35 millions of them, were afraid of what the Hindus and Sikhs might do to them. The fact that nothing happened during this period of stress and strain, made the Hindus and Muslims realise that they had little to fear from each other. The result is a sense of security which we have not had for over a year. For the first time there is a feeling of real solidarity, whatever the causes, among Hindus and Muslims. Internally, therefore, the situation has improved very greatly and we do not think that anything is likely to happen which can lead to any major trouble.

(3) The chances of a war with Pakistan have become remote. There is no chance at all, so far as we are concerned. But there was always a fear that Pakistan might be pushed into some kind of a warlike action. The whole background of policy in Pakistan is based on that and they have created a psychology among their people, which thinks in terms of war. It is astonishing how their newspapers harp on this theme and publish the most amazing lies about conditions in India. Recently all these newspapers in Pakistan were filled with stories of massacres of Muslims in India and the streets of Delhi and other cities running with blood. This was in the last week of August, when probably you were here. As a matter of fact there was absolute calm in Delhi and not the smallest incident. So also elsewhere. Again

3. I.N.S. *Delhi*, formerly known as H.M.S. *Achilles*, a Leander class cruiser with 7030 tons displacement, was the flagship of the Indian Navy from 1948 to 1978.



during the Hyderabad operations, wild stories were put in Pakistan without the slightest basis of fact.<sup>4</sup> Imagine people reading these stories day after day, they are bound to get terribly excited and their excitement might lead to anything. During the Hyderabad operations, the Pakistan press and radio announced from day to day that the Hyderabad armies were invading India. When the Nizam's surrender came, it was a terrible blow to people in Pakistan, who had been led to expect from day to day that Hyderabad was winning.

I think now definitely that there is hardly any chance of war between India and Pakistan. Of course the Kashmir issue remains and it is a difficult one. There also the U.N. Commission has come to some conclusions which are unfavourable to Pakistan. Their ceasefire proposal was accepted by us and rejected by Pakistan.

So it can be truly said that this brief Hyderabad affair has led to very substantial gains all round.

I intend starting for England on the 5th October. I hope I shall meet you and your wife during my stay there.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. *Dawn* and *Sind Observer* published fantastic stories about Hyderabad under sensational headlines.

## 20. To Eamon de Valera<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 26, 1948

My dear Mr. de Valera,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th September.

The Hyderabad affair has been much misinterpreted in the English press. It has in fact led to very substantial gains in peace and security in India. The whole atmosphere has been cleared and the various religious communal groups have a sense of security and fellow-feeling. I think ultimately it will lead to far better relations with Pakistan. It is very good of you to congratulate me on the happy termination of the Hyderabad dispute. We shall certainly be generous, although indeed there is no question of generosity when we are dealing our own people, who must have equal rights.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

21. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 2, 1948

My dear Premier,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 28th September, enclosing a copy of a report from the Special Branch, C.I.D., on the communist activities in Hyderabad State. We are fully aware of the situation there and our army has orders to deal with it effectively. The report, you have sent, is a very vague report which does not help very much. It is elementary in some respects, as when it deals with communist principles and ideologies. The C.I.D. Officer is apparently unaware of the fact that a good part of the world has accepted this ideology in varying degrees.

The rest of the report is an enumeration of all kinds of evil deeds performed, presumably, by Communists when they were in conflict with the Hyderabad State.

The question of how to deal with this communist menace is important enough and is engaging the attention of the Government of India. But a vague kind of report like the one you have sent, is not the kind of report which normally intelligence men should send. It does not contain any actual or factual information but is merely a report in regard to a number of things that are said to have happened. Nothing can be checked or vetted, and a report, which cannot be checked because it has no specific examples, is a bad report. It is apt to mislead and create a wrong impression. We have always to be on our guard against the implications of such reports.

I am writing this because I have found a tendency to be vague and to judge of events without finding out if they actually took place. The Intelligence Department should be asked to present facts and not opinions.

May I also here mention an occurrence which indicated to me how dangerous it is to arrive at conclusions from vague rumours. On the 15th September I was informed that you had telephoned to our Southern Army Headquarters, expressing a great deal of alarm at the course of military operations. You were afraid that there was danger to parts of the Madras Presidency from the Hyderabad troops or Razakars and you had demanded special protection for those areas. I do not know on what information you had proceeded because at no time was there the slightest danger of this kind. Indeed, as events showed, our military operations proceeded with clock-work regularity and brought about the surrender of the Hyderabad Forces within a very short time. And yet you were alarmed and sent messages which could not be justified by events. May I suggest that you might check your information in future and in any event exercise some restraint in sending messages which may upset plans already laid down.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

22. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

London

5 October, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I had a telephone call from Padmaja from Hyderabad. She said that our army was doing a fine piece of work. The politicians were too busy with politics to think of doing much else. The position in the rural areas was still fairly bad, that is, Hindu hooligan elements were misbehaving.

We have made arrangements for a special secret cypher between External Affairs and wherever I might be. So if you wish to send me a secret message ask Pai to arrange it. No one in the Cypher Bureau here or in the London High Commissioner's office will understand it.

Yours,

Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50*, Vol. 7, pp. 257-258.





## KASHMIR

## I. Negotiations with U.N. Commission





## 1. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>1</sup>

I have received your telegram No. 2414 dated 28th June. I should like to point out that I have not called your Foreign Minister an indecent person. What I stated in my previous telegram was that your representative at the Security Council had made statements which seemed to me to surpass all limits of decency and veracity.<sup>2</sup> These statements not only referred to particular incidents but were in the nature of general charges against the Government of India. They were made in public about public occurrences and my Government resented them greatly. We repudiated those statements there, and we repudiate them again. I regret that you should consider what I have said as a challenge to the personal honour of your colleague. There is nothing personal in what I have written. So far as I am concerned, I don't see what useful purpose can be served by further correspondence on this point.

The Garhi Habibullah incident that you give itself demonstrates that where we have found that an error has been made on our behalf we admitted it immediately. I do not understand your connecting the Indian Army with the R.S.S., or any other group. I have not seen an iota of proof against the Indian Army anywhere. The fact that sections of the population have left parts of Kashmir State has nothing to do with our Army but is due to the tactics adopted by hostile forces who carry on incessant propaganda against our army and themselves drive away the people before being compelled to withdraw by our forces.

I regret that you have again decided not to send any answer to the question I had put to you about the regular Pakistan Army fighting against our forces in Kashmir State.

1. New Delhi, 1 July 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.
2. Zafrullah Khan had charged that the Indian Army had started an all-out offensive to obtain possession of western Kashmir. He warned that "unless immediate steps are taken, Pakistan will have no option but to change her policy of minimum regular force" in Kashmir, and undertake a counter-offensive to prevent India from over-running Poonch and Mirpur districts. This would inevitably lead to the "most bloody fighting" which Pakistan has tried to avoid. He also alleged that Indian Army and Air Force had been reinforced on a large scale.

## 2. To S.M. Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

2 July 1948

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

A recent special issue of the *Blitz* has a long message from its Kashmir correspondent. There are references in the *Blitz* to the boycott of the U.N.O. Commission and so on and so forth.<sup>2</sup> I think that whatever the motive of the correspondent, he is doing an ill-service to our cause. There can be no question of a boycott when governments are concerned or indeed of any kind of demonstration or ill-will. Many of us still seem to think that we are living in the old agitational period with a foreign government, as when we boycotted the Simon Commission. The position is entirely different when a government as such deals with the matter. It was open to us to tell the U.N. Commission not to come to India. They would not have come then, But of course serious consequences would have flowed from our stopping them. It would have been an affront to the United Nations as a whole and the merits of the Kashmir case would have been put aside and a new international offence charged against us. For this reason we could not possibly tell the Commission not to come. All we could tell them clearly was that we adhered to the position taken up by us in the Security Council and that the Commission will have little to do here. But if it came we would confer with it and explain our position further. That was the only attitude we could adopt. It is a firm and clear attitude and at the same time not a discourteous one.

I hope, therefore, that nothing will be said or written or done in Kashmir which goes against the attitude that we have adopted. Perhaps, you will be good enough to explain this to your colleagues. As you know, I intend coming to Kashmir specially to discuss this matter with you on the 7th. I am writing to you now just to keep you in touch so that you might give necessary instructions to your colleagues and workers. A wrong word or a wrong act may injure our cause.

It is clear that the Commission is coming as a Committee of Good Offices, that is, seeking to advise us privately and to do nothing else.

I do not think it is open to them to receive any representations or petitions or indeed to hold any kind of inquiry. They can only deal with the Governments of India and Pakistan who are the principal parties to the dispute. They can only act in India in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India and no further.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. It was reported that Sheikh Abdullah had insisted upon a boycott of the U.N. Commission, when it would visit Kashmir.



Our Minister in Switzerland as well as Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, who is in Geneva, have met the Members of the Commission there and have sent us a report which is not unsatisfactory. One of the Members of the Commission is a great Sanskrit scholar. All the members are at present reading hard my last book, *The Discovery of India*. They are anxious not to say or do anything which might irritate us. We should equally avoid irritating them.

Our party intends to reach Pathankot on the 7th morning at about 8.30. We do not propose to go to Jammu. After the opening of the bridge we shall come back to Pathankot and then fly to Srinagar. It would be good if you and Bakshi could meet us at Pathankot, participate in the celebrations, and then fly with us to Srinagar.

I shall return early on the morning of the 8th to Delhi. During my stay in Srinagar I should like to have an opportunity to talk to the Maharani. I do not want to go out to dinner anywhere. That takes a lot of time which can be more usefully employed. Gopalaswami Ayyangar would be coming with me.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. First Meeting with the U.N. Commission<sup>1</sup>

The Commission was received by the Right Honorable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: a thin man, small of figure with a beautiful face, deep, dark eyes, small, refined hands. He spoke with us about the economic problems of India, about the movement of people away from cities to villages—a movement quite the reverse of that in Europe—making industrialization difficult. He spoke, too, about the eight cultures of Delhi. And as he spoke he seldom raised his head to look into our eyes. Nor did he utter a word about Kashmir.

1. No record of informal meetings Nehru had with the U.N. Commission is available. The accounts given by Josef Korbel, Chairman of the Commission, in his book, *Danger in Kashmir*, are printed here. When any point in his account differs from the considered stand or opinion of Nehru, it has been explained in footnotes. July 1948. *Danger in Kashmir* by Josef Korbel (New Jersey, 1954), pp. 122-123.



#### 4. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16 July 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th July about the U.N. Commission. The Pakistan papers have been constantly referring to our troops as enemy troops for the last many months. The members of the Commission are quite convinced that the Pakistan Army in considerable numbers is functioning in Kashmir. Indeed the Chairman told me tonight that Pakistan had admitted the presence of three brigades of the Pakistan Army in Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, during a meeting with the Commission, admitted that three brigades of regular troops of Pakistan had been fighting in Kashmir since May 1948. Pakistan later gave excuses that troops had been sent as India's spring offensive threatened her security, that she did not want to be faced with a *fait accompli* in Kashmir and that she wanted to prevent the influx of refugees.

#### 5. Cable to Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

I have carefully considered the resolution of the Commission<sup>2</sup> which in substance, corresponds to a resolution<sup>3</sup> adopted by the Security Council of the U.N. on January 17th, 1948 in the course of which the Government of India were asked to take immediately all measures within their powers calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements which might aggravate the situation. In my reply to the Council I stated : "The Government of India have never faltered in their desire or in their endeavour to improve the situation." This is still the position of my Government and the Commission may rest assured that, consistently with their rights under international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of India will continue to endeavour to give effect to the Commission's requests.

1. 17 July 1948. File No. L/P&S/13/1934, I.O.L.R., London.
2. The Commission appealed to both India and Pakistan, on 15 July, to take measures to improve the situation and refrain from making statements which might aggravate it.
3. The Security Council, on 17 January 1948, asked both India and Pakistan to refrain from doing or permitting any act which might aggravate the situation and requested them to inform the Council about any material change that might occur while the matter was under its consideration.

6. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
28th July 1948

My dear Dickie,

I returned last evening from my Madras tour and received your letter of the 15th July.<sup>2</sup> Thank you for it. We are all very grateful to you for all the good work that you are doing in England on behalf of India. Amrit Kaur has met me after her return, and she gave me a full account of the happenings at the other end in which you have played such an important part.

The U.N.O. Commission have had long discussions with us and I have met each member separately and informally. The question we set out to prove, that is the complicity of Pakistan in Kashmir, hardly needs any proof now; indeed the Commission have privately told us that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has admitted this. Zafrullah Khan told them privately that Pakistan had three brigades in Kashmir. If that is so the whole case which Zafrullah Khan built up before the Security Council collapses. Believing this, yet the Commission hesitate to say so officially or publicly. This is I suppose a product of the "League of Nations-mind" which according to you Noel-Baker possesses. It is this mind, I suppose, of ignoring realities and bypassing truth that led to the failure of the League of Nations.

I quite understand that Attlee is terribly overworked. I do not want to add to his burdens, nor do I want Krishna Menon to rush up to him frequently. I am grateful to Attlee for the facilities he had given to Krishna Menon to approach him whenever needed. That is enough for us. What I was a little afraid of in this particular matter was that Noel-Baker and the Dominions Offices might deal with it in a slow and formal way which would delay matters greatly.

I should very much like to be present in Bombay when the new cruiser arrives there. I shall certainly try to do so.

I am even more anxious than you that I should go to England next October. I know that, apart from other and weightier reasons, it will be good for me to get out of India and take a more distant view in perspective. I am indeed proceeding more or less on the basis of my having to go. Yet so many uncertainties face one that it is a little difficult to be sure of what will happen.

My visit to Madras turned out to be an astonishing success from every point of view. The popular reaction to it was stupendous. I saw a good deal of the Nyes<sup>3</sup> and the more I saw them the more I liked them. I am very glad he will be coming to Delhi later in the year.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mountbatten wrote that Noel-Baker had a question asked in the House of Commons to try to establish H.M.G.'s attitude towards gun-running by private aircraft between Hyderabad and Pakistan.

3. Sir Archibald, the Governor, and Lady Nye.



## 7. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 9, 1948

My dear Dickie,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th July which has reached me today.

As I have already written to you, there has been general appreciation in India of Attlee's speech in answer to Winston Churchill.

Thank you for sending me the programme of the dinner given to Krishna. I wish you could have sent me the speech delivered by Edwina, or some report of it. I am glad Krishna had this recognition of his services. You know how highly I think of him and of the work he has done. Unfortunately a few persons go on maligning him. This would not matter much but for the fact that Krishna is frightfully sensitive.

I have read the letter you have written to Rajaji about new Indian decorations. I confess this subject is a little beyond my understanding. I am prepared to agree to anything which does not definitely go counter to the Constituent Assembly resolution. But you know how strongly some of my colleagues feel about this matter. I shall have a talk with Rajaji and he will no doubt discuss it with others also.

I am enclosing three press cuttings. One is a statement we have issued in answer to an article attacking Lockhart and to some extent Bucher.<sup>2</sup> The other two are specimens of Pakistan writings.<sup>3</sup>

The U.N. Commission has not communicated with us since it went to Karachi, and I do not know how their mind is working. Meanwhile, information reaches us that, regardless of this Commission or any other matter, Pakistan armies are concentrating in ever larger numbers in Kashmir territory. There are supposed to be about two divisions there now. The idea is to make an all-out attack on all fronts but more specially on the Kashmir Valley itself. In fact a very considerable part of the Pakistan Army is functioning in Kashmir now, naturally with British officers conducting the operations.<sup>4</sup>

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The article alleged that a private letter to Rob Lockhart from George Cunningham warning of tribal infiltration into Kashmir had been deliberately withheld from the Indian Cabinet. The article held that it was only recently that the contents of the letter had been revealed by Roy Bucher to the U.N.C.I.P. The Government's press note stated that since the letter was a private one, Lockhart was not obliged to make official use of it. However, he had communicated the contents to the other Chiefs of Staff.

3. See *ante*, pp. 89-90.

4. It was reported that General Gracey had visited the Pakistan front in Kashmir. He had also defended the Pakistan use of army by stressing the refugee problem, the threat to Pakistan's security and the danger to her canal waters.



In spite of all this, the Pakistan Government continues to refuse to answer our straight queries. We put to them the news that had appeared in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore about Pakistan admitting to the U.N. Commission that they had a large body of regular troops in Kashmir since May last. We asked them to confirm this or deny it. Further we asked them that if this statement was true why we were not informed in May last that they had sent their troops. Our High Commissioner in Karachi called on Zafrullah Khan. Zafrullah Khan replied that this was a complicated matter and he would like the High Commissioner to write to him about it and he would also answer in writing. Thereupon our High Commissioner wrote to him. The answer that came stated that communications between the Pakistan Government and the U.N. Commission were secret and could not be divulged. Can you beat this for evasiveness? It is of course an admission and Pakistan newspapers now have adopted the line that if this is true, which they say they do not know, then Pakistan is justified in sending troops there. A week ago a series of articles came out in the Pakistan papers denouncing me for stating that Pakistan armies were fighting in Kashmir, which, they said, was an absolute falsehood.

Few persons, I suppose, want war between India and Pakistan, certainly I don't. But it is equally obvious that we can hardly carry on diplomatic relations or continue sending military stores to Pakistan after these disclosures. If there is a withdrawal of diplomatic representatives, there is bound to be a rapid deterioration in the situation.

Gracey, from various accounts, is playing a very important part in all these operations for Kashmir.

Hyderabad, it seems to be clear that the Nizam is not in a position to do anything at all against the will of the Ittehad and the Razakars. Because of his little spurt with Mirza Ismail, he has been sat upon heavily and he has submitted.<sup>5</sup> I enclose Mirza Ismail's statement. Two days ago there was another attack on a railway train by Razakars just across the border.

You are in Broadlands now and I do hope that you and Edwina are having a real holiday, though I rather doubt it,

I should like to be present in Paris for the opening of the U.N. Assembly. That means the 21st September. The Premiers' Conference will probably be held about the 11th October. I have to be back anyhow by 20th October or soon after. How I can manage to be away for all this time is not clear to me, in view of all the developments that are taking place here, try to ignore all this and still think in terms of visiting England.

5. In his statement on 9 August 1948, Mirza Ismail said his efforts to bring about a settlement between India and Hyderabad had been "nullified by the influence of extremist elements in Hyderabad, particularly by the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen members of the Council". He appealed to his compatriots to work for a peaceful solution to the problem.

The Constituent Assembly began here today and the next month is going to be a very heavy one.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 8. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 12, 1948

Nan dear,

I have just received your letter of the 2nd August.

I am sorry to be so vague about your programme and mine. But circumstances are so inchoate that it is extremely difficult to be definite. Here in India things are marching to a crisis with considerable rapidity. Wars and rumours of wars fill the air. Indeed there is something more than a rumour. Hyderabad, though slightly disintegrating from its side, is continually barking and wants to bite. In Kashmir, Pakistan is throwing almost all her strength openly and blatantly in order to break through our lines, in spite of the U.N. Commission's presence. Probably in the course of the next few days the U.N. Commission will be here and we may know what they propose to do. I rather doubt if they are in a position now to stop future developments leading to a big conflict. One possibility may make a difference and that is the U.K. Government withdrawing their officers from the Pakistan Army. This would be a blow to Pakistan. Probably it is the fear of this that is inducing them to go ahead with their adventure in Kashmir as rapidly as possible.

It is impossible to fix dates, but things are moving so rapidly that by the end of this month there may be a burst up.

This being the state of affairs here, it is not frightfully easy to fix programmes. Nevertheless, I still intend going to Paris, if this is at all possible. I may even go just before the Assembly meets, stay for a few days and come back to India. And then later in October go to London for the Premiers' conference.

If I cannot go, I might ask you to come here for consultation. I shall have to decide in the last week of August finally.

I quite realise that very difficult questions are going to be considered at the U.N. Assembly meeting. Hence I desire to go. I think in any event I shall send Bajpai.

1. J.N. Collection.



I am enclosing a folder giving some of the new Gandhi stamps.

The Mountbattens have been of great help to us during the last few weeks in London. They have made a difference in the British Government's attitude and policy. They are bitterly hated in Pakistan now and *Dawn* writes the most virulent articles about them. Every 10 days or so Edwina telephones to me from London and thereby wastes a lot of money.

We had a party here in our new house this evening to meet the members of the Constituent Assembly. A large crowd assembled. The house has plenty of space both indoors and outdoors for a party.

Yours,  
Jawahar

## 9. Issues and Prospects<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: It does not correspond with our mentality to wage wars. We had the British here for 150 years and fought for our independence by peaceful means, and not by arms. Now that we have achieved our goal, we find we must fight against people who for so many years have lived here with us. We have always been for a united India, but when we saw no other solution than partition we accepted it. It should be so natural to have with Pakistan the closest possible cooperation. We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. If it will be in four, five, ten years, I do not know.

The background of the partition is economic. We Indians have always advocated political freedom and social progress. First, we had to get rid of British domination and now we must try to achieve economic prosperity and social progress. Some people have been against this policy. But as nobody can possibly stand up publicly against the independence of a nation and against the prosperity of the broad masses, these people had to find other arguments to preserve their privileged position. So they used religion.

In reality, it is not at all a dispute between religions. We give to all people full religious freedom. Besides, it is impossible to divide the country according to a religion. Even now there are still some forty-two million Muslims in India. It is, then, a struggle between freedom and progress and a group of wealthy men. Jinnah abandoned us, the National Congress,

1. Record of discussions between Nehru and Josef Korbel held presumably on 12 August 1948. *Danger in Kashmir* by Josef Korbel, (New Jersey, 1959), pp. 127-130. Extracts.



thirty years ago and founded the League—not to defend Islam, as he asserts, but to defend privileged materialistic rights. It has nothing to do with religion; he himself is not a religious man. But there was no other solution to this problem in our struggle for independence, so we agreed to the establishment of Pakistan.

Pakistan, however, is developing today as an Islamic, feudal state. It is backward, reactionary, economically weak, administratively disrupted. The army is led by British officers. If they left there would be no Pakistani Army. We have some few British officers, too, but step by step all functions are being taken over by our own people.

This, then, is the background of our differences with Pakistan, and it applies also to Kashmir. It would never have occurred to us to send an army to Kashmir had she not been invaded by tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, and exposed to the danger of wholesale pillage and murder. And other parts of our country were in danger too; the tribesmen advanced, shouting that they were on their way to Delhi.

Now the question is to find a solution. We have been greatly disturbed by the policy of the Security Council which accepted the allegations of the Pakistan delegation, though we proved the complicity of Pakistan in the invasion of Kashmir. You talk about a ceasefire. But Pakistan does not admit having her own army in Kashmir. It means that a ceasefire would apply only to us. We must insist upon the withdrawal of the Pakistani army and then we would be willing to negotiate. It must be publicly declared that her army has withdrawn from Kashmir, with the condemnation of Pakistan thus implied. As things now stand, the presence of her army in Kashmir is not publicly known, and we, instead of Pakistan, are thought of as the aggressors.

We do not insist upon the right of our army to advance and occupy the territory which would be evacuated by Pakistan. On the other hand there must not be a vacuum there and we shall be satisfied with the recognition of the authority of the State over all its territories and with the occupation of advanced positions important to us strategically and economically.

Josef Korbel: The Prime Minister's original intent would be carried out only if the Indian Army also withdrew from Kashmir.


JN: We would withdraw as the situation permitted; the campaign costs us money and people. But we must insist on having our army stationed at strategically important posts.

And Pakistan must be condemned. I do not require any solemn, formal verdict, but a clear declaration about the Pakistani Army's presence in Kashmir and its withdrawal.

JK: I suggest that a peaceful solution of the problem depends very much upon the goodwill of both parties. The Commission's possibilities are limited. We do not overestimate our powers. The success of our



WITH A MEMBER OF THE KASHMIR COMMISSION, NEW DELHI, JULY 1948



WITH C. RAJAGOPALACHARI, NEW DELHI, 12 AUGUST 1948



mission is in your hands; we depend upon your goodwill. If we find a solution it will be to the benefit of the whole world, of United Nations, and above all, of India and Pakistan. You have just stressed the distaste with which you have taken up arms and your desire to end the conflict. Could you not use the presence of the Commission to seek, together with us, a solution? Can you indicate what final solution you would have in mind if we succeed in arranging a ceasefire?

JN: I have already indicated the solution and I am going to add : We ourselves asked for a plebiscite. We wish the nation of Kashmir to decide for itself. We did it spontaneously and not because of Pakistan. But now for almost ten months there has been a war going on in Kashmir. The country is devastated, the administration disrupted, the situation different from what it was. The preparation for a plebiscite would of course require the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces and then a prolonged period of adjustment preceding the elections, including such necessities as the return of refugees, their settlement and the like. It means that the plebiscite could not take place before one year after the cessation of hostilities.

JK: I appeal to your inspiring leadership and suggest that India may be in a position to make a gesture of concession to Pakistan.

JN: You seem not to understand our position and our rights. We are a secular state which is not based on religion. We give to everyone freedom of conscience. Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should never have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind this foolish idea of Jinnah....

## 10. Discussions on Ceasefire Resolution<sup>1</sup>

Before the Resolution on the ceasefire<sup>2</sup> was handed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Korbel stated that while drafting the Resolution, the Commission gave

1. New Delhi, 14 August 1948. Record of discussions between Nehru, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Indian officials and the members of the UN Commission. Kashmir Papers, Ministry of External Affairs.
2. On 13 August 1948, the Commission adopted a resolution which provided for a ceasefire, a truce agreement and consultations for a plebiscite after the truce agreement was made. The Commission recognised that Pakistan had violated international law by sending troops into Kashmir and was also guilty of not informing the U.N. about the material change in the situation introduced by this action.

very careful consideration to all the observations made by the representatives of the respective Governments. The Commission, said Mr. Korbel, carefully weighed every word or phrase before approving its final formulation so that the Resolution is the result of a most meticulous consideration of the problem. The Commission hoped that the Resolution would be acceptable to both Governments and that it would bring the desired cessation of hostilities.

Mr. Korbel asked the Prime Minister to give his Government's reply to the Resolution at the earliest convenience. He realized that the Resolution required an equally careful consideration on the part of the Indian Government as it did on the part of the Commission. He did not wish to press for speed, but mentioned that prompt answer would be gratefully appreciated.

The Prime Minister skimmed the Resolution and handed it over to Mr. Ayyangar and subsequently to Sir Girja. He assured the Commission that he would give the Government's answer as soon as possible, but considering the pressure of work and the forthcoming celebrations for the Independence Day, he could not state a definite date. The Resolution appeared to the Prime Minister the result of very careful wording and would have to be read with due care on the part of the Government. Mr. Ayyangar shared the Prime Minister's opinion and said that he would refrain from any comments *impromptu*, but would like to give due consideration to such an important document.

## 11. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

14 August 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

This evening some members of the U.N. Kashmir Commission called on me and presented a copy of a Resolution they had passed yesterday in

1. J.N. Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Baldev Singh and Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

Karachi. We did not discuss this Resolution at all. I told them that we shall have to consider it very carefully before we could say anything about it. We may require further elucidation.

I am enclosing a copy of this Resolution. You will notice that it raises very important and vital issues and we shall have to give it the most careful consideration. It will have to be considered by the Cabinet. But, before we take it there, a few of us might meet together to discuss it. I am arranging a small meeting for this purpose in my room at the Council House on Monday morning at 12. To this meeting I am inviting Sardar Patel, Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, the Secretary General, Mr. V.P. Menon and Mr. Vellodi. I suggest that for the present no others need be brought into this consultation. I trust you will keep this Resolution completely secret till then.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 12. Further Discussions on the Ceasefire Resolution<sup>1</sup>

Nehru opened the discussion by stating that the Government of India had very carefully examined the Resolution presented by the Commission and that it had requested this meeting with the representatives of the Commission in order to clarify certain provisions of the Resolution. He commented that the Government of India was sincerely anxious to effect a peaceful settlement of its dispute with the Government of Pakistan over Kashmir. It was important, however, that various steps towards such a solution be

1. New Delhi, 17 August 1948. Those present were Nehru, Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, and India officials and member of the U.N. Commission. Kashmir Papers, Ministry of External Affairs.



examined carefully, inasmuch as the taking of an initial step, which was not a solid one, might cause a further deterioration of the situation rather than contribute to its solutions.

Turning to the Resolution itself, Nehru said that he intended to comment only on the major points. Under Part I he enquired with reference to paragraph A<sup>2</sup> at what point the four days mentioned therein began. In reply, Ambassador Korbel (Czechoslovakia) explained that it was the intent of this paragraph to provide that agreement as to the date when the ceasefire would begin would be determined within four days after acceptance of the proposals by both Governments, and that the four-day period began immediately upon such acceptance.

Turning to paragraph C<sup>3</sup>, Nehru enquired as to the exact meaning of "local changes in present dispositions". In reply, Mr. Korbel explained that these were changes which the commands of both side would agree and were essential to facilitating a ceasefire. The two commands, he said, would agree on such changes, the ceasefire would then be issued, and then the changes would be carried out. He emphasized that changes would be effective only if agreed upon by the two commands and that if no agreement were reached, the forces would stand on their present lines. Nehru then enquired if the truce line would be the same as the ceasefire line, to which Mr. Korbel replied in the affirmative. The Prime Minister then remarked that, before an effective truce could be arranged, it would be necessary that a fairly precise line be worked out. He explained that there were several pockets in which at present there were no military forces. Some of these, he stated, Indian forces could occupy at will, but at present they were unoccupied. In such case, he enquired, what would the line be and who is to determine the line? Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had endeavoured to avoid going into military details and had endeavoured to limit itself to matters of political importance. At this point, Mr. Graeffe (Belgium) explained that it was the Commission's intent that the ceasefire line would be along the lines occupied by the respective forces and that any no-man's land which existed would remain.

The Prime Minister digressed at this point to comment on the possible legal implications of accepting a ceasefire along present lines. He wonder-

2. A ceasefire was planned to be effective within four days after the acceptance of the Resolution by the two Governments.
3. Paragraph C read that the two High Commands were required to confer regarding any changes in local disposition of the troops. The Commission would appoint military observers who would supervise the observance of the ceasefire.

ed if a certain legality would not be accorded to the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir by an acceptance of the proposition that the ceasefire be effective along the present lines. India, he said, maintains that it is legally in Kashmir, and though this may be contested by Pakistan, one thing is certain, and that is that the territory does not belong to Pakistan, and therefore that her troops are illegally in that State. In reply, Mr. J. Korbel said that the document had to be considered as an entity and that Part II with its provision of the withdrawal of Pakistan troops should be considered along with Part I. He doubted that the Government of India was thereby in any way recognizing the legality of the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir. The Prime Minister observed that even so, it accorded a validity to the presence of those troops from the point of view of a truce, that is, from a military sense.

Returning to the idea that certain pockets would exist if present line were accepted, the Prime Minister recalled that the representatives of India had at an early meeting of the Commission in Delhi suggested a precise line along which a ceasefire should be effected. He believed that in the absence of such a definition, it could be anticipated that events would take place in these pocket areas which would be denied and that much difficulty would be created thereby.

A second consideration which bothered the Government of India with reference to the fixing of a ceasefire line along the present lines was that these lines ran very near to the Pakistan frontier and that in a short time varying from one-half to two hours, the tribesmen or the Pakistan Army itself could overrun the positions held by garrisons left by the Indian Army, and that a situation might be created worse than that of last October. He contended that India needed to have certain strategic points for defence against sudden attack. Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had been quite aware of this danger, but that it had tried to strike a military balance. The Commission, he said, felt that if the two Governments could be brought together this danger of a sudden incursion would be removed. Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would remain and that on the other side only the "Azad" people would remain in their present positions. Should the eventuality envisaged by the Prime Minister occur, the whole weight of the United Nations would be turned against Pakistan?

While agreeing that this might be so the Prime Minister remarked that, should such an incursion take place, it would take another eight months to rectify the situation. He further remarked that he did not believe Pakistan could consider itself threatened by the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir. If the Government of India were of evil intent, he said, its forces would attack Pakistan directly and not via Kashmir and Gilgit. On the other hand, he thought Kashmir was directly threatened by the presence of Pakistan troops in that State. He concluded his comments on this subject by



stating that in order to ensure the security of Kashmir, there must be no possibility of a sudden incursion such as had previously occurred.

In replying, Mr. Korbelt stated that the Commission fully recognized the concern of the Government of India for security, but commented that in all frankness he had to tell the Prime Minister that the Pakistan Government was equally fearful of invasion by the Indian forces. The Commission, he said, could not assure either country on this question of security. The present document, he said, was a first step in this direction. If the Commission could succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, it would have the obligation while present on the sub-continent of watching over Pakistan. Once the Kashmir problem had been satisfactorily settled, it would then be the duty and right of the Government of India, should the State finally be placed under the sovereignty of that country to take all necessary measures for the security of that area.

The Prime Minister reiterated his fears of possible infiltration with or without the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan and mentioned the strategic points previously enumerated to the Commission which the Government of India considered that its forces must hold in order to ensure the security of Kashmir. In particular, he mentioned Domel, remarking that, if the Government of India forces held that point, a natural boundary between the two would be established along the line of the river, and that Pakistan would, in no sense, be threatened through the occupation of this point by the forces of the Government of India inasmuch as Pakistan was from 22 to 26 miles away.

Mr. Korbelt commented that such a readjustment of the front line went beyond the ceasefire and said frankly that the Commission, after giving careful consideration to the Indian point of view in this respect, had not been able to accept this view. However, such a readjustment should not be ruled out, if the respective Commanders-in-Chief agreed to make such a change. He emphasized again that the success of the Resolution depended on the existence of goodwill between the parties, to which the Prime Minister replied that the Commission had here to deal with a hysterical and neurotic state of mind.

At this point, the representative of the United States remarked that the Commission had come here with an open mind and that after being out here for a short time had become confirmed in its belief that it could not impose any conditions on the parties. The Commission was simply an intermediary and as such it had endeavoured to ascertain the feelings of the two parties. The Commission has concluded, he said, that both parties genuinely wanted an agreement. The Commission had been careful to avoid *dicta* and in some quarters had been criticized for not taking a stronger position. The Commission, he said, had given consideration to the military considerations involved. The present draft was a compromise, but the Commission



believed that its acceptance by the two parties would provide a basis for a common discussion. The Commission, moreover, had reason to believe that if the Resolution was agreed to, incursions such as were feared by the Government of India would not happen. The Resolution, he said, was so worded as to avoid sudden or abrupt changes in the military situation which would leave a possibility for attack.

Mr. Huddle (United States) then referred to a recent article in the *London Times* which, with reference to the destruction of a waterworks in Jerusalem, had criticized the Security Council for assuming unto itself certain powers—in this case the giving of guaranty to either side—which it did not possess. The United Nations, Mr. Huddle concluded, had no power to back up guarantees of this sort and consequently the Commission in the present instance was working entirely on a basis of securing agreement between the parties. The Commission, he felt, believed that it had “down to earth” proposals and that it was not dealing in theory. The representative of Belgium corroborated this view, saying that he believed that in this Resolution the parties had a basis on which the edifice of a final solution could be built.

Turning to Part II<sup>4</sup>, Nehru enquired whether the principles elaborated therein were considered to be final, or whether they might be subject to change on the basis of the comments which either party wished to advance. In reply, Mr. Korbel explained that the Commission was glad to provide any explanations of the text, but that as worded the preamble meant that the Commission wished both parties to accept Part II in principle, following which the details could be worked out. The Commission, he said, had hoped four weeks ago that an unconditional ceasefire could be worked out, but that in response to the Government of India's request, the Commission had drafted proposals coupling the ceasefire with certain conditions. The conditions finally proposed were such as the Commission thought just and which could be defended before the Security Council.

The Prime Minister enquired again if the principles as elaborated represented the Commission's final decision; or whether it was open to the Government of India to put forward ideas for changes. In reply, Mr. Korbel stated that, in the Commission's opinion, a possibility for discussion should be excluded, but that the draft was not open to change as a result of bilateral discussions.

4. Part II enumerated the principles of a truce agreement under three distinct heads. Here the Commission noted its opinion about Pakistan's violation of international law: “As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State”.

Remarking that this answer limited the scope of discussions very greatly the Prime Minister proceeded to comment on various other proposals under Part II, feeling that the Commission might like to have the Government of India's views thereon. The formulation of paragraph A-I, he said, constitutes "rather a feeble and complicated way of saying something very simple." On this same point, Mr. Ayyangar said that the Government of India readily accepted the principle that Pakistan troops should be withdrawn, but that it was not in accordance with the reasons given in support of this principle. Mr. Korbél then pointed out that the Prime Minister himself said that the Government of India was not concerned with humiliating Pakistan, but wished to effect the withdrawal of Pakistan troops. Point A-I, he said, secures this result. The Commission, he said, did not wish to concern itself with the juridical questions<sup>5</sup> involved but on this point had followed the line adopted in the Security Council resolution of 21 April.<sup>6</sup>

Turning next to Point 3 under Section A, the Prime Minister enquired if this wording envisaged any change in the status of the territory, or whether it recognized the jurisdiction of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over that territory. Mr. Korbél remarked that this point incorporated the suggestion which the Prime Minister himself had advanced and that the phrase "pending a final solution" was intended to recognize the temporary nature of the administration by local authorities. Sovereignty over this territory has not been changed.

Asked by the Prime Minister if the Commission would function as a representative of the State authorities, Mr. Korbél replied that he did not know if the Commission were competent to do this. The Prime Minister appeared to accept this interpretation and commented that in practice the Kashmir authorities would not interfere with the administration of the area. He pointed out, however, that no local administration at present existed and would have to be created. The area, he said, was presently occupied by people one hundred per cent sympathetic to Pakistan as a result of non-Muslims having been driven out or killed. He wondered how it would be possible for the Commission to distinguish raiders from the local population. To this Mr. Korbél remarked that the Commission was aware of its inability to control fully the administration of the evacuated territory and, therefore, intentionally used the expression "surveillance".<sup>7</sup>

5. The Commission was bound to follow the Security Council directive embodied in its resolution of 21 April, which proscribed any pronouncement of judgment concerning guilt or the juridical validity of accession.
6. By a resolution on 21 April 1948, the Security Council recommended some conditions for a ceasefire and a plebiscite, besides providing for a commission of five members to proceed to the Indian sub-continent to place its good offices at the disposal of the two Governments with a view to restoring peace.
7. The Commission formally wrote also on 25 August to Nehru endorsing his interpretation and adding that the local people of the evacuated territory would have freedom of legitimate political activity.



Turning next to Section B, the Prime Minister felt that it was faulty in requiring the simultaneous withdrawal of the two armies inasmuch as the Pakistan Army was there illegally. In reply, Mr. Korbel explained that, as drafted, this provision provided not for the simultaneous withdrawal of the two armies, but rather that the Indian forces would begin withdrawal after being advised by the Commission that Pakistan forces had begun withdrawal. This requirement that Indian troops begin their withdrawal before Pakistan forces had completed their withdrawal from the State, he said, was arrived at to meet Pakistan fears of an attack by Indian forces and to make it easier for Pakistan to accept the withdrawal of their troops. Mr. Huddle reiterated that the Commission had not wished to impose any abrupt changes under which the security of either party would be threatened. He believed acceptance of this provision would provide an evidence of the good faith of the two parties.

With reference to Point 2 under Section B,<sup>8</sup> Nehru remarked that it would be necessary for India to retain troops in Kashmir for defensive purposes as well as for the maintenance of law and order. He recalled that this same issue had been raised in the Security Council and that the Government of India must have sufficient troops to protect the territory against external attack. Mr. Korbel commented that in his understanding the phrase "law and order" could be interpreted to include maintenance of adequate defence inasmuch as this was essential to law and order.

Commenting on Point 3<sup>9</sup>, the Prime Minister criticized what he considered the unilateral nature of the request made therein on the Government of India and the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He wondered whether a similar proclamation should not be required of the Government of Pakistan with reference to territory evacuated by Pakistan troops. In reply, Mr. Korbel commented first that he did not think this provision demanded the guarantee of any new rights, and with respect to the Prime Minister's remark, said that he thought the Government of India would have severely criticized the Commission had it asked Pakistan to assume any responsibility with reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

8. The crucial provisions regarding Indian obligations contained in Section B of Part II of the resolution were carefully worded: the Government of India was to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces after (1) the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals had withdrawn, terminating the situation referred to in the Indian complaint to the U.N. and (2) the Pakistani forces were being withdrawn, pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would maintain, within the ceasefire line, the minimum forces "which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order". The Commission would have observers stationed wherever necessary.
9. Another specific obligation of India was to ensure that "the Government of Kashmir take measures to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed".



In response to the Prime Minister's enquiry as to how long the truce would last, Mr. Korbelt replied that it was intended to be effective until a final solution had been reached, but thought that this was a point which could be discussed by the two parties.

Turning finally to Part III<sup>10</sup>, the Prime Minister enquired if the Commission had any ideas as to the general lines which a final solution might take. To this, Mr. Korbelt replied that the Commission had no right to submit a solution to which the parties were not agreed. He said that the Commission believed it possible that a solution different from that envisaged in the Security Council resolution might be worked out and that the Commission would be quite willing to help in this respect. However, if no agreement could be reached, the Commission, he believed, would have to fall back on its instruction from the Security Council.

Thanking the Commission members for their explanations of the resolution, the Prime Minister stated that he expected to be able on the following day to inform the Commission as to the day on which it could expect a final answer from the Government of India. Before such an answer could be arrived at, he said, it will be necessary to consult the Cabinet, as well as the representatives of the Government of Kashmir. Mr. Korbelt thanked the Prime Minister for the opportunity to discuss the Resolution with him and appealed to him to give careful consideration to the Resolution before the answer is decided. He reminded him of the value of peace if the answer is positive and the grave dangers in case of a negative answer.

10. Part III of the resolution dealt with the plebiscite and asked for an affirmation by the two governments that the future status of the State would be determined in accordance with the will of the people and provided that, upon acceptance of the Resolution, both Governments would enter into consultations with the Commission to determine conditions for a fair and equitable plebiscite.

### 13. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

In the letter that I sent you with Mrs. Handoo last Monday, I enclosed a copy of the ceasefire proposals of the United Nations Commission which were given to me on the 14th. We have discussed these with the Commission and also considered them in Cabinet. Although we explained to the Commission the grave difficulties which some of the proposals presented to us, the Commission have made it clear that it is not possible for them to amend the terms of the resolution. They plead that, after giving the fullest

1. New Delhi, 18 August 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A. Extracts.

possible consideration to our point of view and Pakistan's, they have evolved formulæ which, in their judgment, are realistic and just to both sides. We have taken no final decision yet. As soon as we do, we shall telegraph to you. Meanwhile, I think it important that you should have a clear appreciation of our position in the context of events since State of Jammu and Kashmir was first invaded by tribesmen last October.

2. As the map shows, whole of western and south-western part of State is within easy reach of Frontier Province and West Punjab. There are excellent roads for rapid movement of troops and materials from Pakistan side to frontiers of Kashmir for military operations against State. Tribal irregulars, over which Pakistan has consistently asserted that it has no control, can in future, as in past, move quickly into Kashmir. Pakistan's organised forces which, in contravention of Pakistan's pledge to Security Council to do nothing which would aggravate situation, have been thrown into the conflict in large numbers, even without our being informed, can similarly stage a fresh aggression against Kashmir. Insurance against such recurrence of aggression, whether by tribal irregulars or Pakistan forces or both, is not only a legal obligation imposed on us by Kashmir's accession but a practical necessity. We simply cannot, in the light of recent experience and, in particular, Pakistan's neurotic mood and hostile actions against us, afford to leave Kashmir unprotected. From this viewpoint, and against this background, the following proposals of the Commission are particularly objectionable to us....

#### Part II - B.1

.... We are to begin to withdraw the bulk of our forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission as soon as the Commission notifies us that Pakistan forces are being withdrawn. Although Commission have explained that our withdrawal is to begin only when withdrawal of Pakistan forces is well underway and that the minimum strength of the forces that we are to maintain under B 2 to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order will include the necessary element for the defence of the State, militarily it will be impossible for the "minimum", left over after the withdrawal of forces, our to ensure the security of the State....

4. I need not trouble you with other objections to the resolution, whether verbal or of substance, but of secondary importance. For the sake of accelerating a peaceful solution no less than for the purpose of avoiding the odium of rejecting the ceasefire proposals, we propose to concentrate only on two conditions :

(a) that we must be allowed to retain in the State enough forces to ensure its security against fresh aggression, and

(b) that, in the area which may be administered under the surveillance of the Commission, the administration is not so organised and conducted



as to disrupt, in advance of a final settlement, the integrity of the State. This afternoon I propose to explain this to Korbél who is acting as Chairman of the part of the Commission now in New Delhi. Later, I hope to telegraph his reactions to our point of view.

5. When you see Attlee, I should like you to explain our position fully and to emphasise that we have gone to maximum limit consistent with the security of Kashmir to meet the Commission.

#### 14. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Reference my telegram No. Primin 1511 of today's date.<sup>2</sup> U.N. Commission's proposals regarding ceasefire do not in any way diminish either urgency or importance of request that we have asked you to press on Attlee for withdrawal of British officers serving in Pakistan forces. They are animated by spirit of deep-rooted hostility to us and, so long as they continue in Pakistan service, there will be no peace between the two Dominions. I hope that, at your next interview with Attlee, you will broach this matter again and push our request with utmost vigour.

1. New Delhi, 18 August 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.
2. See preceding item.

#### 15. Josef Korbél's Discussions with Nehru<sup>1</sup>

I had once asked Mr. Nehru if he would consider again the idea of an unconditional ceasefire order, and he had replied: "How can you ask for something like that? It means that you are putting us on the same platform with the other side—the intruder and the aggressor. It is your duty, as a Commissioner, to condemn Pakistan for having an army on our soil. You should compel them to withdraw. Otherwise, it would be as though a thief had broken into my house, and you would then tell him to stay and not to move out until some further measure had been taken. You treat the thief and the owner of the house as equals. First, the thief must get out, and then we can discuss further steps".

1. 18 August 1948. *Danger in Kashmir* by Josef Korbél (New Jersey) 1954, p. 134.



16. To Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th August, 1948

Excellency,

You will recall that in our interview with the Commission on the 17th August, I dealt at some length with the position of the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the Jammu and Kashmir State in the north. The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars or Pakistan troops. The Commission's Resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration of defence in this large area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us. The only exception that we should be prepared to accept would be Gilgit. We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Jawaharlal Nehru  
Prime Minister, India

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L., also published in the *National Herald* on 25 September.
2. In his reply of 25 August Korbel stated: "The Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the peculiar conditions of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in its Resolution of 13 August 1948. It believes, however, that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the Resolution."

17. To Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20 August 1948

Excellency,

On the 17th of August, my colleague, the Minister without Portfolio, and I discussed with you and your colleagues of the Commission now, in Delhi,

1. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.

the Resolution which you had presented to us on the 14th instant. On the 18th, I had another discussion with you, in the course of which I tried to explain to you the doubts and difficulties which members of my Government, and representatives of the Government of Kashmir whom we consulted, had felt as the result of a preliminary but careful examination of the Commission's proposals.

2. During the several conferences that we had with the Commission when it first came to Delhi, we placed before it what we considered the basic fact of the situation which had led to the conflict in Kashmir. This fact was the unwarranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan Government on Indian Dominion territory in Kashmir. The Pakistan Government denied this although it was common knowledge. In recent months, very large forces of the Pakistan regular army have further entered Indian Union territory in Kashmir and opposed the Indian Army which was sent there for the defence of the State. This, we understand now, is admitted by the Pakistan Government, and yet there has been at no time any intimation to the Government of India by the Pakistan Government of this invasion. Indeed, there has been a continual denial and the Pakistan Government have evaded answering repeated enquiries from the Government of India.

In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations adopted on the 17th January, 1948, the Pakistan Government should have informed the Council immediately of any material change in the situation while the matter continued to be under the consideration of the Council. The invasion of the State by large forces of the regular Pakistan Army was a very material change in the situation, and yet no information of this was given, so far as we know, to the Security Council.

The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Government is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international law and usage, but has also created a very grave situation. It is only the earnest desire of my Government to avoid any extension of the field of conflict and to restore peace that has led us to refrain from taking any action to meet the new situation that was created by this further intrusion of Pakistan armies into Jammu and Kashmir State. The presence of the Commission in India has naturally led us to hope that any arrangement sponsored by it would deal effectively with the present situation and prevent any recurrence of aggression.

3. Since our meeting of the 18th August, we have given the Commission's Resolution our most earnest thought. There are many parts of it, which we should have preferred to be otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental facts of the situation, especially the flagrant aggression of the Pakistan Government on Indian Union territory. We recognise, however, that, if a successful effort is to be made to create satisfactory con-



ditions for a solution of the Kashmir problem without further bloodshed, we should concentrate on certain essentials only at present and seek safeguards in regard to them. It was in this spirit that I placed the following considerations before your Excellency :

(1) That paragraph A3 of Part II of the Resolution<sup>2</sup> should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as

- (a) to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops,
- (b) to afford any recognition of the so-called "Azad Kashmir Government", or
- (c) to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State.

(2) That from our point of view the effective insurance of the security of the State against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no less important than the observance of internal law and order, and that, therefore, the withdrawal of Indian troops and the strength of Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be conditioned by this overriding factor. Thus at any time the strength of the Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be sufficient to ensure security against any form of external aggression as well as internal disorder.

(3) That as regards Part III,<sup>3</sup> should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the State by means of a plebiscite, Pakistan should have no part in the organisation and conduct of the plebiscite, or in any other matter of internal administration in the State.

4. If I understood you correctly, A.3 of Part II of the Resolution does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions to which we have objected in paragraph 3(1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that the Commission was not competent to recognise the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.

As regards paragraph 3 (2), the paramount need for security is recognised by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.

- 2. Paragraph A 3 of Part II of the Resolution stated that "pending a final resolution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission."
- 3. Part III of the Resolution called upon the two Governments to reaffirm their wish that "the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people" and that both governments would ensure "fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expressions will be assured".



Finally, you agreed that Part III, as formulated, does not in any way recognise the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite.

5. In view of this clarification, my Government, animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace, and thus to uphold the principles and prestige of the United Nations, have decided to accept the Resolution.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Jawaharlal Nehru  
Prime Minister, India

### 18. Cable to Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

Your Excellency handed us Commission's ceasefire proposals on 14th August. Simultaneously, they were presented to Sir Zafrullah Khan in Karachi. Our reply was communicated to your Excellency on 20th August and Commission's reply<sup>2</sup> to our letter of 20th reached us on 25th. Our reply was in Your Excellency's hands in less than week after receipt by us of Commission's proposals. Pakistan has now had more than fortnight to consider proposals. Your Excellency will realise imperative need of decisions of both Governments being made available to public without further delay. Our Parliament, which is due to adjourn on 4th September, is naturally getting impatient to know what has happened, and same is true of Indian public opinion. I shall, therefore, be most grateful if Your Excellency will do everything possible to obtain Pakistan's reply to proposals without further delay.

Please accept assurance of my highest consideration.<sup>3</sup>

1. New Delhi, 30 August 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.
2. In a letter, dated 25 August, the Commission expressed "its sincere satisfaction that the Government of India has accepted the Resolution", and expressed appreciation of the spirit in which this decision had been taken. On the other hand, the Commission "observes with regret that the Government of Pakistan has been unable to accept the Resolution without attaching certain conditions beyond the compass of the Resolution, thereby making impossible an immediate ceasefire and the beginning of fruitful negotiations to bring about a peaceful and final settlement of the situation on the state of Jammu and Kashmir".
3. Pakistan, though not rejecting it, did not accept the Resolution in effect, as the Commission did not agree to its contentions about the "Azad Kashmir" government, and about the withdrawal of tribesmen only after they were satisfied that the Muslims in the State were safe.

## 19. Cable to Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

I am grateful for Your Excellency's message of the 31st August conveyed through our High Commissioner<sup>2</sup>. Earlier during present session of our Parliament, I promised to make full statement on Kashmir. Parliament is due to adjourn on 4th September. It would be both inconsistent with my assurance and discourteous to the House not to apprise them of the nature and outcome of our negotiations with the Commission before Parliament adjourns. I propose, therefore, to inform them on the 4th of the Commission's proposals for a ceasefire, our reply to those proposals dated the 20th August and Your Excellency's reply to me dated the 25th. Of course, if Pakistan Government's reply is communicated to Your Excellency before the 4th, we shall have no objection to immediate simultaneous publication by you of your own proposals and relevant correspondence between Commission and Pakistan Government on the one hand, and between Commission and ourselves on the other. I wish again to emphasise that Pakistan has already had two and a half weeks for the consideration of Commission's proposals and, considering the promptness with which we communicated our reply to Your Excellency. Pakistan's, if I may say so, is overdue.<sup>3</sup>

1. New Delhi, 1 September 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.
2. The Commission requested the Government of India to delay informing Parliament of its Resolution and India's reply upto 7 September by which time the final reply from Pakistan was expected.
3. Pakistan was attempting to complicate the situation by practically insisting on recognition of the "Azad Kashmir" Government, e.g. intimating to the Commission that ceasefire by "Azad Kashmir" troops could be enforced by "Azad Kashmir" government alone.

## 20. Cable to Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

In deference to Your Excellency's wishes and wishes of Commission as conveyed to me by our High Commissioner and M. Greaffe, whom I met this afternoon, we have decided not to communicate to our Parliament tomorrow the 4th,<sup>2</sup> the Commission's proposals for a ceasefire and the

1. New Delhi, 3 September 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.
2. The statement was however made on 7 September 1948. See next item.



resulting correspondence between Your Excellency and me. It has always been my earnest desire to be as helpful as possible to the Commission.

I understand from M. de Graeffe that, if the Commission itself is not in a position to publish the ceasefire proposals and the result of its negotiations with India and Pakistan by Tuesday, the 7th September, we should be at liberty to release those proposals and our correspondence on that date. I propose to do so irrespective of whether or not a reply has been received by the Commission from Pakistan. If, on or before that date, you should have received Pakistan's reply and should be publishing on behalf of the Commission your proposals and the result of your negotiations with the two Governments, I shall be grateful if you will let me know.

I greatly appreciate the Commission's courtesy in sending His Excellency M. de Graeffe to discuss this matter with me personally.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

## 21. Right Action in Kashmir<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, I crave your leave to place certain papers on the table of the House and to make a statement thereon. These papers relate to the United Nations Commission on Kashmir which has been in India and partly in Pakistan for about two months or more now. Honourable members of the House must have read in this morning's papers some correspondence which has passed between this Commission and the Government of India; a resolution passed by the Commission some three weeks ago; the Government of India's reply thereto and some indication of Pakistan's reply. The full set of papers has not been published in the press yet, and we have only received them, in fact, this morning by special courier from Karachi. No doubt, these papers will be published in the newspapers. Meanwhile, I shall place on the table of the House some part of these papers and the rest I hope to place there in the course of the day, as soon as they are typed. Now, the House knows that this Commission has been here for the last nearly two months or more and the House will have seen from this published correspondence what their Resolution was and our response to it. In effect they will have seen that we accepted

1. 7 September 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VII, Pt. II, 1948, pp. 1125-1130.



certain conditions for a truce and ceasefire.<sup>2</sup> In effect, Pakistan has rejected them. Now I do not wish at this stage to say very much more about the matter, partly because I should like to go through those papers much more carefully than I have had time to do this morning since they came, partly because the Commission is considering what further steps they may or may not take, and it will not be perhaps quite proper for me to say anything which might embarrass the Commission.

As the House perhaps knows, it was the desire of the Commission that we postpone publication of papers and any statements in this House till today. We have been anxious right from the beginning of these consultations with the Commission to take this House and the country into our confidence because we wished to take no steps in such a vital and important matter without the full knowledge and consent of this House, but inevitably in the circumstances, it became difficult for us, much as we wanted to do so, to make statements in the House when the Commission was engaged in these delicate negotiations, and so at their request we had to postpone this from time to time. Ultimately they issued their statement yesterday at 4 p.m. in Karachi. Now, although I do not wish to say much on this subject, there are certain facts to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. The facts themselves are very well known not only in this House but all over the country. Nevertheless sometimes known and established facts are denied, and it does make a difference when those facts are admitted.

The present story and tragedy of Kashmir began over ten months ago. Late in October of last year there was an invasion of Kashmir by people coming across or from Pakistan territory, and the Government of India were faced with a very difficult problem calling for a decision as difficult as any Government has to make, and we had to make that decision within a few hours. We made that decision and since then we have followed that decision. It became clear to us then and that fact has become abundantly clear to all the world that wants to know it, that this invasion was not only encouraged and patronized by the Pakistan Government, but actively supported. Later, it became clear that apart from supporting others, there was active participation of the Pakistan Army in it. Now throughout these ten months the Pakistan Government have denied that fact, they denied it, aggressively, loudly and persistently. We stated it before the Security Council of the United Nations. In fact, we went to the Security Council with a very simple plea that the peace of Kashmir has been disturbed by these raiders coming across the Pakistan territory and we placed our case

2. India accepted the Resolution after being assured by the Commission that it recognised the sovereignty of the State Government over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, and the right of India to defend the State from external aggression. It did not recognise the right of Pakistan to have any say in the affairs of the State.

as low as possible, although we could have placed it much higher. We said that it is inevitable, even apart from facts, that people coming from Pakistan could only come with the assistance and goodwill of Pakistan and therefore, we requested the Security Council to ask Pakistan not to assist them, not to permit them to come in this way. It was, if I may say so, a very moderate request, couched in moderate language. Pakistan denied that fact and during the long discussions before the Security Council they not only went on denying it, but expressing a great deal of irritation and anger that anyone should make such a charge against them. Well, I do not want to go into this long history of denial by them, but the point is that today on their own admission, their denial was false. Now, that is an important matter.

It is important from the point of view, not only of practical politics and the situation we have to face today, it is important also from the point of view of the standards of morality, good behaviour and decency that should subsist between nations. Now, I know very well that the standard of public morality and international morality is unfortunately not very high in this world. Nevertheless, certain appearances have to be kept up, certain decencies have to be maintained and some standards have to be kept. I do submit to this House and to the country that the story of these ten months and more and the way the Pakistan Government have reacted to all that has been said about them in the course of these ten months is so extraordinary as to be hardly creditable for a nation. Even till yesterday, so far as the world is concerned, even till 4 p.m. yesterday, there was no admission by Pakistan that they were participating in any way in those Kashmir operations. Of course, we knew. We have the most definite and positive evidence to that effect, and you cannot hide large armies ultimately. Nevertheless, till 4 p.m. yesterday when those papers were issued to the public, there was no public admission. In fact, there was a continual denial in the course of the last few weeks, while this large Pakistan Army was functioning in Kashmir, battling with the Indian forces in the Indian Union territory. Please remember that all the fighting that has taken place in the last ten months has been in Kashmir, has been in Indian territory; there has been no fighting, there has been no incursion, there has been no Indian Army anywhere on Pakistan territory. That is a fundamental and basic fact, which apart from any other enquiry and any other facts would lead one to the conclusion that if any outsiders are fighting in the Indian Union territory, those outsiders are the aggressors. Why are they there? During the last six weeks or so, again we pointed out in the most explicit language to the Pakistan Government and to the Prime Minister of Pakistan this presence of Pakistan troops in the Kashmir State.

Again, there was either a denial or an evasion of the issue. It was an extraordinary thing to me. I do not claim to be in any way different from others



of my kind. My standards, I hope, are not lower than others. But it has been a shock to me that any country, any responsible Minister of Government should make statements which are patently and obviously false and try to mislead the world by that means. You will remember that before the Security Council at Lake Success, there were prolonged arguments on this issue. The Foreign Minister of the Pakistan Government, who was the chief delegate of their Government there, placed the case for Pakistan before the Security Council. How does that case stand now? I would beg you and the country and the world to consider. Because, that whole case was based on one fundamental fact, that is the denial of Pakistan's complicity in Kashmir. They denied throughout that they actively participated in it. If this fact is proved, as it is proved, out of their very mouths today, to have been false, then what happens to that whole case so laboriously built up by the Pakistan Government before the Security Council? What happens to the charge that we brought against them, which was never considered by the Security Council at all, much to our regret and amazement? So, the fundamental thing for us to remember is this, that a fact which was denied for ten months and more has at last been publicly admitted by the Pakistan Government. They have admitted, of course, in their own way. I shall read out to you some passage from their letter to the Commission wherein they have admitted. They say:

"India was steadily building its armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This building up process did not cease on 21st April 1948, but was continued and intensified. The Indian Army mounted a big offensive in the beginning of April, thereby causing a material change in the situation. This offensive action has continued ever since. The publicly declared intention of the Government of India was to secure a military decision in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting the United Nations Organisation with a *fait accompli*. This situation not only put in jeopardy the entire population of the areas under the "Azad Kashmir" government and led to a big influx of refugees into Pakistan, but also constituted a direct threat to Pakistan's security. It was this which compelled the Government of Pakistan to move their troops into certain defensive positions."

Observe here too, they do not say clearly that the defensive positions happened to be in another country.

Quite apart from their decision in regard to ceasefire and other proposals, the country which participates in aggression over a neighbouring country, may be in the name of defence, may be in the name of its own security, denies that for many months and then, in fact, when it has found out



that its guilt is proved, when it cannot hide it any more, then grudgingly admits it and gives some reason for it. How shall we consider the politics of that country from any international or national or moral point of view ? Observe, according to this statement they took this action in April last, four months or four and a half months ago. If they felt that their security was imperilled, or something was happening that endangered them and they had to send their troops, what then should they have done ? Obviously, they should inform the Government of India, and inform the United Nations Organisation that this is happening and there has been, as they say, a material change in the situation, and therefore we are compelled to take this or that action. I cannot conceive of any country anywhere in the wide world which would not have done so. Quite apart from motives, whatever they may be, this is the obvious and inevitable thing to do. They sent this army, according to them, in April last or thereabouts, and there is no intimation to us into whose territory they were coming, and there is no intimation to the United Nations Organisation which was seized of this question, and was, as a matter of fact, then thinking of sending out a Commission to India. You will remember that right in the early stages of the Security Council's activities, an appeal was made to India and Pakistan in regard to these military operations and in regard to avoiding any situation as between India and Pakistan. That appeal was repeated. In the few lines I have read out to you from Pakistan's reply, they accused India of mounting an offensive. We are trying, from the Indian Union territory, to push out the invader. It has been our declared policy, which we have declared before the United Nations Security Council repeatedly, which in fact was inevitable for us or for any country with any grain of self-respect.

So, we did that. But on the other hand, what did the Pakistan Government do ? We have right from the beginning, whatever step we may have taken, we have taken in the limelight; there has been no hiding about it. The House has been greatly interested in this matter of Kashmir. The Indian public has taken the greatest interest, and rightly; the burden of it has fallen on our Government. It has been a heavy burden. I shall be frank and tell you why it has been heavy on me and more especially on my Government: not because military operations were involved, although that is always a burden, but rather it has been a burden that we wanted to be sure that at no time we acted fundamentally against the principles we had so long proclaimed. May I take the House into my confidence that in the early stages towards the end of October and in November, and indeed subsequently, I was so much exercised over this fact that I felt intensely about Kashmir and if anything happened, or was likely to happen to Kashmir, which might have been, according to me, bad and disastrous for Kashmir, I would have suffered heartbreak because of that ? I was intensely interested apart from larger reasons which the Government have, for emotional and

personal reasons: I do not want to hide that. I am interested in Kashmir. Nevertheless, I tried to keep down the personal aspect and the emotional aspect and to consider it from the larger viewpoint of India's good and Kashmir's good. I tried to consider the question from the point of view of not straying or drifting from the high principles which we had proclaimed in the past.

So, when this question first came up, I sought guidance, as I often did in other matters, from Mahatmaji and I went to him repeatedly and put to him my difficulties. The House knows that that apostle of nonviolence was not a suitable guide in military matters,—and he said so,—but he undoubtedly always was a guide on the moral issue whatever the question might be. And so I put my difficulties and my Government's difficulties before him; and though it is not proper for me to drag in his name at this juncture in order to lessen my own responsibility or my Government's responsibility which is complete on this issue, I nevertheless mentioned this matter merely to show how the moral aspect of this question has always troubled me. And more specially when I saw in India all manner of things happening and which had happened in previous months which had brought India's name into disrepute. I was greatly troubled and worried and was anxious that we should keep straight or as straight as we possibly could. Now this has been my attitude, and on several occasions, I had put it to others in public. And apart from rhetoric and vague insinuations, I should like to know from anybody—friend, opponent or enemy—that from that day in the last week of October when we took that fateful decision to send out troops by air to Kashmir till today, what is it we have done in Kashmir which from any point of view and from any standard is wrong?

I want an answer to that question. Individuals may have erred here and there; but I say that the Government of India and the Indian Army as a whole have done something which was inevitable, and each step that we have taken has been an inevitable step which, if we had not taken it, would have brought a measure of disgrace to us. That is how I have ventured to look at this question of Kashmir. And when I find that on the other side the whole case that has been built up on what I venture to say is using strong language—falsehood and deceit—am I wrong? That is what I ask this House and the country and the world to consider.

Now, therefore, this is the first fact to remember that all this case built up by Pakistan before the Security Council crumbles by this admission of theirs and by the proven fact that large armies of theirs are functioning in Kashmir and no doubt similar armies—if you like—and others connected



with them functioned in Kashmir on Indian Union territory during these ten months or so. Every subsequent proceeding should be viewed from that aspect.

Now we come to the present, and I may again add one other thing in this connection. This has been an aggression; and if it is called—as according to their own admission it must be called—an aggression, then certain consequences ought to follow. Now my difficulty has been that in considering any question, if you lose yourself in a forest of intricate detail sometimes, you lose sight of the forest or the wood for the trees. There have been long discussions over the Kashmir issue and every aspect and phase, and past and present history has been considered.

But what has been the major point? I repeat that, because I think that is the fundamental factor. That is, the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory; secondly, the denial of that fact of aggression; thirdly, the present admission of that fact. These are the governing factors of that situation. And this argument has gone on for long because these governing factors were slurred over and were not emphasized. We emphasize them of course, and the problem was discussed in intricate detail. Now if you start from a wrong premise in an argument obviously your whole argument goes wrong and you land yourself in difficulties. If you try to solve a problem without analysing or stating the nature of the problem how are you to solve it? And that has been the fundamental difficulty in this Kashmir business, that the fundamental issue has been slurred over and bypassed and passed over. Therefore, we have been dealing with other matters which cannot yield a solution if we ignore the basic factor. Now the basic factor is out by the very admission of the Pakistan Government.

Now coming to this proposal of the United Nations Commission in India in regard to ceasefire and truce, etc., I shall not discuss that much, because I do not wish at this moment to say anything in that regard which might embarrass that Commission. But certain papers are before you. I need hardly say that the proposal they had made was not welcomed by us with joy and enthusiasm; there were many matters in it which went against the grain. But we tried to look at this matter as coolly and dispassionately as possible with a view to establish peace on this harried State of Kashmir, to avoid needless suffering and shedding of blood; and we agreed to that ceasefire proposal after the Commission had been good enough to elucidate certain points which we had placed before them. We did not place too many points, but only certain simple obvious points relating to the security of Kashmir, we placed these before them and they were good enough to tell us that. That was their meaning. Thereupon, we accepted that ceasefire proposal, accepted many things in it which we did not like, because



we felt that both in the interest of peace and of international order it was a good thing for us to go a few steps forward even though some of the steps might be unwilling steps. In order to bring about this peace and to show that we were prepared to go as far as possible, in order to meet the wishes of an international organisation like the United Nations, we did that. The original proposal of the United Nations was given to us on the 14th August. The 15th was our Independence Day. Immediately after, on the 16th, we met the members of the Commission and discussed the matter with them to find out exactly what they meant and told them exactly what we meant; and within four days of that i.e., on the 20th August we sent them our reply. We did not want to delay matters as they were anxious that they should not be delayed.

The Pakistan Government had also got these proposals on that identical time, on the 14th August at 3 or 4 P.M. They also had the same amount of time. But even after the return of the Commission to Pakistan—and some members of the Commission went in between to Karachi—they were not ready with their reply. And in fact it was by the pressure of events or the pressure of the Commission that ultimately they have given some kind of a reply yesterday. In between they gave long letters seeking elucidation etc. I am sorry I have not read the reply wholly yet because I got it just a little before coming here. But I have read the significant parts of it, and in effect it is a rejection of those proposals.<sup>3</sup> Now the Commission had told us that these proposals stand as a whole and while they were prepared to discuss any matter and would gladly do so, it was difficult—in fact it was not possible for them to accept conditional acceptances—because if we make some conditions and Pakistan naturally makes other conditions, what is exactly accepted and by whom? So they said that this thing was to be accepted as it is after being understood or if there were conditions attached, it is not an acceptance but a rejection. Now, therefore, what the Pakistan Government have done is tantamount to a rejection. It is for the Commission to decide and to say what they are going to do. It is not for me to advise them. So we arrive at a curious state of affairs, that the country which was an aggressor nation according to its own showing, now even rejects and refuses a proposal for a ceasefire, or puts forward conditions which are tantamount to that refusal.

Now certain international consequences should follow from all this. What consequences follow? In a somewhat narrow sphere all those officers and individuals who are participating in this aggressive war against India in Kashmir territory—there are of course Pakistani nationals and

3. Korbels reply to Zafrullah Khan dated 6 September contained the following passage: "Commission observes that your Government have found themselves unable to accept without reservation proposals as contained in its Resolution of 13 August."

others there too—are participating not only in an aggressive war but in a war after a refusal of a United Nations Commission's proposal for cease-fire.<sup>4</sup> Their position is worthy of consideration.

That is all that I wish to say on the Kashmir issue. Naturally the story of Kashmir goes on. It has been a saga during these ten months or so, and there has been a great deal of suffering, and blood and tears involved in it. There have been high moments also. But for us in India, and for the Government of India, it has been a period of trial and difficulty from many points of view; still, at no time have we considered that we were wrong or that we took a step which we could not fully justify in regard to Kashmir. It is in that faith that we are going to continue. And may I say one word, that in all these consultations with the United Nations Commission and in other matters affecting Kashmir we have kept in close touch with the Kashmir Government under Sheikh Abdullah and consulted him in all these steps that we have taken. That was natural and that is inevitable in the circumstances that we should march together in full consultation with each other. Proceeding on that basis, we shall go ahead, whether in the military spheres or in other spheres, and I am quite convinced that, if we adhere to a right course, and that, if we do not stray from it, even from an opportunist point of view of some present advantage, we shall win through, and any country that bases its case on an essential falsehood cannot gain its ends.

4. In his letter of 19 September to the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Commission said: "The Commission was repeatedly informed by you and by the representatives of the Pakistan Army that the "Azad Kashmir" forces were under the overall control of the Pakistan High Command".

## 22. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

8 September 1948

My dear Sri Prakasa,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th September.

Yesterday I made my statements about Kashmir and Hyderabad. I am yet not quite sure what the U.N. Commission is going to do now. I expect to meet them tomorrow. The Hyderabad business is fast moving and swift consequences are likely to follow. We have given very great thought to this matter and come to the conclusion that there is no other way. Never-

1. J.N. Collection.



theless, it has been a difficult decision, for all the consequences are unpredictable.

I am interested in what you have written about Kashmir.

I have practically made up my mind to go to England early on October. I am likely to be away for three weeks during which I shall visit Paris for a few days for the U.N. Assembly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 23. Cable to Josef Korbel<sup>1</sup>

Excellency, I have carefully considered the Resolution of the Commission which, in substance, corresponds to the Resolution adopted by your Commission at its 15th meeting held on 14th July, 1948, at Faridkot House, New Delhi. In reply to this Resolution, I stated: 'The Commission may rest assured that, consistent with their rights under international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of India will continue to endeavour to give effect to the Commission's request. My Government have faithfully kept this promise. The Commission is aware of the continued presence of Pakistan troops on the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which is now Indian territory, and of the continued offensive against Indian troops in the State by Pakistan troops as well as by other hostiles, who are under the operational command of the Pakistan Army. The extent to which the Government of India can observe the Commission's Resolution will naturally depend upon this situation.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

1. New Delhi, 29 September 1948. File No. KS-55/48, Ministry of States, M.H.A.

### 24. No Aggressive Designs<sup>1</sup>

Three months have passed since last I came here. I am leaving for London on the fifth. Before going, I wanted to meet my old friends here. I have

1. Speech at a public meeting, Srinagar, 1 October 1948. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 2 October and *National Herald*, 4 October 1948.



said before that the raiders would not have entered Kashmir without Pakistan's help. We put forth a straight forward case before the U.N., which was that the raiders must have entered with Pakistan help. Pakistan replied that they were not helping the raiders. This particular point was not discussed at the U.N. Later the U.N. sent a Commission to India and Pakistan. After seeing everything, the Commission said in a resolution that there were considerable number of Pakistan troops in Kashmir.

We did not like the U.N. Commission Resolution, but for the sake of peace we accepted it. But Pakistan did not, and fighting has continued in Kashmir, but not within Pakistan territories. Even if Pakistan tries for 100 years, she would find it impossible to achieve her ends in Kashmir. Under no circumstances can India be driven out of Kashmir.

It is clear that Pakistan has a large number of troops in Kashmir. After formally denying it, she now accepts the fact that the troops are there for their defence. But anyone can see that if we wanted to attack Pakistan we could do it far more easily from places like East Punjab, and not through mountainous regions of Kashmir, via Kohala and Domel. The soldier knows that when the Punjab plains are so near, it is futile to get entrapped in the hilly and mountainous terrain of Kashmir.

Meanwhile, the war goes on in Kashmir. The entire battle is taking place within Jammu and Kashmir which has acceded to India. This naturally constitutes an attack on India. We would have been legally and militarily within our rights to attack Pakistan. We did not do so as we did not want to extend the frontiers of the battle. Following the footsteps of Mahatma Gandhi, we did not reply aggression with aggression, and we did not lift our eyes or our feet in the direction of Pakistan. We have shown patience and tolerance in the face of repeated provocation. Any other country except India would have attacked Pakistan under such circumstances.

The complete peace that prevailed in the country during the action against Hyderabad has removed the fear of communal trouble in India.

There is considerable false propaganda regarding Hyderabad in the Pakistan press. I am surprised to see the Pakistan press carrying a report saying that blood was flowing in the streets of Delhi following a massacre of Muslims. Another kind of propaganda that is being put out by Pakistan is that India is about to attack their Dominion. India has no such design. I call upon the people of Pakistan to shed fear of India. I may also say that if ever at a future date the people of Pakistan express their desire to join India, I will advise them against it. I will not like India to carry the burdens and problems Pakistan has created for herself.

## II. Internal Developments





## 1. Muhammad Usman<sup>1</sup>

I write to express my deep grief and the deep grief of the Government of India at the death of your brother, Brig. Muhammad Usman, in action in Jammu and Kashmir State. It was a soldier's and a brave man's death and as such we should not grieve over it. Nevertheless, the cutting short of a brilliant career in the service of the nation is a tragedy which we feel deeply. Usman had already made a name for himself by his gallant leadership in Kashmir, and a bright future in the army of the nation awaited him. Quiet, unassuming, and retiring, in spite of the fame that had come to him, simple in his habits, he was an ideal soldier and an ideal servant of the nation.

To my own province, from which he came, and to my city of Allahabad, to which he was so intimately connected, Brig. Usman's death will be a great sorrow. To the people of Kashmir, in the service of whose freedom he died in action, his memory will remain ever green, something that will inspire them to fight and retain that freedom. So, while we naturally grieve we rejoice also at that courage which triumphs over death and which, in the ultimate analysis, makes a nation.

1. Message of condolence to Muhammad Subhan, a correspondent of *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 5 July 1948. Published in *National Herald*, 6 July 1948.

## 2. To Ramadhar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31 July 1948

Dear Ramadhar,

Your letter of the 31st July.<sup>2</sup> I am afraid I cannot do anything in this matter except to refer to the Kashmir Government. It is for them to decide as to whether a permit should be issued at present or not. Kashmir, as you know, is a war area at present and everything has to be subordinated to military considerations. I hope your friend will be able to go there before very long.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. In his letter Ramadhar wrote about Frederik Jan Hopman, a Dutch artist and applicant to the post of a Kashmiri interpreter. Frederik wanted to proceed to Kashmir to perfect his knowledge of Kashmiri and Ramadhar pleaded his case.

I do not myself see why this particular time should be chosen for improving one's knowledge of the Kashmiri language. As for acting as an interpreter to the U.N. Commission, that is for the Commission to decide.

The question is not of believing in national or racial divisions. Kashmir is fighting a life and death struggle and anything that does not fit in with this struggle is for the moment secondary.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To S.M. Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 September 1948

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

Kachru has just arrived and given me your letter with the questionnaire addressed to your Government.

You will of course give such answers as you can to this questionnaire. I have asked Kachru to take Gopalaswami Ayyangar's help in the matter. The main thing is, of course, that, the present position is a provisional and extraordinary one. In strict law and constitution, the old constitution still prevails and the only change that has been made is by the Declaration of the Maharaja appointing you Prime Minister and asking you to form the Government. But in practice and by the agreement of the parties concerned, that is, you and the National Conference, the Maharaja and the Government of India, it has been decided that your Government should function as a constitutional government. Inevitably there is a certain vagueness about this arrangement, and in regard to some matters which originally were considered reserved subjects, sometimes there has been an argument. Also because of military reasons the needs of the military situation are paramount, and the army has a certain freedom in regard to defence matters. But the general principle is that the State should have full responsible government, by convention now, and by law as soon as this can be done. It is agreed that the constitution of the State should be framed by a fully elected assembly.

So far as the Praja Sabha is concerned, the position is also peculiar, because admittedly this Praja Sabha is totally unrepresentative and was boycotted by the principal party.<sup>2</sup> The elections were collusive. The Go-

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In January 1947, elections were held in Kashmir but the National Conference boycotted them in view of the repression. Only 182,800 voters out of 707,419 had exercised their franchise and the rival organisation, the Muslim Conference, won 16 out of 21 Muslim seats.



vernment of India comes into the picture constitutionally because of the accession, that is in regard to Defence, Communications and External Affairs. In practice, defence is the vital subject today and every other consideration has to be subordinate to it. Therefore, the Government of India, acting through its Defence Ministry, are concerned with everything connected with military operations, as well as allied matters. They are consulted in other matters too. They have given loans to the State, and at the request of the State Government, a financial adviser has also gone from the Government of India.

In regard to most other matters, e.g., the present electoral arrangements, franchise, courts, taxation, economic matters, etc, the old rules are rather archaic and have to be changed. Changes are being introduced gradually even now in so far as they are possible. But real changes can only come when peace and order have been restored.

Some such preamble might precede fuller replies to the questions asked.

We have been pressing the U.N. Commission to let us have their final decision so that we might inform our Parliament here before it adjourns on the 4th September. We even said that if there is delay in Pakistan's reply we wanted to lay the Commission's Resolution and our reply before our Parliament. The Commission have requested us to delay doing this upto Tuesday next by which time they hope to have a final reply from Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> They were so anxious that we should not say anything now in public that they sent one of their members, the Belgian, Dr. Graeffe, to explain the situation to me. We have agreed, but we have made it clear that we cannot wait longer than Tuesday next.

My sister, Vijayalakshmi, is coming here tomorrow for instructions for the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris. She will be here for about 9 days and will then go direct to Paris. I should like Krishna Mehta to come here to meet her. I am therefore sending you a telegram to arrange to send her with Professor Blackett.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 6 September, Pakistan sent a formal reply to the Commission. It began by stating that it was only Pakistan's reply and not that of "Azad Kashmir" also. Its representatives would have to be met as individuals by the Commission. Pakistan could only lend good offices to make "Azad Kashmir" accept the Pakistani view of the proposals, but the final acceptance must entirely rest with them. The ceasefire order would also have to be issued by them.





## LETTERS TO THE PREMIERS OF PROVINCES





New Delhi

1 July 1948

My dear Premier,

As you will no doubt have noticed, I have skipped a fortnight and I did not write to you in the middle of June as I ought to have done. You will forgive me for this. I have been pretty well occupied during this last fortnight with the Hyderabad affair, Kashmir, the Mountbattens' departure and the arrival of the new Governor General.

2. For some odd reason, which we have been unable to fathom, there were widespread rumours for some time past that trouble on a big scale is likely to break out on June 15th or thereabouts.<sup>2</sup> These rumours were specially prevalent in Pakistan as well as East Punjab and Delhi. Some people even expected war to break out. There was no obvious reason why any of these calamities should happen, nevertheless rumours persisted and disturbed the lives of innumerable people. Adequate precautions were taken and nothing did happen then or later. It is interesting to find out who starts these rumours and with what purpose. Obviously they do not rise out of nothing and there is some deliberate design about them. Our Intelligence tells us only that there are rumours, not who the originators are. I have little doubt that there are groups of people who spread these tales of impending disaster in order to unnerve our people and thus prepare the ground for mischief. There are plenty of mischief-mongers and normally they are to be found among extreme communal groups, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. We have to be very careful in watching the activities of these communal groups which continue to persist, though they do not function quite so much in the open as they used to do.

3. I should like to draw your attention to a fairly recent development in Rajputana, which is significant of how foolish people actually try to align themselves with the most dangerous causes simply because they do not like something that is happening. In some parts of Rajputana, notably Jodhpur and partly also in other States, certain Rajput elements, disliking the new democratic order that is taking shape, have organised themselves to combat it. They even go so far as to think of intriguing with Pakistan. During a Rajput procession the following slogans were noticed:

1. These letters to the Premiers have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru—Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 141-210.
2. For some time rumours were afloat that war between India and Pakistan would break out about the middle of June 1948, and Pakistan had been preparing itself to meet the situation.

“Pakistan Zindabad”

“Kasim Razvi Zindabad”

This is astonishing enough. Obviously the Rajputs had no particular sympathy for either Pakistan or Kasim Razvi. But they were so much enraged at the coming new democratic order which they feared might affect their vested interests in land and in the State generally, that they were prepared to ally themselves with every enemy of the Indian Union.

4. I mention this as a significant indication of how destructive forces work. Apart from its inherent badness, it shows very limited understanding and gross folly. Today in India there are obviously powerful forces at work for unity and stability. But we cannot ignore certain strong tendencies towards disruption and certain anti-social elements which are taking advantage of these tendencies. There are the communalists of all groups who have no constructive programme or objective and who only wish to destroy or weaken the present structure. There are the Communists, who, quite apart from their communism, are at present engaged in creating as much trouble as possible not only in India<sup>3</sup> but much more so in Burma,<sup>4</sup> Malaya,<sup>5</sup> etc. If they wanted to spread the ideology of communism, they were welcome to do so, provided there was no violence about it. It must be remembered that in spite of considerable provocation the Communist Party has not been declared illegal in India, except in West Bengal. We have tried to avoid taking any steps restricting the functioning of organisations except when we were forced to, as in regard to some communal organisations.

5. Even legitimate demands, when made in this context of disruptive forces, may become rather dangerous in the sense that they encourage disruption. Thus the demand for provincial redistribution and rectification of provincial boundaries is a perfectly legitimate demand and must claim

3. The Communist Party of India held the view that partition had given to the country false independence and the Congress was a tool of imperialism. Strikes, agitation and infiltration into the civil services were promoted. The party aligned itself with the Razakars in Hyderabad and organised a parallel government in the Telengana area. Over 100 Communist leaders were arrested in different parts of the country.
4. Communists in Burma planned an uprising and seizure of power. On 20 August 1948, because of mutiny and widespread disturbances, President Sao Shwe Thaik imposed martial law throughout the country.
5. Due to serious outbreaks of violence, lawlessness and a wave of strikes in Malaya in May and June 1948 and involvement of “Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army”, an organisation of Chinese Communists, in these outrages, on June 16 the Government proclaimed a “state of emergency” in several districts of Perak and Johore. By June 19 this emergency was extended to the whole of Perak, Johore and Negri Sembilan.



attention. But in present circumstances to press the demand is to encourage the wrong tendencies in the country. First priority must necessarily be to preserve the unity, strength and stability of India. Everything that comes in the way of that may prove harmful.

6. The preservation of this unity and stability of India largely depends upon the functioning of the Congress organisation which has brought a sense of unity. If that organisation weakens or is split up, the one major cementing factor is removed and popular energy is diverted to the quarrels of rival factions.

7. The recent withdrawal of the Socialists from the Congress has already led to increasing bitterness.<sup>6</sup> Elections have been held and, as always during elections, passions have arisen and much that was undesirable has been done. Those elections have demonstrated again the fundamental hold of the Congress on the public in India, in spite of big promises being made to them by the opponents of the Congress. That shows that the common man in India, in spite of the horror that he has gone through in recent months, still realises the importance of this fundamental unity and the fact that the Congress is as necessary as ever to uphold and preserve that unity.

8. I would suggest to you and your government to view the problems of today, whatever they might be, in this context of the paramount importance of preserving the unity, strength and stability of India. We have no leisure yet to play about with other matters when the very foundations are imperilled. First things must come first.

9. The Mountbattens' departure was the occasion for public demonstrations in Delhi, which were surprisingly big. Those demonstrations of course did not mean that the public approved of all that has been done by the Mountbattens or by the present Government of India during the last year or so. They did demonstrate however that the man in the street believed in the sincerity of purpose of Lord and Lady Mountbatten and that they had striven hard to serve India and her people. It was a remarkable tribute.

10. Lord Mountbatten strove hard to bring about a settlement of the Hyderabad issue before his departure.<sup>7</sup> Being an irrepressible optimist, he believed to the last that he would succeed. He failed. There has been no settlement and there is no prospect of a settlement on those lines.

6. At the Nasik conference of the Socialist Party in March 1948, the Socialists decided to sever their relations with the Congress and become an independent party. In the by-elections to the U.P. legislature held on 29 June 1948, the Socialist candidates lost their deposits. The Congress won all the 16 seats.

7. Lord Mountbatten had been closely involved in the negotiations to settle the Hyderabad problem.



11. There has been much public criticism, in which responsible persons have joined, about what is called the soft and appeasement policy of the Government of India towards Hyderabad.<sup>8</sup> Action is demanded of us, that action being a military invasion of Hyderabad. As you know, we moved our armies and armour to the Hyderabad frontier sometime ago and they are there now. If necessary they can take action.

12. To talk of appeasement, etc., or of any partiality for the Nizam or his Government is absurd. If the Government of India adopted a certain policy, it is based entirely on practical considerations and on what they imagine to be India's good. Naturally much of the information in their possession is not available to the public. They have to consider a hundred factors and the repercussions of every step that they might take. They have many commitments at present, military and other, and in any event can any government enter light-heartedly into war? At the same time every government worth its name must prepare for every conceivable contingency to the best of its ability. We have prepared for Hyderabad both from the military point of view and the economic and political. We shall undoubtedly take military action when we think the time is ripe for it. But you will appreciate that only those can judge the rightness of the time, who know all the facts and all commitments. It is rather irresponsible for people who do not know all these facts to demand military action on a large-scale which might entangle us and which might, though certainly leading to our victory, lead also to great suffering to a large number of people. These people, whether inside or outside Hyderabad, have to be considered as citizens of India as they will undoubtedly be before very long. We have in other words to take a long-distance view and not be swept away by some momentary passion.

13. I know well that the Hyderabad Government and the Razakars are misbehaving and causing much suffering to the people there. But I would add a slight note of warning in regard to believing every rumour and unverified report that comes out. We have found on several occasions that some reports have no basis in fact or are exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is true that conditions in Hyderabad are bad for the people, and are deteriorating. Considerable numbers of persons are migrating from Hyderabad.

14. How are we to meet this situation? We suggested certain terms of agreement which have been criticised by some leading persons. It is easy to criticise them as one can criticise anything. But the point to be noted

8. Jayaprakash Narayan said that the Government of India had no alternative but to declare war against the Nizam.

was whether those terms of agreement, if finally ratified, gave us a firm grip of the situation or not. Once the power of the Razakars, etc., was broken, other forces would have free play. Therefore it is not good enough to consider these matters from a theoretical point of view, but to see how they fit into the present and how far they lead to our goal. I am convinced that the terms we offered were good from every point of view, though I could have easily improved upon them. Now these terms are out of date and there is no question of our carrying on long or short negotiations with the present Hyderabad Government. Other factors will decide the issue now. I would warn you against believing rumours and statements in the press about fresh negotiations. There have been none and there will be none with the existing Hyderabad Government.

15. The present position in regard to Hyderabad is this: We are ready at short notice to invade Hyderabad. But we propose to wait for developments and to avoid such invasion if we can help it because of the other consequences that it is bound to bring in its train. Meanwhile, the economic blockade will continue and to that will be added other measures, for instance, financial, and in regard to the stoppage of many kinds of communications. There are other ways too which I need not mention here. We feel that this is a surer way of dealing with the situation at present. But as I have pointed out, we are ready for any other method also as soon as we are convinced that this is necessary. Hyderabad has suffered a lot from the economic blockade. Undoubtedly the pressure of this blockade is very great, though not very demonstrative. I might point out that we are not stopping food or medical supplies. We have to act as civilised nations and not descend to the Hyderabad level of conduct.

16. In Kashmir the military situation has been generally good, and we have made progress. The capture of Gurez is important.<sup>9</sup> It is true however that our progress has not been quite so swift as we had hoped. The reason for this has been the throwing in by Pakistan of considerable numbers of its regular troops, more specially on the Uri-Domel front. There is no doubt about this now. In fact our armies are fighting a part of the Pakistan Army in a very difficult terrain, which gives a great advantage for defence. This raises political issues of great magnitude. It also complicates the military problem, in the sense that it delays results somewhat. We are taking steps however to meet this new situation more effectively.

17. I visited Kashmir<sup>10</sup> two or three days ago and conferred with our military commanders and representatives of the Kashmir Government. I visi-

9. Indian troops in Kashmir had captured Gurez on 29 June 1948.

10. Nehru was in Kashmir from 27 to 30 June 1948.



ted Sonamarg and Baltal also. The latter place is situated at the foot of the Zoji La Pass. I must tell you that every time I have visited Kashmir I have been very greatly impressed by the quality and morale of our troops. They are a fine type of men of whom any country can be proud. Many of us have no conception of the tremendous difficulties they have had to face. I have myself seen our pickets at about 15,000 feet altitude. As for our airmen I can hardly speak in terms of sufficient praise for their courage and daring.

18. Within a few days the Kashmir Commission of the United Nations Security Council will be reaching India and there is much speculation, not unmixed with apprehension, as to what it might do. We have not welcomed the coming of this commission and we have thoroughly disapproved of the resolution of the Security Council. We have stated however that we are prepared to meet the Commission and have talks with them. This Commission, it should be realised, is nothing more than a Good Offices Committee which can only offer advice and nothing more. We do not propose to resile in any way whatever from the attitude we have taken up in the Security Council on this subject. No question arises there to begin with except the removal of the aggressor, stoppage of fighting and the return to peaceful conditions and some normality. We do not propose to be hustled by this Commission in any way. But we shall treat them with all courtesy and, at the same time, with all firmness. The fact that Pakistan armies are functioning in Kashmir will of course be an important factor.

19. Our commitments in Kashmir, Hyderabad and elsewhere necessitate our keeping up the defence services at a certain level and indeed to add to them. We are taking steps to that end. In addition we hope to have the militia functioning fairly soon, and in this we shall require your government's full and urgent cooperation. Further the Government have decided to form a National Cadet Corps organisation throughout the country to provide military training for boys and girls in schools and colleges. To begin with we have placed limited targets. But we shall immediately enlarge these as soon as the first target is reached.

20. Some provinces have schemes of their own<sup>11</sup> for this kind of military training and some of these are good. But it is obviously necessary to concentrate on one thing at a time and do it well. The Government of India have therefore requested the provinces to concentrate on this National Cadet

11. The West Bengal Government, for example, proposed to raise a National Defence Force to guard the border of 500 miles between East and West Bengal.



Corps scheme for the present, and not to fritter away their limited energies on other schemes which may be vaster. For the present therefore the Government of India cannot sponsor or render assistance to any other scheme of military training in the provinces either in the shape of instructors or equipment. I trust that this attitude of the Government of India will be appreciated by the provinces and will receive their entire support.

21. I should like to draw your attention to a step that we have taken in regard to the Posts and Telegraphs Department. We are creating an independent appellate tribunal to deal with appeals from this department. We are doing this, in common with some other countries, both to expedite the disposal of long-pending matters and to make the Posts and Telegraphs staff feel that they will get a square deal. The tribunal will consist of a judicial officer and one retired senior officer of the department. To them will be added, as assessors, men actually in service, selected by recognised union of workers. This is a novel experiment and its progress will be watched by Government with considerable interest. For the present this will be confined to one circle, but it will be extended if the experiment succeeds.

22. You will have noticed that Shri Mohanlal Saksena has been appointed Minister of State for Relief and Rehabilitation. As Minister of State he will not be a full member of the Cabinet but will attend Cabinet meetings when any subject relating to his ministry is under discussion. The Minister without Portfolio<sup>12</sup> will be in charge of the inter-Dominion negotiations in regard to the refugee problems.

23. I shall only refer briefly to a subject of vast and overriding importance, that is, the deterioration of the economic situation in the country and the rise in the cost of living index. We have watched with grave concern the rise in prices of food and cloth. It is true that there has been some small fall recently in prices. Nevertheless, the cost of living index is very high and is affecting our entire economy. We have been dealing with these matters in a piecemeal way with no satisfactory results. We can afford to do so no longer. I would invite your attention to this extremely important matter and would welcome your suggestions.

24. As you know, Governors of provinces have been sending me fortnightly letters, of which copies have been sent to you. I am now suggesting to them to send their fortnightly letters directly to the Governor General, sending a copy of it to you and to me. You will of course be good enough to continue sending me your fortnightly letters.

12. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

25. We informed you sometime ago of the decision of the Government of India about the provisional use of *Jana Gana Mana* as the national anthem. The final decision will, of course, be taken by the Constituent Assembly.<sup>13</sup> Even this provisional decision was taken after months of careful consideration of the problem in all its aspects. It was in fact rather a recognition of a growing practice in the services and elsewhere. A national anthem is absolutely necessary for our foreign embassies and defence services and we had to suggest to them something, even though provisionally. One Premier of a province<sup>14</sup> has protested against this decision and said that he prefers greatly the *Vande Mataram*. Needless to say, the *Vande Mataram* is a cherished song and tune and must remain so. But for a variety of reasons, into which I need not go now, most of us were firmly convinced that *Jana Gana Mana* was far more suited both for domestic and foreign use, and the latter is very important than the *Vande Mataram*. The *Vande Mataram* represents very effectively the long period of our struggle and it will ever remain as a national song which inspires our people. But after the struggle is over, some other motive comes into play and the most important element of a national anthem is the tune. We were definitely of opinion that *Jana Gana Mana* was a more effective, attractive and distinctive tune than *Vande Mataram*. Some months' practice of it in India and abroad convinced us of this. In other countries this has been greatly appreciated.

26. The world situation is critical and recent developments<sup>15</sup> in Berlin might almost lead to war. I do not myself think that they will lead to war, but we cannot rule out the possibility. We have, therefore, to be prepared for this terribly worsening international situation. That leads us again to what I have written at the beginning of this letter, that is, to concentrate all our energies to build up the unity, strength and stability of India and not to divert our energy to secondary purposes.

27. Some criticisms have been made of our ambassadors abroad. It is difficult for me to correct or answer these criticisms in public. I should like to say however that generally speaking our ambassadors are functioning very well and some of them have achieved remarkable success. Naturally their work is behind the scenes and cannot easily be explained to the pub-

13. On 11 June 1948, *Jana Gana Mana* was provisionally adopted as the national anthem. On 24 January 1950 it was formally approved by the Constituent Assembly.

14. B.C. Roy.

15. The relations between the western powers and the Soviet Union became tense when the Soviet authorities cut off all traffic to Berlin from the western zone on 21 June 1948 in retaliation to the currency measures introduced by the American army. In cooperation with the British forces, the United States organised an air-lift of essential commodities into Berlin.



lic. Press reports are often incorrect. For instance, Dr. Syud Hossain, our ambassador in Cairo, was criticised for something he was reported to have said. On enquiry we found that he had not said it. He is facing a difficult situation and he has been handling it with ability.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

II

New Delhi  
15 July 1948

My dear Premier,

The last fortnight has seen many developments in both the Hyderabad and Kashmir situation. The sterling balances negotiations have resulted in an agreement between India and the U.K. Government for a period of 3 years.<sup>1</sup> This agreement will soon be published. The economic situation continues to cause us grave anxiety more specially in relation to the rise in prices and the cost of living index, and the question of controls is again being raised in various parts of India.

2. Abroad, war has broken out again in Palestine<sup>2</sup> and the situation in Berlin is still very tense and difficult. Normally such a situation would lead to war, which, of course, would mean something like world war. But in spite of aggressive utterances and threats, no country really wants war and so very probably the situation will be tided over somehow. Even so the essential causes of conflict remain, and we shall continue to live tensely and anxiously.

3. I do not wish to discuss this European situation here or to criticise this great power or that in a superior way. But there does appear to be an increasing tendency for statesmen of high position to rattle their sabres.<sup>3</sup> This practice when indulged in too often may well lead to unforeseen consequences.

1. The Sterling Balances Agreement for the next three years was signed between India and Britain on 9 July 1948. Under this agreement, the British Government released £ 80 million in addition to the unspent balance of £ 80 million from the earlier releases. Out of this £ 15 million were convertible into hard currencies.

2. On 11 June 1948, a truce for four weeks in the Arab-Israel war was secured by the U.N. Security Council. Arab refusal to extend the truce led to renewed fighting from 9 to 18 July, when both sides agreed to a ceasefire.

3. For example, on 10 July 1948, Churchill called upon the western democracies to unite "against communist intrigue and Russian imperialism."



4. In Palestine the situation is a very complicated one and it is not clear how any settlement can take place, in the near future.<sup>4</sup> In a military sense at present probably the Arabs are stronger. But given the fact that American and Russian prestige are involved in maintaining the new State of Israel, it will not be easy for the Arabs to win through. What the final end of all this will be, therefore, it is very difficult to say. Both sides feel passionately about their position and are hard fighters. In the past India has generally sympathised with the Arab case in Palestine, though with some reservations.<sup>5</sup> The position we took up in the United Nations represented this attitude which I still think was the correct one. However, neither party approved of it. In the present struggle there India does not want to be involved. We have enough trouble of our own.

5. In Hyderabad various financial and other steps have been taken by the Government of India which must produce definite results.<sup>6</sup> Productive work in Hyderabad is coming to a standstill. It is unfortunate that this kind of economic blockade should be applied, but it is far better and more humane than many other types of pressure. Many people perhaps do not realise the effectiveness of this step because the results are not sudden. Demands continue to be made in public for immediate military intervention. I am surprised to see even Ministers of provincial governments repeating this demand. Surely, they should appreciate that a situation cannot be judged in isolation but in relation to all-India. I cannot naturally write in detail about the developing situation in India, except that it is full of dangerous potentialities, and it is hardly responsible talk to ignore everything and ask for something to be done without relation to the rest. The situation in Hyderabad is undoubtedly a bad one. But it does not help to see out of perspective or to exaggerate the events that are happening there. We have found on enquiry that there is a good deal of exaggeration often enough although the realities are bad. We are fully seized of this situation and we are determined to deal with it effectively. In doing so we have to take not only the all-India view but the long distance view. I trust that our colleagues in the provinces will give us some credit for appreciating the Hyderabad situation and paying full attention to it.

4. India had been opposed to partition of Palestine and favoured a federated state, with the widest possible regional autonomy in the areas occupied respectively by the Arabs and Jews.
5. The Indian member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine did not subscribe to the majority plan recommending partition of Palestine.
6. On 1 July 1948, the Government of India banned the transfer of securities held by the Nizam. On 2 July, air links with Hyderabad were cut and export of gold and currency from India to Hyderabad was stopped. On 6 July, more financial sanctions were taken against Hyderabad. On 7 July, parcels for despatch from Hyderabad were not accepted by Indian post offices in Hyderabad.

6. Recently reports appeared in the press about gun-running by air between Karachi and Hyderabad. There is no doubt that this has been done by night flights by a gang of foreign adventurers who have got powerful planes and who use air-fields near Karachi as their base. We have taken steps against this gang in England and elsewhere and we shall certainly shoot them down if we have the chance to do so on their flight. But it is not easy to intervene at night and to shoot down planes flying at twenty thousand feet. There is no doubt that arms have gone to Hyderabad but the quantity that a plane can take is not very great. The real difficulty of Hyderabad is lack of petrol. They had a stock of about two hundred thousand gallons but this is being rapidly depleted.

7. In Kashmir, I regret to say, there have been some setbacks in the Ladakh area and round about Leh a company of our troops was surrounded by large numbers of the enemy and rather overwhelmed. The whole fighting in Kashmir has during the last few weeks undergone a very marked change. This is due to the practically open association of Pakistan regular troops in the fighting. In fact there is undeclared war in Kashmir between the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army. This has made a difference chiefly because the Pakistan Army has supplied mortars, howitzers, mountain batteries and the like. The terrain, it will be remembered, is exceedingly difficult.

8. The United Nations Commission on Kashmir is now in Delhi. They are proceeding in a leisurely fashion and, for the present, they have had one or two interviews with our Secretary General in the External Affairs Ministry<sup>7</sup>. Our position is being explained to them clearly and firmly. I do not yet know what line they are likely to adopt, but I imagine that they will be here for the next ten days or more. May I say here that it is undesirable for our newspapers or for any responsible public man to speak slightly of this Commission. That does not strengthen our position; it only irritates the members of the Commission and the U.N.O. We have decided to offer them every courtesy and at the same time to be perfectly firm in regard to our general attitude in Kashmir.

9. I referred in my last letter to the economic situation and asked you for any suggestions that you might make. This matter will be considered here in its various aspects and we may have to take vital decisions. The man with a fixed income in India is in a terrible position with these rising prices and

7. The U.N. Commission arrived in New Delhi on July 10. The Government of India presented to the Commission documentary proof to show that regular Pakistan forces were taking part in the Kashmir operations.



a recent cartoon brought this out vividly.<sup>8</sup> We have got into a vicious circle, and it will require all our effort to get out of it.

10. Taking an overall view of India at present we see many constructive activities in progress in various provinces, large schemes being implemented and plenty of hard work being done. There is life and vitality in evidence in India. Yet at the same time there are many serious dangers, and the next few months may well be difficult for us. Those dangers extend from possible war to economic chaos. It is well, therefore, that all of us should realise that we live on the verge of serious crises and try to give priority in our thought and work to the solution of these crises. I fear there is not this realisation and the danger to the country is not sufficiently appreciated. Many people get rather excited about secondary matters which have no great importance in this context. Party factions, provincialism flourish and weaken and distract us. I do hope that your government will keep in view this all-India situation and try to help in dealing with it.

11. The negotiations on sterling balances have resulted in a three-year agreement. I shall not go into the details of this agreement here as it will be published soon. Probably some parts of it will be criticised. Indeed, we were not happy in regard to some parts. We feel, however, that it is not essentially an unreasonable agreement having regard to all the circumstances. There has been no scaling down and we shall get adequate releases in the course of the next three years for our projects. Apart from the agreement we have come to an understanding that in the third year, if necessary, further advances can be made to us. Certain developments have taken place in many European countries like Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Brazil, etc., which enable us to use sterling there.<sup>9</sup> This will help us greatly. Dollars are now required practically for the U.S.A. only. We have been promised help in the procurement not only of machinery but of certain essential commodities.

12. We have had before us the Bihar Zamindari Abolition Bill. We are all committed to the abolition of the zamindari system but it appeared to us that the manner of dealing with this had not perhaps been as happy as it might have been and certain economic aspects had not been perhaps fully considered. The result is that it is proposed to have certain amendments made in that Bill. Then also it is presumed far too easily that the Central Government will go on providing large loans to provinces to finance schemes of acquisition of zamindari. Obviously, the capacity of the Central Government is limited.

8. A cartoon by K. Shankar Pillai, published in *Shankar's Weekly* dated 11 July 1948.

9. India had entered into commercial agreements with the "soft currency" countries such as Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Yugoslavia, Japan, Egypt and Pakistan.



If we pour all our money in the acquisition of zamindari, we shall have little or nothing left for our development schemes for which also the provinces look to us. Therefore, each province must very carefully consider the financial implications of any measure that it may introduce. It would be desirable for some uniform all-India policy to be adopted in this matter for there is a danger of our financial structure suffering very greatly if any wrong moves are taken. It is not enough to consult the Central Government at a late stage when changes are difficult, but at every stage.

13. I should like to stress the need for economy in the use of petrol and steel. Not only because of our development schemes but also because of other possibilities hinted in the earlier part of this letter we have to conserve our resources as much as possible. Officers concerned with the rationing of motor spirit should be impressed with the importance of exercising the greatest economy.

14. Recently I had the privilege of opening the bridge over the Ravi river near Pathankot and the new road from Pathankot to Jammu.<sup>10</sup> Both this road and the bridge—indeed there are many bridges and causeways—are fine pieces of engineering work rapidly done in cooperation between our Central P.W.D. and the Army.

15. I am afraid that we have been very slow in the construction of new houses all over India in spite of a great demand for them. Of course this is largely due to our lack of material. Nevertheless, we could have done much even with the existing material and I have seen many types of model houses built with existing material which are very good. I suggest that each province should not wait for steel and cement all the time but should go ahead with such material as it possesses. Apart from this we are thinking in terms of putting up soon a housing factory, that is, a factory which will produce pre-fabricated houses. The material to be used will largely be local material easily available. If this factory is a success it may be desirable to erect further factories of that kind in different provinces. We sent an expert<sup>11</sup> to Europe for this purpose and he has returned with full plans and specifications, and we hope to go ahead soon with this project.

16. Although essential houses are not being built or are being built very slowly, luxury buildings still continue to be put up, such as cinemas, large bungalows, large shops, etc. I think the time has come when such luxury

10. The Madhopur bridge and the new Pathankot-Jammu road were inaugurated by Nehru on 7 July 1948.

11. Otto Koenigsberger.

construction should be prohibited. It is a little difficult to describe luxury construction, but an easy way of doing so is to say that any building costing above a certain amount will require a special permission of Government. This is a simple rule easily enforced. The construction of cinemas should of course be completely prohibited for the time being. Dwelling houses are more necessary. If luxury construction is forbidden, this will release materials for more essential buildings, and it will reduce black-marketing also to some extent in those materials. Also it would have a far-reaching psychological effect on our people. I commend this proposal to you. I understand that at least one provincial government is already proceeding on these lines.

17. The Education Ministry has brought to my notice the presence of a large number of college lecturers and teachers who have been thrown out of employment as a result of partition, particularly from East Pakistan. It is a pity that qualified teachers and professors should lack employment when we are trying to extend opportunities for education. May I suggest to provincial governments that they might consult our Education Ministry as regards the availability of these refugee teachers before they employ new personnel? Many of these lecturers etc., were permanent government servants appointed as a result of selection by the Public Service Commission of the province or a Selection Board.

18. I continue to receive from foreign countries, specially trade unions and labour organisations, letters of protest and surprise at the internments that have taken place, specially of trade union and labour leaders. I do not know what the exact position is in any province, but I know that some of the activities of these labour leaders have been very injurious and have had little to do with labour. The matter is for each provincial government to consider. I do not want India to get a reputation among progressive circles abroad of a country which does not permit the fullest liberty in regard to labour work or other work. We are living in difficult times and anti-social forces are working all round us. On the one hand, we can take no risks when the very basis of freedom and security is involved; on the other hand, a tendency to suppress the individual without adequate cause is bad. Some High Courts have criticised governmental action in regard to detention and many people have been freed under the writ of *habeas corpus*. In some provinces<sup>12</sup> it has been made difficult by ordinance for *habeas corpus* applications to be made. I have no doubt that the provincial governments have taken action after the fullest

12. For example, in July 1948, the Government of West Bengal promulgated a security ordinance which prohibited interference with essential services, strikes, lockouts and processions and provided detention for three months without trial on a written order and detention for 15 days without this formality, and empowered the police to search any place. Later these detentions were increased to six months and 30 days respectively.



consideration of the situation, but I should like to point out to them that the reputation of India as a champion of freedom is suffering somewhat because of these happenings.

19. We have been asked about the coming 15th of August, how should we celebrate that day. Our Cabinet considered this matter and they were generally of opinion that, both because of the serious situation in the country and Mahatma Gandhi's death, it would not be proper to have any lavish celebrations or for any money to be spent on illuminations and the like. There should however be an appropriate and modest celebration of the day. The day happens to be a Sunday. We do not propose to have a holiday on the Monday following.

20. Celebrations will be official as well as non-official. So far as the latter are concerned, no doubt the Congress President will issue instructions, probably suggesting a public meeting, etc. In Delhi, we propose to have an official celebration including a party by the Governor General to the diplomatic corps and others, a flag-hoisting ceremony on the Red Fort and a military parade. I understand that the army authorities have directed that military parades should be held on that day at important centres where our troops are situated.

21. We have limited the use of the national flag. On the 15th August, however, this limitation will not apply, and any one can use that flag on his house or shop.

22. A matter for you to consider is whether on the 15th August, there should not be a release of prisoners, that is those who you feel can be released. That would be a good gesture for the New Year of Independence which would be appreciated.

23. You will have noticed in the press the violent attacks made by the Pakistan Government and officials on Lord Mountbatten.<sup>13</sup> He is made guilty of all the blood that was shed in the Punjab last year because he did not take action against the Sikh leaders early in August last. This charge is a most fantastic and monstrous one. The Pakistan Government do not scruple to say or do anything regardless of truth or fairness if they think it suits their purpose. I think in this particular matter they have over-reached themselves and injured their own cause. Lord Mountbatten, of course, has nothing to do with all this and it is just absurd to drag him in this way. But the whole

13. Ghulam Mohammed, Finance Minister of Pakistan, who was leading the Pakistan delegation in discussions with the British Government on the sterling balances on 3 July 1948, criticised what he considered to be the haste with which Lord Mountbatten effected the partition of India. He also alleged that Lord Mountbatten knew of "a deep-laid conspiracy by a militant section of the Sikhs to throttle Pakistan by eliminating the Muslim population, but no action was taken to prevent it."



basis of the argument has been that the Sikhs were the original sinners and nothing would have happened but for the Sikhs. I think this is an exceedingly unfair and false approach to the problem. You know how the situation developed in the Punjab from March 1947 when trouble broke out in Multan and Rawalpindi. You also know how during subsequent months there was continued killing and arson in Lahore and Amritsar. However, I shall not repeat this story except to point out that the charge made by Pakistan is grossly unfair. Our Government had thought of saying something about it in public but we decided not to do so as the U.K. Government had already issued some kind of a contradiction.<sup>14</sup>

24. I find that our Ambassadors abroad are some time criticised. This puts me in a difficult position. They cannot reply and it is not easy for me to say much about their work; much of it is necessarily not public work in the sense of being given publicity. We are building up our foreign service and it has always been a difficult matter to build up such a service. Some of the biggest countries in the world are yet rather backward in their foreign service because of the lack of traditions and experience behind that service. I think I can say that in the course of the last year or so, we have done rather well in building this service up and some of our Ambassadors and Ministers have functioned effectively and done good service to India. We live in critical times and the lot of our Ambassadors abroad is not an easy one. It is his business to be on friendly terms with the nation to which he is accredited, to raise India's prestige there, to gain benefits for India where he can, and at the same time firmly to adhere to India's general policy. That policy I repeat is a policy of not aligning with any power group but of being friends with all countries as far as possible. I am convinced that there is no other possible policy for us either in the present or in the foreseeable future.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. On 6 July, the Commonwealth Relations Office stated that Mountbatten's actions in the Punjab were based on the advice and discussions he had had with the Governor of the Punjab, who was constitutionally responsible for the security of Punjab and who based his advice on the assessment made by the local officials; and Mountbatten's actions were approved by the British Government. The decision to partition India had been taken with the approval of British Government and after consultations with the leaders of the two major political parties in India.

## III

New Delhi  
3 August, 1948

My dear Premier,

The last fortnight has seen many developments both in India and abroad which are of grave consequence. Abroad, the situation in Berlin is still full of danger, though there has been some slight relaxation. The approach of the western powers to Stalin may well lead to some temporary arrangement. Even if such an arrangement takes place, it is hardly likely to take any permanency but it will certainly stave off fear of war in the near future. The principal reason, however, for thinking that there will be no war this year at least is the real disinclination of either of the two major parties to launch into war. But speeches continue to be made which are bellicose and sometimes events take the reins into their hands.

2. The Palestine situation is relatively static. Recent events have probably been somewhat in favour of the Jews and the Arabs are angry.<sup>1</sup> They feel that the great powers, including the United Kingdom, have not given them a square deal. In the Arab and the Islamic world, generally in the Middle East, there appear to be two rather contradictory tendencies at work. There is undoubtedly a certain pan-Islamic tendency drawing the Islamic countries of the Middle East towards each other. At the same time there is a completely different tendency which may be said to be pro-Asian as against Europe and America. That is to say, there is a feeling that Europe and America have consistently tried to profit by the internal troubles of Middle East countries and have exploited them. Therefore, they must give up all hope of relying on Europe or America and trust Asian countries. This latter tendency bases itself more on nationalism just as the former bases itself on religion. The nationalistic tendency is more confined to the intellectuals who can see a little further. They try to play down, to a certain extent, Islamic sentiment as such because they realise that while it is the cementing factor for certain Islamic countries, it comes in the way of a larger cooperation with other Asian countries.

3. In India the three dominating issues continue to be Kashmir, Hyderabad and our economic difficulties. In all three of these there have been marked developments.

1. From 8 to 18 July, when both sides agreed to the new truce ordered by the Security Council, the Israeli forces militarily improved their position by capturing Nazareth, Ramleh, Lydda and Lydda airport, the largest in Palestine. This was done according to the demarcation made by U.N. resolution on the partition of Palestine.



4. In Kashmir the military situation took a turn for the worse for us because very large forces of the Pakistan regular army were thrown against our forces in the State. It is estimated that at least one full division of the Pakistan army is functioning in Kashmir now, apart from the irregulars, frontier scouts, tribal folk, etc. A full division with all modern equipment fighting near its base naturally made a great difference and came in the way of the development of our plans. Pakistan organised an all-out attack on many fronts. The fiercest attack took place in the Uri-Tithwal sector, in the Jhelum valley. In the Jammu area and in the Ladakh there was also continued fighting. In the Tithwal area our forces had to retreat a few miles. It must be remembered that a large-scale offensive of this type must have taken long weeks of preparation. Nevertheless, it was held with such resources as we had at the time. Some reinforcements have been sent subsequently. Just at the present moment the Kashmir situation must be considered to be rather static, but we do not intend to allow it to remain so.

5. The U.N. Kashmir Commission after spending three weeks in Delhi have now gone to Karachi.<sup>2</sup> Their discussions with us centred round the ceasefire which later would be followed by further talks for a settlement. We were agreeable to the ceasefire but on two basic conditions. One was that the complicity of Pakistan must be recognised and stated; the other was that all Pakistan regular armies should completely withdraw from the State territory. Presumably Pakistan would not agree to these and hence matters came to a standstill. There is no doubt that the U.N. Commission knew that Pakistan armies were functioning in Kashmir. This meant that the whole case of Pakistan, which was based on Pakistan not taking part in Kashmir operations, was based on falsehood. The U.N. Commission appears to recognise this fact, indeed there was no help for it. Nevertheless, they were reluctant to say so in public, because they felt that this would not lead to a settlement which could only take place by agreement of the two parties. On our side we laid the greatest stress on this not only moral but factual issue. It seemed to us scandalous that patent facts should be denied and the whole case built up on that denial. The Security Council went completely wrong because it proceeded on wrong premises. We insisted, therefore, that the first step should be to right this wrong approach. The U.N. Commission are now, as I have said, in Karachi presumably discussing possibilities of ceasefire. Probably some of them will come back here soon for further discussions.

6. Meanwhile, one important development has taken place. It appears that the Pakistan Government have openly admitted now that their armies are

2. The Commission was in India from 10 to 31 July 1948. It returned to Pakistan on 1 August 1948.



functioning in Kashmir State territory. They have given rather futile reasons for this, but the fact remains that admittedly now the Indian Army is fighting the Pakistan Army in Kashmir territory, that is, India and Pakistan are at war, which is formally undeclared in the Kashmir State. It is clear that this kind of situation cannot continue and rapid developments may well take place. We can hardly be at war with each other in one area, and at peace, carrying on inter-Dominion conferences and the like in other areas.

7. It must be remembered that the Pakistan Army has a very large number of British officers. The whole General Staff is British-controlled. If the Pakistan Army is functioning in Kashmir it naturally follows that the British General Staff as well as other British officers in the Pakistan Army are conducting operations and are responsible for them. This raises serious issues, and we have drawn the attention of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to this very anomalous state of affairs. In another context the U.K. Prime Minister agreed that British officers could not stay on in either army if there was possibility of war.<sup>3</sup>

8. In Hyderabad the situation grows more difficult internally from every point of view. There was a very serious incident near the Sholapur border on the way to Barsi enclave. A convoy of ours was suddenly attacked by a band of Razakars and some of our soldiers were killed. Our troops went into action and cleared the place of all Razakars killing a considerable number of them. Since then our troops have been in possession of this bit of the Nizam's territory and we intend to hold on in spite of the protests we have received from the Nizam's Government. A joint commission of enquiry consisting of an Indian brigadier from our army and a British colonel serving with the Nizam conducted an enquiry into this incident and jointly reported that it was an organised well-prepared attack by the Razakars on the Indian troops.

9. Petty incidents continue to happen on the Hyderabad border, but what is much worse is the activities of the Razakars and others like them within the Hyderabad State. Recently a Minister of the Nizam's present Government, Mr. Joshi, who has been till now a close colleague of Kasim Razvi of the Ittehad-ul-Muslemeen, resigned from Government and made a public statement. This statement discloses a terrible state of affairs in parts of the Hyderabad State. There is no doubt that large sections of the non-Mus-

3. There were about 300 senior British officers serving in the Indian Army and 700 in Pakistan Army though none of them were in an operational command in Kashmir. Nehru feared that Pakistan might use its air force, which had inducted British personnel, against India in Kashmir. To this Attlee replied that if there was a war British officers would be withdrawn from both countries.

when we removed this control or at any rate we took it in a wrong manner and the results have been very harmful. While a small number of people, manufacturers and dealers in cotton textiles, have made money, vast numbers of others have been hard hit. When disparities in income increase in any way, there is inevitable trouble. All legislation and financial policy has to aim today at removing these disparities as far as possible and gradually working towards a common level of income, or, at any rate, incomes which do not differ too much. The removal of controls has worked the other way, and, apart from hitting hard both the middle classes and the poorer classes, they have introduced a psychology of extreme dissatisfaction in the people. It has been felt that various sections of the community do not shoulder burdens equally.

16. This reimposition of control on textiles casts a heavy burden on the provinces. Its success depends upon the efficient enforcement of it there and the proper selection of wholesalers and retailers. It is essential that cases of infringement of control are tried expeditiously and offenders severely punished.<sup>6</sup> Leniency in this matter, instead of proving a deterrent, actually encourages violation of the law.

17. The steep rise in the price level has hit particularly hard the people with fixed incomes, such as Government servants, employees in trade, industrial labour etc. The consumers' cooperative societies, to meet the requirements of these people particularly should be encouraged. It is also desirable to restrict the sales from Government-controlled shops to people belonging to certain specific income groups. Supplies to these people should be on the basis of coupons to be issued by Government.

18. This control on textiles is only a small part of the economic problem which faces us. I shall not write more about this here except to say that it will require all our wisdom and energy to deal with this matter. We may point out a number of factors which have gone to worsen the economic situation and we may be right, but the causes are deep-seated and therefore the remedies must fit in with them.

19. The problems of the refugees from Pakistan still pursue us, and I fear that progress continues to be very slow. Recent changes in policy<sup>7</sup> have rather upset these refugees and there are plenty of anti-social elements among them to take advantage of this fact. It is clear that the problem can-

6. The Government of India served orders on 400 textile mills freezing their stock and undertook to control prices and distribution.

7. An order of 21 July 1948 introduced certain restrictions on return of Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan in order to regulate the influx under a permit system.



not be solved unless the whole of India cooperates. At the recent Premiers' Conference held in Delhi there was evidence of this desire to cooperate.

20. Housing has been a terrible headache in all the provinces. It was bad enough because of the war, but the influx of refugees has made it indefinitely worse. As I wrote to you in my previous letter we have decided to start a factory for the manufacture of pre-fabricated houses. We are opening a new department of housing and putting it under the Health Minister. I commend to you the opening of similar departments of housing in each province.

21. I have written to you often enough on the subject of detenus or people kept in prison or detention without trial. Circumstances in India today are bad and we will not take a risk which may lead to violent repercussions. Subject to this I would again ask you to consider how far it is desirable to keep people for long in detention without trial. This has a bad effect on our reputation, and I continue to receive large numbers of protests from every part of the world. I cannot advise you because the responsibility is yours and you have to judge finally. I only wish to point out to you the dangers of continuing a policy, which ultimately probably depends on the judgment of police officers, or the like, and which tends to become stabilised as a method of Government. It must always be remembered that this is not a normal or proper method of government or administration, and that it can only be indulged in cases of grave emergency. It is true that there is emergency in India today. I would suggest to you, what indeed some provinces have done, that a panel of senior judicial officers, preferably High Court Judges, might be asked to examine privately all cases of detention and to advise Government what action to take in regard to them. It is obviously something that does not redound to the credit of Government that High Courts should pass strictures on Government when such matters are brought before them.

22. Long ago it was decided to exchange prisoners between western Pakistan and certain parts of India but many hitches occurred and delayed this transfer. Now we hope to carry this through as expeditiously as possible.

23. The Government of India have decided to send a delegation to the second session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as to the Interim Commission of the International Trade Organisation. These commence at Geneva on the 16th and 25th August respectively. The Leader of the Indian delegation will be Shri Raghavan Pillai, Charge d' Affaires of India, Paris.



lims in Hyderabad are being terrorised in every way. Apart from killing, arson and rape, there are forcible conversions and forcible collection of money by the Razakars.

10. It appears that the increase of disorder in Hyderabad State is having a bad effect on the Nizam's army. This army has a large number of senior British officers. These officers have been somewhat alarmed by the recent speech made by Mr. Attlee, the U.K. Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, in answer to Mr. Churchill.<sup>4</sup> They have suddenly realised that in case of hostility with India, if they continue to serve the Nizam, they would put themselves in a very difficult position with their own government. There are thus internally weakening factors in Hyderabad. The economic blockade continues, but it must be remembered that we are not stopping the sending of medical supplies, salt or chlorine for purifying water. Of food, there is no lack in Hyderabad as it is an exporting country. The propaganda that is being carried on that we are starving Hyderabad and denying it medical supplies is completely false. As a matter of fact we are sending a large quantity of cholera vaccine now.

11. What are we going to do about Hyderabad is a question that is frequently asked. I can well understand the impatience and irritation in the country. The way the Nizam's government and the Razakars have behaved has been scandalous. We have made it clear that not only the old formula is dead and gone but also that we are not going to talk even unless the present government there is changed and the Razakars are banned and suppressed. Recently, Sir Mirza Ismail came to Delhi and it was reported in the press that he was carrying on negotiations on behalf of Hyderabad. This was not strictly true. Sir Mirza is an old colleague whom we respect and we are always prepared to meet him. In effect, however, there can be no serious talk with him because he had no authority.

12. To come back to the question: what are we going to do with Hyderabad? You will not expect me to answer that in this letter. All that we can say is that, while we do not wish to take any precipitate action and must go forward warily and in full knowledge of all the consequences of any contemplated action, we cannot refrain from action either for very long. Some action is already taking place, economic and other, and this is producing results in spite of the brave words of some members of the Hyderabad government. Further action will undoubtedly be taken unless something happens which changes the situation in Hyderabad. But it must be

4. On 30 July 1948, replying to a speech by Churchill on Hyderabad, Attlee ruled out the possibility of mediation or intervention by the United Kingdom.

remembered that every step has to be viewed in the all-India context. No government can forget the whole picture of India in considering one particular part of it. In no event can we admit the right of Hyderabad to independence. There is no instance in history, so far as I am aware, when a land-locked territory, surrounded on all sides by one state, has become independent. Both in strict law, and in fact, the notion of Hyderabad's independence is a little absurd.

13. In recent weeks, a great deal of attention has been attracted to the gun-running between Karachi and Hyderabad. Four-engine Lancaster planes worked by foreign pilots have been continuously flying at night to deliver their cargo of arms, etc., to Hyderabad. We have asked them not to do so, and, indeed, according to our rules no aircraft can fly over India without stopping on Indian soil. We are certainly entitled to shoot them down, and we shall do so, but it is not easy to locate a plane flying at night at about 15 to 20 thousand feet altitude. Yesterday, an accident happened at Mauripur airfield, near Karachi, when one of these Lancastrians had a crash soon after taking off. The pilot died, and the plane was smashed. The most revealing fact of all was the ammunition and arms spread out all over the airfield after this crash. This matter also raises important issues for us, vis-a-vis Pakistan. We are in constant communication with the U.K. Government on these subjects and, of course, with the Pakistan Government to which formal protests have been addressed.

14. In view of this Kashmir, Hyderabad and Pakistan situation, it is clear that we cannot allow ourselves to be tied up in secondary matters when, at any moment, a very grave crisis may confront us. I would request provincial governments to keep this picture before their eyes, and to be mentally and otherwise prepared for any possible development. It is well known that we are not war-mongers and we are more devoted to peace than any other country or people. We shall avoid war because war is a frightful thing and comes in the way of progress and leaves bitter trails behind it. But events follow one another in quick succession and our patience is tried to the utmost.

15. The economic situation shows no sign of improvement and the whole question of controls, among other things, has come up for reconsideration. So far as the cotton textile policy is concerned, control has for all practical purposes been reimposed.<sup>5</sup> We must confess that we took a wrong step

5. On 19 January 1948, production, pricing and distribution of cotton yarn and cloth were decontrolled. On 21 April, the quota system was abolished and stamping of price was relaxed. These led to a steep 40 to 100 per cent-rise in prices of textiles. After a thorough review of the situation, a new policy reimposing control on cotton yarn and cloth was announced on 30 July 1948.



24. You will be glad to know that the Government of India have agreed to enter into a treaty of friendship with the ancient republic of Switzerland.<sup>8</sup> This is our first treaty of this kind.

25. I have already written to you about the celebrations on the 15th of August. It is for the provinces to decide the manner of such celebrations, but our advice is that they should not be on a lavish scale and that no large sums should be spent upon them. That would be unbecoming in any event in view of the distress in the country. Mahatma Gandhi's death is too near us for us to take part in any celebrations. The day must be treated by us not in any spirit of vain glory, but rather in a spirit of dedication to the cause we have served for so long and which demands fresh and continuous service from us still.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. The treaty signed on 14 August 1948 at New Delhi for "perpetual peace and unalterable friendship," provided for exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two countries, respect for rights of residence, trade, profession and movement of each other's nationals, privileges on the "most favoured foreign nation basis", and settlement of all disputes through negotiations.

#### IV

New Delhi  
16 August 1948

My dear Premier,

I write to you the day after our celebration of Independence Day. It would be fitting on this occasion to review the work of the past year, our successes and our failures, but that would be too large an undertaking for this fortnightly letter. Our celebrations of Independence Day, quiet as they were planned to be, were successful and I think they indicated that in spite of our difficulties there was an appreciation in the mind of the general public of the achievements of the year.

2. In the many messages from prominent leaders that were published or broadcast, there was one common theme that without self-praise or self-pity, we should dedicate ourselves anew to the service of India and her people. It was a right note. Self-praise is bad but self-pity is equally foolish. We have to take a dispassionate view of the situation and face it with all our faith and courage. There is no doubt that the problems we face are most difficult; there is also no doubt that we are



going forward step by step towards the solution of some of these problems. It may be that while we solve one problem another takes its place, but that is the way of life and the way of dynamic growth.

3. The situation in Berlin is somewhat easier and it seems likely that some arrangement will be arrived at between the rival powers. How far that arrangement will take us and how long it will last is another matter. In a little more than a month the United Nations General Assembly is meeting in Paris<sup>1</sup> and all these international problems are going to come up before it. India, not only because of her independent nationhood but also because of her potential power in world affairs, becomes more and more entangled in these international problems. We cannot isolate ourselves and remain aloof or refuse to express an opinion. As members of an international body we have to shoulder the burden and obligation of that membership. So the Paris General Assembly of the U.N. will be an important one, possibly having far-reaching results.

4. In view of this I have been earnestly thinking of visiting this Assembly session myself if only for a few days at the beginning.<sup>2</sup> If it is at all possible I shall go there. Whether it is possible or not, subsequent events will indicate.

5. There is also the probability of my going to the Premiers' Conference in London. This is likely to be held in the second week of October. Normally I would go for the General Assembly and stay on till the Premiers' Conference.<sup>3</sup> If I cannot be away from India for this period, I may come back after the first meeting and then go again for the second.<sup>4</sup>

6. Before you get this letter you will have learnt of the resignation of our Finance Minister Shri Shanmukham Chetty and of acceptance of it.<sup>5</sup> I made it clear that there is no question of our doubting the *bona fide* of Shri

1. The Assembly met at Paris from 21 September to 12 December 1948.
2. Nehru addressed the Assembly on 3 November 1948.
3. Nehru attended this Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' in London from 11 to 22 October 1948.
4. In fact Nehru left New Delhi on 5 October and returned on 5 November 1948 after attending both the meetings.
5. R.K. Shanmukham Chetty resigned from the office of Minister of Finance on 16 August 1948. He had been charged with withdrawing some names submitted to the Income Tax Investigation Commission, after having created an impression that once the Commission was seized of the matter its investigations would not be interfered with. He explained that he had merely attempted a revision of the cases which was agreed to tacitly because of the haste with which they had to be submitted to the Commission.

Shanmukham Chetty. Nevertheless, some things were done which can only be described as a grave error of judgment. In such matters we have felt that we must have the highest standard of public conduct and so I have agreed with deep regret to accept his resignation. I trust that this occurrence will help both our provincial ministries and the general public in realising that in public affairs only the highest standard must be maintained and that even *bona fide* errors cannot be tolerated.

7. This resignation has come at a very awkward time for us and just when we were dealing with the economic situation. The Finance Minister himself was in charge of two important legislative measures, the nationalisation of the Reserve Bank of India and the Banking Bill.<sup>6</sup> But more important than any particular legislative measure is the problem of how to deal effectively with the economic situation as a whole. In this matter we are at present trying to consult important interests and experts. I am glad to inform you that we are consulting even those who are normally completely opposed to Government. We do not wish to proceed in this and other matters on a narrow party basis. Even if we are right in our policy but fail to win over large sections, our rightness will not take us very far. I would commend to you this example of attempting to win the cooperation of others. In regard to the economic situation there are two general approaches: (1) that very radical measures are necessary immediately, and (2) that just at this present moment it would be undesirable to embark on even desirable radical measures. It may be that some balance has to be struck between these two viewpoints.

8. Recently there has been much criticism of certain legislative measures in a province which tend to deprive High Courts of their normal powers.<sup>7</sup> Sometimes, ordinances are issued and at other times the Provincial Assembly deals with the matter. I have written to you on several occasions about the growing tendency to restrict individual and group freedom. In a crisis, much can be said in justification of this and we live in days of crisis. Nevertheless, it is a dangerous path to tread, and governments get used to

6. The Reserve Bank (Transfer of Public Ownership) Bill was passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on 3 September 1948 and became an Act with effect from 1 January 1949. The Banking Bill, aimed at defining a banking company and increasing the control and powers of the Reserve Bank of India, was promulgated through an ordinance on 18 September 1948.

7. The West Bengal Security Act stated that before making arrests, the Government should be satisfied on "reasonable grounds" for its action. A question arose as to what was "reasonable" for the Government. It was maintained that the "reasonableness" of the executive should be judged by the judiciary. The full bench of the High Court was to give an interpretation of this point on 5 July. But the Government forestalled the move by an ordinance which deleted the ambiguous words "reasonable grounds" and added "facilities for the government and difficulties for detenus" and gave the amendment a retrospective effect.



very special measures which they cannot do without later. For us, with our past record in regard to civil liberty, this is a peculiarly distasteful course.

9. In any event, any attempt to limit the powers of a High Court or to prevent it from judging executive action in the normal way is fraught with grave consequences. The judiciary are supposed to be the defenders of freedom within the law. If they cannot even do this then one of their chief functions vanishes. The reputation of High Courts, which has been high, suffers. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to keep this in mind and not to interfere with the High Courts' discretion or to put too many restrictions on individual freedom.

10. This is particularly applicable to *habeas corpus* applications and to the freedom of association in trade unions, etc. In many countries in the world today there are labour or semi-labour governments. For them it is a creed that trade unions must have freedom. Anything that lessens it, therefore, is objected to by them. I continue to receive from foreign countries and especially from trade unions in foreign countries, letters and telegrams of protest expressing their surprise and dismay at somethings that our governments have done.

11. So far as High Courts are concerned, we have been advised by high judicial authority that even if an ordinance or other kind of legislation comes in the way of a High Court issuing the writ of *habeas corpus*, the right of the High Courts will not be affected in this regard. Our Draft Constitution expressly preserves this right of the High Courts.<sup>8</sup> We have, therefore, officially advised provincial governments that it is undesirable to oust the jurisdiction of High Courts in *habeas corpus* applications under the Public Safety Act.<sup>9</sup>

12. While we cannot go far in suppressing activities, even those considered objectionable, there is no doubt that in existing circumstances we have to take every precaution against the revival of anti-social elements. Reports have come to us from many parts of India that the activities of the R.S.S. are again growing. The R.S.S. method is often to speak softly, but their whole ideology and activity is different and opposed to the ideology which has governed us for so long. We cannot, therefore, so long as we are the Government, tolerate the encouragement and spread of this wrong ideology. I hope that provincial governments are wide awake in this respect and will not permit the spread of communal doctrine in whatever shape.

8. Article 226 of the Constitution gave this right to the High Courts.

9. The Government of India issued directives to the provincial governments on the undesirability of ousting the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. By that section High Courts had the power to set at liberty any person who was illegally or improperly detained. Under the Draft Constitution this power was expressly given to the High Courts and the Union Government had ensured that in the transition period nothing would be done to counter the spirit of the Constitution.



13. I might mention that it has come to my notice that the R.S.S. are now functioning in various guises, even as civil liberty unions or *Jana Adhikar Sabhas*. We must not be led astray by these names but should find out the content behind them.

14. There are also reports of a certain revival on a smaller scale of some pro-Muslim League feeling in India. I was surprised to find this as far away as Madras. That also we cannot encourage in any way.

15. Our neighbour country Burma is in the throes of a very serious rebellion<sup>10</sup> and it is doubtful what the outcome of this rebellion will be. We are deeply interested in this, not only because any change in Burma affects the whole position in South East Asia, but also because of the large number of Indians in Burma. We shall help them of course, to the best of our ability, but we have found from experience that it is little that we can give where such large numbers are involved. Any attempt to bring them over to India is a colossal task and if we bring large numbers to India and add them to our refugee population, how would it profit them and us. We have advised Indian residents in Burma to remain there and to help each other, at the same time not entangling themselves in the internal affairs of Burma.

16. In Malaya there has also been a serious rebellion but in view of the superior striking power of the British Government there, this revolt is likely to be suppressed.<sup>11</sup>

17. We have started an Atomic Energy Commission. This will be directly under the Prime Minister. Most people connect atomic energy with the atomic bomb. As a matter of fact we are hardly likely to be able to make such bombs for a long time to come, and I trust that India will never use such a bomb which brings such misery to vast numbers of people. The real importance of atomic energy is that it brings a new and powerful force into daily life. This force by itself is of revolutionary social consequences; it is likely to change the structure of life as it is today; it brings tremendous power which can be carried from place to place easily and can be used for raising the productive and other resources of the country.

18. You have been informed of the decision of the Cabinet here that all women, whether married, unmarried, or widows, should be eligible to apply for appointment to all branches of public services.<sup>12</sup> It will, of course, be in your discretion to employ them where they can be most useful. I am

10. On 9-10 August 1948 two battalions of the First Burma Rifles mutinied at Thayetmyo, the oil town on the Irrawaddy north of Prome, and Mingaladon and seized control of Prome. They planned to march on Rangoon and seize power.


11. The British authorities in Singapore announced on 3 August that they had nipped communist guerilla plans to set up a Malayan communist republic that day.

12. From 17 July 1948, women were declared eligible for all public services.



"FIXED INCOME AND PRICE LEVEL", A CARTOON FROM SHANKAR'S WEEKLY,  
11 JULY 1948





ADDRESSING PRIME MINISTERS OF PROVINCES, NEW DELHI, 19 JULY 1948



glad of this decision of the Government of India because it is in conformity with Congress policy during the last 20 years at least.

19. The situation in Kashmir has not been satisfactory. While we have been waiting for the U.N. Commission to take some definite steps, Pakistan has been trying to force the pace and has used very large numbers of its regular army with this end in view. That is a very serious matter with far-reaching consequences. We have taken the strongest exception to Pakistan armies functioning in Kashmir.

20. The U.N. Kashmir Commission is here at present and has given us a resolution which deals with ceasefire first and then a truce and then later other necessary arrangements. We are considering this carefully. In view, however, of Pakistan Government's complicity in this matter and their continuing denial of such complicity, it is impossible for us to trust their word.

21. Hyderabad continues to deteriorate and we receive letters not only from the Hindu population but from the Europeans there, painting a picture of conditions there which is very peculiar. Our grip on the Hyderabad frontiers is strong now, and our instructions are that if any one misbehaves near the border our army or police should immediately cross that border and take action. The White Paper on Hyderabad has recently been issued.<sup>13</sup> This will help you to understand the background.

22. The Agent General for Hyderabad, Nawab Zain Yar Jung, has been recalled by the Nizam, presumably because he did not fall in line with the present Razakar Government. A new Agent General has come, Mr. S.M.A. Razvi.<sup>14</sup>

23. The next few weeks should see major developments in Kashmir and Hyderabad. The present situation is far from static. The presence of the U.N. Commission is a restraining factor.

24. I started this letter two days ago, but was unable to complete it. A very great deal of our time has been taken up by the Kashmir issue and more specially the proposals of the U.N. Commission in regard to it. These proposals have placed us in a peculiar difficulty. We are naturally anxious to do everything in our power to promote peace and a settlement, and as a first step to this end, to have ceasefire and a truce. But a ceasefire, which leaves conditions as they are, is going to lead to no settlement. The first condition is that the Pakistan regular forces and irregulars, including the tribal people must withdraw from Kashmir State territory. The second is that our own forces must remain there in adequate numbers to prevent any new

13. This was issued by the Government of India on 10 August 1948.

14. S.M.A. Razvi, a member of Hyderabad Civil Services; Chief Secretary, Hyderabad State in 1948; Agent General in New Delhi from 6 August 1948.

raid or incursion from outside. Many other factors have also to be borne in mind, but the most important is the one I have mentioned above. It is quite impossible for us to weaken our defence in Kashmir, even if the Pakistanis withdraw, because they have to withdraw only a short distance into their territory and can come back again with great rapidity. We can take no risks of this kind. The U.N. Commission have suggested certain governing principles. Elucidation and the working out of these principles is left to a somewhat later stage. We shall have to come to a decision on this subject very soon.

25. Whatever the decisions in regard to Kashmir and Hyderabad may be, provincial governments should keep wide awake about the possible reactions within their areas. As I have mentioned above, there appears to have been recrudescence of communal activity in various parts of India. This has to be checked and prevented from doing any mischief, whether it is Hindu or Muslim or Sikh. Unfortunately, some leaders of the Sikhs have been carrying on a most unwise policy and delivering intemperate speeches.<sup>15</sup> You will have noticed that the Hindu Mahasabha intends to embark again into politics.<sup>16</sup> This is an undesirable move and has to be watched carefully. As you know, Government have decided not to encourage any communal organisation. That is to say that Government or Government officers, whether in the Centre or in the provinces, should have no dealings with the Hindu Mahasabha as such, or any other body that is obviously communal, whatever different garb it may wear.

26. In a letter sent to me by a Premier of a province,<sup>17</sup> it has been suggested that army units should be raised provincially and given provincial names. This is proposed because it is thought that it would lead to greater enthusiasm in the province concerned. The Defence Ministry are entirely opposed to this proposal and have pointed out that it would disturb the present organisation of the army. I entirely agree with them. We have enough provincialism as it is and we should not encourage it any more, specially in the army. The army should be a homogeneous Indian Army and not a collection of provincial armies. It is highly important that any separatist tendencies, whether communal or provincial, should not be allowed to come into the army. Present recruitment is done on a zonal rather than a pro-

15. For example, Master Tara Singh, at a press conference on 2 August 1948, raised the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state.

16. On 8 August 1948, the Working Committee of the All India Hindu Mahasabha met in Delhi and decided to resume political activities and to throw open the membership to all citizens irrespective of caste or religion.

17. Ravi Shankar Shukla of the Central Provinces.



vincial basis. It would be a great pity if we changed this and prevented people in the army from developing an all-India outlook.

27. It has come to my notice that certain rather irresponsible newspapers and periodicals are continually attacking many of the ambassadors and ministers that we have sent abroad. Any discussion of policy is of course always to be welcomed. Indeed any criticism which is *bona fide* should have full play. But the kind of fantastic and rather personal charges that are made distress me, because the person so charged can make no reply and it is difficult for me to contradict such statements from day to day. To do so is to give a certain importance to the newspaper or periodical concerned. Most of these charges and stories are completely false or are perverted. It is my belief that the building up of our foreign establishments has been more of a success than we could have anticipated and most of our foreign representatives have done rather well.

28. Inevitably much of their work does not see the light of day and so perhaps people imagine that they do not work. It is a difficult matter to build up a foreign service and there are only a very few countries which have succeeded in doing so adequately. Our success in this matter seems to me to be marked. Of course mistakes have been made, and, no doubt, will continue to be made. But on the whole I am prepared to congratulate our foreign representatives on the good work that they are doing.

29. Criticisms are sometimes made of the large sums being spent on our foreign diplomatic establishments. It is true that this is a costly business. We have tried to prevent waste, and I think on the whole we compare favourably in this respect with the embassies etc. of other countries. The choice before us is either to have such diplomatic relations with foreign powers or not. As an independent country, especially because of our present status and potential for the future of India, it is unthinkable to me that we can do away with these foreign embassies etc. however much they may cost. We would hardly be functioning as an independent nation then, and we would not be able to protect the interests, insofar as we can, of the large numbers of Indians abroad. Inevitably we would have to rely on some other power to represent us in other countries, as Pakistan is doing today in many countries. That would not be in keeping not only with our dignity and status but also with any external policy that we may wish to pursue.

30. Embassies in foreign countries represent the State. They have to maintain a certain dignity and function in the normal diplomatic way. We have made some innovations which, so far as we know, no other country has



done. Among these, we have ruled out the use of alcoholic drinks at all our official functions and this is a saving apart from its moral aspect. Considering the previous practice all over the world, this has been a fairly notable change.

31. Criticisms are also made of our general policy and it is said that, by maintaining an independent foreign policy, we make enemies all round and have no friends. That, I think, is a basic misunderstanding of the position. It is incorrect to say that we make enemies and have no friends. It would be correct to say that our refusal to be anybody's camp-followers is not liked by some countries. Looking at it purely opportunistically, I am sure that no other policy is likely to be advantageous to us, even in short-run and certainly in the long-run. The fact that India counts in the world today, far more than most people imagine, is itself a reason why we have to come up against the policies of some other nations. I think that India is respected more and more in foreign chancellories, and what India says has weight.

32. You will have learnt of the appointment of His Highness the Maharaja of Bhavnagar as the next Governor of Madras in succession to Sir Archibald Nye.<sup>18</sup> Sir Archibald Nye, who is the last British Governor in India, has been a great success there and it is with regret that both we in the Central Government and the Madras Government are parting from him. It is not a real parting as he will be coming back to India as the U.K. High Commissioner. His presence here in that capacity will be welcome. The appointment of the Maharaja of Bhavnagar is an innovation as this is the first occasion when we have appointed one of the Princes to this high office.

33. Recently the East Bengal Government has indulged in some aggression across their border with West Bengal. They have occupied certain *Char* lands<sup>19</sup> about which there has been some dispute and which thus far have been included in West Bengal. It is unfortunate that these acts of aggression continue. We cannot submit to them and we have to take action to regain possession of these alluvial lands on the borders of Murshidabad district.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. On 13 August 1948.

19. Low-lying alluvial soil added to the East Bengal bank by Bhagirathi river which shifted course after the monsoons. There were about twelve disputed *Chars* and villages in the Murshidabad-Rajshahi border.

## V

New Delhi  
23 August 1948

My dear Premier,<sup>1</sup>

For some weeks past I have been writing to you about the very serious economic situation resulting from inflation and continued rise in prices. In my fortnightly letters I have mentioned this and I have asked you for your views on the subject. Some premiers have sent me notes on the subject.

2. You will realise that the Government of India have been peculiarly exercised over this matter as the responsibility is ultimately theirs and apart from this, anything affecting vast numbers of people in India is of vital consequence. It is a possibility that unless the economic situation is grappled with effectively, there may be continued deterioration and we might arrive at a pass from which it may be difficult to extricate ourselves. We have enough problems and troubles—Kashmir, Hyderabad, etc—and probably the basic problem of all is this economic situation.

3. The Government of India decided to confer with various important interests and experts before they came to any new conclusions. We consulted representatives of labour. We are consulting representatives of industry. We invited a number of prominent economists from all over the country and asked them to confer together and present us with their recommendations.<sup>2</sup> These economists came to Delhi and for a week or so they sat together discussing this problem amongst them. We did not give them any precise terms of reference. We asked them to consider the present economic situation in the country and to suggest remedies. The economists who came here represent differing schools of thought.

4. Yesterday these economists met the members of the Cabinet and presented a report on the economic situation in India.<sup>3</sup> This report was a unanimous one. It contains an analysis of the situation and of the major causes which had led to inflation and rise in prices. Remedies were suggested under four heads—(1) Fiscal, (2) Monetary, (3) Controls and (4) Production.

1. A special letter in addition to the fortnightly letters.

2. The economists were K.T. Shah, C.N. Vakil, Gyanchand, Radhakamal Mukherjee, P.J. Thomas, D.R. Gadgil, Narayan Rao, V.K.R.V. Rao and E.P.W. da Costa.

3. The Government of India on 2 September published summaries of their reports on the economic situation. They were agreed on the need to secure increased industrial output, on the maintenance of the existing controls over some essential commodities and their extension to others, on slowing down of the pace of prohibition, austerity in government's expenditure, and on liberalisation of import policy and other ways of mopping up surplus purchasing power.



5. The economists considered the situation as one of grave national emergency which required a war-time outlook and a war-time approach. In fact they called it a war against inflation and for this they suggested remedial measures involving a simultaneous attack on a number of fronts. Their plan, they told us, was to be looked at as a whole and not in bits and parts, although, of course, the emphasis may vary or possibly some relatively non-essential parts might not be considered important. But they did lay emphasis on our considering their proposals as an integrated whole.

6. These proposals involve far-reaching changes in various aspects of our present day economy, both Central and provincial. Essentially this plan is a short term one and is not meant to bring about permanent changes, though obviously even a short term plan produces certain permanent results. The whole objective is to break the back of inflationary tendencies in the course of a few months or a year and then to review the situation and perhaps relax somewhat in some directions. The plan, therefore, must be considered roughly as a year's programme or may be a little more than a year. During this period everything, or almost everything, has to be subordinated to the fight against inflation and its attendant evils. This involves our stopping expenditure on every project and activity which does not yield immediate results or which does not help in the fight against inflation. That is to say even beneficent schemes are to be held up.

7. I need not describe their proposals here as I am enclosing a full copy of their report<sup>4</sup> for your consideration. You will notice that provincial governments are affected by many of the proposals and it will be for you to consider how far you can go. But in any event, in view of the present situation and the probable steps that the Government of India may take, it would appear to be clear that reliance must not be placed by provincial governments on the Government of India for grants or loans except for every urgent and unavoidable reason. This will affect many of your schemes and policies.

8. Two important matters which provincial governments have before them are: prohibition and acquisition of zamindaris. Both of these are essential parts of the Congress programme; both involve large expenditures by way of compensation or otherwise. It is for the provincial governments to consider how far they can go ahead with these in the immediate future. But in giving this consideration they might bear in mind that the Centre be able to give any effective help. will not

4. Not printed.



## LETTERS TO THE PREMIERS OF PROVINCES

9. This is a hard thing for me to say after all the promises we have made to provincial governments, but we have to be realists and realism requires a frank facing of the issues before us and a grappling with them with all our might. I am afraid we have rather slurred over these matters and allowed them to drift. There can be no excuse for that any more.

10. The Government of India have not considered the report yet and therefore have come to no conclusions. They will consider it fully and exhaustively very soon as the matter can brook no delay. What their conclusions are going to be I cannot prophesy. Normally we should have waited for full provincial reactions and your opinion before arriving at any final conclusions. But the time at our disposal is short and we may have to come to some conclusions even before we hear from you fully unless you write to us soon. It is obvious that a unanimous report of eminent economists from all over the country must be treated with respect. Economists, however eminent in their domain, need not necessarily be acquainted with the practical and administrative aspects of the problem. That is for us to consider.

11. As you are aware the Central Assembly is meeting at present. Normally the present session would end on the 4th September. It would be desirable from every point of view to place some of the major indication of Government's future policy before the Assembly for discussion before the Assembly breaks up. It may not perhaps be easy to arrive at final conclusions by then, either for the Government or the Assembly. But some general indications will have to be given. The Assembly may meet for this purpose early in September. We may have to extend the session by two or three days if necessary.

12. I also enclose herewith a copy of the report on this very subject submitted to the Government by the economists attached to the various Ministries of the Government of India.

13. I shall be grateful to you if you will give earnest and immediate thought to this matter and to the report I am sending you. If you could let me have your preliminary reactions as soon as possible, it would help very much. Fuller reactions might be sent a little later.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

VI

New Delhi

1 September 1948

My dear Premier,

The last fortnight has been one of important developments and we are on the eve of far-reaching decisions.

2. The international situation has not undergone any marked change except that there appears to be every prospect of some kind of an agreement between the four powers in regard to the Berlin deadlock.<sup>1</sup> Probably the Russian blockade from the western part of Berlin will be removed and at the same time the new Russian mark will be the sole currency used in the whole of Berlin.<sup>2</sup> This probable settlement will remove one cause of grave tension in Europe but the essential causes of conflict are not resolved in this way and no doubt friction will continue.

3. The situation in Burma has not changed greatly though there might be said to be a slight improvement from the point of view of the Burmese Government.<sup>3</sup> In Malaya the strength of the rebellion is evidenced by the fact that more and more armed forces and aircraft are being needed to suppress it.<sup>4</sup> It has been said by British authorities that it will take a long time to liquidate this rebellion. Although the rebellion may be communist-inspired, it could not have assumed such large proportions unless there was a great deal of discontent and economic distress. It is strange that while every effort is being made to suppress the rebellion by force, little attention is paid to the economic aspect.

4. The whole of South East Asia is in turmoil, yet some of the major western powers who have interest there have not quite realised that radical changes, political and economic, have become essential. In Indonesia, the Dutch

1. After several deliberations between the Western envoys and Marshal Stalin from 2 to 30 August 1948, an agreed four-power directive was sent to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany instructing them to discuss certain technical problems to resolve the Berlin crisis.
2. The four-power directive embodied an agreement that the blockade should be lifted and that the eastern mark should be the single currency for Berlin, subject to four-power authority. The Commanders-in-Chief were asked to convert this agreement into a workable technical arrangement.
3. A new Communist-led insurrection was reported on 26 August in the Karenins Hill area northeast of Toungoo. Premier Thakin Nu warned on 23 August that rebel activities near Rangoon menaced the capital. But the Government claimed on 25 August to have relieved that threat and sent rebel forces in retreat.
4. The British in Kuala Lumpur on 30 August listed 197 dead, of whom 175 were rebels, in Malayan guerilla warfare since 16 June.



Government continues to function and to think in the old colonial way.<sup>5</sup> It is obvious that this can only lead to strife and can never offer a solution. The Indonesian Republic has faced very great difficulties and dangers with courage.<sup>6</sup> Those dangers continue. But there is beginning to be a realisation in the minds of some of the great powers that this treatment of Indonesia may lead to a general worsening of the South East Asia situation and that a more sensible approach is needed.<sup>7</sup> In Indo-China the same old colonial outlook has prevailed thus far.<sup>8</sup>

5. I should like to make it perfectly clear that both in Burma<sup>9</sup> and Malaya<sup>10</sup> there has been no question of Indian troops functioning. We have no desire to interfere. The question arose before us of the possibility of Indians requiring protection. Fortunately there is no anti-Indian feeling in either of those countries and we came to the conclusion that no special measures of protection were necessary. Indeed, any attempt to take such measures might have a bad effect and create an anti-Indian feeling. Although we are not interfering in any way in either of these places, I might inform you that we have permitted the Burmese Government to purchase some arms and ammunition in India.

6. In view of the grave problems facing us in India, I have decided not to go to Europe in September as I had previously hoped to do. I intend still to attend the Dominion Premiers' Conference in London on the 11th October. I might therefore go to England early in October and visit Paris also for a few days for the U.N. General Assembly meeting.

5. The Dutch Government had begun to set up autonomous states in Indonesia by holding plebiscites in territories that were under their jurisdiction, despite their earlier agreement with the Republicans in January 1948 to observe a truce. The Republicans boycotted the provisional government of United States of Indonesia formed by the Dutch since the Republicans' role in the proposed federation was not defined.
6. A trade embargo imposed by the Dutch to curb arms traffic had resulted in inflation, scarcity and fall in agricultural production in the territories under the Republicans' jurisdiction.
7. On 10 June 1948, the American and the Australian members of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations Security Council proposed that a constituent assembly be elected to (a) define the state boundaries; (b) draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia; and (c) form a federal government. While the Republicans favoured the proposal, the Dutch rejected it.
8. In Indo-China, the struggle of national movement against the French was going on since the end of the Second World War.
9. From 18 to 30 August 1948 there were sporadic clashes between the Burmese Government forces and insurgents at Binbu, on the Irrawaddy Valley, Thayetmyo, Prome and Syriam in the Bassein district.
10. During July and August 1948, isolated acts of terrorism by Chinese Communists occurred in different parts of Malaysia and the British carried out extensive operations in Selangor, South Perak, Batu Arang area of northwest Kuala Lumpur to destroy insurgent camps.



7. In response to an appeal from Count Bernadotte,<sup>11</sup> the U.N. mediator in Palestine, the Government of India have contributed Rs. 100,000 for the relief of refugee sufferers. This is a token amount only and it is meant to be without distinction of race. A great number of refugees are Arabs but some are Jews also. We are prepared to forward any other sums that may be contributed in this behalf.
8. On the 15th September, the new Indian cruiser, H.M.I.S. *Delhi*,<sup>12</sup> is due to arrive in Bombay. This is rather a special occasion from the point of view of our Navy and our Armed Forces. It means that our little Navy in a sense grows up. I intend going to Bombay to welcome this cruiser.
9. The negotiations for the exchange of prisoners between Pakistan and India have been completed<sup>13</sup> and it is hoped that the actual exchange may take place some time fairly early in September.
10. As you know, our Finance Minister, Shri Shanmukham Chetty, resigned from his high and responsible office a short while ago. As I stated in the Assembly, I do not think that Shri Chetty was guilty of anything more than a grave error of judgment. Nevertheless it became important for him to resign. While I regret the departure of an able colleague in this way, I trust that this incident will indicate to all concerned that our desire is to maintain high standards in our public life. There is sometimes a tendency to slacken and to gloss over errors. In the public interest it is better not to do so even if individuals occasionally suffer. We have yet to develop the discipline of a free and democratic country.
11. Shri K.C. Neogy has taken charge for the present of the Finance portfolio in addition to his own portfolio of Commerce. Newspaper reports of new appointments are without foundation.
12. The Minister for Commerce has removed control over the import of certain sterling and soft currency areas including Switzerland and Sweden. A comprehensive public notice dated 26th July 1948 describing the principles governing the issue of import licences has been issued.
11. Count Folke Bernadotte (1895-1948); served in the Swedish Army, 1918-45; President, Swedish Red Cross Association, 1946 ; U.N. mediator in Palestine, 1948. Assassinated in 1948.
12. H.M.I.S. *Delhi* former British cruiser *Achilles* was formally received by Nehru on 15 September 1948.
13. An agreement for the exchange of detenus, guilty of offences before 1 August 1948, was reached on 13 August 1948.

13. I addressed you a secret letter a few days ago about the economic situation in the country.<sup>14</sup> I attached with it certain memoranda of economists whom we had consulted. We have also consulted other groups like labour and trade union leaders, leading industrialists, bankers, etc. In view of the gravity of the crisis and the possibility of far-reaching changes being necessary, we have consulted all these various groups representing different sections of the community. We intend to collect all the memoranda we have received on this subject from these different groups and to publish them soon in a small pamphlet which we shall send you.

14. Government have come to no decision so far on these important matters. But they will no doubt have to come to some decisions before long. I shall not discuss the various proposals made to meet the crisis, except to mention that there appears to be unanimity among all those consulted in favour of the reintroduction of physical controls of all essential commodities. That is a matter intimately affecting all provinces. Food comes first on the list of controls in these lists.<sup>15</sup> This control and rationing inevitably involve widespread procurement. We have to remember that we are not likely to get much foodgrains from Pakistan because of the heavy rains as well as other causes. However, much foodgrains we may get from abroad, the primary consideration will be how much we can procure in our own country.

15. While the economic situation is undoubtedly bad, in the sense that it is not under control and may rapidly deteriorate by further inflation and rise in prices, it must be remembered that basically India's position is sound. But, however, sound the position, the delicate mechanism of a nation's economic life, once upset, is apt to lead to widespread suffering. Therefore, we have to deal with this emergency urgently and effectively. We have to remember that one of our richest areas, the Punjab, is for the moment out of the picture from the point of view of production. Many of its people are refugees who, instead of producing, merely consume. Another important fact to be remembered is a shift in income groups in recent years resulting in a diversion of purchasing power from the higher income groups to the rural sections of the community, as well as to some others. This, of course, is a very desirable development, but for the moment it does create difficulties because the needs of the latter groups are different and cannot be fully met.

16. I would again remind you that in this economic crisis of inflation etc., the strictest economy is needed and any schemes or project involving large

14. See preceding item.

15. On 21 September 1948, control was reimposed on the prices, procurement and distributions of foodgrains.



expenditure may have to be postponed. Provinces should not look up to the Centre for special help. This would apply to the policy of prohibition also. It is for the provinces to consider what they will do, but in that consideration too much reliance should not be paid on help from the Centre.

17. The United Nations Kashmir Commission has gone to Karachi to get a final reply from Pakistan on their proposals for a ceasefire and truce. It is hoped that some final decision will be arrived at within the next few days. We have made it clear that we are prepared to accept the ceasefire and truce, but, of course, we cannot be parties to the creation of a situation which might endanger the security of Kashmir State.<sup>16</sup>

18. Meanwhile, a U.N. party has gone to Kashmir for what was rather wrongly described in a press note as a political and economic survey.<sup>17</sup> There is going to be no such general survey by them. Their main purpose is to meet members of Government and officers.

19. The Hyderabad situation has arrived at a stage when some kind of positive action on our behalf may be needed. I shall be communicating with you separately in regard to this. Meanwhile, I shall only warn you to take all necessary measures for internal security. Reports sometimes reach us of intrigues by some Muslims here and there. There may be some such intrigues, but it is clear that any large scale trouble from the Muslims as such in India is exceedingly unlikely. There is a far greater possibility of communal trouble started by non-Muslims as a reaction to events in Hyderabad. That has to be strictly guarded against, for it will be dangerous to allow any such development to take place. We have a special duty to protect our minorities and we cannot permit individuals or groups to take the law into their own hands, especially at a moment of national crisis. If we allow things to go wrong even in a small way, it will be difficult for us to correct them later.

20. There is yet another important consideration to be borne in mind. We function on the world stage today with a glare of publicity. If anything happens in India which is criticised or condemned outside, it will react very much to our disadvantage. Whatever we do, therefore, we must follow the right path and not imagine that a narrow opportunism of the moment, if it leads us astray, can possibly benefit us in the end. As a democratic government we are the servants of the public and must give effect to their wishes. But

16. On 20 August 1948, the Government of India clarified that Indian forces could not be withdrawn to an extent that would jeopardise the security of Kashmir State and that they would not recognise the "Azad Kashmir" Government.

17. The press note appeared on 26 August 1948.



## LETTERS TO THE PREMIERS OF PROVINCES

this does not mean that we should permit wrong things to be done because members of the public unthinkingly ask us to do them. A party or a nation gains both prestige and success by adhering to the right policy, even though it may not bring immediate results. India has built up some kind of a reputation for right and impartial conduct, chiefly because of Mahatma Gandhi's magnificent personality and the emphasis he always laid on right means. That was not merely a moral precept but a wise and expedient policy. In the days of difficulty ahead of us we should try to remember the teaching of the Master and not allow ourselves to be led astray by momentary passion.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### VII

New Delhi  
September 9, 1948

My dear Premier<sup>1</sup>,

Several provinces have in preparation or in some advanced stage, Zamindari Abolition Bills. May I remind you that this highly important question should be considered in consultation with the Central Government and not in isolation? This has necessitated because of several reasons:

- (1) Any policy should have a certain uniformity all over India;
- (2) The Centre's capacity to help with grants or loans is strictly limited; and
- (3) As far as possible, we should not do anything to encourage inflationary tendencies.

It is desirable therefore for your Government to consult the Central Government, and more specially our Finance Ministry, in regard to any such measure before it is finalised.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. An additional letter to the fortnightly letters.

VIII

New Delhi  
September 9, 1948

My dear Premier<sup>1</sup>,

You have no doubt followed carefully the recent developments in regard to Kashmir and Hyderabad. You have read the two statements made by me in the Central Assembly. So far as Kashmir is concerned, the U.N. Commission have failed to find any solution thus far and their ceasefire proposals have not been agreed to by Pakistan. I think it is true to say that we have gained a diplomatic victory, which will be somewhat to our advantage in the United Nations and the world generally. I do not know what the final report of the Commission is going to be. It is clear, however, that no settlement is at present possible by way of agreement. The Commission is likely to go to Kashmir for a few days and then write their report.<sup>2</sup>

2. In the complicated position, national and international, that we have to face today, this turn of events in our favour is to be welcomed, though it may not take us far.

3. I am however writing to you more specially about Hyderabad. Here there is no longer any static position and events are marching with some speed. We have made a final appeal to the Nizam to allow our troops to go to Secunderabad. This was three days ago and no reply has come yet. Obviously, we cannot wait indefinitely for a reply and some action will have to be taken. There is one aspect of this, or rather a possible reaction to it, to which I must draw your particular attention, even though I know that you are fully seized of the matter. We must at all costs and with all our strength prevent any communal deterioration in any province. The consequence of this will be harmful to us in many ways. Nationally this will impede our effort and produce complications. Internationally it will not only injure our good name but may have even more serious consequences. Therefore we have to be as prepared as possible to prevent this.

4. So far as I can judge, and I am supported by fairly reliable evidence, there is nothing much to fear from any Muslim activity against the Indian Union. The general position of the Muslims in the Indian Union is such that they are exceedingly unlikely to do anything which may bring swift reactions against them. What we have to guard against specially, therefore, is any

1. An additional letter to the fortnightly letters.

2. The U.N.C.I.P. arrived in Geneva on 30 September 1948 and on 23 November presented an interim report to the Security Council.



non-Muslim aggression on Muslims. This may well be feared if the Razakars in Hyderabad State misbehave towards non-Muslims. Even apart from that, there is some danger of it.

5. Therefore, it has become incumbent on us for the very success of our operations and not to alienate world opinion, to give every protection to the Muslim minority in India. This ultimately applies to the Muslim minority in Hyderabad itself. Apart from adequate precautions, police or other, which must be taken, there must be some attempt to educate public opinion, quietly but clearly, as to the evil consequences of any outbreak against Muslims in India. This is of the utmost consequence and I trust that your government will appreciate the full importance of what I am writing to you and take all necessary measures.

6. Every stress should be laid on the non-communal aspect of the steps we might have to take. We are not out to punish the Muslims in Hyderabad but to protect everyone there, Hindu or Muslim, and to put an end to the disorders that are taking place in Hyderabad State.

7. In this matter the press can play a very important part and I would suggest to you to meet representatives of the press and explain to them the full implications of what I have said above. This should be done in two ways, firstly by calling selected editors who can be addressed frankly and fully, secondly, larger numbers of journalists who might be spoken to off-the-record. Off-the-record conferences will be better than normal public press conferences.

8. It should be made perfectly clear that exaggerated news or the giving of publicity to vague rumours, or indeed to anything that might excite public opinion, is to do a grave disservice to India. We have had to deal with a number of reports in the press, in regard to Hyderabad, which we have found on enquiry to be grossly exaggerated. Sometimes they are without foundation. Recently, a particularly ghastly report appeared in some newspapers about the massacre of a large number of men, women and children in a village in Hyderabad by the Razakars.<sup>3</sup> A full account of this was given with substantial details. Nevertheless, on enquiry being made through our military sources, we have been unable to get any confirmation.

9. The presentation of news and views in newspapers, in regard to Hyderabad, thus becomes a matter of prime importance. It is desirable that such

3. On 26 August 1948, 150 persons were reported to have been killed by Razakars in Behrampalli village in Nalgonda district.



news should be checked before it is published not only in order to avoid the spread of rumour and unconfirmed news, but also to avoid the publication of anything which accentuates communal ill-will.

10. We have taken a step which involved dangers and difficulties. We had to take it. We have now to see it through and we must do it as effectively, efficiently, rapidly and humanly as possible.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## IX

New Delhi  
21 September, 1948

My dear Premier,

I have not written to you my usual middle of the month letter, as nearly all of you were here for conferences.<sup>1</sup> We met then and discussed various matters.

2. There is one important matter, however, to which I should like to draw your immediate attention. It appears that a number of Muslims were arrested when we commenced operations in Hyderabad. Presumably they were arrested for their sympathies with Hyderabad, or some activities connected with it, or on suspicion. Now that the Hyderabad affair is ended, so far as the military operations were concerned, there is no point in the persons being kept in prison or detention. I hope, therefore, that you will order their release unless there is some other and substantial reason for their detention.

3. It is important that after the dramatic events in Hyderabad our policy should be as generous and friendly as possible, not only to the people of Hyderabad but also to Muslims generally in India. There is no doubt that the Muslims as a whole in India helped our policy considerably by siding with the Union at a moment of crisis. This is a psychological moment for us to win over the goodwill of the Muslim masses by our friendly approaches to them. They have been hit hard by all the events of the past year and there is a sense of frustration and despair among them. What has happened in Hyderabad has created a situation which should lead to a stabilisation of the

1. There was a conference of Agriculture Ministers (8 September), meetings of the Congress Working Committee and sessions of the Constituent Assembly on the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in October.

communal situation in India, or rather to a progressive elimination of the communal sentiment, provided we act rightly. It is not enough to allow matters to drift. We should take some active steps to this end.

4. In regard to Hyderabad, I would also beg of you to remember that the world's eyes are upon us and we have to act carefully and with wisdom. It is desirable that as few as possible statements be issued or any remarks made without full thought. Every word said counts, and is pounced upon by our opponents. We have a bad press abroad, and there has been much criticism of our action. That criticism ignores the realities of the situation and is, I think, unjust. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore opinion abroad, more specially when even many of our friends there share it to some extent. Therefore, I would suggest that we might impress upon others also to exercise some restraint in expression.

5. You are aware that during the last session of the Central Legislature a committee was formed to collect comforts and amenities etc., for our troops. This committee has been named the Bharat Sena Sahayak Samiti<sup>2</sup> and Shrimati Ammu Swaminadhan is the chairman. This committee requires both money and gifts in kind. I hope you will help in giving publicity to the work of this committee and in other ways.

6. It is now settled that I leave for England on October 5th to attend the Dominion Premiers' Conference. I expect to be away for about three weeks, during which I hope to attend the U.N. Assembly session in Paris also.

7. As you know, decisions were taken at the recent Premiers' Conference in favour of the reimposition of controls in regard to food, cloth, kerosene, iron and steel and cement. Some of these are of course already partly controlled. The important items are food and cloth. Any system of controls requires efficient governmental machinery and strict enforcement. You will be informed of the precise proposals in regard to these matters. Meanwhile, I want to tell you that our Ministry of Industry and Supply is building up an enforcement department. This was originally meant for cloth alone but in view of new developments it is clear that there should be an integration in regard to the enforcement of controls of various kinds. We cannot have separate departments and separate machinery for the enforcement of different controls. Generally speaking, the same machinery should suffice for all, both at the Centre and in the provinces. The Central machinery should be

2. The Indian Army Aid Committee, an organisation set up by the Constituent Assembly on 10 September 1948, requested Nehru to direct the provincial premiers to organise amenities committees in their provinces.



effective and efficient and should have the full cooperation of the provincial machinery.

8. Mr. Jetly,<sup>3</sup> Inspector General of Police, has been appointed Director of Enforcement. He will have some senior officers under him covering various regions of India. Under these senior officers it is proposed to have about 800 men of the rank of Inspectors (100) and Sub-Inspectors (700). It is suggested that these 800 should be divided as follows : 20 % from the Police, 30 % from other services, such as Rationing, Central Excise, Customs, etc., 50 % public men.

9. Your help is required in regard to the choice of these 800 men, and more specially of the 50 % who may be drawn from the public. The age limit of these 50 % should be 42, i.e., they should be under 42. Educationally they should have attained at least the Intermediate standard, or in the alternative, they should have a good knowledge of Hindi. Of course integrity is essential as well as good health.

10. In the choice of these men from the public the Congress organisation might also be consulted.

11. I am sure your Government will give every help in the building up of this enforcement organisation.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Brij Bhushan Sharan Jetly (b 1900); joined Indian Police Service 1924; Director of Enforcement, Textiles, Ministry of Industry and Supply, August 1948-January 1949; Inspector-General, Hyderabad-Deccan, 1949.



## X

New Delhi  
October 4, 1948

My dear Premier,

I am writing this letter to you on the eve of my departure for Europe. I am leaving tomorrow direct for London where I shall attend the Dominion Premiers' Conference. About the middle of the month I shall take advantage of the weekend to pay a brief visit to Paris from London in order to meet important representatives of some countries. I expect to meet there Mr. Marshall<sup>1</sup> of the U.S.A., Mr. Vyshinsky<sup>2</sup> of the U.S.S.R., Dr. Tsiang of China,<sup>3</sup> the French Foreign Minister,<sup>4</sup> and some others. I shall then return to London for the continuing sessions of the Premiers' Conference. After that Conference is over, I shall go to Paris again for a few days. I am not yet sure of the date of my return to India, but I believe I shall start on my journey back on the 28th of this month, arriving in India on the 29th or 30th. During my absence, the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, will be in charge of such functions as the Prime Minister performs, and in case you have to make a reference, you will kindly make it to him.

2. I shall be absorbed chiefly in foreign affairs and Commonwealth relations during my absence. May I say in this connection that the world situation is a complicated and delicate one and every word that is said in regard to it should be carefully weighed? Responsible Ministers in the provinces are not directly concerned with foreign policy. Nevertheless, any remarks they may make have a certain importance in foreign eyes. I would, therefore, beg of you and your Government to be a little careful in criticising foreign nations.

3. I have written to you during the last fortnight, but I have not sent the usual fortnightly letter. Much has happened during this period, notably the speedy termination of the operations we undertook in Hyderabad. This has produced important results and gains for us, quite apart from what has happened in Hyderabad State itself. The first gain is that it is established that the Central Government in India is supreme and that no part

1. George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State.

2. A.Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister.

3. Tingfu F. Tsiang, Permanent Representative of China to U.N.

4. Robert Schuman (1886-1963), Prime Minister of France, 1947-48; Foreign Minister, July 1948-January 1953, President, European Parliament, Strasbourg, March 1958-60, and its honorary President, 1960-63.

of India, State or other, can challenge the Centre's authority. On the eve of their departure from India, the British made certain decisions which produced a good deal of confusion in regard to the States. Fortunately, in regard to nearly all the States matters were settled peacefully and cooperatively. It was only in Kashmir and Hyderabad that trouble arose. But even in some other States there was the will to create trouble though not the capacity to do it. This question has now been settled once for all for the whole of India.

4. This is not a reversion to the old paramountcy of the British power, because such paramountcy can only be exercised by an alien authority or an autocratic regime. In a democratic India it has no place, for each part of India should have the same freedom and status as any other. Every State therefore necessarily has, or will have, the same status as a province in regard to representative institutions or individual freedom. In other words, India will be a free partnership of provinces and States which have a large measure of autonomy, but which are at the same time tied up closely to the Centre in whose direction they all share.

5. This is the first gain. The second gain is even more important. What has happened in Hyderabad has produced a very remarkable change in the communal atmosphere of India. Where there was fear previously, there is a sense of security and cooperation now. I received a very large number of telegrams of congratulations from all over India on the termination of the Hyderabad operations. Quite half of these were from Muslim organisations and individuals. Both Muslims and non-Muslims have gone a long way to shed suspicion and fear.

6. This is indeed a development which is not only most welcome but is also of the highest significance. It relieves our minds of the continuing burden and allows us to concentrate on the work of building of the new India in cooperation with the various elements in the country. Provincial Governments have to play an important part in this process. We should now take full advantage of this new sense of security and add to it by our own approach to every question.

7. Ever since the partition and the horrible things that followed, Muslims in India have been very hard hit, psychologically even more so than otherwise. They have not felt sure of their position in this country. Gradually things have been improving and Hyderabad has helped this process very greatly. It is for us now to take full advantage of this new atmosphere and produce the sense of absolute security in the minds of the Muslims and



other minorities. The majority always owes a duty of this kind to minorities. We must not think in terms of copying what Pakistan does or think of retaliation. Both Hindu and Muslim, as well as Sikh or Christian or Parsi, must believe that they are as good citizens of India as anyone else. Therefore, I suggest to you that, while we should exercise vigilance, we should act generously and shed fear. If our Governments function in this way, they will also help in removing the fear complex from other minds.

8. We have to face another difficulty and that is the Communist attempt to create trouble. Fortunately this has not succeeded in India, but we have to be completely prepared for attempts at trouble of this kind. These must be nipped in the bud and not allowed to grow. We have not yet rid ourselves of that atmosphere of violence and disorder which came with partition. Any activity therefore which tends to violence, is more dangerous now than it might be in a more peaceful state of affairs.

9. While we must be careful in checking all violent manifestations, we must be equally careful in drawing the line at peaceful agitation. I have frequently written to you to exercise care and restraint in the suppression of civil liberties. To us, who preach civil liberty at a thousand occasions, any suppression is painful. When the vital needs of the State demand such suppression it has to be undertaken, but there is always a danger of exceeding the necessities of a situation. A government with the power to change laws quickly by ordinance is apt to use that power too frequently and too widely.

10. I have noticed legislation by ordinance or otherwise becoming progressively harsh in regard to civil liberties. I must confess that I am greatly perturbed at this prospect. Such legislation should normally not be proceeded with without reference to the Government of India, that is to say the Home Ministry. It is obvious that the law and order problem in India is an integrated one and cannot be dealt with separately with any great success. It is obvious also that any organised subversive activity is also an all-India problem. Therefore, the Government of India must be kept fully in the picture by provincial governments.

11. I have found that the Provincial Governments do not do so and proceed with legislation without any reference to the Government of India. It is only later that they inform them. I do not challenge the authority of the provincial governments in doing this, but I would like to point out the propriety of always consulting the Centre before any such step in the nature of legislation is taken. I would draw your attention to the clauses of the Draft Constitution that the Constituent Assembly has been considering.



12. It is particularly undesirable that the power of the High Courts should be set at naught in regard to individual liberty. That is always a sign of weakness for an executive. Our Home Ministry drew your attention to this matter some time back.

13. It may be that normal proceedings in a High Court are not desirable in all cases as this involves placing of secret matter before the court. But it should always be possible to consult the High Court Judge privately. Indeed some such procedure has been laid down in many of the ordinances or acts of provinces. I do not understand, however, why this consultation should be delayed. As it is, in many cases sometimes indeed the period of delay has been extended by legislation. This indicates a fear of the High Court or of the judge of the High Court which is not becoming of a provincial government.

14. We must remember that what our Government are doing today will set the tone for future administrations. The very powers that may be exercised perhaps for adequate reasons today may be exercised later for totally inadequate and perhaps even for objectionable reasons. It is always unsafe to weaken on principles.

15. You have already been informed about the decisions that were jointly taken in regard to the reimposition of controls. You will be informed about other decisions which the Government of India is taking and your cooperation will be invited. Our fight against inflation must be carried on with vigour on all fronts.

16. The situation in Kashmir might be said for the present to be more or less static. Diplomatically we have won a victory in the sense that Pakistan has been put very much in the wrong by their rejection of the ceasefire proposal of the United Nations Commission and by their being compelled to admit the presence of their troops in Kashmir. As a consequence of this we have formally asked the Pakistan Government to withdraw their troops.<sup>5</sup> Our operations in Kashmir will, of course, be carried on and must be carried on. But we do not propose to take any other action at present. We await the report of the United Nations Commission.

17. You will have noticed that I have repeatedly stated that we are entirely opposed to aggression and I have told Pakistan not to be afraid of any ag-

5. Nehru urged Liaquat Ali Khan on 27 August 1948 to withdraw Pakistani troops, as their involvement amounted to an act of aggression against India.

gression from India. Of course, we have to meet their aggression wherever it may occur. This statement of mine represents not a vague sentiment but a definite policy which is not only in keeping with our general outlook but is also very desirable from the strictly practical point of view. On the side of Pakistan wild statements are made in speech and writing and in the press. Pakistan is jittery and is suffering greatly from the fear complex. We must not allow ourselves to copy their behaviour. We must function as a strong, united and composed nation which does not shout and which does not lose its head whatever happens. There is no reason for us at all to get excited. Therefore, certain restraint signifying strength should be observed in statements in regard to Pakistan. Indeed it would be a good thing if few public references were made to Pakistan. I can assure you that there is very little chance of any conflict with Pakistan so far as we are concerned. Of course, I exclude Kashmir from this, where conflict is continuing and cannot end as long as there is no satisfactory settlement and external aggression is stopped.

18. You know that Dr. John Matthai has been appointed as Minister for Finance. That is a very heavy and responsible charge. The Finance portfolio is in some ways the most important of all and I am very happy that Dr. John Matthai is in charge of it.

19. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is now our Railways and Transport Minister, another very difficult charge. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is a colleague for whom I have the greatest respect and I am sure he will deal with the difficult problems facing him adequately.

20. In order to help him in his heavy task, I have appointed Shri K. Santhanam as a Minister of State working in the Railways and Transport Ministry under Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

21. Further, I have appointed Shri Khurshed Lal as a Deputy Minister who will function in the Communications Ministry under Shri Rafi Ahmad Kidwai. It is my intention, on my return from Europe, to appoint some more Deputy Ministers to relieve Ministers of a part of their work.

22. A question has been asked us about the effect on Hindu temples of zamindari legislation, that is to say in regard to the acquisition of temple lands. It has been pointed out that some of the great temples of South India have built up a kind of community centres and we should be careful not to break up these community centres. I shall be grateful to you if you could let me know what your views are on this subject and how your Pro-



vince proposes to deal with this matter in connection with zamindari legislation. Of course, this will apply not to Hindu temples only but to other places of religious worship and their endowments. It seems to me clear that all public endowments connected with places of worships should be controlled and audited by governmental agencies in order to avoid private misuse of such funds.

23. You must have read in the newspapers that when the Hyderabad issue came before the Security Council and the U.N., the Argentine representative was peculiarly offensive to India. You will be glad to know that the Argentine Government, through their Ambassador in Paris, has conveyed to the Leader of our delegation the amplest apologies for this behaviour of their representative in the Security Council. They have said that he had no business to behave in this manner and that it is Argentina's desire to be friendly to India and even when they cannot completely line up with India on any issue, not to oppose her. We have naturally accepted this apology with good grace and expressed our pleasure at it and hope that our relations with Argentina will improve.

24. There is one matter to which I should like to draw your special attention. Governments, both Central and provincial, have a great deal of financial patronage at their disposal in regard to licences, contracts etc. It is important that this patronage should not go to any individual whose record in regard to payment of income tax has been bad. This matter specially concerns the various departments of the Government of India and I have drawn their attention to it. I have asked them to keep in close touch with our Income Tax Department in regard to the granting of any such financial patronage. In so far as this concerns your Government, I hope you will be good enough to bear this in mind. People who are suspected of defrauding Government revenues cannot be made recipients of Government favour financially.

25. If I may say so, I have a feeling that India has turned the corner more specially since these Hyderabad operations. We are on the upgrade now. The atmosphere is different and better and we have greater chances now of going ahead with our constructive work. This work is as much psychological as other. I wish you success in this.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



## CONGRESS PARTY AFFAIRS



1. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

1 July 1948

My dear Pantji,

Jayaprakash came to see me this evening and gave me a copy of a letter which he has addressed to the President, All India Congress Committee. I enclose this copy.

In this letter a reference is made to what you are reported to have said in public meetings during the election campaign. I do not know how far these reports are correct. I can hardly believe that you would have made such remarks, or at least some of them.<sup>2</sup>

A particular charge made was that Government agencies were used during the election on behalf of the Congress candidates, that the Raksha Dal was also so used.<sup>3</sup> It was stated by Jayaprakash as well as by Raghukul Tilak,<sup>4</sup> who came with him, that there was large scale intimidation of voters who were told that they would get into trouble if they did not vote for the Congress.<sup>5</sup> I am rather concerned that such charges should be made against any of our prominent colleagues and more especially you. Jayaprakash is apt to go astray very often and act in an irresponsible manner. But he is one of the straightest and finest men I have known, and if character counts, as it does, he counts for a great deal. It seems to me a tragedy that a man like him should be thrust by circumstances into the wilderness.

There is a reference to Hindi in the passages quoted in Jayaprakash's letter. I do not know what you said. But I hope you did not say what is attributed to you.<sup>6</sup> For my part I stand for Hindustani, as Gandhiji always desired, and I think that the present trend in India towards pure Hindi is most unfortunate. I am beginning to feel more and more a stranger in my own country.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Pant replied on 7 July 1948 that he tried to examine public questions in a dispassionate manner and to present his own views in a reasoned and rational way. He had invited the Socialists to come back to the Congress as the Congress itself had accepted the substance of socialism.

3. Pant denied this allegation.

4. Raghukul Tilak (b. 1900); participated in non-cooperation movement; elected to U.P. Assembly, 1937, 1946; joined Socialist Party, 1948; Vice-Chancellor, Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi, 1971-74; Governor of Rajasthan, 1977-81.

5. Pant denied this and said the Congress had no need to intimidate the voters in these bye-elections when it had won the district board elections only the previous month.

6. Pant replied that he had said that the U.P. Government had accepted Hindi and Devnagari as the official language and script respectively.



## 2. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

July 8, 1948

My dear Pantji,

Thank you for your letter of July 7th with its enclosures.<sup>2</sup> I am grateful to you for having taken so much of trouble in writing this letter and enclosing the other printed material. It seems to me that the Socialist Party or some members of it behaved badly during the elections.<sup>3</sup> What I was anxious to know was that no one connected with the Congress should act in this way.

I understand that Rajendra Babu has also sent you Jayaprakash Narayan's letter. In order to save you the trouble to repeat what you have written to me, I am sending your letter with its enclosures to Dr. Rajendra Prasad.

I think it would be a good thing if the facts and the other circumstances that you have mentioned were placed before Jayaprakash.

I agree with you entirely that public life, as it is developing in our country, is becoming increasingly unbearable for sensitive persons.<sup>4</sup>

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Pant had enclosed two reports—one from Meerut and the other from Faizabad—on how the Socialist Party workers had disturbed peaceful campaigning and polling.

3. Pant had alleged that during the election campaign the Congress Ministers were subjected to calumnies and vulgar attacks and were portrayed as corrupt and dishonest by the Socialists, but no action was taken against anyone.

4. Pant had written that he was getting rather fed up with public life.

## 3. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

31 July 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have had very grave complaints from several provinces about Congress M.L.As and District Congress Committee officials interfering with the administration. This has gone so far that district officials find it difficult to function and have complained bitterly.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

Another type of complaints is that M.L.As etc. sit at the doorsteps of Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in search of jobs for some people. It is even said that some money is made out of this business.

I am not mentioning any province. May I suggest to you to send a personal letter<sup>2</sup> to the Provincial Congress organisations as well as to the Legislative parties warning them against this kind of thing which must have the most serious consequences on our administration.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Rajendra Prasad had written to all premiers on 17 July 1948 that deserving cases should be brought to the notice of the organisational head by Congress workers for taking up with the Government. He suggested contacts between the provincial governments and the P.C.Cs to smoothen matters and remove legitimate complaints of the public. He also wrote to all P.C.Cs and regional councils that the real safeguard against administrative lapses was a strong public opinion and they should create the same and not deal directly with lower officials.
3. Rajendra Prasad replied on 2 August 1948 mentioning his circular letter to all P.C.Cs and regional councils and said that Nehru's letter had strengthened his stand. He reiterated this stand on 6 August in a letter to all P.C.Cs.

#### 4. To N.S. Varadachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 8, 1948

My dear Varadachari,

I have your letter of the 3rd August.<sup>2</sup>

All I said at the Party meeting was that in view of the difficult military situation all over India as well as round-about Hyderabad, it would be undesirable to divert the police to any other important activity. It might be better, therefore, to go a little slow about the enforcement of prohibition in the remaining districts, specially those districts which happen to be near Hyderabad. This, of course, does not mean giving up the programme or policy.

1. File No. 7(102)/48-PMS.
2. N.S. Varadachari had said that Nehru's advice against extension of prohibition without adequate enforcement had been interpreted to mean postponement. Varadachari blamed the delay in making arrangements for enforcement on police inefficiency. He criticised the Governor for relying on punishment rather than on persuasion and propaganda.



You will appreciate that I cannot judge from here about the efficiency of provincial offices, nor can I constitutionally interfere in this matter. This should be taken up with the provincial government.

I do not think there is any question of long postponement of the prohibition programme. The next three or four months are going to be very difficult for us and we should like our hands as free as possible.

I quite agree with you that persuasion and propaganda are more important than police work. It would be a very good thing indeed if the time gained now was used for this persuasion and propaganda as well as for diversional entertainment and recreation.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To Jayaprakash Narayan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 19, 1948

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have no idea where you are. Occasionally I read some report of your speech in some far corner of India. I have been wanting to write to you for sometime. Indeed I have been wanting to see you.

I am greatly distressed at many things in India. But perhaps what distresses me most is the wide gap which is ever growing between many of us and the Socialist Party. That, I think, is not good either for us or the Socialist Party, and certainly not good for the country. It may be that we are largely responsible for this. But I certainly think that the Socialist Party is at least as responsible. Responsibility apart, it seems to me patent that the Socialist Party is making itself rather ineffective at least for some time to come. Long-distance programmes may be followed, but when big crises occur in the near future, then long-distance programmes are of little use and indeed they are put out of joint by previous happenings. If I may remind you, the Socialist Party's attitude to the Constituent Assembly<sup>2</sup> was most unfortunate.

1. S. Vijayalakshmi (editor), *Sri Jayaprakash Narayan—Sixtyfirst Birth Day Celebration : Commemoration Volume*, (Madras, 1962), p. 151.
2. At the A.I.C.C. meeting of 6 July 1946 the Socialists had opposed the Working Committee decision to accept the long term proposals of the Cabinet Mission. Jayaprakash Narayan had said that the Constituent Assembly would not bring independence for it was a creation of the British and could not work freely as long as British power remained. Later, on 24 November, 1946 he said that the members of the A.I.C.C. and not the Congress members of the Constituent Assembly should decide the shape of Swaraj.



I had hoped that the going out of the Socialist Party from the Congress would reduce the internal tension. As a matter of fact it has had the opposite result and the gulf grows. Whatever the merits of the Socialist Party's programme may be, I do not see how, standing by itself, it can hope to be in a position to give effect to it for a considerable time to come. The result will naturally be that it will try to ally itself with various groups which, generally speaking, are undesirable and which will bring no credit to the Socialist Party. Indeed I have received reports of such attempts at alliance. I do hope they are not true. For it will be a bad day for the Socialist Party if it gets associated with small factions which are never likely to face responsibility, or even with reactionary groups which may indulge in tall talk but which are essentially reactionary.

I know that you can and do criticise the present Government strongly. You may be right, and certainly I have no particular objection to your criticism, except it is usually rather negative criticism which does not help much. If the Socialist Party thinks in terms of controlling Governmental policy, it must think also and act as if it was on the point of becoming a Government and not merely negatively, and in any event it does not pay thus to run down individuals or groups who represent something that has strength in the country.

I think the next few months or years are going to be rather critical for our country and it will be a great pity if the gulf between the Socialist Party and the Congress is not bridged to some extent at least, and tends to grow. There will be a sense of frustration and ineffectiveness. I should like therefore to help in every way to reduce that gulf and I hope you will try to do the same.

Perhaps you know that I had asked Achyut<sup>3</sup> to go to Paris in our delegation to the U.N. He expressed his inability to go. I would have indeed liked very much if you could have gone, but I did not approach you because I felt you would not agree. Achyut's refusal confirmed me on this. I wish you and others in the Socialist Party would be a little more cooperative in such and like matters. We have terrible problems in India and big things to accomplish. We cannot fulfil our destiny if we think too much in terms of a group or a party, however good that might be, and even in terms of that group or party an isolationist attitude can seldom help.

I write to you rather briefly, but even these few lines will convey to you something I have in my mind. I cannot, by sheer force of circumstance, do everything that I would like to do. We are all of us in some measure prisoners of fate and circumstances. But I am as keen as ever to go in a particular direction and carry the country with me and I do hope that in doing

3. Achyut Patwardhan, was a member of the National Executive of the Socialist Party.

so I would have some help from you. I need not tell you that we are living at a very critical time and dangers threaten us in many directions. It may be that we are not strong enough or wise enough to face these problems, but for the moment I do not see any other group that can do so more successfully. You will remember the least what the recent history of Europe has taught us, that an attempt at premature leftism may well lead to reaction or disruption.

I hope I shall meet you when you come here.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To Pattabhi Sitaramayya<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 22, 1948

My dear Pattabhi,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th September.<sup>2</sup> The Hyderabad operation has indeed been an amazing success. What I am afraid of, however, is that this success might not turn our heads.

As for the Congress presidentship, I must confess that I feel reluctant to take any step. Ever since I took office, I have done so little direct Congress work that I do not feel justified in giving any kind of a lead in such a matter.

I would welcome you of course as the Congress President. But there appear to be several candidates,<sup>3</sup> all of whom are our old colleagues. It was right and proper for Gandhiji to recommend one person. But much smaller folks are not in a position to do so, and where there are several candidates in the field, it becomes even more difficult to support any one of them publicly. But, as I have said above, I would welcome your election.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

2. On 18 September 1948 Pattabhi Sitaramayya wrote to Nehru as well as to Rajendra Prasad, Patel and Maulana Azad seeking their endorsement of his candidature for presidentship of the Congress Party.

3. The names of Rajendra Prasad, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, J.B. Kripalani, P.C. Ghosh, Purushottamdas Tandon and Shankarrao Deo had been received duly proposed by the requisite number of delegates for the presidentship of the next session of the Congress. Rajendra Prasad had soon withdrawn his candidature.



## 7. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
24 September 1948

My dear Rafi,

Your letter of the 23rd September.<sup>2</sup> I think there is substance in Neogy's objection.<sup>3</sup> Personally, as I told you, I do not fancy W.C. Bonnerjee<sup>4</sup> being specially chosen in spite of his having been the first President of the Congress. Coming after Gandhiji it is a bit of a fall. If somebody had to be chosen it should have been Dadabhai Naoroji. I think we should postpone this issue now. When you bring out a new issue it might well be a series giving several effigies, i.e. a selection of past political leaders.

Why not think in terms of historical figures like Asoka and Akbar?

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 27(37)/48-PMS.
2. Kidwai had suggested that to avoid criticism from non-Congressmen the issuing of special stamps at the coming Congress session might be postponed till Independence Day.
3. K.C. Neogy, the Finance Minister, wrote on 22 September to Kidwai that it would be improper to issue special stamps with W.C. Bonnerjee's portrait on them when the Congress was in session.
4. Woomesh Chandra Bonnerjee (1844-1906); eminent lawyer; President, Indian National Congress, 1885 and 1892; member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1894-95; settled in England in 1902 and represented India's cause there.

## 8. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
25 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 25 September about the Congress presidency.<sup>2</sup> I have read Rajendra Babu's letter.<sup>3</sup> Only two days ago after my talk with you, when you told me that Rajendra Babu had finally refused to stand for the Congress presidency, I wrote to Pattabhi. I told him that I had no objection to his standing, and if he got elected, I would welcome

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 421-422.
2. Patel had sought Nehru's advice on whether they should press Rajendra Prasad to stand for the Congress presidency.
3. Rajendra Prasad had written to Patel that though, due to ill-health, he did not wish to stand for the presidency he would not refuse if both Patel and Nehru still thought he should take on the burden.



it. But I did not wish to take any sides in this matter or to make any public statement. All the candidates whose names had appeared were colleagues of ours, and it was not proper for me to make any special recommendation. This was all right for Bapu. But lesser fry had better remain silent, as I intended to remain.

Now Rajendra Babu's letter puts a somewhat different complexion on this business, as he hints that he would be prepared to undertake the burden of the presidentship if you and I advised him to do so, although he wishes very much to be relieved of it.

I entirely agree with what Rajendra Babu has said about the fresh problems that are arising as between the Congress and the various governments, more especially provincial governments.<sup>4</sup> Also that the Congress organisation requires careful handling. Indeed, it requires something much more than handling. It requires a fresh dose of vitality. I am afraid there is little doubt that while on the one hand, the Congress is quite dominant today in India, at the same time it is losing its hold and becoming just a political machine.

I find myself in a difficulty. If I felt that Rajendra Babu was going to keep moderate good health and would be able to give his time to the Congress sufficiently, and further that he was not averse to this, I would have no hesitation whatever in pressing him to stand. But from his letter to you I find that he is very reluctant, and we have seen that ill-health has pursued him for a considerable time. So I am torn between two urges: (1) to press him to stand for the presidentship, for I would like him to be there, and (2) not to make him do anything which he is not keen on doing and which might be a special burden on him because of his ill-health. In the balance I would say that if he himself thinks that his health will be able to stand the strain and he feels that he should undertake this heavy burden at this critical juncture, I should like him to stand and would be very glad of his continuance as Congress President.<sup>5</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

4. In his letter to Patel, Rajendra Prasad pointed to tussles between the Congress committees and the Congress governments in the provinces. There was a real risk if the Government got identified with the Congress. The distinction between the rights and responsibilities of the Congress and the Ministers had to be outlined.
5. Patel wrote to Prasad, enclosing Nehru's letter, that it was in the interests of the country if he continued as President. Prasad however asked to be excused in favour of Pattabhi since he wished to avoid any North-South controversy. He felt Tandon should withdraw for the same reason. Pattabhi Sitaramayya was elected President on 24 October 1948 defeating Purushottamdas Tandon.

## 9. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
29 September 1948

My dear Rafi,

Your letter of the 29th has just come.<sup>2</sup>

I do not quite know what kind of a statement we can issue. Of course the rumours you mention are quite absurd. In this matter I have consulted Sardar Patel several times, and we came to the conclusion that neither of us should give any public or private support to any of the candidates for the Congress presidentship and leave the elections entirely to the electors.

Dr. Pattabhi wrote to me about this matter asking for my support. I wrote to him that while I would welcome his election if he got elected, I did not propose to say anything on the subject as all the candidates were old colleagues of ours and it was difficult for me to say anything. It was all right for Mahatma Gandhi to give a lead in such matters but we are too small people to do that kind of thing.

I am sorry if this back chat is going on and various motives attributed to Sardar Patel or me. All that can be done is to deny privately because if we say anything in public that itself gives rise to an argument.

I shall, however, consult Sardar Patel, in this matter.<sup>3</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 423.
2. Kidwai said Patel and Nehru should issue a joint statement that they were neutral in the Congress President's election because it was being suggested that Patel was supporting Tandon and Nehru, Sitaramayya.
3. Nehru sent Kidwai's letter to Patel and asked for his suggestions. Patel said he was glad Nehru had countered the rumours reported by Kidwai. He had, as the best way out, asked Prasad to continue as President and if he did, no action would be necessary.

## 10. To Hayatullah Ansari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 2, 1948

My dear Hayat,

I have your letter of the 24th September.

I am afraid it will not be proper for me to say anything for public use

1. J.N. Collection.



## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

about the Neecha Nagar film.<sup>2</sup> The film is a good one<sup>3</sup>, and I am glad that it has been saved and is going to be released soon.<sup>4</sup> But I feel it would be improper for me to say anything about any film.

As regards the U.P. Assembly, I have been completely out of touch with elections and the like, but I would be very glad indeed if you were elected.<sup>5</sup> I am writing to Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant and the President of the U.P.P.C.C.<sup>6</sup> about it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Directed by Chetan Anand, it was a film about slum dwellers' fight against exploitation. It had won the GrandPrix award at Cannes International Film Festival in 1946. Hayatullah Ansari wrote the script of this film.
3. Nehru had seen the film at a special screening in the Viceregal Lodge.
4. International acclaim and Nehru's opinion of the film helped the producers to get over the difficulties raised by the financiers. Its release was secured after a great deal of delay.
5. He was elected to the U.P. Legislative Council in 1952 and was its member till 1966.
6. P.D. Tandon.

### 11. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 2, 1948

My dear Pantji,

Hayatullah Ansari, Editor of the *Qaumi Awaz*, writes to me that there is a vacancy in the U.P. Assembly among the Muslim M.L.As. He suggests that he might be considered for this vacancy as there is a scarcity of intellectuals among the U.P. Muslim M.L.As.

I should not like to interfere in any way in the selection of a Congress candidate, but I should like to say that I think Hayatullah is a very fine young man both in intellectual attainments and character. I have known him for a dozen years or so. At my request he spent some time with Gandhiji at Sewagram and was greatly influenced by Gandhiji. Gandhiji himself liked him. I am sure he would be a credit to us if he was sent to the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## I. General Perspectives



## 1. Fundamental Unity of India<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Mayor,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Deputy Mayor, Aldermen and Councillors, *Jai Hind*. You have been generous in what you have said in your address. You have been still more generous in what you have not said in that address. When you approach a person with affection, you are apt to slur over his shortcomings and to think only of the bright side and possibly exaggerate it. You have done that in your address. You have not mentioned many facts which you might well have done. First of all, the fact is that I have come to Madras and to the South after many long years. Why did I not come here earlier? It is nearly nine years since I came to this city, and, that too, was a very brief visit of a day.<sup>3</sup> It is not right for a person who is carrying on the work on a national scale to ignore, if that may be called ignoring, this vast and highly important part of India. Now, I have no particular excuses to offer for that except to say that sometimes fate and circumstances are too strong for an individual to do what he wishes to do. In fact, as one goes on in life, one finds that it is extraordinarily difficult to do what one wants to do. Something always intervenes. Something comes in the way and the picture that emerges is so different from what one hopes it to be.

You have been referring in this address to my being Prime Minister of the Indian Union. It is a high office, and a very great responsibility. And, I rather doubt sometimes if I am worthy enough to shoulder that responsibility, although I am not lacking in conceit. I am not over-modest. Nevertheless, the burden is such that no man can bear it, unless he has the cooperation and goodwill of vast numbers of the people of India. For long years we struggled for the independence of India. We achieved it, but we achieved it in a manner which was not to our liking. We achieved that in a manner which has hurt India and hurt us, and in spite of the rejoicing that we may indulge in often enough, there is sorrow in our hearts because of what has happened during the last year or so. So things do not happen as one wants to. And so, to go back to what I said earlier, I could not come to Madras during these long years as I wanted to. You know that I am not only a resident of the northern part of India, but I am even more so a child of the northern Himalayan mountains. Whether I live in Allahabad or Delhi, temporarily, my heart remains in the mountains, and in Kashmir, from where we hailed. It is a long cry to the snowy mountains of Kashmir

1. Speech at the Madras Corporation, 24 July 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

2. U. Krishna Rao.

3. Nehru stopped in Madras on 15 July 1939 on his way to Sri Lanka. See *Selected Works* (first series) Vol. 10, pp. 7-8.



from here in Madras. I do not know the exact distance. Probably, it is about two thousand miles or so. There are enormous differences in climate, in ways of living, and to some extent, among the people who live in those northern regions of India, and those who live in the south, and yet we all know that all those diversities and varieties are rather superficial, and that there has been, and is, a very fundamental unity which binds us all together, and this has not broken in the past even when there were political divisions in India. India has remained India, whatever shape the overall political picture may have taken in the course of the last two thousand years or more. I have no doubt that India will remain so whatever temporary political changes may take place or may have taken place. India would not have survived through all these long ages if there had not been something deep down which held her together, something which was stronger than just politics, or even economics as economics is a more potent factor than politics. I do not know how to describe it, but there is no doubt that there has been something which has held the people of India together. That, to which any Indian can tune in, is a thing which has given strength to India and possibly also has given weakness to her. Weakness, I said, because when we have a unity in diversity, that diversity gives us weakness. But the real strength comes from that inner unity. In the long run, probably, unity based on a lack of diversity, on an attempt at regimentation and uniformity would not be a binding unity. So India has progressed in the past ages, with this diversity and at the same time with this fundamental unity. During the past year many things, shameful things, have happened which cut up the living body of India. I do not complain, because I am a consenting party to that, rightly or wrongly; in the balance, we consented and we hold by that and we shall abide by that. But one cannot help thinking of the future, one cannot help thinking of the immediate past and what it has meant to us, and how it would affect the future. But I am sorry, it is not my intention to launch on these high matters of the present and the future.

I have begun by apologising to you for the long time that has elapsed in my coming to the south. The south of India, and this great and gracious city of Madras, have a very peculiar significance and importance in the scheme of India as a whole. They represent something of the most vital consequence to India, and it may be said, that in many ways they represent the old culture of India far more than the north does. For my part, I do believe that one of the reasons why India is not merely a geographical entity, but is something deeper, why India has continued, is because of two factors: one, an essential deep grounding in something, call it if you like, an outlook on life, a philosophy of life, some ideal which found expression long ages ago, which may change in particulars, which may be adapted but nevertheless which basically has governed India's outlook. That is the

bigness, that unity which has continued. And the second thing that is rather different, oddly enough, that is an amazing adaptability and a power of assimilation. So we have assimilated all manner of people who have come to India. They have accepted the mode of India, somewhat more in the north, of course, the south also has been affected. In the past many thousand years they have come in various ways, as friends, as traders, as invaders, many have been driven back, some have come in, but all, or nearly all, have been assimilated in the ocean of India's humanity. There is a slight difference to India's humanity but more so being themselves influenced by that ocean and being absorbed by that. So India has that capacity for absorption, assimilation, and unless a country and a people have that capacity for adaptation and assimilation, they become rigid, unchanging, unprogressive, and rigidity is something near to death. However great a thing might be, a country, or a people, or an idea, even an idea, if it is rigid, it becomes unprogressive and it dies. Now, India manages to combine with a fair measure of success, these two things, that is, a certain holding on to an anchor, which is essential, or else we are swept away with every wind that blows. We have many times to hold on to an anchor, call it what you like, an outlook on life, and the other thing that certain adaptability and power of assimilation which made it change to some extent with the changing time, and it made it absorb other people, and it made it influence other people beyond the confines of India a great deal, for a great part of Asia has been tremendously influenced by India.

So with that past I feel confident that India's future is going to be secure and strong, in spite of all the difficulties that face us today. I have never had in my mind, any particular fear, shall I say, although I don't like the word fear, that any external authority or power can ultimately do great injury to India. It may, of course, influence us, affect us, sometimes injure us slightly but ultimately I do not think it can do very much. The only fear that sometimes comes to me is what we might do to ourselves, in our narrowness of vision, or by our forgetting the ideals that have governed us. No race, much less a great people like the people of India, can go down because of outsiders' activities. A great race goes down because it injures itself, because it becomes little-minded, because it becomes so tied up with the small and the little things of life, that the big things escape it. In the days of our adversity, when we struggled for freedom, we held together. We were not afraid either of that condition of adversity or of the mighty power of the adversary. We held together and we looked up to some extent to the stars. Well, we cannot reach the stars, perhaps, but looking at the stars does keep our head up and thus keep our body straight and we march with strong, confident strides. Now the question arises, when an apparent success has come to us, where do we stand? Do we still think of the stars? Do we hold our heads up? Do we think of the big things of life, or



have we got suddenly entangled in the littlenesses of life ? I do not know, or rather I do know a great deal, but I cannot strike the balance. Obviously, there are ups and downs in a nation's life, and when achievement comes, it is followed by a period of reaction, of sitting down, of getting involved in the lesser things of life. However that may be, and whatever the balance may be, it is very important for us to look into this ourselves and to find out, how far we are concerned with little things of life. I am afraid that many of us are too much concerned with them. They are shouting too much about secondary matters, which may be important in themselves but which has little relevance in the context of things today. We have, after a great struggle, achieved something. We have, at the very moment of achievement, had to undergo a vital and dangerous operation. We are recovering from that operation and undoubtedly we shall recover, we have recovered a good deal, and we shall recover wholly. All kinds of problems that had lain dormant during many generations past, have suddenly come up, political, economic and social. In India, apart from that, in the world, no one knows what the next six months or year might bring for us. Now, when this is happening, are we to lose ourselves in the small things and be unprepared to face the big things ? Whether you look at it from the international point of view, or the national or the provincial, that is not good enough. If we do so, we not only lose the big things but we also lose the small things, because they cannot stand apart. Therefore we have, if I may use the word, declared war against some of the tendencies which weaken the country and which are essentially bad, especially, in the present context of events. We have declared war against communalism. We will not tolerate it. Although in certain aspects, it may be perhaps commended or understood, but the thing has proved such an evil thing, such a vicious thing, it has brought so much suffering and injury to India, that we will not tolerate communalism in any shape whatever the consequences.

Secondly, I will not say that we will not tolerate provincialism, but we are going to oppose provincialism with all our might—not, again, because the love of a province or of a desire to push a province ahead, has anything wrong in it, of course, not. You, who dwell in this great Presidency of Madras, should be proud of it. There is no reason why you should not. You should try to further expand, of course, but that is not what I mean. What I mean is that there is a tendency in every province, whether it is my province, Punjab or Bengal or U.P. or Bihar or Bombay, any province you like in India—that has suddenly grown, as a reaction I suppose, far too great an interest in provincial matters, which lead to some extent to conflict with neighbouring provinces. So long as it is a constructive provincial activity, well and good ; but when it becomes one which creates a feeling of separateness from a neighbouring province, then it is bad. Because the



fundamental thing that is bad in India today is anything that disrupts, that separates, and which, therefore, weakens. Therefore, I should like you in Madras and the south to consider these matters and give a lead to us in the rest of India, and you have, perhaps, a right to do so and an opportunity to do so, at the present moment, which we in the north have not.

For two reasons, first, because of what has happened in the past year in the north, before the partition and after the killing, and murder and all the terrible things that had happened there, have very badly affected the people of the north. They have created complexes. of course, all that business has stopped and superficially peace and order prevail. They do prevail. But you can imagine when millions of people are uprooted from their homes, and undergo terrible sufferings, all manner of changes take place in their minds and hearts, and it is not an easy thing for them to recover normality. So we have an abnormal population or rather a considerable proportion of abnormal population in the north. It is rapidly coming to normality through work etc. You have viewed these events from a long distance. You have been affected by them, no doubt, but you have not been presumably, emotionally affected, as the north has been, which has seen them and helped them. Therefore, you are in a better position to consider it coolly and dispassionately and point out the right path. Secondly, relatively to the north, the people of the south are considered to be constitutionally more cool and dispassionate, and highly intellectual, of course, so that again you should utilize that superior vantage point on which you stand, to look at these problems not only in your provincial or South Indian context, but in the all-India context, and rise above this narrowness, separatism and provincialism. As it is in Delhi quite a large number of people I have to work with, whether in the Secretariat and elsewhere, seem to hail from the south. Well, they have not got there because of any personal influence or favour. They have got there because of their competence and ability, and therefore, they came. Although Madras may be far from Delhi, the fact is, that it does play an important part in the formulation of policies and other things in the Central Government. But I should like you as a province to think of these matters in the all-India context, because you are peculiarly fitted to do so and for my part, I gladly accept the leadership of Madras provided it fulfils these conditions.

I thank you very much for your welcome. I listened to your address, but as I listened and even now I can hear almost, the roar of the welcome of vast numbers of people whom I passed just now when coming here through the streets of Madras. And not only that but I had some kind of vague picture of hundreds of thousands of eyes looking at me with love and affection. This is very heartening and it is a little difficult to say much about it, or to express one's thanks. But it does make one feel very humble

to see how much affection and love is showered upon one in this way and how unworthy one is for it. Thank you very much.

## 2. Duties in a Free India<sup>1</sup>

Comrades of Madras,

We are meeting here, you and I, after many years, and during these years much has happened to you and to me. Many of the old faces I used to know here, are no longer to be seen, and there are a number of newcomers. Those who were children then, are young men and young women now, and those who were young then, are in their middle years, and so I have changed and many of you have changed. But since yesterday I have been looking at the city of Madras and sensing not individuals but the people as a whole, and I find that there is little change in the people of Madras. As before, they are full of a generous affection, of affection and generosity towards those whom they like. You have overwhelmed me again, as you have done on some occasions previously with your love and affection, and I have wondered to what exactly you directed that love and affection. Surely, it was not to an individual, but to something that you fancied, you saw in that individual, and I thought that you were hungry to get something and for the moment you imagined that I was some symbol which gave you hope that you might get your hearts' desire. Now, I feel overwhelmed by the thought that you should expect so much from me, or from any other individual. At the same time, I am tremendously heartened by this affection that you have shown and in the turmoil of the present and in the difficulties that face us, the conviction that I have your affection and faith, goes a long way to strengthen me to face these trials. I do not know what you expect me to do. I have myself a feeling that to arouse so much emotion in the public is a dangerous thing, because one cannot fulfil the task one sets before oneself, however much one may try. I have a feeling of failing, not only in the promises made to you, but in the endless tasks that I allotted to myself. Failing to solve the problems which must be solved. I do not know how you judge the past few years? What has happened and what is happening now? As for myself, I judge many of ourselves, and more especially myself, rather harshly. But you are kind and generous, and you

1. Speech at Madras, 25 July 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.



overlook failings in your loving kindness, for love is a little blind, and so, in spite of everything, instead of complaining, instead of criticising, you shower your affection. Many of us have laboured for many years in India's service, and we shall labour for a few years more, and then we shall pass away, and others will take the torch in their hands, and carry it forward. For, while men and women come and go, the cause and the spirit and the nation lives on. India lives on, and from generation to generation, it demands love and service from her children. Those of my generation have not failed India, I think, in our efforts to serve her, though we may not have succeeded in achieving what we wanted to achieve. At least, it can be said of them that they served India with all their heart and soul, and if achievement did not come, it may have been due to their lack of strength.

So today we have achieved something, and we have also, not achieved what we wanted to achieve. We have achieved the political freedom of India not in the form that we wanted to get it, but rather in a way which has hurt us and pained us and brought tragedy to the land. Yet, we have, nevertheless, achieved the freedom of India. That has brought in its train many problems. Those are political problems, and the problems in relation to this new country, that was a part of India and that has been cut out of India, problems in relation to other parts of India like Kashmir or Hyderabad, problems relating to the economic condition of the masses of India, and that, after all, is the most fundamental problem of all, because it affects each one of you, and each one of the hundreds of millions of India. Political freedom is essential for the self-respect of a country, to give it opportunity to progress. Political freedom is essential to enable it to decide and to do what it wants to do. But political freedom cannot be enough because it is but a way to the larger freedom that a nation and every individual should have. What is political freedom worth to the hungry and the starving, to those who have no clothing to wear or no house to live in ? What worse fate can they have than this ? Therefore, it becomes essential that we must give them economic freedom. We must give them the necessities of life. We must abolish poverty and unemployment and the like. But that is a very big task when you deal with large numbers of people, more especially, when our country has been rent into two, and we have hardly recovered from this very serious operation, which has cut off a limb of the country. Still we have to face these problems and the most difficult of them today are these economic problems which demand urgent solution. You rightly complain of the rising prices which are hitting our people so hard and hitting, more specially, the people with fixed salaries. They are gradually sinking in the morass and they can't rise above it unless something is done. I am not going to discuss these matters here in this vast gathering, because they are intricate. But I mention them to tell you that none of us who is connected with the Government of India, and I



take it, with the Government of Madras, ignores these problems or does not think continually about them. But one thing I should like you to remember that these great problems, like any other problem, cannot be solved by a mere fiat from above i.e. by some decree from Delhi or the Government of India. The Government of India certainly can lay down right policies as far as it can. It can legislate, but successful tackling of these vast problems depends upon the goodwill and cooperation of the community, of large numbers of human beings. Unless that goodwill comes, that solution is difficult, however good the law may be. Now I have an idea that we are not getting that goodwill in that ample measure, that should come to us. Remember this, that if you disagree, if you disapprove of a particular government, whether it is the provincial government of Madras or Central Government of Delhi, the right course is, not just to disapprove and not to help. It is better to change that government and put another that you like and give that government your full support. But remaining merely passive and not giving your support to the government of your choice, does you no good and does the government no good. We have got into the habit from long ages of foreign domination, not to look after ourselves properly enough, not to help ourselves, but we expect the Government to do everything we expect those in authority to perform wonders. Now that is wrong, that is a wrong approach, at any time. It is a completely wrong approach when you have a democratic system of government, which you can influence this way or that way, which you control and which you can change. Democracy cannot function unless it has the active cooperation and goodwill of large numbers of people. In a free country, it does not merely mean that the country is politically free from another's domination. But it should mean much more, that the individual in that country, man or woman, functions as a free individual with the rights, the duties and the responsibilities that freedom brings. If you do not, then you are not really free. Now, that process is a little difficult one to adjust oneself to, and I find that although India is independent and can go any way she chooses, subject to circumstances, nevertheless, people have not got out of the old habit of not functioning fully as free men and women. They claim their rights of freedom, loudly enough. They complain loudly enough, but they are not quite prepared to assume the responsibilities that freedom brings and to carry the burdens that freedom brings. Now, there is a law in life that you cannot have the right unless you also assume the responsibility that accompanies that right. There are no rights without responsibility, without duties attached to them, however big you may grow. The bigger you grow, the more the responsibility and burden you have to carry. Therefore, you have to prepare yourself for carrying those burdens and sharing those responsibilities with those whom you choose. It is a dangerous thing to put a few people in authority, to idolize them, as you sometimes idolize me, and I

want to warn you that it is a dangerous thing, because not only is it bad for the person whom you idolize in this way, but you get into wrong habits. You tend to make that person function, shall I say, in a manner unconnected, in an autocratic manner. You tend to create possibly an oligarchy of such individuals and the governments of the day, whether it is central or provincial, do not derive that sustenance and faith from you as they ought to do. Now, that is my first point. You must, the people of India must, complain certainly if they want to, but must also shoulder the obligations and responsibilities of freedom.

Secondly, you must not rely on the government to do everything. Governments can do much, but governments cannot do everything, specially in raising millions of people. The Government can clear the path, can help in some ways, can legislate, but ultimately the people have to raise themselves. So you must think more in terms of raising yourselves, through your own labours, in town or village or wherever you might be. Do you remember when we were struggling for our freedom, under Mahatma Gandhi's inspiring guidance, what did he tell you always? He laid the greatest stress on what he called his constructive programme. Now that constructive programme had many paths and aspects to it. Some of you may have criticised some aspects; it is immaterial. The point I wish you to understand and remember is that he did not believe, even then, in a negative or in a passive agitation without constructive effort. Sometimes an agitational role becomes necessary, sometimes even a destructive role is necessary, and sometimes, unfortunately, wars are necessary. But nations do not come up by destruction or following the path of sheer agitation. Agitation or war may remove an obstruction from the path. But a nation grows by constructive and creative efforts, and even when the opportunities of creative and constructive efforts were limited to us, even then Mahatmaji asked us to concentrate on constructive work and put forward his programme to that effect. How much more so is that necessary today when we have avenues of constructive efforts opening out to us, when the governments, provincial or Central, when it should be their duty to open out these avenues and help all kinds of official and even non-official activities of this kind? So I want you particularly to think over this, and each one of you to ask himself or herself, what part you are taking in the building up of this new and free India, apart from, perhaps, criticising or condemning? Now, I am not afraid of criticism or condemnation, and I think, it would be a sad day if people stop criticising and condemning those in authority. Because without criticism and strong criticism and pointing out the errors of their ways people in authority often go wrong. They get swollen-headed. They get complacent. They think that everything they do is right and everything else is wrong. That is a dangerous habit of all those who get into authority even though they might have been Congressmen. Therefore, people in authority have to be check-



ed and kept up to the mark. That is necessary. Nevertheless what is even more necessary is for each one of you to ask yourself, what are you doing in the building up of India ? How are you helping it, in a small way or in a big way? During the days of agitation people thought that the greatest service to India was to deliver a speech or shout a slogan. Well, delivering a speech is never much of a service to anybody or anything, and shouting a slogan may be good occasionally, but it does not help in building anything. Now, it is true, a slogan may be necessary, though our slogans may perhaps be new ones, and speeches are sometimes necessary if you think so and perhaps they are. Still, we have bigger work ahead. How are you helping in that work? What are you doing? And the work is not merely, as I am sorry to say, many of my colleagues in the Congress seem to imagine, getting into legislatures or other elected bodies or the Constituent Assembly or somewhere else and thinking that they are serving the nation in that way. For that way of serving the nation is often rather misused. But, obviously, everybody cannot get into the legislatures, and if they all did, the country would simply stop working. So the problem before you and us and the country is how each individual can do his little bit to build up the new India. If each individual did his little bit, miracles would be performed in India. Think about that, think of this vast concourse sitting here. I do not know, I cannot compute your numbers but there are hundreds and hundreds of thousands here. Think of it, each one of you doing regularly his little bit for this country that we love. How could we not change it? Just doing it for this great city of Madras or this province? What would it amount to? How many problems could you solve ? Suppose we talk of production. Production is lacking. We want to increase our production of cloth and do many other things. We need not for the moment consider the economics of production, and how far a cottage industry or a machine industry can produce more. The point is this. If each one of you produced even a little bit, how much would that little bit multiplied by half a million or a million would amount to? Therefore, do your little bit for India, and then, you will be worthy of India and India will be proud of you.

Now, as you all know, we have many problems today, and this partition of India, the cutting off of a portion of this country which is called Pakistan, has created innumerable problems, political and economic, but most of all psychological. We cut off something from the living body of India, and it will take a long time to recover from that deep injury to the heart. We have tried to smile through it but it has really broken our heart to see what happened then and what has happened subsequently. That partition happened as you know, with our consent. We were consenting parties to it and we shall abide by what we consented to. We consented because we thought that thereby we were purchasing peace and goodwill, at least, at a heavy price. We did not get that peace or goodwill. We got something terrible





AT A CHILDREN CARE CENTRE, MADRAS, JULY 1948



INSPECTING A RALLY OF WOMEN VOLUNTEERS, MADRAS, 24 JULY 1948



instead, and I do not know now, if I had the same choice, what I would decide. But that is a foolish speculation because history cannot be unwritten and there is no good going back on decisions made. We accepted them, and today the position is this that if Pakistan and the leaders of Pakistan wanted suddenly to rejoin India, to reverse that process of history, I am quite clear in my own mind, that we would not accept it. We would not accept it for the present. I cannot speak for the distant future, because in the distant future, I think that the facts and the forces of history, and the facts of geography, must ultimately have their way, and I do not think even political division can override those great forces that are working in the world, in Asia, and in India, nor, can they certainly override what geography has done. But that lies in the future, the distant future. For the present I said, if Pakistan wanted to rejoin India and to undo the partition, we would not accept that. Why not? Simply because, that would mean in the present context, going back, in the worst possible way, to that troubled condition, from which we sought to escape, by partition. It would mean shouldering the tremendous burdens that Pakistan has to shoulder. We have enough troubles of our own. Why should we add to them? Therefore, do not imagine, let no man imagine, that however much I may regret the partition of India, I work for undoing it. I say this, because of the fantastic allegations made by the leaders of Pakistan at Lake Success, at the United Nations, Security Council and elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> They have gone on repeating that we are intriguing to break up Pakistan, to crush it, put an end to it. Now I do not wish to say very much about Pakistan in this connection, except this, that they have achieved a remarkable capacity for piling falsehood on falsehood. It is an amazing thing, how they go on building their policies on lies, and falsehood and deceit. But, however that may be. I want to make this clear that it is a fantastic thing, to say that we are trying to put an end, or intriguing to put an end to Pakistan. It is fantastic because that would be doing injury to ourselves.

First of all, we do not want to get caught up in this mess that Pakistan is gradually getting into. Secondly, if Pakistan economically or otherwise collapsed, that would have its bad effect on India as well. Because remember, however much there may be partition, you cannot, after all, separate two neighbouring areas which are geographically so close to each other. Their economy is connected, in a hundred ways they are connected. If Pakistan collapsed, the injury to India would be equally great. Therefore, from no point of view could we wish for the collapse, economic or other, of Pakistan. Now, what we want in our own interest is that Pakistan should

2. For example, on 16 January 1948, Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, charged that "India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme and has, since June 1947, been making persistent attempts to undo it."



continue and remain, economically and politically, sound. We do not want Pakistan to continue in the way it has been continuing as a progressively hostile country to India. Because Pakistan and India, as they are situated cannot remain for long just neutral countries, indifferent to each other because our relations in the past have been too close and intimate. Our geographical proximity and other reasons make it impossible for us to be just acquaintances. We have either to cooperate together in a friendly manner, or we have to be hostile and inimical to each other, and to fight each other. There is no middle course ultimately. For a while the middle course may be followed, but it will lead either to friendship and cooperation and a closer contact or to trouble and conflict. Of course, the middle course may continue for some years, and talking together a fairly long period of time. Unfortunately during the past few months, on the whole, we have not gone forward towards closer cooperation. In some ways, minor ways, we have done that, but on the whole we have drifted away. You see evidence of this in Kashmir and in Hyderabad even, though that is behind the veil. In fact, I just said to you that the policy of Pakistan has been based, often enough, on deceit and falsehood. I am sorry to make that serious charge against not only a neighbouring country but against people who, after all, whatever political division may have come, are Indians, and will continue to remain Indians, even though they might call themselves by some other name.

But look at this Kashmir business. You know that, at present, there is a Commission of the United Nations in India, considering the Kashmir question and it is not proper for me to say much on this subject. But one matter, one part of it, I want to draw your attention to, and that is this: do you remember when we went to the Security Council? What we placed before them? We said that Pakistan was aiding and abetting the raiders, who have come across Pakistan's territory, to invade and loot and destroy the valley of Kashmir. We said that, and we asked the Security Council to call upon Pakistan not to do so. It was a simple fact stated and a simple request made. Either it was true, based on facts, or it was not a simple issue. Now, the Security Council sat for six or seven months, and discussed it many times, and ultimately appointed this Commission. Oddly enough, during all these six or eight months of hard work and discussion, they never considered that simple fact and simple issue, that we had placed before them, and because they didn't do so, they were continually proceeding on a weak and uncertain foundation and on a wrong premise. However, why I mention this is that we had said about Pakistan's aiding and abetting because we knew it. The Security Council did not know it, and there was no reason why the Security Council should take our word for it. They could have enquired, they could have found out then and there and then decided it. They did not even choose to inquire then. They went off at a tangent and considered other matters.

What is the position now ? Eight months ago, seven months ago, we said this to the Security Council. Well, now you know and I know and everybody knows that it is not merely a question of Pakistan's aiding and abetting some tribesmen but Pakistan is sending their regular armies into Kashmir, that is Indian Union territory, and fighting our troops there. Note now that the whole of Pakistan's case before the Security Council was based on this claim that they were not aiding and abetting or that in no way was there any complicity between them. What is happening in Kashmir ? Now if it is established as I do claim that it is established to the knowledge of every person who enquires into it, to the knowledge of governments, indeed, I would go so far as to say, it is admitted practically, though not absolutely openly and formally by Pakistan, that Pakistan is functioning in this way, with its armies in Kashmir, what about this case that they built up in the Security Council with such a flourish.<sup>3</sup> Is it not that the whole case was built on a falsehood and on deceit ? And if it has been based on these false premises then the whole case falls.

In discussing Pakistan I want to discuss another matter which is not often discussed, but I think it is good for you, good for all of us, to understand this. This cutting away of Pakistan has produced tremendous reactions in India on the Muslim mind, on the minds of Hindus and Sikhs who are in India. We see many unfortunate reactions and so many complexes. Prior to the partition, we stood, as you all know, for a united India, for a secular India, for that India in which every citizen, whatever his religion, has the same right and opportunity and the same obligations, as any other. Now we stand for all these still. In spite of partition, in spite of the fact that a purely communal state has been built up in Pakistan, we stand for that. The Congress certainly has repeated that it stands for that. Then the Constituent Assembly has repeated that. We stand for that. That is all right. Nevertheless, it is a fact that there is a doubt in people's minds and questions arise. You know that some of our unfortunate countrymen have gone astray and have thought about a Hindu State, a Hindu Rashtra and the like. That is an extraordinary case of how evil somehow spreads. How the Hindu communalists of this country, in trying to oppose the Muslim communalists of the Muslim League, have become entirely converted to the Muslim League's lines of thinking. In the reverse, of course, that is, how they advance exactly the same arguments, how they think exactly in the same way; only as a reaction to the Muslim League and the poison-

3. On 13 January 1948, the Pakistan Foreign Minister had told Reuters in London, that it would be utterly impossible for Pakistan to guarantee that no Pakistan nationals should be able to cross the border between Pakistan and Kashmir and participate in the struggle going on there. On 8 July he informed the U.N. Commission that three brigades of regular Pakistani troops had been fighting in Kashmir since May. Pakistan Government publicly admitted participation in the fighting on 3 August.



nous thing that the Muslim League has stood for in the past. Now these questions arise. Well, I have a straight answer to such questions. As a matter of fact, you can think it out logically yourself i.e. if you think in terms of any kind of a communal state, a Hindu Rashtra, etc. then you are thinking in terms of something which, first of all, you are not going to get, however much you may try. Such things cannot be created today except at great peril and at peril to the nation. Attempts to do that will bring about conflict and ruin to the nation, because those attempts will be fought and resisted to the end, and either they will be defeated or the nation will suffer tremendously. But it is more important than that, because in the modern world today such nations, communal states, cannot exist, except in a terribly backward condition. If you look round the world, you may find some such states if you like, small and backward ones, which do not count in the world. But what do you think India is like? Is it a wretched little backward state somewhere? Is it some odd republic or state of some far continent, which just carries on because the people allow it to carry on? You want India to be that or you want India to be a great, modern, progressive and strong nation which can, which refuses to allow any other nation to play about with it, which plays its great part in the councils of the world, What do you want? It amazes me to people see talk in this ignorant, bigoted way and injure India's cause. You cannot have this limited vision, if you want to think of India as a great nation, as you must. So we must have India as a composite nation, as a secular nation, predominantly of course, that nation will be predominantly Hindu, if you like, because the Hindus are predominant here. The Hindus' thinking will obviously prevail in that. The Hindu approach to things will obviously prevail. That is a different matter, but each individual must have the complete freedom and opportunity and it will be a secular state in the sense, that each, from the state's point of view, each man has a square deal, and a clear opportunity.

Now, Pakistan, as you know, clearly proclaims and puts forward a completely different ideal. It talks about an Islamic State. It talks about a theocratic State. It talks about a communal State. It is not for me to advise Pakistan. They can go their way. They have gone their way. But I am interested as I told you in Pakistan, because to my mind, however much it may cut itself away, it still remains a part of India, and it surprises me how rapidly Pakistan is going downhill in every manner. Today, to talk of a nation in theocratic terms and in religious terms, is to talk a language which used to be spoken a few hundred years ago. If Pakistan wants to go back a few hundred years, well it can do so except that it won't ultimately succeed in doing so. It will come to grief. But because Pakistan talks the language of a few hundred years ago, we are not going to be foolish enough to talk a similar language.

Now, various complexes have arisen, in the mind of India, in the Hindu mind and the Muslim mind. A large number



of Muslims who thought and worked for Pakistan have gone to Pakistan and are a part of Pakistan. Nevertheless, millions and millions of Muslims, thirty-five to forty million Muslims, remain in India. They are welcome in India, as everybody is welcome, who considers himself or herself a child of India, who is loyal to India, who wants to serve India. Because India is going to be a secular State, a composite one, composite in the sense of including all her children and all their cultures, and giving them freedom and scope to grow. So many Muslims have gone, many remain. In the world today let us remember, there are more Muslims in India than in any Muslim country in the world except Pakistan. Now that is the position. What about these Muslims in India? Sometimes, people talk of demanding from them a certain loyalty: "Oh, you must be loyal". Well, of course, people who live in India and are citizens of India should be, and are expected to be, loyal to India. If they are not, then they isolate themselves and then they no longer have any real place in India. Nevertheless, it is rather silly for anyone to go on publicly demanding loyalty from someone else. Loyalty is a thing of the mind and the heart and not of public declaration. It almost reminds me of the days in the olden times when the British Viceroy and Governors talked pompously about loyalty in this country. Well, it is rather silly to go about demanding anyone's loyalty, and I am not demanding anyone's loyalty, but I do wish to make this clear that I can understand very well the crisis of the mind and the spirit that the Muslims in India have had to face during the past year. It has been a difficult year for them; those who were completely loyal to India, even they have had to face this crisis. Quite naturally, I sympathise with them. I should like to help them to resolve their crisis. Having set the ideal before us of a secular India, I personally stand for the development in India of a composite culture which will, no doubt, be influenced by the more dominant elements in the country. Nevertheless, this composite culture will be open to all.

Having said that, I wish to say this, that India is facing and will continue to face various crises, and our countrymen, who are Muslims in India, have to understand quite clearly how they fit in this composite picture. I find, I have been a day and a half in Madras now, and I have been rather surprised to read certain journals that are issued on behalf of Muslims here. I have been surprised to see the tone and the language of those journals. I have found in those journals not only a trace but something much more than a trace of the arrogant communalism that has brought so much injury to India. Now I want to be frank with you. The Muslim League in the past followed a policy, a vicious and a poisonous policy, which has done harm to India and which has brought about this partition. The Muslim League or those who think in terms of the League have no place in India today. That Muslim League has been wound up happily by its own erstwhile votaries in most places of India. I was surprised and amazed that there were

some people in the Madras Presidency who ventured to carry it on. That I say is a challenge and an insult that they should dare or any person in India should dare to say that he is carrying on the traditions of the old Muslim League. The old Muslim League has its homeland now in Pakistan only. It has no place in India and if any Muslims here wish to carry on those old traditions, I would suggest to them, in all friendliness to leave for Pakistan, because otherwise it will not be a happy thing for them and for us. If they don't, then the tension will continue and that composite nation, that secular nation that we wish to raise here, will have elements which will not fit in it. The whole conception behind Pakistan had no element of nationalism in it. It was a religious, extra-territorial and communal conception. It is rather a fantastic notion in this modern age to have a theocratic conception of a State. However, it now means that a Muslim who is a citizen of Pakistan is not a citizen of a territory where he dwells, but rather of an Islamic theocratic conception. Well anyhow Pakistan has come into existence. If the old Muslim League idea was at all right, then it means that there can be no Hindu who can be a citizen of Pakistan or no non-Muslim, Hindu, Christian, Parsi, Sikh or any other, because Pakistan is an Islamic theocratic state, claiming allegiance of Muslims. Therefore, no non-Muslim can be a citizen of Pakistan. Therefore also no Muslim can be a citizen of India. That is to say, if Muslims in India still believe in that old ideology of the Muslim League that means automatically that, therefore, their fatherland or motherland, whatever land it is, is Pakistan, not India. Now that conflicts directly with the conception of a secular, composite nation in India, in which there are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Parsis and others. I know for a fact that a large number of Muslims in India, accept India's ideology of a secular nation, composite state, and have absolutely no desire to line up with Pakistan in any way. Therefore, I am content with this, but there are some, no doubt, who find it difficult to get out of the wrong habit they got into in the past. Maybe they got out of it, and there are some, who, rather deliberately, apparently carry on with that thought and that was the idea that struck me when my attention was drawn to certain journals issued by some, apparently by some organizations or individuals here in Madras. Now when I talk about a secular state, someone might say: "Oh, if it is a secular state, why do they want *Jana Gana Mana* as a national anthem? Why this, why that, why this crest." Now, I have never heard a more fantastic nonsense than this and I want to make it perfectly clear to those who write this nonsense that nobody is going to put up with this nonsense any more. Neither our crest is going to be changed nor our songs are going to be changed, because somebody in his arrogance thinks otherwise, and does not like it and has said so. I never heard any greater impertinence or arrogance in my life. This is not the meaning of a secular state. Are we going to shake



and twist all our cultural institutions, because somebody, who used to belong to the Muslim League of Madras, does not approve of them? Let him get away from here and the sooner the better, if he does not approve of it.

A nation's culture grows. It has its roots in the soil, thousands of years bring it up. We are going to allow that culture of ours, remember, which is a mixed culture and which is, although fundamentally the same, yet slightly different in various parts of the country, as it has mixed with other cultures because India has always shown two clear tendencies. One is, India has got such tremendously strong cultural roots of her own, that the impact of the powerful culture of Greece, the impact of the powerful cultures of other countries did not shake her from her anchor during the last two or three thousand years. That is one part of it. The other tendency was that strong as she was, she was receptive and she was adaptable and if Greece came here, she took something from Greece. If China came, she took much from China, and she took a great deal from Iran and Persia. She took a great deal from Arabia and so the composite culture of India gradually grew up. We received everything with open arms without allowing ourselves to be shaken or blown away from our foundations. We built upon them and built rather finely, whether it is architecture or any other aspect of national life. Even our philosophy was partly affected. So we are not exclusive, and I think the moment a nation and its culture become rigid and exclusive that moment that nation dies. Why India fell from the tremendous height that it had reached in the past, why it fell and ultimately became dominated over by others? My answer would be that India forgot that receptivity. India for a while shut up the windows of her mind and soul, for a while she became complacent. She became rigid, decayed and deteriorated and became a slave country. Therefore, it is a dangerous thing to shut up the windows of your mind and soul, specially, at a time of rapid transition. If you think that free India of today is just going to look back or keep looking to herself, then you are very much mistaken, and if India does that, India will again sink into oblivion and slavery. We have to be wide awake to look at the world, to get the best from it and give what we have. But it has to be a two-way traffic. Let us take what we can, and we have plenty to take if we have to come up in line with many nations of the world. We have plenty to give too, I have no doubt, but before you can give, make yourself worthy of giving. So, there is this composite culture which we wish that it should continue. There is also that fundamental culture of India on which our whole outlook and philosophy of life have been based. Therefore, it is rather absurd for people to talk and think of challenging the symbols of that culture. That is not the way. A symbolic thing, it has nothing to do with religion as such. It is a cultural symbol. Somebody objected, I remember, some



years ago to the lotus as a symbol, I think it was in Calcutta, the lotus which is preeminently the flower of India. Our ancient literature is full of references to that. That lovely flower typifies so much of India and her past. Somebody objected that lotus is a religious symbol. Now, I just cannot understand the mentality that lies behind these objections, and we are not going to listen to any of these objections. But what is important for you to remember and, more especially, for the Hindus to remember is, because we are in a great majority, we are in a dominant position and, therefore, we have to be very careful that we do not become intolerant, that we do not exercise that dominant position in a wrong way, that we do not create fear and suspicion in the minds of any minority in the country. The responsibility always is of the dominant and a majority party, because you are strong and because you can have your way. Therefore, you have to be careful that you do not have your way in a manner so as to produce fear and suspicion in the minds of minority communities. If you bear that in your mind, then it is well.

Now, in this connection I said that it was rather absurd to demand loyalty from any person. Loyalty should grow out of your heart. At the same time, you have to create conditions where loyalty will grow. If you go on condemning, damning and criticising and demanding loyalty, that is, you create conditions when loyalty cannot grow, even if it wanted to grow. Therefore, in this crisis of the spirit in which Indian Muslims have been caught, you have to be gentle with them. You have to treat them helpfully and leniently, and make them feel that they have as much right to be in India as you or I or anyone of us. That is so. But, if in spite of all this, in the major issues of the day, any person, Hindu or Muslim, is disloyal to India, then obviously, he must suffer the penalty of disloyalty. Then we cannot absorb them into India as we would like to.

We have various problems which put us all to test. There is Kashmir. But Kashmir is rather far from Madras. Now there is Hyderabad. I want to say a few words about Hyderabad, because this problem must interest you. It is near to your province and it affects you. You will remember, that in November last, we came to a Standstill Agreement with the Hyderabad State. There are many aspects in it. Among other things the three subjects, defence, communications and external affairs were to be supervised and controlled by the Central Government at Delhi. These are the matters I need not go into. We entered into that standstill agreement, because we did not want to compel the Hyderabad government to accede to us. We were of opinion, and we are of

principle, elsewhere. Now we did not want to force the pace in Hyderabad. We thought this matter can be settled quietly and peacefully, a little later. So we entered into this Standstill Agreement for a year. In fact if properly understood and worked out, that Standstill Agreement meant 80% of accession, because the three subjects of accession were under the Government of India. We agreed as a price of this understanding to withdraw our troops that were stationed at the Secunderabad cantonment. We withdrew them soon after, and carried out that very important part of the bargain. It was a very important part, because with our troops sitting in Secunderabad, we dominated Hyderabad in a military way. It would have been exceedingly difficult for the ruler of Hyderabad, or for anyone else in Hyderabad, to play much mischief. Yet in order to ease the way we entered into that Standstill Agreement, and we withdrew our troops from Secunderabad. That was the major thing. There are many other matters in which we complained of breaches of the Standstill Agreement on their part, and they complained of breaches on our part. These are minor matters. Their complaint chiefly has been that we did not supply them with arms. Well, in the context of things, you can yourself judge of that, but apart from these complaints, the really big thing that stands out is that we were in a dominating military position in Hyderabad when we withdrew our army. Can you find a bigger gesture of our attempt to see that we wanted a peaceful, cooperative solution of the Hyderabad problem? After that it is a long history and progressively deteriorating history, a history of repeated journeys of the Prime Minister and other ministers and advisers of the Hyderabad Government to Delhi and back. Repeatedly they came to us, and more or less we agreed, as they also agreed, and they went back. But that provisional agreement was not accepted. On the last occasion, this was again, what appeared to us, an agreement with the representatives of the Hyderabad Government. Again, they went back and it fell through. Now I am exceedingly sorry, I have to use rather strong language, because strong language does not normally help, but I can't help it, if the truth can only be expressed by strong language. The Hyderabad Government have behaved in the last few months in a manner which would do credit to any gangster, a thief or a deceitful person. They have come to us again and again, speaking softly, and all the time they have gone on intriguing in a hundred ways against us. All the time they have said one thing and done something else. I am not speaking vaguely, but, on facts in our possession, and the latest of this you will see, you have read yourself in the papers, how there have been, these gun-running expeditions from Karachi to Hyderabad, how certain foreigners have been helping the Hyderabad Government in this way. I am told, I want to be perfectly frank with you, that there are even in government service some people who sympathize with the Hyderabad Government at the present moment. If there are any in government service



here, the sooner they quit it the better. No man is going to be tolerated in service or outside it, who is a friend of the present government of Hyderabad. Let him go away from here, if he is a friend. With Hyderabad, we are not going to be at war, whatever steps that we may have to take against Hyderabad. But the Hyderabad Government have behaved in a hostile and inimical manner to us, and if any person here, a private individual or in State service, in spite of all this, sympathizes with Hyderabad, wants to help Hyderabad in any way, that will be a bad day for him when he does so, because we shall come down with all our strength upon him. We shall tolerate no enemies of the State in this country. Therefore, let people choose now, before it may be too late to do so.

You have been wonderful at this meeting and I want to congratulate you on how well you have behaved not only at this mighty meeting, but in this city of Madras, where I have met with enormous crowds wherever I have been. Everywhere, they have been well-disciplined. I would congratulate the authorities here too, but I know very well from experience that no amount of police work or other work can really discipline a great crowd unless that discipline comes from within. I want to congratulate you, men and women of Madras, on the excellent way that you have behaved here at this meeting, because I attach the greatest importance to discipline. If discipline was necessary to us in the old days, discipline is all the more necessary in these days of our newly-won freedom. Because freedom can only work satisfactorily with a disciplined people. Autocrats and others can govern with the sword over people who are not disciplined. But a free people can only govern themselves through discipline, and discipline must be shown in the small as well as the big things of life. I have rejoiced to see the disciplined way in which you have behaved in these last two days. Day after tomorrow, I shall go away from here, and I shall carry back with me memories of this gracious city and of this large, vast numbers of people whom I have seen and who have seen me, and who have filled me with affection, and the strength that affection gives. For remember that there is nothing more energising than the love and affection of others, as there is nothing more weakening than hatred and violence in the heart. We gained our strength in the past from the lessons the Mahatma taught us. He taught us the lesson of keeping away from hatred and violence, of even trying in so far as our weak nature allowed it, if not to love him, at least, not to hate our opponent. I think we succeeded in an amazing degree and because we succeeded to that degree, we added to our strength. We prevented ourselves from falling into frustration. Now, unfortunately, because of what has happened in the past years, India has been filled with hatred and violence. Until we get rid of this hatred and violence, we will not make much progress. Therefore, I hope that even when we have to fight and struggle,

we shall do so in the manner that Mahatma Gandhi has taught us, which is not with hatred and violence, but with as much love in our hearts as possible. Anyway, I go back with your love and I am happy for it. Thank you. *Jai Hind*.

### 3. A Social-Minded State<sup>1</sup>

I have great pleasure in participating in this function. I have always thought that our nation cannot hope to go far ahead unless women kept moving. Whatever may have been the position in the past, in the present day, it is certain that unless women play an important part in the activities of the State, the State cannot make much progress.

Why I say so is because now the State's activities are becoming progressively social. There are, of course, political and economic activities but they are more and more social. In days of old, the State's functions were very limited. All that the State had to do was to discharge what I would call police functions. They preserved order in the State, prevented people from doing any crime. The State protected the people against external invasion. It collected money by way of taxation to carry on the administrative functions. These were the basic functions of the State. Gradually, other functions began to be discharged by the State. The chief function of the State became social i.e. all social functions like education, health, sanitation, housing, recreation. In other words, the welfare of the community as a whole became the chief function of the State. Now the State has become and should become social-minded. A social-minded State can never function in the old way with a few politicians at the top passing laws. Of course, laws are necessary. Laws have to be passed. But a social-minded State must have the support of a large number of social-minded citizens of the State. Otherwise, even the laws that are passed will not take any effect. Surely, therefore, it is essential that the community as a whole should be very social-minded and be made to appreciate the changes that the State tries to bring about.

1. Address at a meeting jointly organised by several women's organisations in Madras, 25 July 1948. From *The Hindu*, 26 July 1948.



Today, the structure of the Government of India is becoming more social-minded, social-minded in theory, as well as in practice, to some extent. Therefore, we had to look at the social problems in a different way than we were used to doing. We have to think not in political terms. We have to think much more in terms of raising the level of the communities, and here women have a greater part to play than men. That does not mean that you should meet at a conference, deliver long and loud speeches, and pass resolutions. Occasionally you may have to do that.

Therefore, the main thing ahead of you is constructive work. Mahatma Gandhi, throughout the thirty years' period of his intense activity in India, did not attach great importance to what might be called purely political activity, though he did not say it was not necessary. He attached the greatest importance to the constructive side of his varied activities and programme.

Today with some kind of a national government in the country, it becomes very necessary that men and women, in this matter women more than men, should take up which might not be very pompous, or very glamorous, but nevertheless very useful. You should take charge of any kind of constructive work and do it well. Please do not imagine that you are conferring some kind of benefit on some one. If you go out to work with that mentality, the superior mentality of doing good to others, it is far better that you remain at home, because there is not much use in the world of today for a superior lady. She is a nuisance. We want persons who can work well. You can choose your job, and having chosen, do it well, and thoroughly. By doing this, whether you do good to others or not, I do not know. What I know is that, undoubtedly, you do good to yourself. You train yourself to attain possibly the greater gift of character and make yourself fit for better and higher work. Therefore, I would commend you to do this kind of work. Choose your activity which, in essence, should have something to do with common people, if I may say so. It should not be something confined to a few select specimens. Get to them, know what their troubles are, and try to get them redressed. Try to get them trust you and then you will be able to do much more.

So I suggest that you should, as indeed you have done in the past, take to something useful. One of the gratifying and pleasing features in India, in the last six or seven months, has been the part women played in various fields of activities. You know that unfortunately we had a great deal of troubles in parts of northern India, Punjab, to some extent in Delhi, and the U.P. and in a great part in Pakistan, and now in Kashmir. This was something exceedingly bad, and happened on an overwhelming scale. We faced that, and gradually, we have controlled the situation. But it had left a very difficult legacy behind. You can, of course, imagine the position

when millions were pushed out of their homes and had to migrate to parts of the country where they had no houses. The whole problem of feeding them and giving them shelter and their rehabilitation has been terrific.

We have had to deal with nearly sixty lakhs of people like that. Apart from this, one of the horrible things that has happened in the Punjab, and in the neighbouring places, has been the organised abduction of women. The position became infinitely worse. People who were normally well-behaved, misbehaved in this way. I do not have actual figures with me. But women were abducted by thousands, and possibly by tens of thousands. Hindu and the Sikh women in the West Punjab and the Frontier Province, and Muslim women in the East Punjab and the Punjab States were abducted. Some people sat down and balanced the numbers, and shouted that more people misbehaved on one side than on the other. But to me that does not make much difference. People on either side misbehaved terribly towards women. Their cause was taken up later by various organisations on governmental level, and those organisations were helped very greatly by a large number of voluntary workers on our side. Quite a considerable number of voluntary workers drawn from all parts of the country, worked in Delhi, East Punjab, and Pakistan, to help in the recovery of abducted women and they did a remarkably fine job of work. They worked under very difficult circumstances amidst a great deal of harassment. Though great dangers and risks were involved, nevertheless, they went, and did much good work—indeed their work became so important that it became difficult for them to come away because people there began to rely on them. That is one of the fine examples for you to consider of what Indian women can do.

I shall tell you the story of a young woman,<sup>2</sup> the wife of a District Magistrate in Muzaffarabad in Kashmir. She was abducted by the raiders but she came back to the rehabilitation camp. The raiders entered her house and shot her husband and abducted her along with her five children, whose ages ranged between three and fourteen. She was taken into the mountains, where, with her children, she spent five to six months with those barbarous, nomadic people. That woman, by sheer force of character and strength of will, simply dominated them and came back ultimately to the Indian camp. I can give some more brilliant examples of what women have done in the past few months. When India was faced with a great crisis, they did not flinch.

I, therefore, appeal to you to act not as individuals, but in large groups, and in an organised way. We have got to build a great nation. We must build it brick by brick and every person can help in that work and I hope you will do it. I thank you for your welcome.



#### 4. The Basis of a True Democracy<sup>1</sup>

Local self-government is and must be the basis of any true system of democracy. We have rather got into the habit of thinking of democracy at the top and not so much below. Democracy at the top cannot be a success unless it is built on this foundation from below.

Democracy will not be much of a success unless there is mass education in the country, because an uneducated populace—I use the word uneducated in preference to illiterate—is no foundation for democracy. The people must understand the problems to some extent before they can express their views.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, education is essential just as local self-government is essential. We have got independence for all practical purposes. Independence is a high privilege; but it is sometimes forgotten that it is a very great responsibility, and a very great burden. It should be a pleasurable burden, a desirable burden, but it is a burden. If you are not competent to discharge that responsibility, to that extent you fail, the country fails.

In India you still find the pre-independence mentality flourishing a great deal, that is, the mentality of opposition, the mentality of putting forward negative and not positive policies. Every free government must necessarily give full weight to critical opposition. No government will function well, however good it is, if there are no critics to point out the errors. Therefore, a constructive critical opposition is an essential part of good government. At the same time, opposition for opposition's sake is futile. When there was the national movement facing a hostile executive of foreigners, that was a completely different matter. The only possible thing to do was to fight the Government. It is only after we got independence that we could start the constructive side of our work. It is not good enough in a free democratic country to adopt that attitude. In fact, and in practice, the government is a removable government, relying on popular will, votes, etc. The opposition must be a constructive opposition, a critical opposition. It may be a friendly opposition or it may not be, but it must be constructive opposition. When an opposition feels that it can never become the government, it becomes completely irresponsible and it is only interested in breaking the government and not in making the government themselves. Today, there is a tremendous spirit of negative opposition and criticism

1. Inaugural speech at the first meeting of Ministers for Local Self-Government, New Delhi, 6 August 1948. From *National Herald*, 7 August 1948.
2. Ministers and delegates from the provinces of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, the U.P., East Punjab, the C.P., Bihar, Assam, Orissa, Delhi and Coorg and Ajmer-Merwara attended this conference.

everywhere, whether it is our home policy or whether it is our foreign policy, There may be many things which deserve criticism and condemnation. What I wish to point out is the approach to the question, the approach of irresponsibility. Every citizen is supposed to be a sharer in this task of government. This approach of irresponsibility can best be countered by each citizen feeling a certain amount of responsibility in his field of work, however limited it may be. He should start feeling responsible for his town or village. Therefore, local self-government becomes the most important subject.

Most of the provinces, have either done something or are on the verge of doing something in regard to establishing municipalities, corporations, panchayats and the like. This is ultimately the department which is concerned with the largest number of people. They must look at this question of local self-government from a wider outlook. It is essential that a person must have the freedom to do the work; then he becomes responsible. At the same time, we have to guard against errors. Whatever the sphere, give freedom to work. If you like to have some kind of check, check later on when the errors go far enough; do not check at the start. Do not look to somebody else for guidance.

Three or four days ago I came here for the Health Conference.<sup>3</sup> On that occasion I asked members present how many of them could understand Hindustani and how many did not. I am told that some at least who were present did not understand Hindustani but were too shy to say so.

We all know, there is some controversy going on in the country about the language question. Of course, it is no use imposing a thing from above. A living language has to be a part of the common life of the people, and all that the Government and the educational system can do is to give a little impetus to it. Although Government's activities will have to be conducted more and more in Hindustani, still the English language will have to be used for many purposes. There is no reason why we should look upon this question as one of high principles or of prestige. From the practical point of view it is clear that we will have to use Hindustani more and more, not excluding English, but using it wherever necessary, because English is not only a language that we have used for a long time, but it is one of the major languages of the world. Also, I do not see why in using Hindustani we should not encourage the use of well established English technical terms in Hindustani instead of trying to translate them into heavy ununderstandable words. There are many such terms which have become common in Hindustani, just as there are a number of Hindustani words which have become current coin in English. I once took the trouble, when I had some leisure in Ahmadnagar, to collect the Hindustani words in the English language—

3. See *post*, pp. 474-475.



I could not complete the task—but I was myself surprised to find such a number of Hindustani words current in the English language. Every living language must take words from whichever source it can. So we need not fight shy of taking words from English or from any other language.

There is another question that arises. Two or three days ago, the Premier of a province wrote to me that much as he appreciated all these all-India conferences that we have in Delhi, to which representatives of provinces are invited, unfortunately there were so many of them to which their ministers and high officers have had to come to Delhi that the work in the province suffered a great deal. There is something in that. There is the risk of work in the provinces suffering. But here, as in other matters, we have to strike a balance. During the present formative stage of our existence as free India, it is better for us to meet oftener than not meet or meet rarely, because it is highly important that a certain uniformity in our general work should come into being.

We have had suddenly to face vast problems. There are in India, as in the world, two forces at play—two contradictory forces. One of them is a unifying force and the other is, what I may term, a disruptive force, encouraging disruptive tendencies. There is the force working towards construction and cooperative effort and there is the force working towards destruction and destructive happenings. We see these forces at work in India. The destructive forces have done a great deal of injury to India. At the same time, they have made many of the people think deeply and work consciously towards establishing an essential unity. We had disruptive forces in the past under the name of communalism. And although a very big change has taken place during the past few months since the partition of India, still the fact remains that communalism in a different guise still acts as a disruptive factor in the country.

And then there is provincialism. It has never been our policy or the policy of any important set of people in India to work towards a regimented India or a dead unity without life or variety. That has never been our policy and that will not be our policy. The whole history of India shows what an amazing degree of variety can exist along with an amazing degree of unity. We do want provincial autonomy, and we want provincial autonomy which is a real thing, just as I like the local bodies to be real things, not farces. But in spreading our autonomy at the bottom, we come across difficulties of various kinds. First of all, we do not have a sufficient number of trained personnel to run autonomous bodies on proper lines. We have, therefore, to work with persons who are not trained for the job. We cannot help it. Gradually, they will get trained as they gather experience. Also we are not working on well-established lines. We are starting almost from scratch, and so it is much more difficult to build up something in these circumstances than when you have only to carry on something that has been built up

already. And all these things we have to do at a moment of grave trouble in India and in the world generally. Therefore, our difficulties are still more increased.

Nevertheless, there are two points which history teaches and which should be borne in mind. One is that territorial integrity should be preserved in India and the other that people should be allowed to grow according to their own genius. But that, if allowed to remain by itself, may lead to the strengthening of the disruptive forces in the country.

Now, if you have provincial or other types of autonomy, you must, at the same time, balance it by a continuous effort to maintain, and strengthen the essential unity of India, not only in the political field, but in other fields also. How are we to do that? Of course, a certain amount of unity is achieved by legislation, certain subjects are Central subjects and certain other subjects are both Central and provincial. We are now drafting a new constitution and a great deal of thought has been given to this.

We do not wish to interfere with provincial autonomy; but how to develop a certain common outlook and unity in regard to these subjects in various provinces and States? Obviously, the only possible way is to confer together and bring about that unity by voluntary cooperation and not by legislation from the Centre. Therefore, the desirability of these periodic conferences of representatives from the provinces and the States is obvious. It is true that they take up some time, involve a lot of trouble to representatives of provincial governments and States in coming here, leaving important work behind. Still, I think it is fundamentally important that during this transitional period we should meet pretty often, even at the risk of some loss of time which may be devoted to other important work, so that we might get to know each other's minds and experiences, and profit by each other's successes and failures. Once the machine is running more smoothly, it may not be necessary to call these conferences and things may be done more by correspondence, although sometimes a conference may be necessary. Therefore, I welcome this conference about local self-government.



## 5. Towards a Free Press<sup>1</sup>

I am glad that at long last the negotiations between the proprietors of the Indian newspapers and Reuters have come to a successful conclusion and the Press Trust of India has been formed.<sup>2</sup> This is another step in our liberation, for a free press and a free news service are the most vital characteristics of a free nation. It is a step, but many more steps will have to be taken before we can be satisfied. I hope that with this one barrier removed other barriers, often self-imposed, will also go and the press of India will mirror the world truly, fearlessly, and with dignity and restraint, in its news and its comments.

I do not particularly like the name, for "Trust" has not got happy associations and has often meant a monopoly which may be used for purposes which may have little to do with the public good. But there is not much in a name, if the content is good, and I hope that this Press Trust will not be a monopoly or a vested interest, but will serve the larger causes impartially and truthfully.

My good wishes to the new-born Press Trust of India.

1. Message to Kasturi Srinivasan, Chairman, Press Trust of India, on the eve of the formation of the Trust, New Delhi, 22 September 1948. From *National Herald*, 25 September 1948.
2. The Reuters and Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society signed an agreement for setting up the Press Trust of India. It was cooperatively owned by the Indian newspapers as a non-profit making trust and was represented in Reuters by a trustee.

## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## II. The Anthem





## 1. The Anthem after the Cinema Shows<sup>1</sup>

Sometime back the Cabinet expressed a wish that the national anthem should be played only on special and select occasions, as is customary in other countries. The practice of playing it, usually rather badly, after every cinema performance, was specially deprecated. In other countries it is not played after cinema shows. This would apply to *Vande Mataram* also. At the end of the cinema shows people are shuffling about intent upon going away and no discipline is observed, as it should be, when the national anthem is played. To prevent this lack of discipline the Bombay Government apparently ordered that no one should be allowed to leave the house till the national anthem was played. This kind of thing does not appear to be very desirable either.

For this reason the Cabinet was of opinion that the national anthem (and I would include the *Vande Mataram*) should not be played by cinema houses at the end of performances and that normally the national flag should be shown on the screen to mark the end.

Presumably these instructions were issued to the provincial governments. Apparently they have had no effect in Delhi as the cinema houses continue to play either *Jana Gana Mana* or *Vande Mataram*, usually very badly. I suggest that the Delhi Administration might be informed so that they might communicate with the cinema houses. This is of course not an order to the cinema houses but a friendly suggestion.

1. Note to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1 July 1948. File No. 2(61)/47-PMS.

## 2. To Gopinath Bardoloi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4 July 1948

My dear Bardoloi,

I enclose a press cutting which describes certain demonstrations in objection to *Jana Gana Mana*. I should like to know why this was objected to and who are the principal parties objecting. I consider this a very serious matter if some people should demonstrate against what is temporarily at least our

1. J.N. Collection.



national anthem. I think this kind of thing cannot be ignored. I shall await further information from you.<sup>2</sup>

I have received your letter of the 25th June. I should like to have some further explanation of your Cabinet's decision regarding the proposal to give up some lands to Bhutan from the larger point of view.<sup>3</sup> It would have been very desirable to give them certain territories which are not very big. In any event there is a small tract with some religious significance which should go to them.

I have noted what you have said about the activities of the Communists and others.<sup>4</sup> This is a matter for your government to deal with vigorously. I realise your difficulties, but then they have to be faced.

About the controls of cloth, etc., the matter is under urgent consideration.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Bardoloi replied on 6 August 1948 that some people demonstrated before the All India Radio in Shillong objecting to the adoption of *Jana Gana Mana* as the National Anthem. Apart from the sentimental adherence to *Vande Mataram*, he wrote, their main objection was the absence of the name of Assam in *Jana Gana Mana*.
3. A Bhutanese delegation visited India towards the end of 1948 to discuss Bhutan's relations with India and a treaty was signed on 8 August 1949. India agreed to pay Bhutan a subsidy of Rs. 500,000 a year and return 32 square miles in Dewangiri area.
4. Some secret discussions were reported to have been held between the Burmese Communist leaders and the left-wing leaders of Lushai, Manipur and Naga Hills. The former were reported to have supported the move by the hill tribes for the secession of these hills from the Indian Union.

### 3. The Tune of the Anthem<sup>1</sup>

This question was addressed to my colleague, the Home Minister. But as I have been largely concerned with this matter, I am taking the liberty to answer it myself. I am grateful to the honourable member who has put this question as this enables Government to remove certain misapprehensions on the subject.

1. Reply to a question by V.C. Kesava Rao asking whether the Government of India had instructed the provincial governments to consider *Jana Gana Mana* as the national anthem, 25 August 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 548-549.

The question of having a national anthem tune to be played by orchestras and bands became an urgent one for us immediately after the 15th August 1947. It was as important as that of having a national flag. It was important from the point of view of our Defence Services, and our foreign embassies and legations and other establishments. It was obviously not suitable for *God Save the King* to be played by our army bands, or abroad, after the change over to independence. We were constantly being asked as to what tune should be played on such occasions. We could not give an answer because the decision could only be made ultimately by the Constituent Assembly.

The *Jana Gana Mana* tune, slightly varied, had been adopted as a national anthem by the Indian National Army in South East Asia and had subsequently attained a degree of popularity in India also.

The matter came to a head on the occasion of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947 in New York. Our delegation was asked for our national anthem for the orchestra to play on a particular occasion. The delegation possessed a record of *Jana Gana Mana* and they gave this to the orchestra who practised it. When they played it before a large gathering it was very greatly appreciated, and representatives of many nations asked for a musical score of this new tune which struck them as distinctive and dignified. This orchestral rendering of *Jana Gana Mana* was recorded and sent to India. The practice grew for our Defence Services bands to play this tune, and foreign embassies and legations also used it whenever occasion required. From various countries we received messages of appreciation and congratulation of this tune, which was considered by experts and others as superior to most of the national anthems which they had heard. Many expert musicians in India and abroad, as well as many bands and orchestras practised it, and sometimes slightly varied it, with the result that the All India Radio collected quite a number of renderings.

Apart from the general appreciation with which this tune was received there was at the time not much choice for us, as there was no proper musical rendering available to us of any other national song which we could send abroad. At that stage, I wrote to all the provincial Governors and asked their views about our adopting *Jana Gana Mana* or any other song as the national anthem. I asked them to consult their Premiers before replying. I made it perfectly clear to them that the final decision rested with the Constituent Assembly, but owing to the urgency of some directions being sent to foreign embassies and the Defence Services, a provisional decision had become essential. Everyone of these Governments, except one, (the Governor of the Central Provinces), signified their approval of *Jana Gana Mana*. Thereupon the Cabinet considered the matter and came to the decision that provisionally *Jana Gana Mana* should be used as the tune for the national anthem, till such time as the Constituent Assembly came to a



final decision, Instructions were issued accordingly to the provincial governments. It was very clear that the wording of *Jana Gana Mana* was not wholly appropriate and some changes would be necessary. What was important was the tune to be played by bands and orchestras, and not the wording. Subsequently, the new Premier of West Bengal<sup>2</sup> informed us that he and his government preferred *Vande Mataram*.

That is the position at present. It is unfortunate that some kind of argument has arisen as between *Vande Mataram* and *Jana Gana Mana*. *Vande Mataram* is obviously and indisputably the premier national song of India, with a great historical tradition, and intimately connected with our struggle for freedom. That position it is bound to retain, and no other song can displace it. It represents the passion and poignancy of that struggle, but perhaps not so much the culmination of it. In regard to the national anthem tune, it was felt that the tune was more important than the words, and that this tune should be such as to represent the Indian musical genius as well as to some extent the western, so that it might equally be adaptable to orchestral and band music, and for being played abroad. The real significance of the national anthem is perhaps more abroad than in the home country. Past experience has shown us that *Jana Gana Mana* tune has been greatly appreciated and admired abroad. It is very distinctive and there is a certain life and movement in it. It was thought by some people that the *Vande Mataram* tune with all its very great attraction and historical background was not easily suitable for being played by orchestras in foreign countries, and there was not enough movement in it. It seemed therefore that while *Vande Mataram* should continue to be the national song *par excellence* in India, the national anthem tune should be that of *Jana Gana Mana*, the wording of *Jana Gana Mana* to be suitably altered to fit in with the existing circumstances.

This question has to be considered by the Constituent Assembly, and it is open to that Assembly to decide as it chooses. It may decide on a completely new song or tune if such is available.

#### 4. Significance of National Anthem<sup>1</sup>

At yesterday's function in Chandni Chowk<sup>2</sup> I noticed that when *Jana Gana Mana* was played, many of the police constables did not stand properly to attention. Some were talking. This must be due to their not realising the significance of *Jana Gana Mana*. I should like you to draw the attention of the I.G. of Police and to suggest to him that the entire police force should be made to understand the significance of *Jana Gana Mana* and the way they should stand to attention, when it is played.

1. Note for Principal Private Secretary, 26 September 1948. File No. 2(64)/47-PMS.

2. Opening ceremony of the Lajpatrai Municipal Market, Delhi, for 2000 refugee shopkeepers from West Pakistan.





## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## III. The Economy





1. To Stafford Cripps<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

3 July 1948

My dear Stafford,

Two days ago I sent you a letter. Yesterday Narahari Rao brought your brief note to me and I had a talk with him about what had happened in London.<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter. I am sure that you did your utmost in existing circumstances to meet our viewpoint. This afternoon we considered the whole matter in the Cabinet here. I must confess that many of our members were not at all happy about the amount of release<sup>3</sup> and I am sure that the public will be very critical when an announcement is made. During the last year or so we have been so overwhelmed with our special problems resulting from partition that we had been unable to pay much attention to planning for industrialisation and increased production. We intend to devote much more time to this in the near future. That future, therefore, cannot be judged from our old standards and because of this we had hoped to have as much sterling released for capital goods as was possible. The difficulty will arise and will be felt in the third year.

I am glad to note what you say in your letter that as time goes on you may in fact be able to do more in the way of capital goods.<sup>4</sup> We hope that if these difficulties appear in the third year, as they well might, your Government will be able to help us with further advances.

After careful consideration of all the factors our Cabinet agreed to accept the proposed terms of settlement. It did express the hope, however, that further advances might be made if necessary in the third year. We do not want to make this a part of the agreement as such but rather a friendly under-

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A delegation with Chintaman Deshmukh, Purushottamdas Thakurdas, V.T. Krishnamachari, V. Narahari Rao, B.K. Nehru, G.R. Kamath and Keith Roy as members, led by R.K. Shanmukham Chetty held discussions in London in July 1948 and concluded a three-year agreement on India's sterling balances.

3. Chetty announced on 15 July 1948 at a press conference that Sterling Balances Agreement between India and Britain, initially for three years, provided for the release of 160 million sterling including the unspent 80 millions carried forward from the current account over and above the export earnings for three years. Half of this could be converted into hard currencies and made freely available to India by Britain. The agreement also included payment of pensions by India in the U.K. and payment for purchase of defence stores and installations of British Government left in India.

4. India was largely dependent upon Britain for the supply of capital goods and more than two-thirds of its import of capital goods in 1946-48 had been from Britain. The quantity of capital goods imported from Britain had increased in 1948 by nearly 80% as compared to 1938.



standing between the two Governments. I hope there will be no difficulty whatever in some such informal understanding which will depend on the circumstances in the third year.

We appreciate the spirit in which these negotiations have been carried on and I trust that this will result in promoting further goodwill between India and England. There is a fund of goodwill and the Mountbattens, as I wrote to you, have added greatly to it.

Unfortunately various events have happened during the past year or so which have shaken Indian public opinion very greatly. The Kashmir episode and Hyderabad and the large number of British officers, both civil and military, who seem to be working against India in Pakistan, have had a bad effect on the people. Personally, I have felt that the British Government itself has been fair and impartial but I have rather doubted how far this has been reflected in the activities of their representatives abroad. Most of these representatives belong to the old school who have not got over their ancient animus against nationalist India. Pakistan is full of them, Indeed they run Pakistan to a large extent. Many of those who have been peculiarly anti-Indian in the past have now found shelter in Pakistan.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 2. To Jairamdas Doulatram<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17 July, 1948

My dear Jairamdas,

Thank you for your two letters of the 16th July.<sup>2</sup> It is perfectly true that I am very much worried at the economic situation. The rise in prices, constant rise in the cost of living index, financial developments, inflation, etc. are dangerous signals.

The proposal you mention to supply essential articles at fixed reasonable prices to employees of Government is certainly worthy of consideration. That would help, but the problem is a much bigger one. If you like, your proposal can be put up at the next meeting of the Cabinet.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 37(114)/54-PMS.

2. In the first letter, Jairamdas Doulatram had suggested the setting up of cooperative stores in all Government offices in view of the price situation. In the second, he pointed out that provincial autonomy had prevented the Centre from taking such action as the situation necessitated. He also discussed the request of the U.P. Government for additional allotment of foodgrains and an extension of relief shops.

### 3. To Maharaj Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
18 July 1948

My dear Maharaj Singh,

I am glad to learn that you have got over the effects of your little operation and are well again.

I have received a copy of your letter to the Governor General. I am very much concerned over the rise in prices and the cost of living index. We have been caught in a vicious circle and we must get out of it. I am myself agreeable with your suggestion that there should be a Ministry of Economic Affairs. We shall consider this matter in a larger context a little later, but fairly soon.

The question of control and decontrol is again one for urgent consideration.

The recent short-lived communal riot<sup>2</sup> in Bombay has come as a bit of a shock. It shows that we have to be vigilant all the time.

The table of precedence has been more or less finalised. It will be sent to you in due time.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Communal trouble broke out in Central Bombay on 4 July 1948 soon after a person was thrown out of a tram-car in an accident. Fifteen persons were killed and sixty-three injured in the police firing. Several stabbing cases were reported the following day.

### 4. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
18 July 1948

My dear Deshmukh,

I am greatly worried, as you can well realise, at the progressive deterioration of the economic situation in the country. I shall be grateful to you if you can send me a note on the subject, relatively brief, giving your analysis and the remedies you suggest.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



## 5. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21 July 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

I have received from the party office a copy of letter dated 17th July sent by B. Das to you.

It is always desirable and indeed necessary to have members of the Assembly to be associated with committees such as the Economy Committee. I do not understand, however, what Mr. Das means when he says that the Chairman, Seth Kasturbhai Lalbhai, handled the work of the committee in a non-parliamentary way. The work of the Economy Committee is to deal with economy in governmental expenditure, not in the working of Parliament. Where the parliamentary way comes in I do not understand.

About the constitution of the committee I cannot say anything as I was not intimately concerned with it. Some time back Mr. Kasturbhai Lalbhai asked me for the loan of two or at least one senior and experienced I.C.S. man to help him in preparing the work of the committee. This seemed to me a proper and reasonable request. So far as I could understand the matter, the I.C.S. men did not become members of the committee but Service experts advising and preparing papers for the committee. This function can only be performed satisfactorily by people who know the inner working of Government offices and Service men have thus to be inevitably associated in this way. Otherwise there would be great delay in even preparing the papers etc. I do not understand how any Service man was supposed to become a member of the Economy Committee. Occasionally, of course, a Service man may be a member of the Committee. But in the present instance it was not intended.

I think the objection to Service men generally is rather out of date in the present context of things. It may be that many members of the Services still carry on the old traditions. They are changing and must change. But it is obvious that no government can be carried on without expert and experienced Services. That is why we take so much trouble to select competent persons for Services. If we can do away with the regular Services then there is no necessity for this complicated procedure of appointment, etc. In criticising and running down the Service as a whole we do no good to anybody and only reduce the efficiency of governmental work. Individuals who err should certainly be open to criticism.

As regards B. Das's suggestion, surely we cannot lay down any hard and fast rules. Everything depends on the nature of the committee and the personnel available. Normally parliamentary committees should of course

1. J.N. Collection.

consist of Members of Parliament. Normally also the chairman of an important committee should not be a chairman and member of other committees. But, as you know, we have frequently to make the same person a chairman of one committee and a member of another.

You may perhaps speak to Shanmukham Chetty on the subject of the Economy Committee and its membership. As for putting up B. Das's letter before the executive of the committee, you may or may not do so as you choose.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. Foodgrains Policy<sup>1</sup>

Previously various foodgrains were available in the market at differing prices—gram, millet, maize, bajra, jowar, etc. Many people took them probably because they could not afford wheat or rice. It was only on special occasions that wheat or rice was used.

2. Now, because of our policy of rationing,<sup>2</sup> because also of a certain change in food habits due to higher standards, it seems to be taken for granted that wheat or rice must be supplied to everybody, including those who have never been used to them.

3. I am told that last year there was a very large stock of gram in East Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. This was hardly used and at the same time wheat was subsidized. This seems rather odd. Where there are these other grains available, there is no reason at all why wheat or rice should be sent and the provincial government must seek to use them in the normal way. Much would depend on the price of these foodgrains.

4. Anyhow, my point is that we are proceeding on certain assumptions which have no relations to past facts, the assumption being that everybody wants wheat or rice. It is quite clear that everybody did not eat wheat or rice in the past. Why should we not give up these assumptions and calculate in a different way which would have more reality behind it?

1. Note to Minister for Food and Agriculture, 1 August 1948. File No. 31(62)/49-PMS.

2. At the Premiers' Conference on 20 July it was decided to increase total grain allocation to deficit areas by 400,000 tons owing to greatly improved import position. There was to be no change in the Government's food policy and relief grain shops were to be opened.



## 8. Spiralling Inflation<sup>1</sup>

Sir, some of my colleagues of the Government will, I understand, speak on this resolution<sup>2</sup>, if they have the opportunity and the time, and deal with the various departments and the different aspects of the nation's economy with which they are most concerned. At this stage, however, I wish to put before the House a few considerations, and the reactions of the Government generally to this resolution that has been placed before the House.

I am glad that this resolution has come up or rather that this subject has come up before this House. It helps in some way. It might have been better if this subject had been discussed at some later stage during this session, at any rate from the Government's point of view, it would have been more convenient and the Government might have been able to give a more positive lead to this House or a more positive assurance to this House as to what they were going to do about it. Nevertheless, the subject is of such vital significance that the more this House considers it the better. Now, I look upon this debate, if I may respectfully say so, not as one in which any, what I might call, final directions are given, but rather one in which the House tells us and tells itself, the various approaches to the question and how one might tackle it, so that we may keep the various facts of the problem before us and be in a better position to come to final conclusions.

The resolution in so far as it calls attention to a certain state of the country is obvious. It is not necessary for any member of the House to remind the Government or any one else that the economic conditions in the country are bad, due to inflation, due to rise in prices and due to hundred and one things. What is necessary is to find out how to check this, how to overcome and how to conquer this; that is the problem. In the resolution itself a suggestion is made that a commission may be appointed. If the House so wants it, the Government is prepared to appoint a commission. But, I must confess that I do not see the value of such a commission and I entirely agree with my honourable friend Shri Bhargava<sup>3</sup> when he said earlier in the day that commissions have normally been appointed in the past to

1. Speech on a resolution for checking inflation, 11 August 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, 1948, pp. 191-202.
2. The resolution expressed anxiety at the rising prices and suggested that a commission should visit the provinces to report on the causes, and suggest remedial measures.
3. Thakur Das Bhargava (1886-1962); member, Central Assembly, 1926-30, 1945-47, Constituent Assembly, 1947-50, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52 and Lok Sabha, 1952-62.

sabotage anything or to postpone decisions and not to meet any difficulty.<sup>4</sup> I do not think that a commission going round the country could possibly give us more facts or figures than we have or that we can possess. The House knows that periodically the Government have been in touch with the provincial governments, their Premiers and their Ministers for Food, Industries and the like. They have often complained that they are summoned to Delhi so often and that their work in their provinces suffers. It is a just complaint. Nevertheless, it is very important that we should confer with each other and act cooperatively and jointly and these conferences have a great importance. Therefore, there is nothing really in the nature of facts that we can get by going round the country. That would immediately afford an excuse not only to the Central Government, but to the provincial governments also, to say that the commission is considering this problem, let us wait and see what they say, and they will do nothing. While they wait and do nothing, events do not stop; events are marching ahead and it is no good shutting our eyes to that fact. We need not be alarmists; but conditions have been deteriorating. A thing like inflation, if it gets loose completely, goes ahead at a headlong pace. This is no time for commissions and committees.

As I said, I do not propose at this moment to indicate with any preciseness what measures Government are likely to take. I would listen to the criticisms and the suggestions of the members of the House and then give thought to them, all of us together jointly, and then place such proposals as we have formally before the House at a later stage for them to consider. The House knows that recently we have changed our policy in regard to textiles and for all practical purposes control on textiles has been introduced. We are watching that situation carefully and I have no doubt that, if it is necessary, we shall impose even stricter control there or anywhere else. Now, while the policy of Government in these matters has to be carefully considered, even in regard to that policy two or perhaps more fundamental matters arise. One is, trying to improve the situation as it is by such measures as appear to us feasible and proper; the other is, trying to seek for the causes of this economic distemper rather more deeply and trying to meet them. That is a bigger problem perhaps and that is ultimately the right approach. But at the moment of some crisis or various kinds of crisis it becomes sometimes a little difficult to go too deep down and upset a certain set up—because at the moment one suffers from it, whatever the ultimate advantages from it might be. However, there is that deeper approach and

4. Thakur Das Bhargava had moved an amendment which asked the Government to take suitable measures to control prices so that action was not tied to the appointment of a commission. What was needed he said was immediate and vigorous action—either complete control or total decontrol—and a commission would take up too much time.



what I may call a somewhat more superficial approach, may be one has to strike a balance between the two. Now whatever policy Government might adopt, one thing seems to me exceedingly important and that is the machinery which helps us in adopting that policy. The fact of the matter is that we live in the matter of adopting policies from hand to mouth. Many of us are eminent and able men with very definite and clear ideas on the subject; I am not challenging that fact, but I am talking about Government machinery for the moment. An Honourable Member criticised us by saying that we are still following the old bureaucracy, and the rest.<sup>5</sup> I do not agree with him in that. Of course, the old bureaucracy is there as the old opposition is there in different garbs, and the old-everything is there; we are all old now in our several ways. But it is no good blaming that bureaucracy; some of them are good, some of them are bad and some of them are indifferent. Some of them are experts in particular departments and no government can be carried on administratively or otherwise without the experts' help even if the experts sometimes go wrong. And I think it is rather ungenerous and unkind always to raise our voice and cast a burden on the administrative personnel or the experts that may be there to advise Government; and certainly I do not wish to shelter myself behind anybody's fault. But when I talked about machinery, and specially the economic machinery, I was thinking of something rather different. In olden times I believe the general economic policy in India was really not determined in India at all; it was determined in Whitehall or in the city of London, or wherever else it might have been determined it was only given effect to here, and minor changes here and there might perhaps have been allowed. It was not necessary, therefore, for any extensive or intensive machinery to develop here which might help in the formulation of policy. Now we are far too much accustomed to talk in rather vague terms of high policies, whether it is a capitalistic policy or socialistic or communistic or any other policy. They have a certain value because they represent a certain approach to fundamental problems. Nevertheless when any Government has to adopt any policy that policy cannot be adopted by passing a vague resolution about socialism; that is not a policy, it is an approach to a policy. Now when we have to have detailed policies we cannot talk in vague terms. And as soon as you get away from vague terms you must have date, you must have statistics, you must know exactly what is happening and where and how. And what is more, you have to watch the changing data, the results of a particular policy from day to day, so that you can remedy an error or take another step whenever you feel like that. Now in most coun-

5. Govind Malaviya had said that while the ideological outlook of the Government was socialistic, by the force of circumstances it had to function through the old order—bureaucratic, capitalistic, ponderous and unimaginative.

tries, whether they are socialistic like Russia or capitalistic like the U.S.A. or England or something half-way between the two, you will find an elaborate machinery for gathering data, for finding out and advising Government, apart from the normal statistical machinery which we have not got here to any large extent. Government have to have special advisers and economic experts, councils, boards, etc., which are in day to day touch with everything that is happening, produce data and statistics, consider the problem as a whole and advise Government or the special Minister under whom they work. Now what do we do here? We have able economists here, we have able people in various departments, we have able Ministers and the rest; but as we function, each person is specially concerned with his own department, that is, his own Ministry. For instance, there is our Minister for Industry and Supply; he has got a tremendous job on his shoulders; he has to work terrifically hard in the day to day routine work and the determination of policy here and there; but necessarily his outlook is largely confined to the problems that come before his Ministry. So also with other Ministries, whether it is Food or Finance or anything else. Now it is no one's particular job to think of the whole economic picture of the whole of India, partly because nobody has the time to do so and partly because it is nobody's special job to do it. That I consider to be a very serious lacuna in our administrative and other apparatus. It should be the job not only of a Minister but of a group of advisers to think specially and almost exclusively of the economic picture of all India as a whole, balancing it, understanding the effect of one thing over another and then advise on that basis. Today the advice we get would be good advice from competent economists even if it is for the whole of India, but probably they may not have enough data because we cannot have all the data. But normally we get split-up advice, if I may say so. Of course it is possible for heads of various Ministries and departments to meet together and consider a question; and that is normally what they do. Nevertheless even when they meet they meet in a hurried moment for half an hour or so; some problem comes up before them and they apply their minds for that half-hour to that problem and give their opinion and go away and find out something else. It is not as if any of them had applied his unencumbered mind to the subject and brought out topics and proposals which Government or the Assembly or anybody else might consider. So I think one of the essential things we have to do is to frame some policy from day to day; we have to do something to meet the immediate menace. But what I consider more important at the present moment and for the future is to set up a machinery so that proper policies can be framed. That machinery may consist—we have come to no decisions but these are only ideas—of a Minister for Economic



and Social Affairs,<sup>6</sup> but the Minister can do precious little unless he has got that background of information and advice by experts. He should have a few competent men who will concentrate on those problems from an all-India point of view and advise with statistics behind them. Now obviously such a Minister would rather tend to overlap with other Ministries which deal with economic matters. That would be unfortunate and that might sometimes create friction and delay. The more I think of it the more I feel that such a Minister of Economic Affairs should have no administrative or executive functions. His special job should be, without any such functions, to consider these problems with the help of his advisers, to confer with each individual Minister in regard to his problem so as to coordinate the activities to a central policy, but the responsibility for the Ministry will remain on the particular Minister in charge of it and it will not be that of the Economic Minister. If I may say so, he should only confer occasionally so as to keep in touch and coordinate, but he should not have any executive authority.

Now, I am just thinking aloud and not putting forward any scheme or proposal before the House, because I am terribly anxious, as every member of this House must be, that something should be done to meet this rising menace in this country. We have many very grave problems before us; as the House knows, we are carrying on a bit of a war in a part of the country. In spite of this, I think the biggest problem for us, and the most vital problem is this economic problem, because that ultimately lies at the root of the problem. If our roots get weak, then all the branches, leaves and flowers dry up. Therefore, I can assure the House that so far as we are concerned, we attach the highest importance to it, and I am not afraid of confessing to this House that my mind in regard to what steps we should take has been far from clear and I have sought guidance from others and I should continue to seek guidance from others in this House. Therefore, I welcome this resolution because I thought the Government would get some guidance from the members of this House which would enable them to think aright. Within the course of the next few days—within a week I think—we are likely to meet certain representatives of various groups of economic interests,<sup>7</sup> some representatives of labour, some representatives of industry, other representatives, experts, some economists and the like.

N.G. Ranga : What about the peasants ? Do they not come anywhere in the picture ?

6. See preceding item.

7. The Government of India invited the views of nine eminent economists, departmental economists, industrialists, labour leaders, bankers and Jayaprakash Narayan and N.G. Ranga on the economic situation of the country and released summaries of their reports.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I was not aware of the fact that the peasants were a leisured class! I mentioned labour.

N.G. Ranga : But they are separate from industrial labour.

J.N : Well, they are certainly peasants!

N.G. Ranga : They are so big that they escape notice and they get nowhere!

J.N : So we do wish to consult and confer with important interests, and who can forget the peasants of India, so long as Mr. Ranga is here to represent them.

So that is all I venture to place before the House for the present, and I should like to seek the indulgence of the House not to be more precise on the part of Government as to what we are going to do except that we hope in the course of this session we shall put forward more precise proposals before.

I fail to understand entirely my honourable friend's talk about carrying it over to tomorrow or postponing it later creating "panic".<sup>8</sup> What exactly does he mean by "panic"? Does he mean that if it is not carried over till tomorrow there will be panic and if it is, there will be no panic? My mind is completely unable to understand what he has been driving at. The Government is prepared to give not one day but every day to the consideration of this subject if it needs, but I just don't see how the continuation of this debate for another day or its non-continuation prevents any panic or accentuates any panic. It has nothing to do with panic. So let us put that aside.

Now, I quite agree this subject has got to be debated more. It can be debated, if you like, tomorrow or a week later or thereabouts just as you may decide. I think personally that it will be far better to debate it some time later rather than tomorrow, and if necessary later on Government will certainly give an official day for the purpose reserving the right as to which particular day should be fixed.<sup>9</sup>

8. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar had suggested that the discussion on the resolution be carried on to a conclusion the next day as delay would give rise to rumours causing panic.

9. The debate on the resolution was resumed on 3 September 1948, see *post* item 12 and item 13.



## 9. The Report of Economists<sup>1</sup>

I have dictated a letter to the Premiers of Provinces.<sup>2</sup> Please send with this a copy of the economists' report.<sup>3</sup>

Please also send copies of this report to the Government of India economists who, at a somewhat earlier stage, presented me with certain proposals of their own.<sup>4</sup> Please ask them to consider this report as a group and let me have, as soon as possible, their reactions to or criticisms of this report. Those economists, among the signatories of the report, who are staying in Delhi for the present, should meet the officer of various Ministries concerned and discuss the implications and the consequences of their proposals with them from the practical point of view. Please therefore ask each Ministry concerned to arrange for such a meeting of their officers with the economists soon and request it to give every facility to these economists to discuss this matter with them. All this must be done in the course of this week.

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, 23 August 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. See *ante*, pp. 357-359.
3. K.T. Shah, Radhakamal Mukherjee, C.N. Vakil, Gyan Chand, D.R. Gadgil, H.L. Dey, V.K.R.V. Rao, P.S.N. Prasad and E.P.W. Da Costa met in Delhi from 18 to 22 August and formulated a report suggesting reimposition of controls on essential commodities, capital issues, raw materials, imports and exports; reduction of public expenditure; graded taxation; public borrowings; production targets for major industries; development of small and cottage industries; tax rebate for new companies; bonus to workers; and machinery to coordinate the economic policy of the Central and provincial governments.
4. A Committee of departmental economists, B.N. Adarkar, B.P. Adarkar, N.K. Bhojwani, W.R. Natu and P.S. Narayan Prasad met from 4 to 8 August 1948 and submitted an interim report on 9 August which recommended an expansionist economy with full utilization of production potential and suggested various measures to reduce deficit of expenditure and improve the industrial and trade situation and governmental machinery for coordination of economic policy.

## 10. To Asoka Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

The 1st September 1948

My dear Asoka,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 28th August with its enclosures. I cannot without further enquiry say anything about the matter referred to therein. I am, therefore, sending it on to the Premier of Bombay.

1. File No. 37 (114) Vol. 2/54-PMS.
2. Asoka Mehta (1911-1984); founder member of the Congress Socialist Party and Member of its National Executive, 1934-38; founded the Hind Mazdoor Sabha, 1949; after the split in the Socialist Party he served as General Secretary of Praja Socialist Party 1950-53; Member, Lok Sabha, 1954-1970; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, 1963-67; Minister for Planning 1966; resigned in 1968; author of *Socialism and Peasantry*, *Politics of Planned Economy* and other books.

Any attempt to bring down inflation is to be encouraged. It is not quite clear to me, however, how inflation can be brought down by processions.<sup>3</sup> No one doubts that inflation is bad. The only question is what steps should be taken in regard to it. You are quite right in arranging consultations with and lectures by leading economists.<sup>4</sup> But the consideration of such a subject must necessarily be crowded if it becomes just a public demonstration.

Not that I am against public demonstrations but in the tense atmosphere of today in great cities when a communal or other flare up is always possible a procession, though itself quite innocent and unobjectionable, may incite trouble-makers to give trouble. It becomes very difficult for us sitting here to judge of the local situation. Only today there was a news of the communal flare up somewhere in Bombay Presidency.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Socialist Party in Bombay had planned to hold a demonstration on 29 August 1948 to mobilise public opinion on inflation because the Government was expected to announce its policy on the economic situation after consultation with various interests such as labour, industry and banking. However the Commissioner of Police had withdrawn permission to take out a procession and so the Socialists cancelled their entire programme for the day.
4. The Socialists had arranged for a series of lectures by economists between 24 and 27 August.
5. Asoka Mehta replied on 4 September that anti-inflation measures, to succeed, would have to evoke public cooperation through posters, pamphlets, meetings and processions and should be welcomed by the Government. His grievance was that permission for taking out a procession was withdrawn without any regret for inconvenience after the Socialist Party had spent Rs. 1500 for the preparation.

## 11. The Economic Committee of the Congress and Government Policy<sup>1</sup>

In view of the economic crisis through which the country is passing the Committee should, in the interest of a realistic approach to the economic situa-

1. Report of remarks at a meeting of the Standing Economic Committee of the Congress, 3 September 1948. File No. 26(24)/48-PMS. Those present were N.G. Ranga, Jagjivan Ram, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Gulzari Lal Nanda, Annada Prasad Chaudhury and Shankarrao Deo. Extracts.



tion, consider the immediate problems facing the country. For some time to come most of the long-term plans may have to be postponed. It was however brought to the notice of the Committee that it was appointed to consider the implementation of the Economic Programme approved by the A.I.C.C.<sup>2</sup> and that while to face an emergency steps and measures should certainly be adopted, they should not in any way run counter to the realisation of the ultimate objectives laid down in the Economic Programme Committee's Report.<sup>3</sup> It was felt that the Committee should be kept posted with all Government papers and documents on economic problems and it was agreed that the Committee should as far as possible be supplied with papers circulated among the Assembly members.

While it is essential that the Committee should see that the Government measures proceed on the principles laid down in the Economic Programme it might not always be possible to consult the Committee on certain immediate measures which the Government will be called upon to adopt. The Committee, under the circumstances, would serve a two-fold purpose, viz.;

1. It could review the plans and measures of the Government and examine the manner of their execution.
2. It could help in the formulation of measures touching on broad economic policies.

For the purpose of special study, assignments may be made of various sectors of the economy of the country on the lines of the division of the economic programme namely :

- |              |                      |
|--------------|----------------------|
| 1. Industry, | 2. Agriculture,      |
| 3. Finance,  | 4. Trade, and so on. |

The Committee appointed a Sub-Committee consisting of :

1. Shri Gulzari Lal Nanda

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 5, pp. 367-68 and Vol. 6, pp. 287-89.

3. The report gave an outline programme on aims and objectives, agriculture, village and cottage industries, industry, industrial relations and cooperation. It concluded by advising the appointment of a central permanent planning commission to advise the Congress Government and to review the tax structure. Foreign trade and foreign capital were to be examined with a view to the nation's independent position.

2. Shri Annada Prasad Chaudhury<sup>4</sup> and

3. Shri K. Mitra<sup>5</sup>

to review the economic situation in India with special reference to the representations of economists, industrialists, and labour leaders<sup>6</sup> and make its suggestions to the Committee.

4. (1875-1971); was imprisoned several times during freedom struggle, Finance Minister, 1947; later left Congress and formed Kisan Mazdoor Party which was merged with Socialist Party and renamed Praja Socialist Party; leader of P.S.P. in West Bengal Vidhan Parishad.
5. Khagendranath Mitra (1896-1978); was imprisoned several times during freedom struggle, author of several books for children; edited *Kishore*, a children's daily.
6. On 2 September 1948 the Congress appointed a 25-member committee to scrutinize the various reports submitted to the Government on the economic situation and to forward its view by 12 September 1948.

## 12. Monetary Policy<sup>1</sup>

Sir, before the debate on the resolution is resumed,<sup>2</sup> I should like, with your permission, to make a statement. Certain untoward developments have taken place as a result of speculation regarding the action which Government might take in the monetary sphere to deal with the inflationary situation.<sup>3</sup> There has been, in certain places, a rush for the conversion of hundred-rupee notes at the banks into notes of smaller denominations. Hectic purchases of gold have been taking place with the result that gold prices have reached new high levels.<sup>4</sup> All this seems to be due to entirely unfounded rumours regarding the possibility of Government taking drastic deflationary action. Though certain rather vague suggestions in this respect have been made in the many and divergent views which Government have received, I wish to make it clear that Government have no intention whatsoever of demonetizing hundred-rupee notes or refusing to pay the full value of any notes. It will take a little time before Government reach a decision regarding the anti-inflationary measures to be adopted for dealing with the

1. Statement on the inflationary situation, 3 September 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VII, Pt. II, 1948, p. 921.
2. See *ante* item 8 of this sub-section.
3. There were persistent rumours about demonetization of currency and freezing of bank deposits.
4. In early September 1948, gold prices were highest ever at Rs. 117 for 10 gms.



present economic situation. I have no hesitation however in making an immediate declaration that Government will not entertain any proposals for devaluing currency. In particular, I should like to make a definite announcement:—

1. That Government will not demonetize 100-rupee note nor pay only a part of the value of any currency note;
2. that they have no intention to freeze any part of any bank deposits.

It is most unfortunate that wild rumours have found credence with the public, and it is of the utmost importance that public apprehensions in this respect should be allayed immediately. I hope this assurance given by me on behalf of the Government will have a reassuring effect. I would like the widest publicity to be given to this statement and I appeal for the cooperation of the House and the public in restoring confidence.

### 13. An Integrated Policy on Inflation<sup>1</sup>

Sir, on the last occasion when this resolution was before this House I spoke for a while.<sup>2</sup> So far as I remember, I was rather apologetic in the sense that I pointed out at that moment that Government would rather not make any clear and definite enunciation of policy. I am sorry that even today, after about two weeks or so, Government do not propose in the course of this debate, as the House will know and realize, to put forward any precise scheme which they wish to have adopted. But during these last few days—ten or twelve days—we have paid a great deal of attention to this matter, consulted various interests, and as a result of that the House is in possession of the various memoranda on this subject which are before Government. Because we do wish to take not only the House but the public of this country into our confidence as to what we are doing and what we are not doing. I hope that before long we shall present—not before this House, I am sorry to say, because the House will not be sitting then, but before the country—our conclusions and our decisions. It might have been possible to put forward one or two decisions even now, in the course of a day or two; but, as some of the memoranda have pointed out, the subject should be seen as

1. Speech on the resolution regarding measures to check rising prices of essential commodities, 3 September 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol VII, Pt. II, 1948, pp. 947-48.
2. See *ante* item 8 of this sub-section.

an integrated whole and not dealt with separately. That does not mean again that we must decide about every matter quickly and before we decide about one or two matters. Nevertheless there must be an integrated approach even though the decisions might be about a few matters now and a few later. Therefore we are put in this difficulty that when this very important matter is considered by the House neither I nor my colleagues can state definitely what Government is going to do about this very important problem.

Members will have seen from the abstracts presented to them that there is a fair unanimity in regard to certain matters and there is a wide variety and divergence of opinion in regard to others. In fact the approaches are completely different. So I seek the indulgence of the House not to say anything which may hinder Government's policy on these matters at this particular stage. May I, however, add that some inferences that have been drawn by my friend, Mr. T.T. Krishnamachari,<sup>3</sup> and my friend, Pandit Kunzru, are not wholly justified.<sup>4</sup> I have not stopped anything except that I have asked the various Government departments not to indulge in any superfluous expenditure or to agree during this brief period in regard to any big schemes which might involve large expenditure. That is all that I have done. And I would like to point out to Pandit Kunzru not to attach any wider meaning to what I have said than what I have actually said. At the present moment I can say no more because we are considering these matters. I have used precise language and we stand by the language we have used. As for what other connected matters there may be, they will have to be considered by us, and we shall then give Government's decision in regard to them.

Pandit Kunzru referred to the position of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister being concentrated in one person.<sup>5</sup> In answer to a supplementary question the other day I expressed my agreement with this principle that the Prime Minister in such a Government should not have any other portfolio, or any portfolio, he should be in essence a coordinating

3. (1899-1974); member, Madras Assembly, 1937-42; joined Congress in 1942; member, Central Assembly, 1942-45, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50 and Provisional Parliament, 1946-52; Union Minister for Commerce and Industry, 1952-55 and also for Iron and Steel, 1955-56, for Finance, 1956-58, without Portfolio, June 1962, for Economic and Defence Coordination, November 1962; for Finance, August 1963-December 1965.
4. T.T. Krishnamachari said that he understood that the Prime Minister had instructed all departments not to go ahead with any programme on hand which would involve expenditure. He suggested the use of sterling reserves and foreign loans to implement the schemes. H.N. Kunzru said that the Government should announce a definite policy regardless of whether it would be popular or not.
5. H.N. Kunzru had suggested that the Prime Minister divest himself of the foreign affairs portfolio so that he could concentrate on overall policy matters.



and supervising authority. That is perfectly true; and I have felt that. But the fact remains that we have had a certain difficulty in regard to this matter, and if I may say so with all respect to this House, this question of foreign affairs has become extremely complicated. Honourable members criticized me—and rightly—in regard to delegations that were sent.<sup>6</sup> And often enough those delegations are not ideal delegations. But the whole subject of foreign affairs is so extraordinarily difficult today that unless one almost specialises in it, not in a broad way—because all of us in a broad way do something about it—but in a particular way, it is very difficult to follow it—the things that happen from day to day, the things that appear in the newspapers, and the many things that happen behind the scenes. And whether it is in a delegation or whether it is in any other place, for a considerable time the person who has to deal with the subject will be put in a difficulty for the simple reason that he is rather out of touch with those things and he has not considered them as they have been happening. Members may have certain definite opinions by which to approach these problems. Certainly, yet even a casual word or sometimes a question that is put here is unfortunate in the results it produces. Yesterday I think an Honourable Member said something about what an ambassador of ours had said elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> Well if I may say so, the questions that are put here are far more embarrassing from the point of view of our foreign policy, and sometimes they might even lead to rather harmful results. Nevertheless, we face those results. If it is very bad we ask the members not to press the question. All these difficulties arise, and it is not a question of having a pleasure trip abroad for anyone—though no doubt many people in some of our delegations may look upon it as such sometimes—but of the hardest possible work. I am glad to say—and I wish to pay this public tribute to our ambassadors, and I say so with full responsibility—that the ambassadors who are functioning on our behalf have done their work extraordinarily well. The average has been very high and I say higher than most countries, higher than the best of countries. Naturally, to begin with, they had difficulties and they have to build up a tradition; but they have succeeded largely. However, my point was the moment I can leave the Foreign Ministership or, in the alternative, the Prime Ministership I shall gladly do so.

6. Questions were asked about the number and the selection of personnel of the various official delegations and missions to foreign countries since 1 January 1948, their expenditure, ceremonial dress, abstaining from alcoholic drinks, diplomatic procedure and results achieved by them.
7. H.V. Kamath had asked whether Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador to Moscow, had been indiscreet in stating to an American agency that India was perturbed about Soviet press attacks on India's policies. In reply Nehru said that the statement represented the Government's view of the matter.

#### 14. To Amrit Kaur<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 4, 1948

My dear Amrit,

Thank you for your letter and the two apples. Datar Singh sent me a few apples also. I did not think them particularly good, but they are certainly very cheap.

I agree with you about the failure of our 'Grow More Food' campaign. I am sending your letter to the Food Minister.<sup>2</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 31(7)/48-PMS.

2. Doulatram, referring to Amrit Kaur's letter, said that the immediate problem was producing enough cereals for the poor rather than production of fruit and vegetables and required much organisation and effort. As for 'Grow More Food' campaign, it was started under the British when provincial governments would send small *ad hoc* schemes unrelated to each other and the Centre would give financial assistance. He wanted the Centre and the provinces to allocate more funds for increasing agricultural production.

#### 15. Reimposition of Controls<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister pointed out that now that Government had decided to reimpose controls on essential commodities, it was desirable to evolve a machinery for coordinated working of controls so that various ministries may not work in ignorance of each other's activities. The Cabinet approved of the Prime Minister's suggestion.

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting, 11 September 1948, Cabinet Secretariat Papers.





## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## IV. Industry and Labour





1. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

5 July 1948

My dear Pantji,

My attention has been drawn to U.P. Government circular issued by the Labour Department to the effect that only representatives of the Indian National Trade Union Congress should be taken into the Factory Workers' Committee.<sup>2</sup> I believe Sampurnanand<sup>3</sup> issued this. It is our policy, of course, to encourage the I.N.T.U.C.<sup>4</sup> but to say that the Factory Workers' Committee should consist entirely of them seems to go against the principle of real representation. Where the I.N.T.U.C. has strongest union naturally its representatives will go in the Factory Workers' Committee.

I understand that Gulzari Lal Nanda<sup>5</sup> who, as you know, is intimately associated with the I.N.T.U.C., also felt that the U.P. Government circular on this subject went too far and will lead to the conclusion that real representatives to the Factory Workers' Committee were being avoided.

As this matter was initiated by Sampurnanand, it is desirable for him to consider it. But he is not here and hence I am writing to you. Perhaps he will be coming back soon.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(55)/48-PMS.
2. Socialists and Communists had been criticising the U.P. Government for extending patronage to the I.N.T.U.C. in appointing representatives to the Workers' Committees. In one circular issued by the U.P. Government, unions formed by the I.N.T.U.C. in the sugar industry were given the exclusive right to nominate their representatives on the Workers' Committee.
3. Minister for Education and Labour, U.P. Government at this time.
4. The Government of India had decided that the Indian National Trade Union Congress was more representative of workers in the country than the All India Trade Union Congress and had therefore invited the I.N.T.U.C. to represent the workers at the session of the I.L.O. at San Francisco on 17 June 1948.
5. Minister for Labour, Bombay Government, at this time.



## 2. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

5 July 1948

My dear Krishna,

As there has been so much talk of the nationalisation of various industries here and in particular about the participation of labour in the management, I should like you to arrange to have sent to me a note on how the present British system is working in regard to it and more particularly the participation of labour in the management.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

## 3. Industrial Labour and the Government<sup>1</sup>

Friends and Comrades,

Yesterday at the tremendous meeting that I addressed,, I congratulated the people of Madras on their magnificent discipline.<sup>2</sup> That meeting was a sight which I shall never forget, not merely because of the great crowd but because of their discipline. I am sorry that now, while there is perfect peace and quiet and discipline all round, a relatively small section of the audience should get excited, and make noises which prevent work from being carried on.<sup>3</sup> Now this, I suppose, is the exuberance of youth. I do not mind it. But it is a pity if our normal work is interfered with by exuberance at the wrong time.

Now I have only a little time here, for I have a multitude of engagements. But I am happy to be here, to say a few words to my worker friends, colleagues and comrades. I have addressed many gatherings during these last two days here in this great city, and I shall be going away tomorrow, but if I had not had the chance of addressing, specially workers, I would have been sorry. For, the workers, the industrial workers, the railway workers

1. Address to labour rally in Madras, 26 July 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

2. See p. 410.

3. A section of the crowd had begun shouting, as Nehru began his speech, that the rest could not hear him, whereupon Nehru jumped off the platform, rushed to the place and appealed to the gathering to maintain peace.

and other workers in this country play a vital and indispensable role in the life of the country, and unless there is the fullest cooperation and understanding between them and the other sections of the community and the Government of the day, then there is likely to be friction and trouble. Now, a country ultimately depends upon its wealth, its well-being, on its productive capacity and what it produces, from the land, from industry of various types. And if we have to remove the poverty of India, if we have to increase the standards and well-being of our people, then we must produce more and then, secondly, we must see that the wealth that our workers produce is properly distributed, that is, it does not stick to a few pockets. Those two things have to be borne in mind, and the first of those is production. Now, there has been a great deal of stress laid on production, and rightly so, and unfortunately there has been also trouble and strife and lockouts and the like, which has come in the way of production. I am not going into that question now, except to tell you, that any Government, any national Government that we may have in the province or in the Centre, cannot subsist unless it has the largest amount of popular approval. Governments today, Congress governments or mixed governments or whatever they may be, must necessarily have the cooperation and goodwill of the public or else they cannot do what they want to do, and the people cannot get what they want. I find today a great deal of uninformed criticism, sometimes the criticism is right, often enough it is wrong. but what I do not appreciate is a kind of negative and passive criticism and condemnation, and a kind of negative sitting by, and not trying to help in the solution of problems. Now, it is a patent fact that the condition of industrial labour in India is, as a whole, not a good one, that many things have to be done to improve its lot; very often it does not get a fair deal from the employees, and we have to examine the very fundamentals of industry in this country, and change them for the public good wherever necessary. These are big questions, and they have to be decided, not as a few persons at the top may like, but as the vast numbers of people in this country want, in the manner which profits them. The ultimate decision will have to be by those large numbers of workers and peasants and others in this country, not by a few at the top. Now, how can that ultimate decision come? Not surely by weakening the country, by weakening the machinery of the Governmental apparatus of the country, by creating chaos in the country, because if you do that, then it is not the mass-will that counts, but the will of the few, who may presume to become dictators, to compel and coerce large sections, because there is no authority to check them.

I find today, people talking in terms of socialism, and more especially, in terms of communism. Excellent gospels, so far as I am concerned. I accept their fundamental principles, but I do not and will not accept the manner and methods of those who call themselves communists, because



I find that in the name of an economic doctrine they are at the present moment trying to compel, trying to coerce, sometimes murdering and committing all manner of atrocities in this province, and then coming to us in the name of civil liberty to allow them to go on carrying on with those atrocities. No country worth the name, no government or state can put up with this kind of thing. If any group, any people in the country want to declare war on the State, then the State is at war with them, and ultimately one will triumph. There can be against those who make war, nothing but war. Therefore, I want to make it perfectly clear that, if the workers of this country and the workers of this city and province want, not only to better their lot as they have every right to do, and even if they want to change the whole social structure of society, as they have also every right to do, the only way for them to proceed is, if I may say so, peacefully, cooperatively and change it, by influencing government, changing government, putting their own government in and through other ways. But, if they go about endangering this new State of ours, this India, free India of ours, before it has fully stabilised itself, before it has completely adjusted itself, after these very terrible changes that we have faced, partition and the other consequences that followed, if people go about upsetting this structure, then they are no friends of freedom, no friends of India, no friends of the working class. They are only friends of chaos and anarchy, out of which they hope something to their advantage might come. Therefore, all workers must realise that.

Now, I should like to say something, something else of a different kind. You know that I have stood for civil liberty. I have stood for the freedom of the individual and the group, and nothing has pained me so much, as that conditions should arise in this country when perforce, civil liberty should be limited in the case of a large number of individuals.<sup>4</sup> It pains me. It hurts me, that the very thing I have condemned in the past should, to some extent, be indulged in, by our Governments, whether in the Centre or in the province. Yet I should like to tell those Governments, my Government in the Centre and the province, that if the state of affairs is this, if the compulsion of events and the rest sometimes induce them and indeed compel them to take action, they must take that action.

We cannot endanger the security of the State. We cannot leave large numbers of people unprotected against this kind of attack. That is so. At the same time each Government, provincial or Central, must think hard indeed, whenever there is the slightest inroad on civil liberty, whenever any single individual's liberty is taken away from him, because it is a dangerous thing to fall back in a complacent mood and to go about leaving large powers

4. The reference is to the banning of the Communist Party in West Bengal and arrest of several communist leaders in Delhi, Bombay and Madras.

to the executive, large powers to the police, large powers to everybody, who can exercise them as they will. It is a dangerous thing, and I see these dangerous tendencies at work in India today, and I dislike them thoroughly. One has to balance between the two. One cannot allow the State to be in danger, and I want you to realize the fact, perhaps which you do not wholly realize sitting in this quiet city of Madras, that we are facing a grave danger to the State. Grave dangers, all manner of dangers, I am not afraid of those dangers. We shall face them and overcome them. But when there is danger to the State, then normal standards do not apply. The first primary duty of any government worth its name is to protect that State, is to protect the community at large, and the people at large, even though that protection means a certain limitation of liberty for some groups or individuals. You know that when there is a war, that war leads to a certain limitation of individual liberty, because war means that the State is in peril. The State is trying to defend itself, and the State defends itself by all manner of means. Now we are not at war, and we shall not, I hope, be at war. Nevertheless, we are facing a situation, political, economic, external, and internal, which creates, more or less, the same dangers, taken as a whole, as a war situation creates. Therefore, our outlook should be, in meeting this situation, a warlike outlook, to see that we win through and overcome all these dangers. When we have a war outlook of this kind, then everything else is secondary, and the person who puts forward a secondary matter before the primary has been concluded, is a person lacking in wisdom and giving importance to the lesser things of life, when the vital things are in danger. Therefore, we have to be careful. We cannot afford as Government to allow licence, which might endanger the State. We have to walk on this rather straight and narrow path in between the two, and I have no doubt that we often err and it is up to you, and it is right for you to point out the error of our ways, and it is right for us, who sit in the seats of authority, not to object to your criticism, but rather to welcome it, if it is made in a friendly, constructive, cooperative way. But, of course, if it is just destructive and meant not to get anything but to create trouble, then the reception has to be different.

So, comrades, I have placed these considerations before you, because I want you to think about this country of ours at the present moment. You know that the Congress has long been committed, not only to a 'People's Raj' but to essentially, a worker and peasant dominance in that raj. Because the workers and the peasants are dominant in this country and predominant, and obviously, any truly democratic government must reflect their will. What are we working for now? Are we working for real democratic governments or are we working for dictatorial societies, in which some group gains power and imposes its will upon other groups? Obviously, our



ideal is a democratic society, a democratic form of structure of government and in that structure the workers and peasants of this country will have the fullest say. It may take a little time to be established fully, but even so, it will take less time than if we reduce this country to chaos and anarchy by trying to get something done sooner and failing to do so. It is an odd thing and a curious thing, how people, some people, who stand for very radical and revolutionary measures and change in society, like the Communists, sometimes go to bed, with people like the feudal authorities of Hyderabad. Now that is an extraordinary thing for you to consider. What is there in common between the Communists and the Razakar leader in Hyderabad?<sup>5</sup> There is nothing in common, except one thing—the desire in the present context to create trouble and chaos. There is nothing else in common. How are we to meet this kind of thing except to oppose it and combat it and down it? There is no other way, whether it is in Hyderabad or whether it is elsewhere. We have yearned for peace in this country so that we may go ahead and work and carry through the great schemes we have, the great schemes which will bring betterment to our people. We cannot improve their lot without going ahead with those schemes, great schemes, when we dam our rivers, construct huge reservoirs, hydro-electric works, irrigation canals, bring fresh land into cultivation, etc., etc. Have you ever looked at the map of India? Look at it again. Look at that magnificent chain of the Himalayan mountains from the north to the north-east. There is no other area in the world which is more powerful, which has more potential power locked up in it, than that Himalayan chain—all that power to be tapped by human resources for the public good. We want to do that, we are going to do that, we have begun doing that, those enormous power resources of India, not only in the Himalayas but elsewhere, the enormous human resources of India. We have everything in India, except what we lack for the present, the proper coordination of that power with the human resources, the cooperative spirit, and the spirit of discipline, so that all of us together, may serve the nation and serve the people. If we do so together, then, very rapidly we build up this great nation and building up the great nation does not mean building up people at the top, but building up people from the bottom upwards, raising their level. This province of Madras is very poor. It shocks me to go in the rural areas and to see the people there. We have to raise their level, and we are going to do it. But we will waste our time, if instead of setting about that work, we simply fight and struggle and quarrel among ourselves and, above all, if we spend our time and energy in waste-

5. In April 1948 the Communist Party had issued a pamphlet denouncing the negotiations between Hyderabad and the Union on the ground that the Indian Government was capitalist and that the Indian Army would crush the people's movement. Though the Communists had been organising peasant resistance to the Razakars, both parties, had, for a time, come together in opposing the Union Government.

ful strife, as some of our misguided friends are doing today. So I beg of you, you, who are workers, whether you are in the field or factory or railways or elsewhere, to give thought to the present state of the world and of India. The present state of the world too is in a pretty bad state. They talk of wars etc., and if war comes, it will be a terrible disaster all over the world. No man knows what the end of that will be. In India, are we thus struggling hard to get out of that mire in which we sank last year, and early this year? Most of you have only read about the troubles we had in Punjab and round about, but we saw them with our own eyes and we felt terribly ashamed. And now, the first thing before us therefore is to get this country, this free India going, to get it properly stabilized, to increase its production and do all this with one common aim in view, that is, the raising of the standards of the mass of the people and making them freer and better, to put an end to poverty and unemployment and the like.

Now you cannot do this, you cannot undertake any work, either those great Himalayan schemes that I mentioned, and there are many great schemes here in your province of Madras, also of the same kind, we just cannot get going if all our time and energy are spent in mutual conflict and in meeting anti-social forces. We have to combat these anti-social forces and I call upon you, comrades, to join together in combating them. Fight and fight if anything wrong is done against you by your employer or by anybody, you have every right to challenge that and with your embattled strength as a union you can face that peacefully and cooperatively, and I shall wish you all success in any such struggle that you may have to face. But if you go the wrong way, then public sympathy will go against you. You will put up the great majority of the nation against you, and you will not get what you want. So, I hope, you will think over what I have said, and thinking over it you will realise that the primary need of the day is to work for peace and order in this country, for a strong trade union movement, a strong peaceful trade union movement, which betters your lot, which fights for you when your rights are challenged, which protects you in any way when you are victimised, but which, at the same time, thinks always of the nation first and of the individual's or the group's interest, as second. *Jai Hind.*



#### 4. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 2nd August 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have your letter of the 26th July.

Your analysis of the labour and industrial situation hardly appears to go deep enough. It is perfectly true that many of the labour demands are excessive and out of keeping with present conditions, but there is no doubt that labour is thoroughly dissatisfied and in many cases it has been hard hit by the rise in prices. The real cause of this dissatisfaction is perhaps more psychological than actual. There can be no doubt that our industrial magnates and merchants have exploited the situation to their great advantage and made large sums of money. Consider the racket in the textile world where prices have shot up and many crores have been rapidly made by the mills and the middlemen. There is a strong feeling among labour that burdens are not equally borne and you are not going to put an end to this by legislation and repressive action.

As for loose talk of responsible Ministers, this is to be deprecated, but I think it is too much to say that our whole industrial situation is affected by one or two odd speeches. Our industrialists are not so thin-skinned as all that. In a democratic country we cannot prevent the expression of opinion.

As a matter of fact the causes of our malaise are much deeper. At the present moment our monied people are in a sense on strike and trying to bring pressure on Government that way. This, of course, may result in something which is neither liked by them nor by Government. But there it is. Anyway, we are giving full attention to this matter.

About Belvedere I would beg of you to give up the idea of making it your record department. We have large ideas about this; it is not merely a place where books are stocked up but a place of research and study. The whole idea would have to be given up if it became also a Government office but if you want a part of it just for storing purposes for the present, this might be agreed to. As regards building quarters there for officers, our Cabinet considered the matter and disliked the proposal greatly.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 5. The Right to Work<sup>1</sup>

One of the main duties of a modern state is to see that all its people have work and none is idle. To achieve freedom from want is a large problem but one which must be tackled with energy and steadiness. In our own country the problem of unemployment has been aggravated by the necessity to provide for a large number of refugees, who have had to take shelter within our borders. The National Employment Service, started by the Ministry of Labour, is a step, however small, in the direction of solving this problem. Its third anniversary gives its organisers an opportunity to take stock of the work and to reinforce their efforts in finding employment for the unemployed. I wish the organisation ever-increasing usefulness in the service of the country.

1. Message sent to the Director-General of Resettlement and Employment, New Delhi, 8 August 1948 and published in *National Herald*, 9 August 1948.

## 6. To Gulzarilal Nanda<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 9, 1948

My dear Gulzarilal,

Your letter of the 7th August together with a copy of the draft ordinance.<sup>2</sup> I have glanced rather hurriedly through this draft and I am sending it to Jagjivan Ram for him to examine it a little more carefully. I can well understand the difficulties you have to face against the anti-social activities of some people. You know the situation best in Bombay and it is difficult to advise from a distance.

But I must say that I am very much alarmed at the way we are going forward step by step both in legislation and in executive action, towards suppressing certain rights which people are supposed to possess. We have

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 was amended in October 1948 to remove the provisions that sympathetic strikes could be undertaken without attracting penalties. Another amendment was that trade unions coming up for registration for the first time under the Act would have to show that they had not "instigated or aided" any illegal strike in the preceding six months.



## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

got a very bad name at present in other countries and I am continually getting letters from England, America, France from old friends of ours expressing their surprise and dismay at the way we are functioning. Trade unions in other countries who have consistently supported us write to me on these lines. You know how strong the feeling is among the trade unions at any governmental action which reduces their freedom of action.

I fear that we will enlarge the circle of our critics and at the same time not put an end to the mischief because the mischief ultimately has deeper causes.

My general impression of your draft ordinance is that it is strong and far-reaching. There are some general clauses in it which give full power to the Government. However, I do not wish to criticise this ordinance in detail. I only wish to tell you that our stock is going down with considerable rapidity and that is a bad thing for any country or government.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

V. Development Projects







PRESIDING OVER A MEETING OF BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL  
RESEARCH, NEW DELHI, 16 AUGUST 1948





ON BOARD H.M.I.S. DELHI, BOMBAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 1948

1. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

3 July 1948

My dear Gadgil,

I think I have written to you previously about the Bhakra Dam scheme. I have spoken about it to Khosla.<sup>2</sup> This is one of our major schemes and it is particularly connected with rehabilitation in East Punjab. It is important that this scheme should be pushed through with all available speed.

The matter came up before the Cabinet on one occasion and two points were stressed :

- (i) That in view of the fact that the Central Government were financing the scheme,<sup>3</sup> we cannot leave it to the East Punjab Government with its slender resources in men and personnel to deal with it as it likes. The Central Government must be the final arbiter.
- (ii) That it was desirable to give a contract for this to a big American firm.<sup>4</sup>

The Cabinet has been anxious for some time past to expedite our river valley schemes by giving some of these big contracts to firms abroad. This would undoubtedly speed up things because the firm would be in a better position to get machinery, etc., from abroad. Also their work here would set a standard for other works undertaken by our own engineers. It was for this reason that the Cabinet on two or three occasions emphasised this aspect and I even took the trouble to get representatives of American firms to visit India through the courtesy of the American Ambassador. The point is that while we may consult foreign experts in regard to any scheme, it is desirable to hand over the entire scheme from beginning to end to some reputable firm so that they might have the full responsibility for it. An American firm would obviously be indicated. I think it is worth considering whether a Czechoslovakian firm could also be given such a contract for any other scheme. It is desirable to spread out our work as much as possible and to introduce a spirit of competition.

Some of our engineers seem averse to this handing over of an entire scheme to a foreign firm. I do not see why that should be so because there is enough and more than enough work for them elsewhere. Anyway the Cabinet decision holds and should be given effect to.

1. File No. 17(59)/48-PMS.

2. A.N. Khosla, Chairman, Central Water Power Irrigation and Navigation Commission.

3. After the partition of the Punjab, the execution of Bhakra Project was beyond the resources of the East Punjab Government and the Central Government had to provide all the funds.

4. The work of designing the dam was finally entrusted to an American firm of consulting engineers headed by J.L. Savage, an authority on high dams.



The Bhakra scheme in East Punjab is especially indicated for this kind of arrangement with a foreign firm. It is a big scheme and an urgent one even more urgent than the others. Thus far it has been carried on in a spasmodic way and what surprises me is that the Centre has little to do with it although we supply the entire finances. This is entirely unsatisfactory and I think we should make it clear that we cannot finance a scheme unless we have an effective voice in it. The East Punjab Government has to shoulder tremendous burdens and in the nature of things they cannot function as effectively as the Centre can.

I have repeatedly laid stress on this, but nothing much seems to come out of it except delay. I saw a report of a conference about the Bhakra scheme some time ago.<sup>5</sup> In this it was stated that we would consider the question of a foreign firm dealing with this matter in future. This business of postponing decisions is not at all helpful and we must come to final decisions soon.

In *The Statesman* of today, page 10, there is an East Punjab newsletter from Simla which criticises severely the slowness of the work for the Bhakra dam and the Nangal Barrage projects.<sup>6</sup> That criticism seems to be fully justified. I suggest to you that this matter must be taken up immediately with the East Punjab Government and rapid decisions arrived at.

Some months ago while the Assembly was sitting I asked Khosla and other engineers concerned to send me a frequent, I think it was a fortnightly, report about the progress of various schemes and a time-table. I do not think I have received any report at all. This system of fortnightly reports should be adhered to so that we may know exactly where we stand and what progress is being made.<sup>7</sup> A full chart should be made also for each major project indicating the time-limit of each phase of construction. Naturally this will not be precise but it will give us some target to keep in view.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The conference held on 25 May 1948 could not decide on the inclusion of Bikaner and Patiala in the scheme because the Punjab representative said he had no authority to commit his Government.
6. *The Statesman* of 2 July 1948 stated that the twin projects of Bhakra dam and Nangal barrage had to be executed in six years, but progress in the first two years, which had cost Rs. 5 crores, was far behind the schedule. If the work was not completed in time, the blocking of several crores would make the project a liability rather than an asset. It called for high priority for import of machinery from the U.S., adequate supply of steel and cement and vigilant supervision.
7. Gadgil wrote that since compiling reports was time-consuming, the engineers might be left alone for actual work and should be asked to submit quarterly reports as these were long term projects.

## 2. To C.M. Trivedi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 July 1948

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your long letter dated June 29, which has given me a great deal of information about your province. I shall only deal here with one or two matters about which you have written.

I shall gladly have your views either when we meet or if you like in writing about the way that we should approach the Sikh problem in East Punjab. It is obvious how important it is to settle this satisfactorily. I must say that the Sikhs as a whole have not helped towards this solution by adopting aggressive tactics which are resented.

About the Nangal and Bhakra Dam schemes I have today written to our Minister for Works, Mines and Power, and I am enclosing a copy of this letter. I do not think this scheme can be handled satisfactorily by the East Punjab Government by itself. Indeed I am rather doubtful if the Central Government by itself can handle it properly or with speed. This is essentially the kind of work that should be entrusted to an expert foreign firm.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Trivedi sent to Nehru a copy of his letter to Gadgil on 7 July and reminded him of the meeting on 28 October 1947 which decided to entrust the Bhakra Nangal scheme to East Punjab Government and appoint a reviewing board. He also wrote that East Punjab Government had agreed to send a small mission to the U.S. for special equipment and to employ foreign experts as recommended by Dr. Savage and setting up of a sub-committee of East Punjab cabinet to consider all matters relating to hydro-electrical schemes in the province.

## 3. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5 July 1948

My dear Gadgil,

Your letter of the 24th June about the construction of a first-class hotel in New Delhi.<sup>2</sup>

1. File No. 28(19)/56-PMS.

2. Gadgil wrote that he had selected a site near Safdarjung airport for the construction of a hotel, but some firms felt it should be near Connaught Place. Building contractors, as also Sir Homi Modi of the Tata group, doubted the commercial feasibility of the proposition in the absence of amenities including the serving of liquor.



I think that we should concentrate on one really big first-class hotel and not two. The hotel must be thoroughly up-to-date and therefore great care has to be taken as to who should be entrusted with the construction of the building. The Imperial Hotel in New Delhi is a significant example of mustiness, disrepair and a generally woe-begone appearance. I suppose because there is no competition and the proprietors can make money easily, they are not interested in improving it. It has become essential, therefore, for a new modern hotel to be built.

I think it would be undesirable to pull down any government bungalow in order to build a hotel.<sup>3</sup> I do not see at all why a hotel should be situated near Connaught Place. In fact if I were to build a hotel I would not use that site at all as that would be a congested site and a great big hotel wants space and some grounds to move about in. Big hotels have a life of their own and they are often situated a little apart from the centre of the city. There is plenty of land still in New Delhi which can be utilised for this purpose.

As for an undertaking about prohibition obviously we can give no undertaking; even if there is prohibition, there may be some relaxation in case of visitors from abroad.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Gadgil had said that if a site on Parliament Street had to be chosen two Government bungalows would have to be pulled down.

#### 4. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8 July 1948

My dear Gadgil,

Many months ago, I think, I drew the attention of your Ministry to the fact that, while there was desperate need for construction and scarcity of materials for it, still luxury construction was proceeding, such as cinemas, large bungalows, large shops, etc. This unfortunate contrast is naturally noticed and resented. I think we should do something in this matter to prohibit to some extent this luxury construction and at any rate to check it for a period say two or three years. We may also say that all such construction in a living area should be prohibited if the cost of it is above a certain

1. File No. 45(7)/48-PMS.

figure, unless special permission is obtained from Government, which normally would be the provincial government. To define luxury construction is difficult, but if a figure is put as the outside cost of construction, then it would be easy to enforce the rule. This might reduce black-marketing also in these materials. If the structure is obviously costly and more than the suggested maximum, this would *prima facie* be evidence of violation of the rule and would make the owner as well as the contractor liable to certain prescribed penalties.

Such a rule would make available additional materials for more important constructional works of use to the public. Also it will undoubtedly have a far-reaching psychological effect on our people as they will see that we are trying our best to help them. Indirectly the prices may be affected too and brought down. This gesture of Government would do some good directly and do more good indirectly and psychologically.

I know that this matter is really a provincial matter and the Central Government cannot do much in regard to it except in certain small areas. Nevertheless, I suggest it to you for consideration. You can apply the rules in the centrally-administered areas and address provincial governments on the subject. If you like, the matter can be considered in the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To C.M. Trivedi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12 July, 1948

My dear Trivedi,

You wrote to me some time ago about the Bhakra Dam Project and told me of how matters stood and of the intention of the East Punjab Government to send some engineers to the United States. Recently a conference was held here about this Bhakra Dam Project. From the proceedings of that conference it appeared that many things were hung up because the East Punjab Government could not make up its mind. This is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

The first point to be decided is as to whether this whole scheme should not be entrusted to a competent American firm or institution. The Government of India are clearly of opinion that some of our major projects should

1. File No. 17(59)/148-PMS.



be handed over to foreign firms. This will speed up work, facilitate the import of machinery, and set an example to the other works of a like nature that we might be undertaking. I am afraid our methods of work are much too slow and sometimes inefficient. We have enormous undertakings on our hands and there is little chance of our making progress with them with our existing resources in men and material. For this reason the Government of India were definitely of opinion that we should take not only the advice of foreign experts but their full help in regard to some of our schemes. It is not much good taking advice here and there because that gives no responsibility to the other party. It is far better to make them fully responsible and then call them to account if they fail in anything. We had not suggested the names of particular projects which might be entrusted to foreign firms but *prima facie* Bhakra Dam Project might be one of them as no doubt it is one of the major schemes involving the construction of a very high dam.

If it is decided to give a contract for this work, with such conditions as we may impose, to a foreign firm, then the whole question of sending a deputation of engineers to America has to be reviewed and fitted in to the new project. I might mention that we are dealing with Czechoslovakian experts also, and they are very good in this kind of work. We do not propose to entrust our major schemes to one foreign country only but to introduce an element of competition. In every such contract we shall insist on our people being employed and trained and on a time limit.

The second important point that arises is the part that the Government of India is going to play in the Bhakra scheme. I think it should be clearly understood that the Government of India cannot finance these huge schemes without a full say in the matter of their planning, execution, etc. Wherever we are financing these schemes we have this say and indeed some of them are completely in our charge, for instance, Hirakud and Mahanadi schemes. The Damodar Valley Project has been put under a statutory authority appointed by the Government of India. It is, I think, not right for any provincial government to assume full charge of a major scheme like this, more specially when the Government of India is financing it completely.

The third point to be remembered is that in the planning of the Bhakra Dam Project, Bikaner cannot be left out. About this the East Punjab Government has taken up, I think, an unreasonable attitude.<sup>2</sup> The Government of India take a broader view and it would be highly improper for Bikaner not to be supplied with water from this scheme for any reason whatever.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Gopichand Bhargava wrote to Nehru on 8 July that as long as waters were needed in the populated areas of East Punjab and adjoining States, diverting them to Bikaner would not be in their interest.

## 6. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
18 July 1948

My dear Gadgil,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th July about the Bhakra Dam Project and like matters.<sup>2</sup>

I have also received progress reports about the Mahanadi and other projects.

When I asked for these progress reports to be sent, I did not intend that long reports should be sent every month. This would take up too much time and is not worthwhile. What I suggested was first of all that some kind of a rough estimate of the time-table of various projects should be made, showing what is expected to be done every six months during the next three years or so. Naturally such an estimate would have to be varied from time to time. But it would give us some standards of measurement of the work that was being done and of our keeping up to the time-table. It is impossible to judge otherwise.

Secondly, I wanted brief fortnightly reports which would show how far we were keeping up to the time-table. I agree with you that real reports should come quarterly. But it does seem to me essential that the closest watch should be kept on the work that is being done. For this purpose printed forms can be made which can easily be filled in every month or oftener to indicate progress made. The filling in of this form, if the facts are available, should not take more than half an hour.

In England today every productive enterprise reports the day's production to the Government department concerned with the result that the Minister for Economic Affairs can give the total production figures for the day before and thus check the work. In most businesses daily reports are sent to headquarters. This may be too much. But I do think that brief frequent reports are necessary for your own ministry of the work that has been done.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(59)/48-PMS.

2. Gadgil doubted East Punjab Government's willingness to treat the Bhakra Dam as a regional project. He said that a conference at engineer-level was held in Simla on 6 July, to be followed by a ministerial conference in August. He was contemplating legislation for development of inter-state rivers for solving disputes. He also felt that final decisions on Bhakra would be affected by (1) settlement with Bilaspur State, (2) inauguration of Phulkian union, and (3) discussions at next Inter-Dominion Conference (canal water dispute) on 21 July.



## 7. Scientific Research<sup>1</sup>

I see here in this gathering many eminent men of science and politicians as well as a very large number of people who are neither, and do not understand much of science or politics. What is then the connection between this vast concourse that has gathered on this occasion and science? Why has this vast gathering gathered here, though they may not understand much, about the particular significance of this occasion? Of course, many of them are here out of curiosity to see what is happening. But the vast majority are here because there is a hunger and a thirst in them impelling them, some vague and longing hope, that some of us here may be able to fulfil their hearts' yearnings and their great needs. Whether the building and the institute<sup>2</sup> that will arise here will help to better their lot and better the lot of the people round about here and in India is the question we have to consider.

I have come here to associate myself with the beginning of this undertaking because I believe that by such undertakings and by yoking science to public good we can advance the lot of the people of India enormously. We get thereby many opportunities to solve the problems of the people. I am, therefore, glad to see such large numbers of the common people associating themselves in such ceremonies.

I am told that people living round about here have not even sufficient water to drink. They also lack most of the other good things of life. Now, it is up to us, who are responsible for the running of Government—whether it be the Government of Madras or the Central Government—to see that our objective must be to provide them the essentials of life. Once that is done, then we can think in terms of providing other things that are necessary.

Now there are many ways of approaching the problem. But the basic essential way is to attack it at the root and lay the foundation for increasing the means of producing the goods that people want. Ultimately, our Government, whether it is the provincial or the Central, will be judged by this one standard. How far have they advanced the good of the people, how far have they made their lot better, and how far have they improved the lot of the common man, not by way of constructing fine buildings and fine struc-

1. Speech on the occasion of the foundation laying ceremony of the Electro-Chemical Research Institute, Karaikudi, 25 July 1948. From *The Hindu*, 26 July 1948.
2. The Electro-Chemical Research Institute is one of India's national laboratories sponsored by the C.S.I.R. It was started to carry on applied research to increase the production of existing industries and to foster new industries based on Indian raw materials as well as fundamental research.

tures in a few cities, but by improving the village and providing them with the normal amenities of life ? That will be the real test.

We have to see how we can apply science to this end. What is science? Science is the method of using various kinds of power to better human lot. A great deal has been done by science to better man's lot; but, at the same time much has also been done to his destruction and misery. But we shall take the good from science and from the building that will go up here and all that they can do and all that the power of science can do for bettering the lot of humanity. People talk of pure science and applied science. To me they are about the same. I think that no science or other activities, for that matter, can be worth anything unless they are carried on and worked in terms of the larger humanity. Therefore, whether it is pure science or applied science, it must raise humanity, human good, human standards and help our fellow men. That will be the objective and the activity which will be desirable.

The combination of pure science and application of science to public good is something which has an integral connection with the life of the people round about here in South India. I congratulate Dr. Alagappa Chettiar<sup>3</sup> on this scheme and his generosity.<sup>4</sup> But, now, the scheme is something more than Dr. Alagappa Chettiar's. It has been taken up by the nation and it has become a national institution. Therefore, it will belong to the nation and not to any particular individual. It is up to you to consider it as yours and help it in every way.

Round about this institution, I understand, other institutions will grow. The building construction, I am told, will take place very soon and the work will start as rapidly as possible. This centre may thus be converted into one of the most productive areas of the country in doing good to the people. Electricity is a great power. You will be carrying on research in this connection, and the usefulness of the work will spread itself out, so that not only the institute but all the other things that flow from it can go to better the condition of the people in villages and towns, and to establish industries and provide employment and the like.

What is the objective we seek? It is to put an end to poverty, to put an

3. Rm. Alagappa Chettiar (1909-1957); barrister and industrialist; Managing Director, Alagappa Textiles, Cochin; Director, Aayon Spinning and Weaving Mills, Cannanore and Asok Textiles Ltd., Alwaye.

4. Alagappa Chettiar had donated 300 acres of land and Rs. 15 lakhs towards the establishment of the Institute.



end to all waste of human power and talent, so that everyone may be able to work and produce and have the amenities of life and advance to the best of his capacity, so that every person whatever caste, community or religion he may belong to, may have equal opportunity and scope to be the architect of his own progress.

We are children of a great and mighty country. Our country has attained freedom. We have now to concentrate on making her great in other ways also. True greatness lies not in the power of arms but by having prosperous, contented and productive people. We therefore have to build up the greatness of the people, for the greatness of India, so that she may become the soul and symbol of a great and productive human activity.

## 8. On Housing and Health<sup>1</sup>

The Government of India have decided to institute a separate housing department under the Ministry of Health to tackle the difficult problem of housing which has been made much worse on account of the influx of a large number of refugees.

The Government are shortly starting a factory for building pre-fabricated houses.<sup>2</sup> This will only be one of the ways of tackling the difficult situation. Pre-fabrication will eliminate the need of steel and to a large extent also of cement which are in short supply. The cost of a pre-fabricated tenement consisting of two small rooms, a kitchen, bath room, small verandah and courtyard will be in the neighbourhood of Rs, 2,500/-. These houses will be cool and durable. I advise provinces and States to start similar housing departments.

I shall now deal with the problem of nutrition. A large portion of the population of this country do not get sufficient nourishment, and without this it would be impossible to fight ill-health and disease. Arrangements for meals in schools should be improved, for children's health is a matter of first priority, as they are the citizens of the future. Recently, I visited an institution in Madras called Asoka Vihar, which provided free medical

1. Speech at Second Health Ministers Conference, New Delhi, 2 August 1948. Full version was obtained from the Press Information Bureau.

2. Hindustan Housing Factory, now known as Hindustan Pre-Fabs. Ltd

aid and attendance for children and their families for just one anna a month per child. This experiment seems to me to be admirable.

I deplore the absence of vital statistics in this country specially in the field of health. The collection of statistics has become an extremely technical affair and only people with expert training in the line can perform the job satisfactorily. The Statistical Institute near Calcutta<sup>3</sup> under Professor Mahalanobis is doing excellent work which proves that we have excellent human material if only we could organise it.

I congratulate the members of the Indian delegation<sup>4</sup> and especially its leader, the Health Minister, which recently attended the World Health Assembly in Geneva. I am glad that India has secured a place on the Executive Board of the organisation and it has been decided to establish the headquarters of the Regional Bureau for South East Asia in India. This is no small responsibility but India will stoutly shoulder it.

Most countries now are thinking in terms of socialising their health services, and India will also have to think this out from the point of view of giving relief to the masses.

3. The Indian Statistical Institute was inaugurated on 17 December 1931 and formally registered on 28 April 1932 as a non-profit making scientific society.
4. The Indian Delegation included Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar and C. Mani. Alternate members were Dhiren Mitra and C.L. Pasricha.

## 9. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9 August 1948

My dear Krishna,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Dickie Mountbatten.<sup>2</sup>

I forget if I wrote to you to convey my appreciation to Attlee about his speech in the Commons.<sup>3</sup> That speech has been appreciated greatly in India and I think it has done a lot of good. Rajaji wrote to Attlee about it. I felt that my writing also perhaps might be somewhat overdoing it. But if you have an opportunity, you may mention it to him that not only I but my colleagues and others in India liked that speech very much.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *ante*, pp. 284-286.

3. See *ante*, p. 202, fn. 3.



I understand from Amrit Kaur that there has been some bypassing of the High Commissioner in regard to the housing factory that we intend putting up. I do not quite know what has happened. I think I wrote to you about it and we asked Shanmukham Chetty to look into this matter because if he went into it personally and approved of it, our Finance Ministry here will give no trouble and will pass it easily. That is what happened and we are quite ready to proceed with the scheme. I expected the matter to be referred to you there, but perhaps this was not done.

The new Department of Housing that we are creating has been put under the Ministry of Health. We have now to sign the contract for this housing factory with the British firm<sup>4</sup> and I think Amrit Kaur is writing to you to get this contract signed in London.

If there is any proper report of the speeches delivered at the dinner held in your honour at the Dorchester, could you send it to me?

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

4. The Government of India signed a 12-year contract with a British firm on 18 August 1948 for establishing a factory in India to erect five thousand pre-fabricated houses a year. However, the Hindustan Housing Factory was set up in Delhi only in 1950.

## 10. A Central Statistical Organisation<sup>1</sup>

A number of ministries have statistical departments and some of these have done good work. Nevertheless our statistical organisation at the centre or elsewhere is very backward and we seldom have any sufficient data to judge of a particular situation. We talk of policies, and this is important, but equally important are the facts and data on which policies have to be based. Also, unless there is accurate checking up of any step taken, it is not possible to judge of its success or otherwise.

2. For some years past we have had a Grow More Food campaign and very large sums of money have been spent upon it. It is difficult, however, to know what success has attended this campaign. We have no data. Any such important activity of Government should have been judged from time

1. Note to all Ministries, 20 August 1948. File No. 17(56)/56-PMS.

to time by various sample surveys and collection of data. This applies to other activities also. The result is that we function largely in the dark, which is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. Faults cannot be remedied and arguments are carried on without any basis of admitted facts.

3. In most other countries, and notably in the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. the organisation for the collection of statistics has grown rapidly and become an essential foundation for the consideration of most problems. It plays a vital part in the nation's life. It is a mirror in which you can trace the temperature of the nation's economic and other life.

4. There has long been a proposal for some kind of a central statistical organisation here. The Advisory Planning Board recommended this last year. We have at present near Calcutta a very fine statistical organisation functioning under Professor Mahalanobis. This works on a relatively small scale, but has developed a world reputation. Government have recently accepted a scheme to help this organisation.<sup>2</sup>

5. But this Calcutta organisation does not take the place of a central statistical organisation. We have therefore to think again and organise some kind of a central statistical organisation.<sup>3</sup> It will be for the Cabinet to decide what this should be, and I should not like to prejudge that decision in any way. I imagine, however, that it will be desirable for each ministry, or such as require it to continue to have its own statistical department. The central organisation's chief function should be to coordinate these activities in the different departments, to prevent overlapping, to advise and to check. This is merely a suggestion.

6. The matter will be considered by the Cabinet in the near future. But before that is done, it is desirable for us to know what the present position is and what kind of statistics and data are being collected by various ministries. I shall be grateful, therefore, if each ministry will send me a note on this subject stating the type of work in the collection of various kinds of data and statistics that is being done there, how is this classified, and how used. In fact the fullest information on the subject should be collected.

7. While a note on this subject will be helpful, I propose, in order to expedite this work, to send a competent person to each ministry to discuss this matter with the appropriate officers there and bring a note of the ministry. I shall send such a person in about a week's time. I shall be grateful if meanwhile these facts are collected and a note is prepared.

2. The Union Ministry of Education was contemplating a scheme for the conversion of the Indian Statistical Institute of Calcutta into a Central Institute of Statistics.

3. In 1949 P.C. Mahalanobis was appointed Honorary Statistical Adviser to the Cabinet and a Central Statistical Unit was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat which developed into the Central Statistical Organisation in 1951.



## 11. To Harold Hotelling<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23rd August 1948

Dear Mr. Hotelling,<sup>2</sup>

I am grateful to you and your wife for your letter of good wishes.

I remember well the discussions we had at my home when you spent a night with us. I hope that we shall be able to do something in developing national planning and for that purpose it is essential that we should take the help of mathematical economics and statistics.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(45)/56-PMS.

2. Harold Hotelling (1895-1973); a leading statistician and economist in the U.S.

## 12. The Indian Statistical Institute<sup>1</sup>

This matter has been thoroughly gone into during the past two years and it has already been finalised and sanction for this grant made.<sup>2</sup> The points raised by H.M. Works, Mines and Power were considered and suitable changes made.<sup>3</sup> The Government can hardly consider this profitably at this stage when action has followed this sanction.

When, however, this question of having a Central Statistical Organisation for Government is taken up, which I hope will be soon, this can be considered in that connection.

The Indian Statistical Institute has done good work and has a very high reputation internationally.

1. Note to Minister for Works, Mines and Power, 24 August 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. The Institute, located at Calcutta, had been receiving regular annual grants from the Central Government since 1935. The Institute was granted Rs. 5 lakhs per year for three years commencing from 1948-49, subject to the condition that it agreed to make certain changes in its constitution and provide for Government representation in it.
3. N.V. Gadgil said that in 1946 persons in charge of the Institute and Indian Statistical Society had refused to give any detailed account of how the grants were spent and claimed that the Central Government had no right, after making a grant, to demand any explanation.

### 13. To Akbar Hydari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 23, 1948

My dear Hydari,

Your letter of the 20th September about the grant for a five-year development scheme of the North-East Frontier Agency.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry to learn of the delays that have taken place. I am looking into this matter immediately. I would hate to stop the working out of any development plan for these frontier areas which had been neglected by us for so long.

Normally speaking, we are not touching five-year plans and the like. What we are concerned at the most is the next year or 18 months. We should like to economise as much as possible during this period. I do not know what part of the original sum is required during this period. It would help if you could kindly indicate your requirements in some order of priority for this five-year planning, more specially what you wish to do in the next year or so.

Meanwhile, we are going to take this up with the Finance Ministry, or rather with the Priorities Committee that has been established.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Work began in 1947 on a five-year development plan for North East Frontier area for building roads, schools and hospitals.

### 14. Development of the North-East<sup>1</sup>

I attach a letter from Sir Akbar Hydari. Could you please enquire into this matter immediately as to why these delays have taken place and what the position is now. I think we must pay special attention to these neglected Frontier areas of the North-East. Apart from the normal reasons applied to development in any part of India, there are political reasons of importance. The more we develop and settle these areas, the more peaceful they become. As it is, they often give trouble and when trouble comes it costs us a great deal of money and the Finance Ministry has no choice then but to pass that expenditure. It is far better to ensure against that trouble by much smaller expenditure, which is really an investment both for peace and progress of the area.

Kindly, therefore, have this matter immediately looked into and taken up with the Finance Ministry. The important thing is what sum is required during this year or the next. Probably the Priorities Committee will consider this. I should like our Ministry to advocate the cause of these frontier areas, more specially from the political point of view. It is no good considering these areas just as if they were any other part of India.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 23 September 1948. J.N. Collection.





## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## VI. State Capitals





## 1. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23 July 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

Will you please let me know what steps are being taken in regard to your new capital.<sup>2</sup> You will appreciate that this is a very urgent matter from many points of view. If you go ahead with it fast not only do you begin to provide for many of your refugees but what is more you produce a healthy atmosphere of construction. Many of your local troubles will disappear if people are engaged in constructive activities. I am anxious therefore that this matter should be dealt with with extreme speed.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(27)/47-PMS.
2. Chandigarh was formally inaugurated as capital of Punjab by Rajendra Prasad on 7 October 1953.

## 2. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9th August 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th August about the new capital.<sup>2</sup>

You will remember that I suggested to you some time ago that you might consult Dr. Koenigsberger, the town planner of the Mysore Government. I think it would be worthwhile for you to do so. The average engineer, however good he may be, and even the average architect, has no special qualifications for town planning which is a very specialised job. There are very few town planners in India. Koenigsberger is one of them. The whole conception of a town planner is different from that of the average engineer or architect.

The main point in building a city should be to keep the social aspect always in view. This is usually completely forgotten, and people think in putting up a number of imposing official buildings.

1. File No. 7(27)/47-PMS.
2. Bhargava had suggested recruitment of architects and planners for the new capital of Punjab by selection in place of international competition. The initial scheme was prepared by an American architect, Albert Mayer, and embodied architectural designs of the Polish architect, Nowicki. In 1951, the master plan was taken over and revised by Le Corbusier in collaboration with Jeanneret, Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew.



I saw the plan of the new capital for Orissa and I was very much impressed by it. This was built entirely round the social life of the city keeping in view schools, markets etc. as well as official buildings. This plan was made by Koenigsberger.<sup>3</sup>

Another point to be borne in mind is that as far as possible the material to be used for construction should be locally available.<sup>4</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The plan based on the principle of neighbourhood units sought to blend the advantages of urban and rural life.
4. Bhargava had said that the chief engineer was exploring ways and means to develop the necessary potential for construction.

### 3. To Albert Mayer<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 24th September 1948

My dear Mayer,

I am sorry for the great delay in dealing with your letter of August 10th.

I am glad that you were pleased with the work you had done in regard to a master plan for Greater Bombay.<sup>2</sup> I would gladly draw the attention of other provinces and cities to his plan. Could you send me a brief note which I could circulate to various provincial governments ?

As for a qualified Indian accompanying the aerial survey party I suppose it would be up to the Bombay Government or the Corporation to take some steps in this matter. I think it would be a good thing if a man was sent. You have already written to N.C. Ghosh,<sup>3</sup> the Director General of Civil Aviation. Perhaps in his reply he has told you what steps are feasible.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. A master plan for Greater Bombay with an outlay of Rs. 115 crores was approved by the Bombay Municipal Corporation on 2 August 1948. The total area to be covered was 147.5 square miles, exclusive of the area of 26 square miles of Bombay city.
3. Nibaran Chandra Ghosh (b. 1890); joined East Indian Railway in 1913; General Manager, E.I. Railway, 1944-46; Member and later Chairman of Air Traffic Licensing Board, 1946-47; Director General of Civil Aviation, 1947-48; Founder President, Aeronautical Society of India, 1948; Director General of Transportation and Secretary, Home (Transport) Department, Government of West Bengal, February, 1949.

## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## VII. Abolition of Zamindaris





1. To Maharaja of Bikaner<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

12 July 1948

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th June which has just reached me.

As I told you I am myself convinced that Bikaner State should have its share in the Bhakra Dam project and I shall do everything in my power to see that this happens. I am enquiring further into the matter.

Before you left India you were good enough to send me a long note regarding Rajput rallies in States. I read this note carefully. I entirely agree with you that the matters in controversy should be settled as far as possible by friendly arrangements. Unfortunately sometimes this is not wholly possible.

No one, I hope, wants to do anything unreasonable or unjust to the Rajputs who have played such an important part in India's history and who form a significant element in our population today. The question that arises, however, is that certain land systems in India, as in many other parts of the world, have proved completely out of date and retrogressive. They come in the way of the development of a country and its people. In the final analysis they come in the way of the development even of its people who apparently profit by them. Because of this, these and similar land systems all over the world have been changed, or are in process of change. In large parts of Europe they have undergone vital changes. In India in most provinces the old zamindari system is being changed, compensation being given and peasant proprietorship is taking its place. The jagirdari system is an intensification of the zamindari system and is considered completely out of date. That, of course, is no fault of the present jagirdars.

So this change would appear inevitable but it is to the interest of all concerned to bring it about in such a way as to meet the just claims and apprehensions of all concerned.

You referred to the Rajput rallies. I should like to draw your attention to the fact that these rallies, or some of them, were definitely against the Government of India and slogans were raised against the Government of India and some of the Ministers of that Government. Further, what seems extraordinary is that, slogans were raised in praise of Pakistan—Pakistan *Zindabad* and even Kasim Razvi *Zindabad*. Any person who raises such slogans in the present context can only be considered as one having a perverted mentality. Such slogans indicate that the background of these Rajput rallies is bad and some of these Rajputs are prepared to play into the



hands of India's enemies just to satisfy a private grudge. Nothing can be more harmful to the Rajputs than play with fire in this way.

I trust that your stay at Evian will benefit your health. I know Evian and its surrounding neighbourhood very well and I have liked it greatly.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To M.S. Aney<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
14th July 1948

My dear Mr. Aney,

As you know certain difficulties have arisen in regard to the Bihar Zamindari Bill<sup>2</sup> which, I believe is now before you. These difficulties are connected chiefly with the mining clauses of the bill as well as the nature of the bonds to be issued.<sup>3</sup> There are also of course certain other fundamental questions that arise to which perhaps sufficient attention has not been so far paid.

We are all committed to the abolition of the zamindari system but it is clear that a vast change like this requires the most careful thought so that it may not upset the whole economic and financial structure of the country.<sup>4</sup> Every province is considering this problem of abolition of zamindaries and obviously there should be some uniformity in this procedure. If a certain step is taken in one province which leads to difficulties, then other provinces will also be affected.

However, I am not raising this larger question at this stage although the Government of India, and more specially our Finance Ministry, will have to

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Bihar Abolition of Zamindari Bill was returned to the provincial government by the Governor General as its clauses relating to the mines and minerals came under the purview of the Central Government. Again the Bill made provision for compensation in the form of bonds. But under section 299 of the Government of India Act compensation could be paid in cash only.

3. The Central Government had already conveyed to the provincial government its inability to finance the abolition of zamindaris. The course open to the Bihar Government was to issue non-negotiable bonds with a time ceiling which again was invalid without a suitable amendment to the Government of India Act.

4. The Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, with J.C. Kumarappa as chairman, had toured the provinces to gather views on land reforms and find a substitute for zamindaris. The Bihar Government was also waiting for recommendations for land ownership and superintendence by the state.

go into this matter as an all-India issue. The Finance Ministry is not only concerned with the larger economic implications but also with the demands made for loans in order to pay compensation. Obviously, there is a limit to the capacity of the Central Government to provide funds for this purpose. Apart from this limit any funds provided for this purpose may very seriously affect our development programmes. That, as you will appreciate, will be most unfortunate, for one cannot afford to stop the development of the country or even to postpone it at this critical stage.

For the present I want to draw your attention more specially to the two matters mentioned above, namely, the mining clauses and the nature of the bonds to be issued. A formal letter on this subject will soon be addressed by us to the Government of Bihar. I am writing this to you, and sending a copy of this letter to the Premier of Bihar, so that you might generally know what our reactions are.

Recently a conference was held between the representatives of the Central and Bihar Governments to consider this matter. As a result of this conference it was agreed that the Bihar Government should undertake to bring an amending bill as soon as possible, and, meanwhile, should declare publicly that they would not enforce those mining and other clauses. The principle was thus accepted. It is clear that some kind of gentleman's agreement or even a public statement by the Government would have no legal binding force and difficulties might arise. A way out might be that as soon as the bill is assented and becomes an Act, an Ordinance is issued embodying the terms of the so-called gentleman's agreement, this later could be placed before the provincial Assembly when it meets next. The other alternative is to keep this bill pending till September next when Bihar Assembly will meet and then make the necessary changes.

We would suggest to you and to your Government that in the present instance it would be desirable for a reference to be made of this bill to the Governor General who could then make these suggestions. We have absolutely no desire to delay this bill and indeed I am anxious that we should proceed as rapidly as possible with the main purpose of the bill, that is the replacement of the zamindari system by some other, but the matter is a complicated one and it would be a great pity if some step was taken which would embarrass both the Bihar Government and the Central Government within the near future. We want to proceed in full co-operation with the Bihar Government in this matter, but the Bihar Government should realise our difficulties and the risks we point out. In particular they should know that our financial capacity to help in this matter is limited.

There is one other small matter to which I should like to draw your attention. That relates to the amendment moved by Kumar Taranand



Sinha<sup>5</sup> in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. From a letter from the Speaker<sup>6</sup> of the Assembly it appears that some mistake has been made, probably clerical, but the effect of this is to make a vital change which may create difficulties. An attempt to rectify this mistake in the Upper House was opposed by the provincial government. I don't know why it was opposed when the Speaker accepted the contention of Kumar Taranand Sinha.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Premier of Bihar.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Kumar Taranand Sinha (b. 1920); joined relief mission for the Bihar earthquake, 1934 and communal riots in Bhagalpur and Monghyr, 1947-48; member, Bihar Legislative Assembly, 1946-51; founder member, Syndicate of Universities of Bihar, 1952-62 and Bhagalpur, 1960-62; member and later Chairman, University Service Commission from 1962 till his retirement.
6. Vindeshwari Prasad Verma (1886-1968); joined Muzaffarpur Bar, 1911 and non-cooperation movement, 1920-21; member, Bihar Legislative Assembly, 1937; Speaker, Bihar Legislative Assembly, 1946-62.

### 3. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22 July 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

The Madras Premier came and told me that the Parliamentary Board had issued some directive to him in regard to the Zamindari Bill in Madras.<sup>2</sup> These directives related to the payment of additional compensation. I do not know the nature of this compensation or the instructions issued. But according to the Premier this would now make it practically impossible to pass the Bill.

I fear that we, both as Government and as Congress, have been very much amiss in regard to the abolition of zamindari in the provinces. We

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. The committee appointed by the Madras Legislature Party recommended the exclusion of the "1936 *inams*" from the scope of the Zamindari Abolition Bill, which was pending before the Legislative Assembly. This recommendation was also endorsed by the party. Both the committee and the party declined to accept the proposal of the Congress Parliamentary Board to pay full compensation to the *inams* as that would impose a big financial burden on the Government. They also disapproved of the proposal to divide the *inams* between the *inamdars* and the ryots as that could lead to litigation and discontent.

have not cared to go deeply into the question in order to evolve a feasible and uniform policy. We have only criticised what the provinces have done. Our criticisms have no doubt been right. Nevertheless, we have been landed in a position which is extraordinarily difficult and which may lead us to an agrarian crisis in some provinces. High expectations have been raised everywhere and if these are frustrated, there will be trouble.

If, as the Madras Premier said to me, the compensation which the Parliamentary Board has directed him to give, is beyond the capacity of Madras to give, then it is not possible for the Zamindari Bill to be proceeded with. It may be that the same difficulty might have to be faced by other provinces. This raises very vital issues because it affects the Congress programme and the assurance given by us to the public. The matter is so important that it might have to be considered by the A.I.C.C. itself. In any event the Working Committee should consider it.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Prasad replied on 24 July that while the compensation to the zamindars had been agreed upon, the extra amount for compensating the *inamdars* had called for reconsideration of the Bill. One formula was evolved involving 17 or 18 crores extra payment. After further discussion another formula was evolved allowing the *inamdars* to retain half the land and giving full tenancy status for the other half. It was left to the *inamdars* to choose between the two.

#### 4. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
27 July 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

Your D.O. No. 357 L.R.T. dated 21st July.

We have no doubt at all that your Government would carry out fully any undertaking which you might give. The question however was that any person may challenge that undertaking in a court of law. In law the undertaking would then have no value. Therefore it becomes necessary to afford some legal protection. There is no question here of doing anything which would be derogatory to your Government or to your provincial assembly. Since you have agreed to a certain procedure in regard to mining leases, this will have to be given legal effect sometime or other. We suggested two methods of doing so and asked you which you would prefer. If you have any third method to suggest, we shall surely consider it. In any event an

1. J.N. Collection.



amendment will have to be made in the existing Bill. The proper course seems to be to explain the situation in your Assembly and having got their agreement to these relatively minor changes, to go ahead. The manner of doing this can be easily determined.

You are right in saying that the Working Committee did not say anything about the bonds being negotiable or not. The matter was not considered by them, nor were the financial aspects before them. This is a highly technical matter in which I can express no personal opinion. Our financial experts have gone deeply into it and we conveyed their advice to you.

The Government of India will gladly help you by way of loan. The difficulty is the amount required and the manner of giving it.

I realise completely the dangers of delay in this matter. I understand that your Assembly will meet sometime in September, i.e., within about six weeks or so. There should therefore be no great delay.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To Harekrushna Mahtab<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 6th August 1948

My dear Mahtab,

Your letter of the 3rd August about entrusting the management of the zamindari estates to the people.

I think the proposal<sup>2</sup> you have made will require rather careful examination, even after accepting the principle of it. The principle, I take it, is this: that the management of the estates should be taken away from the zamindars, that is the bigger zamindars, and at the same time to guarantee to them a certain income which is calculated after taking costs of collection and perhaps some sum for improvement of the estate. Having approved of this principle how the management is to be organised is another matter. Probably it would be better for the Government to take it up completely and then to form some kind of cooperatives for the purpouse.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mahtab's scheme envisaged formation of zamindari units yielding annual revenues of Rs. 3 lakhs to be administered by joint committees of zamindars and representatives of the farmers. The Government would post officials to help the committees to collect and utilize the revenue.

There is another approach to this problem and I wish this had been done by other provinces first. We talk about giving adequate compensation. Now compensation depends on various factors. Those various factors are governed by taxation, which essentially is acquisition of a certain part of the income without compensation. The first step should be to increase taxation wherever possible. I do not myself know what the position is in Orissa. But it is admitted generally that we should tax land progressively in the same way as the income tax, that is to say, the larger estates should pay some kind of an income tax on the income of a land. If this is done you tap a source of revenue and at the same time you bring down the value of that land. Still you can deal with it in other ways.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddijar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 9, 1948

My dear Premier,

I notice that your Zamindari Abolition Bill is coming up before your Assembly.<sup>2</sup> That is as it should be. But I should like to draw your particular attention to what I have written to you before already.<sup>3</sup> That is that every step taken in this important matter should have two considerations in mind.

1. The possibility of the Central Government not being able to help much in providing funds,
2. The avoidance of inflationary tendencies.

Any policy therefore must be a uniform one, although it may vary in details, all over the country, and should keep in view the present economic condition of the country as a whole.<sup>4</sup> For this it is necessary for full consultation with the Central Government before any final decisions are taken.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(92)/48-PMS.
2. The Zamindari Abolition Bill was finally passed in the Madras Assembly on 27 October 1948 and received the assent of the Governor General in April 1949.
3. See *ante*, p. 365.
4. One of the Government's anti-inflationary measures was an intimation to provincial governments that deficits incurred in the enforcement of prohibition or the abolition of zamindari would not be made good by subvention from the Centre.



## 7. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 27, 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I have received your undated letter about the scheme for the abolition of the zamindari system in Bihar. The new proposals<sup>2</sup> you have sent appear to me to be reasonable, but there are aspects of them which require a little careful examination. I hope to let you have a final answer fairly soon.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Bihar Government was contemplating an interim land reform scheme which included reclamation of waste lands, irrigation facilities, distribution of loans and improved seeds to cultivators.

## 8. Telegram to Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

Continuation my telegram 27th September regarding zamindari abolition scheme. We have no objection to the two proposals you have made to modify scheme, namely, (1) while retaining power to acquire all zamindaries, for the present you only acquire zamindaris yielding income of Rs. 5000/- and above.

(2) For these zamindaris compensation will be paid in non-negotiable non-transferrable bonds, redeemable in 40 equal annual instalments.

We would point out that the question whether such bonds would be valid compensation under Section 299 of Government of India Act is not free from difficulty. An eminent lawyer has given his opinion that they would be valid, but your own Advocate-General<sup>2</sup> has thought otherwise. If you are prepared to take the risks of being challenged in regard to this matter later, we have no objection provided no financial burden falls upon us.

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1948. J. N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Mahabir Prasad.

As regards mining clauses, Governor General having already given his assent to Mines and Minerals Bill passed by Parliament, it would be inconsistent for him to give assent to your provincial bill which contains provisions not in harmony with Central Act. We suggest therefore that either you should drop those provisions in your bill or amend them as suggested by us.

We are anxious to expedite this matter and we think that no further major difficulty remains. We are writing fully to you, but I hope your representatives will come here on October 6th as arranged, in order to finalise this matter. .





## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## VIII. Personal Laws





## 1. Special Marriage Act<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister pointed out that what was required was not piecemeal amendments of the Special Marriage Act,<sup>2</sup> but a new bill to replace the Special Marriage Act which should

- (a) throw open marriage by registration to every person without consideration of religion; and
- (b) permit every person who is already married under other valid forms of marriage to consider the marriage under the Special Marriage Act so as to avail of the benefits of the Act.

There was general agreement with this view.<sup>3</sup>

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting, 1 July 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. Special Marriage (Amendment) Bill was introduced by P.S. Deshmukh.
3. The Cabinet decided to request Deshmukh to withdraw his bill to enable the Government to replace the Special Marriage Act of 1872 as suggested by Nehru.

## 2. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22 July 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,  
Thank you for your letter<sup>2</sup> of the 21st July about the Hindu Code.<sup>3</sup> I do not exactly remember whether this matter was put up formally before the party or not. But I have a distinct recollection of repeated discussions about it in the course of the last year and a half.<sup>4</sup> Few contemplated pieces of legislation have been so thoroughly thrashed out and publicly discussed than this Bill. It has been considered by the Cabinet on more than one

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. Rajendra Prasad had written that a deputation of eight members of the Select Committee on the Hindu Code led by Bakshi Tek Chand told him that the proposed code introduced some very fundamental and far-reaching changes in the Hindu law which had been accepted by the vast majority of Hindus until then. It would not be proper to rush this Bill through the next session of the Assembly.
3. The Hindu Code Bill aimed at reforming the Hindu personal law relating to marriage, divorce, property, inheritance, adoption and guardianship.
4. Prasad wrote that the Bill had never been considered at a party meeting and was put up for second reading on the last day of the last session during the last hour and was referred to a Select Committee.



occasion. It has been considered by the Executive of the Party certainly. There is no doubt that a large section of orthodox opinion opposes it.<sup>5</sup> There is also no doubt that the so-called socially progressive Hindus are anxious and eager for it. The matter has been pending for a very long time and has been repeatedly postponed. At last an assurance was given that it would be introduced in the last session and taken up in the next. The Bill was introduced. To try to smother it now or postpone it would create some kind of a crisis and the reputation of the Congress would undoubtedly be affected.<sup>6</sup> As it is, it is being stated widely that the Congress is a reactionary and a very conservative body now, which dares not face any radical change. We are called not only socially reactionary but a police state which suppresses civil liberties and the like.<sup>7</sup> In this context if we push out this bill, we shall not only confirm this growing conviction of our excessive conservatism in India but would also go down in the mind of foreigners outside India. I confess I do not see how in these circumstances we can go back on what we have done after much argument and debate and not proceed with the Bill.

Apart from these considerations, the question is one of merit. The Cabinet has declared itself in favour of it twice at least.<sup>8</sup> Personally I am entirely in favour of the general principles embodied in it. Are we therefore to give up something that we consider right and on which so much labour has been spent, because some people object?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Rajendra Prasad felt that a measure of such import about which there was difference of opinion, need not be passed by the Constituent Assembly sitting as a legislature which was a make-shift arrangement to avoid elections. He wrote that the Committee recorded a good deal of evidence, overwhelmingly against the proposals of the Bill and the matter was never placed before the electorate. He said that he was not aware of any propaganda to convert the bulk of the people in favour of the Bill.
6. He suggested that this subject might form one of the items of Congress election manifesto and the electorate should be consulted at the next election before it was placed before the Legislature.
7. Rajendra Prasad replied on 24 July 1948 that the question of civil liberties stood on altogether different footing. He thought that most of the "so-called 'conservatives' are more concerned about it than the so-called 'progressives'."
8. Rajendra Prasad replied that he did not know "when and where we made a promise or gave an assurance about the Bill. If any assurance was given to the Constituent Assembly by the Government, the objection to the competence of these bodies to take up this matter at this time and during this session without any reference to the electorate and the country remains"

3. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

27 July 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have just received your letter of the 24th July about the Hindu Code. I really do not know what I can do in the matter. The Bill is before the Assembly and it is for the Assembly to consider it and decide this way or that way. It is not being hurriedly put before the Assembly. The Cabinet has considered it on at least two if not more occasions and you yourself say, the matter is one on which there is deep feeling. It is for this reason that this has been kept pending for a long time and references have been made to all public bodies interested in it. It has been discussed in the press.<sup>2</sup>

It is perfectly true that the A.I.C.C. or the Working Committee have not considered it. Nor is it in the election manifesto.<sup>3</sup> Normally such matters of legislation have not been considered by the Working Committee or the A.I.C.C. Considering that this question has been before the country for the last two or three years, if members of the A.I.C.C. or the Working Committee wished to consider them, they could have certainly done so. This applies to the party too, which has been watching every stage of this legislation, and yet did not consider it worthwhile to discuss it at a formal party meeting when any member could have brought it forward. The matter will no doubt come up before the party in some form or other. On previous occasions when similar matters came up before the party, the general rule followed was that there should be no party mandate and members should be free to speak or vote as they liked. It is for the party to decide what they will do in this matter.<sup>4</sup> At this stage even the Cabinet cannot thus go back on its decision unless the party so directs them.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that he was not aware that the Bill, containing very fundamental changes, had been subjected to any critical examination by the public at large on any extensive scale.
3. He said that he did not know if the Congress, the A.I.C.C. or the Working Committee had ever given any thought to this and it had certainly never been included in the election manifesto. He thought that the Constituent Assembly was hardly a body to take up this fundamental legislation for the simple reason that it had not been convened to deal with personal law of any community.
4. He urged Nehru not to allow a major crisis to be created in the party and in the country on a matter 'which cannot on its merit claim the priority that belongs to so many other things which we have not been able to take up.'
5. At the party meeting on 26 August, it was decided to consider the Bill as reported by the Select Committee in the current session of Parliament. On 31 August Parliament postponed further consideration of the Bill till the budget session.





## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## IX. Linguistic Provinces





1. To M.S. Aney<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

3 July 1948

My dear Mr. Aney,

I have received your letter of June 21st which you say you have written as a citizen of C.P. and Berar. I entirely agree with you about the undesirability of taking up the question of new provinces at this critical stage. But there has been such tremendous agitation for this, more specially in the Andhra<sup>2</sup> and Karnataka<sup>3</sup> provinces, that it became impossible to do nothing about it. For the present, as you know, the President of the Constituent Assembly has appointed a commission<sup>4</sup> on the broad issue only. It is quite open to that commission to suggest that whatever the merits of the case. The present is no time to take any effective steps.

I am sending your letter to the President of the Constituent Assembly. The question of Hyderabad cannot obviously be mixed up with the formation of Andhra and Karnataka at the present moment. Ultimately no doubt that question will have to be faced from the linguistic point of view.

I do not see any justification for taking any hasty action in regard to the formation of new provinces but you should not attach much importance to the reactions in regard to this.

I might mention that the commission is not being appointed by the Government of India but by the President of the Constituent Assembly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS.

2. M.R. Apparao, the President of the Andhra Mahasabha, demanded on 5 August in a memorandum to Linguistic Provinces Commission, formation of a separate Andhra province consisting of Telugu-speaking areas of Madras, Orissa, the Central Provinces, Telangana and Mysore State.

3. The agitation for a Karnataka province consisting of Kannada-speaking areas of the provinces of Bombay, Madras and States of Mysore, Hyderabad and Coorg had been going on since 1920. The Youth Conference held in 1948 also demanded the unification.

4. A commission headed by S.K. Dar with Panna Lal and Jagat Narayan Lal as members and B.C. Banerji as secretary was appointed on 16 June 1948 to report on formation of linguistic provinces. The report, submitted in December 1948, said that the re-organisation of states along linguistic lines was not in the larger interests of the country at that time.



## 2. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd September 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,

There has been a growing feeling among many people that I have met both here and in Bombay, and including a large number of members of the Constituent Assembly, that the question of creation of new linguistic provinces is likely to give us a lot of trouble if persisted in the near future. I entirely agree with this. But I do not quite know what to do about it. The Enquiry Commission you appointed, to my surprise is functioning in public and thereby encouraging an atmosphere of argument and passion. I had hoped that the commission would not hold public sessions. Is it possible to do anything in this matter now?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

## 3. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
24th September 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 8th September.<sup>2</sup>

I did not like at all the memorandum issued by some West Bengal representatives in the Dominion Parliament to which you refer. Ever since this, much has happened, including the Hyderabad affair. For my part I am laying the greatest stress on all linguistic provinces and provincial boundary questions being completely postponed. I think it will be best for you also to remain quiescent on these issues instead of entering into an argument with the West Bengal people.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(98)/38-PMS.
2. The West Bengal Government had submitted a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly claiming some 16,000 square miles Bengali-speaking areas of Bihar. S.K. Sinha was particularly surprised to see among the signatories the names of two Central ministers, S.P. Mookerjee and K.C. Neogy, as the Central Government did not want to raise the boundary question at that time.

**4. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
September 27, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have received a copy of a letter dated 24th September, which you have sent to Vallabhbbhai Patel. With this you have sent a circular<sup>2</sup> issued by D.I.G., S.R. Ranchi.<sup>3</sup>

I agree with you that this circular is undesirable. But at the same time I would point out that the activities in West Bengal and even outside of a number of Bengalis in regard to the demand for the transfer of certain areas from Bihar to Bengal, are creating a great deal of ferment in Bihar. I have received a number of letters from the Bihar Premier protesting against these activities and pointing out that they are leading to a most difficult situation. He asked me if he and his colleagues could indulge in a counter-agitation. I told him that they must not do so.<sup>4</sup>

I am perfectly clear in my mind that to raise any question of provincial redistribution at this stage is inopportune and harmful. I am equally clear that any question of a part of Bihar going to Bengal cannot be considered in the present context. We have first to stabilise ourselves completely and solve many more important problems. An agitation, therefore, for this, not only serves no useful purpose but merely excites people and makes any future solution more difficult.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 7(67)/48-PMS.
2. The circular asked the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad, to report on the activities of those promoting an agitation for the transfer of Bengali-speaking areas of Bihar to Bengal.
3. R.R. Prasad.
4. See preceding item.

**5. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
September 27, 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

I enclose a copy of a circular which has been sent to me by the Premier, West Bengal.

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS.

He takes strong exception to this circular and I must say that I agree with him in considering this circular most undesirable.

I entirely agree with you when you say that there should be no question at present, and certainly no agitation, for any changes in provincial boundaries. I am pressing this on the West Bengal Government and I think there has been a change recently. A circular of the kind enclosed is bound to be resented and create bitterness.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
29 September 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of 29th September.<sup>2</sup>

I should not attach any importance whatever to what M.N. Roy or his groups say.

But I agree with you that this tendency in our provinces is very bad.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS.

2. In the context of formation of provinces on linguistic basis Rajagopalachari wrote that M.N. Roy's party advocated referendum and plebiscite for resolving every dispute between provinces and that some provinces thought that they were separate nations.



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## X. The Language Question



## 1. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

18 July 1948

My dear Sri Babu,

Your letter of the 11th July about the translation of technical and legal terms into Hindi.<sup>2</sup> I quite agree with you that there should be uniformity in this matter. But I just do not see how this can be brought about at present. In any event I think it is better to try to do it non-officially or semi-officially, as Rajendra Babu is to some extent doing. I am myself greatly alarmed at the kind of translations that are being made which are completely incomprehensible to me. I believe fully in Hindustani being developed as Gandhiji desired and not Sanskritised Hindi. Personally I think that common technical and legal terms in English which have become current in Hindi should continue to be used.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 33(26)/48-PMS.
2. He suggested that a central committee be set up to coordinate the activities of various provincial committees to work on the translation of technical and legal terms from English into Hindi.

## 2. Hindustani as the National Language<sup>1</sup>

I am happy to be participating in this function of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha. When the subject was broached in Delhi, I had agreed gladly to take part in this function. I wish to put before you a few thoughts of mine. There is no doubt about my views on the importance of the propagation of Hindi. But there is a great deal of confusion about this. I feel it is essential for Hindustani to be the national language and even if that were not so, I would consider it my duty to continue the work which was started by our beloved Bapu. But there are all sorts of arguments these days. You will know better, but I have heard it being said that Hindustani is being im-

1. Speech while declaring open the new office premises of Dakshina Bharat Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Madras, 26 July 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi).



sed on them and that it is being set up above the regional languages. People seem to feel that there is some deception behind all this. One thing is quite obvious and that is that the south Indian languages are naturally predominant in this region and they will be given importance. There can be no rivalry between Hindi and Tamil and Telugu. Whether anyone believes it or not, the languages of this area are Tamil and Telugu. How can there be any question of Hindustani competing with them? Tamil is a very ancient language and I feel sad that I do not know it. Tamil is a very beautiful and ancient language with a very rich literature. Where is the question of Hindustani competing with Tamil or usurping its place? That feeling should be banished forthwith. The languages of this region—Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam—will continue as before. Then why is Hindustani necessary? It is obvious that the necessity arises because we need one language to foster a sense of unity among our countrymen and for transaction of the country's work. To some extent, English has played that role so far and it will continue to do so for some more time. I do not think English will disappear from this country, nor do I think it is necessary for it to go. We must take whatever advantage we can of something which has been here for more than a hundred years.

There is no harm in knowing English or for that matter any art or skill. Whether we use English in India or not, we do need it for our dealings with the rest of the world. So we must learn English and not only English but other great foreign languages like French, German, Russian, Spanish, Italian, etc., and Chinese, Persian and Japanese also. These are some of the great foreign languages and English is the most important among them. But it seems impossible to me that English can continue to be used by the millions in this country in future. The number of English-knowing people, especially who know it well, will gradually decrease. When we start using the regional languages more, we will need one language to conduct the inter-state work, and if you think about it, there is no other option except to adopt Hindustani for that purpose. English may also be used for a while, and I have certainly no objection. But if you want to involve the common people in the work of the nation, then there is no other option except to adopt Hindustani. There is no question of Hindustani competing with any regional language. It can only be a sister language and function alongside the other languages.

In this connection, the question that arises is, what is Hindustani? As you know, a controversy arose about Hindi-Urdu, Hindustani, etc. It has been a long drawn-out controversy. You heard just now that the goal of this Sabha is to propagate a simple Hindi or simple Urdu or Hindustani. Mahatma Gandhi had laid stress on the importance of doing this till his dying day. And, I feel that, as in everything that he did, in this also Mahatma Gandhi showed great foresight, because he always thought of every

issue, not from the point of view of the present alone, bearing in mind the future also. It was a very fundamental issue that he raised that Hindustani should be a mixture of simple Hindi and Urdu. If you were to go to my State and have an ordinary conversation with someone in the market place or in the street, you would wonder whether it is Hindi or Urdu which is being spoken because the two merge together in their simplicity. The controversy arises only with people who keep dabbling in literature or journalism. When such people get together and hold conferences of writers, then such high-flown language is spoken that no ordinary man can understand it. Whether there is a conference on Hindi literature or Urdu, people talk from such a high plane and use such difficult language that it goes above the heads of the common people. Now this is really wrong because it creates a gulf between you and the common man.

I feel very sad that the creation of Pakistan, which has caused all of us great grief, has had several evil consequences. One of them is that people in my State and Delhi and other provinces who were earlier in favour of simple Hindustani have turned completely against the inclusion of simple Urdu words in it, and because of their hatred of Pakistan, they are now bent upon introducing a difficult form of Hindi. I find this rather regrettable. It is happening in my own province which pains me because I think it is wrong and it is something which leads us away from the path shown by Mahatma Gandhi. I am convinced that we would have to reverse the trend some time, but, in the meantime, it will result in weakening our country and breaking it into pieces. Those who advocate this path look at it from one narrow angle and fail to perceive the consequences that might follow. Therefore, I dislike what is happening in our States even within those States where we have Congress governments in U.P., Bihar and elsewhere.

I will continue to express my disapproval, and if my colleagues do not agree, I cannot help it. When the matter comes up before the Constituent Assembly, I shall express my views strongly because I feel that what Mahatmaji did was right and to deviate from it could only do harm to our country and our literature.

So, difficulties arise when we try to create a Hindustani literature. There is no difficulty about evolving a simple language. But nowadays literature is sought to be created in a particular framework, whether it is Hindi or Urdu, and so it grows in a manner which isolates it from the common people. It is difficult to lay down any policy about it. It will have to evolve gradually. The people will say that we are trying to create something artificially. If the new language has its roots in the language of the masses, it can very soon become a flourishing plant with new shoots. If you impose a court language from above, it will be useless. I would say that so far neither Urdu nor Hindi literature has had any contact with the masses. They are both languages of the court, of an intellectual elite, which very few peo-



ple can understand. When any literature confines itself to the courts, it cannot become strong, especially in today's world when the people are down-trodden. It, therefore, becomes extremely important to evolve a language of the masses though our writers and literary critics may feel that the language is rustic and not sophisticated enough for the intellectuals. But if you take any great language in the world today—take English, for instance, which is a very great language—what makes those languages so strong ? They are strong because they do not close their doors to outside influence—they borrow new words from other languages. You may know that every year five thousand words are added to the English language. Now, some of them are coined but others are taken from other languages. Hundreds or perhaps a few thousand Hindustani words have crept into the English language. They have no fear of introducing words from other languages. We too must do this. We should borrow words from the English language which are in common use here like rail, station, etc. I see that in Maharashtra and elsewhere, long Sanskrit words are being coined for ordinary things of daily use and no one can understand them. But they are being coined in order to avoid the use of English or simple Urdu words. This is absolutely wrong.

I feel that the work being done by the Hindi Prachar Sabha here is of a fundamental nature and is extremely useful in every way for our literature, and for the unity and the strength of our country. I am very grateful to you for giving me an opportunity of coming here today. It is amazing how far we can go if people do something whole-heartedly. Your progress in regard to propagation of Hindi during the last few years has been very striking indeed. There is no doubt that this good work will continue and go very far when it is in such capable hands. Even so, I hope that this work which is being done here will progress more rapidly because it is essentially a task of national importance. *Jai Hind*.

### 3. To M.A.K. Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 2nd August 1948

My dear Maulana,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 23rd July.<sup>2</sup>

1. File No. 33(26)/48-PMS.
2. Maulana Azad had written that the Bengali-speaking children in primary schools in Manbhum district of Bihar and the Urdu-speaking children in U.P. were being imparted education in Hindi only. He suggested that all provincial governments be urged to impart education upto the sixth standard in the the mother language of the children and Hindi be taught to them from the seventh standard onwards.



I entirely agree with what you have written and I think the circular may well be sent to provincial governments. I feel, however, that the practical application of it will be difficult if you put down the number of children demanding a certain language at 25. I think this number is too small and great difficulties will be created. For the present, I suggest that no numbers should be mentioned in your circular. Let the principle be accepted and then the number can be considered. I would, therefore, suggest that the sentence in your draft within brackets might be omitted or altered so as not to mention the number.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

XI. a. Armed Services

XI. b. The I.N.A.





## XI. a. ARMED SERVICES

1. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17 July 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I have been somewhat distressed by the news that the Maharaja of Patiala has made grants of land to certain of our officers. I understand that in one case the grant is of about 2,000 acres. It seems to me that this grant and acceptance are both highly objectionable. I rather doubt if they are not contraventions of the rules governing our Defence Services. But apart from rules, and on public grounds alone, any such grant should neither be made nor accepted. I think it was improper for the Maharaja of Patiala to make the grant and for any of our officers to accept it. What adds to the impropriety is the fact that the land is evacuee land. And further that the grant is a big one. The fact that the grantees may themselves have lost property in West Punjab is no reason whatever why they should be shown this particular favour. The fact that 2,000 acres is given to a single individual is also against the general rules we seek to enforce. Further, the impact of a ruler of a State on our Defence Services in this way is bad, from every point of view. Therefore these grants are wrong in principle and practice. This matter requires your serious consideration and some action will have to be taken about them. I suggest that you should get in touch both with the Maharaja of Patiala and the officers concerned. If you like I am prepared to do so also.

You will remember that I wrote to you many months ago about some Sikh officers attending political gatherings in Patiala and elsewhere. You agreed with me, I think then, that this was undesirable. Further information has come to me that this tendency is on the increase and communal gatherings of officers have taken place, discussing their interests or other subjects from communal point of view. This kind of development should be dealt with firmly and without loss of time. Our Army will go to pieces if we permit this kind of thing.

I regret to learn also that there has been some trouble in the R.I.A.F. All this indicates an extraordinary lack of discipline and no army can carry on if indiscipline is permitted.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 4th August 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

Your letter of the 3rd August. I agree with much that you say and indeed the time has come for vital decisions. We have been in constant touch with the U.K. Government through our High Commissioner in London over this matter. It is as a result of this that you will have noticed the latest Reuters' message in the papers. Obviously this kind of thing cannot go on. It is open to us today to take any step we like against Pakistan, whether it is stopping of all stores being sent, or break of diplomatic relations, or war itself. The only question is what is more advantageous to us and when we should do it.

For the present we have put this position squarely before the U.K. Government and called upon them to withdraw British officers from Pakistan. This of course entails a possible withdrawal of British officers from India.<sup>2</sup> We have not mentioned this but we have to bear this in mind.

We have formally called upon the Pakistan Government to confirm or deny the news in the *Civil and Military Gazette* and to withdraw their troops immediately from Kashmir State. We have now to await the U.K. Government's reaction in the matter as well as to some extent the reaction of the U.N. Commission. Any false step on our part might injure us.

As regards General Bucher's letter to you, I agree with him that the article in *Blitz* is vicious and highly improper.<sup>3</sup> I am concerned that our top secret matters should reach *Blitz* in this way.

The *Blitz* story is greatly exaggerated and distorted. I have a vague recollection of something about Cunningham's letter having been mentioned some time. At that time the position was different and hence probably much attention was not paid to that letter. It was only much later that the Pakistan's formal denial made the position different. I do not myself think that General Lockhart deliberately suppressed any information from us. Certainly Bucher mentioned this matter quite clearly to Patel and Chanda some two months ago or more.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Under the Indianisation plan the army commands upto the post of Lieut-Colonel had come to be held by Indians. However, 200 to 300 British officers, were retained as advisers and instructors in certain technical units of the army.

3. The article published on 31 July 1948 in *Blitz* accused high British officers of complicity in Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir and referred to a letter from the Governor of the N.W.F.P. to Gen. Lockhart informing him about the tribal invasion of Kashmir one day before the invasion.



I do not quite know what we can do to *Blitz*, but something should be done. It is unfair to allow such articles to be published defaming the British officers and servants. I should like you to consider this matter. One thing that we can do of course is to send for the *Blitz*'s correspondent here and tell him that the story is greatly distorted. We may ask the Bombay Government to do something of this kind at the other end with the *Blitz* editor.

But what are we to do about this leakage of top-secret matters. I should like a list of persons who attended the meeting in my room where this matter was mentioned; also a list of those who attended at the U.N. Commission when our officers were present. The person who let out the story must have been present at both these meetings.

Please let me know what you propose to do about this.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 5, 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,  
I have your letter of the 5th August.

I quite realise that the withdrawal of British officers from the Indian Armed Forces would be unfortunate at the present moment and would result in deterioration in our standards. I do not want that to happen as far as I can help it. But it is difficult, I think, to avoid that happening if the U.K. Government decide to withdraw their officers from Pakistan.

About the *Blitz* article, I am issuing a secret letter to the persons who were present at the two meetings, whose names you have mentioned in your letter. I enclose a copy of this for your information.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Not printed.

#### 4. To R. S. Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 18, 1948

My dear Shuklaji,

In your letter of July 11th, paragraph 10, you suggest the formation of provincial units in the regular Indian Army. I am sorry for the delay in answering this. I referred the matter to the Defence Ministry before answering you. The Defence Ministry's reply, with which I entirely agree, is that such a practice would be opposed to the policy of Government and would disturb the present organisation of the Army. It would be wholly inadvisable under present conditions. The policy of Government has been to endeavour to maintain a homogeneous Indian Army. Recruitment is on a zonal, and not a provincial basis. Many of the men from the C.P. are being recruited into the regular armed forces, militia, and will later be recruited into the territorial army. To give provincial names to Army units would be to come in the way slightly of a homogeneous Indian Army which thinks in terms of India rather than in terms of a province. Any other policy would rather encourage a provincial spirit which is unfortunately so strong today.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Ministry of Defence.

#### 5. To Akbar Hydari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 26, 1948

My dear Hydari,

Thank you for your letter of 19th August. We shall consider all that you have written and consult the Defence Ministry about it also. Meanwhile, I entirely approve of your continuing recruitment to the Assam Rifles as mentioned by you. There is no doubt that the situation all over India is a grave one and we may have to face a crisis at any time and we can take no risks. Assam, by virtue of its somewhat isolated position, will have to look after itself.

Apart from the military position, there is also the question of preparing, in regard to supplies etc., in the event of a break in relations between India

1. J.N. Collection.



and Pakistan. This breach need not lead to war necessarily, but it will obviously stop traffic of goods etc. I hope your Government will consider this matter and prepare for it in so far as is possible. Of course nothing should be said or done which frightens people or creates any kind of panic. But precautions should be taken quietly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. The Development of the Navy<sup>1</sup>

Officers and men of the Indian Navy,  
I have come here today specially to welcome you and this noble ship on which you serve on behalf of the Government of India. Today is rather a special day, not only from the point of view of the Indian Navy, but from a larger point of view of the defence services of India. And, therefore, in spite of my many preoccupations, we thought it necessary and desirable that I should make a journey to Bombay to meet you and to meet this cruiser *Delhi*.<sup>2</sup> This cruiser is a symbol to us of many things, it is a symbol of the gradual growth of our Navy. It is a symbol also of the cooperation of England and India in this task. You have brought her all the way from England. For many years and on many critical occasions, it did gallant service on the sea. It is young for us and yet it is old, and hardened with experience. It is right that you should have this mixture of the young and the old, so that you may train yourself up in the new India, but also the experience, the great naval experience, which you may derive from those who may help you and who come from England. So we welcome the senior British officers, who are helping us to build up our Indian Navy. So I come here, not only to welcome this ship as a sign of strength and dignity, but as a symbol of many things in the future.

It is a curious thing, that we, who have prided ourselves being men of peace and not as men of war, that we should take pride in these vessels of

1. Speech on board the H.M.I.S. *Delhi*, Bombay 15 September 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.
2. H.M.I.S. *Delhi*, 700 ton cruiser, was the first to be acquired by the Royal Indian Navy. As H.M.S. *Achilles* it had won a major naval victory in the battle of the River Plate in the Second World War. Modernised with the latest naval weapons and equipment like radar it had now joined the Indian Navy.



war and in warlike operations. It is a curious thing and yet it is not so curious, if you understand it aright, for we still remain, and I hope we shall always continue to remain in this country, men and women of peace and that our country will remain ever devoted to peaceful objects and peaceful pursuits. But unhappily in this world today, it is not merely enough to desire peace. One has to have the grit, determination and the strength to keep peace and sometimes to make others to keep the peace. So in this world any country that seeks freedom and independence must be strong enough to maintain it. We in India seek no dominion over others and seek no exploitation of others. We seek freedom for ourselves, freedom of opportunity, freedom of life, and we wish freedom to all others, to all other people, and all other countries. We wish to interfere with no one else, and we, of course, seek peace all over the world for war has come to mean destruction over large areas of the earth's surface and leaves problems, which are terrible to contemplate.

And yet peaceful as we are, and speaking as a man of peace, and a person devoted to the ideas of peace, I welcome this cruiser which is after all an emblem of war, but only an emblem of war, in order, I hope, to maintain the peace. But if, unfortunately our freedom or our independence is threatened in any way, then indeed, it becomes necessary and essential for all of us, each one of us, to defend that with all our might. When freedom is imperilled, when the nation's freedom is imperilled, then every individual's freedom is also imperilled, and every individual must think of that larger cause, that is the defence of the nation. So, if and when such a contingency arises, then indeed we have to battle for our freedom and to battle against any person and any country that interferes with it. Even so, when unfortunately, we are driven to such warlike courses, even then, I hope that every one of you will remember that our essential objective is peace and not war for war's sake. It is not dominion over others, but to maintain and retain our own freedom. Even if, unfortunately, we have to go to war, always remember that you have the good name and the dignity of your country in your keeping, and that you should do nothing that might tarnish that good name. For we are children of no mean country, but a great country with a mighty past. We have had our ups and downs. There are many things in the past which we are sorry for and we regret our many weaknesses, our failures, but in a long history of an ancient country, there is always much that is good as there is always much that is bad. So we are inheritors of great traditions and we are also inheritors of certain weaknesses which we have acquired over a period of time. Now building up this new country with its new-won freedom, we have to get rid of those weaknesses, those things that separate and divide us, and build up this great unity of India, keeping in mind the great traditions, which have kept this country going for thousands of years, and building new ones, and combine the

old traditions with the new that we can make and build upon. Now that is a very big thing. We talk of India. What is India? A big country, with many kinds of people; we differ in many ways, in language sometimes, and sometimes in customs, but always there is and there has been a tremendous bond that has held us together. That bond is greater today and must be greater than it has ever been in the past. For above all, we must remember that we owe service to India, as a whole, not to any part of it, not to any section of it, not to any group of it, but to India as a whole.

Today, we have to face many problems and there are many forces that tend to disrupt and weaken us, but all the more, therefore, we have to concentrate on this essential conception of the unity of India, and that is not merely a sentimental conception, but in the world of today, it is an essential conception because if you do not pay any heed to it, then, if any part of India weakens each group weakens and the next result would be that we cannot hold ourselves up against the possible adversary or face adversities. Therefore, think always of this country as a whole, think always of you, yourself as a tiny bit of this great country. For India means many things, but above all, it means the hundreds of millions of people who inhabit this country, and so you and I are tiny bits of India. India is not apart from us. It is our flesh, blood, and bones, and our thoughts and traditions, our urges and desires, all put together. So we are all little bits of India and what we do whether good or ill, means good or ill for India. Now that is a great privilege and a great responsibility. May you be worthy of that privilege and that responsibility. May you never fail in your duty to India.

You of the Navy, make friends with the seas. It is only right, for the sea is a great mother to this country as to many other countries. We have the high mountains in the north and we have these seas, washing the shores of India on both sides. Make friends of the sea as it serves us, for the sea has protected India in the past, and across sea waters, India in the past, has developed her trade and commerce, and people have gone, friends have come across this sea and enemies have also come across the sea. But if we are friends of the sea, and are not afraid of her, then, the sea is also friendly to us and if friends come, they are welcome, and if enemies come, we will face them bravely and drive them away. Therefore, we of India, if I may say so, have the great mountains in the north to protect us and the great seas from the west to the east to protect us, provided we prove worthy and do our task. It is in this belief that the R.I.N. is growing up and is going to be a powerful arm in the defence of India, for the service of India, and for up-holding India's dignity and honour, not only here, but wherever the ships of the R.I.N. may go flying proudly the flag of India—it is with this belief that I greet you again. *Jai Hind.*



## 7. To F.R.R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 21st September 1948

Dear Commander-in-Chief,

You know that it is the Government of India's general policy to encourage prohibition. In some provinces this has already been adopted. Our general directions to our ambassadors and other representatives abroad are not to serve alcoholic drinks at official functions though a certain latitude is allowed at small non-official functions.

I have no desire at this stage to interfere with the practice prevalent in the Defence Forces, but I have little doubt that this general policy will gradually have to be introduced in the Defence Forces also. I must confess to a feeling that our officers indulge far too frequently and far too much in alcoholic drinks. Quite apart from prohibition, this is not a thing to be encouraged, and I believe it is not encouraged in the armies of many countries. Any officer who so indulges in excessive alcohol can hardly be trusted with secrets. He is apt to be expansive and to say things which he ought not to say.

I do not quite know what should be done about this and would like your own advice in the matter, but I do feel that something should be done to check a habit which is neither good for the nation nor for the individual and is certainly not good for the Army.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2 (244)/48-PMS.
2. Roy Bucher replied on 22 September that alcoholic consumption was strictly rationed in the Army and suggested that officers' bills should be carefully scrutinized by commanding officers. He said that physical fitness and economy in expenditure were two very important factors necessitating such supervision.

## 8. To F.R.R. Bucher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22 September 1948

My dear Roy,

...About alcoholic consumption in the Army, I agree with you that there need be no enforcement of prohibition in messes etc. What I would suggest, however, is some kind of a hint or good advice sent to officers to try to reduce their consumption of alcohol. This is not for reasons of prohibition but for the reason you have mentioned that this is not encouraged in any

1. File No. 2(244)-/48-PMS. Extracts.



army and it does come in the way of efficient work and secrecy. There is far too much loose talk and alcohol no doubt adds to this.<sup>2</sup>

There is another consideration which might be borne in mind. Too much public consumption of alcohol is naturally not quite in keeping with the general temper of the public. So while there is no ban, a certain consideration might be shown to the public viewpoint in public.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. General Bucher wrote, "Indian officers and specially those of certain classes, who consume fairly large quantities of alcohol become prolix and garrulous in speech, whereas similarly addicted Scots and Irishmen resort to pugnacity, Germans to self-pity and Englishmen to gloom."

## 9. Appeal on Flag Day<sup>1</sup>

The Government of India have decided that on the 1st of October 1948, which will be called the "Flag Day", collections will be made all over India for the benefit of ex-servicemen and their families to assist them in resettlement and rehabilitation. A part of the fund so collected will be used for providing amenities for serving members of the Defence Forces.

Ever since the attainment of independence last year, a great burden has fallen on our Armed Forces. At a time when the reorganisation of these Armed Forces had not been completed, disturbances broke out in certain parts of the country, followed by the migration of millions of people from their homes. The task of organising this migration was a most difficult one and it had to be undertaken largely by our Defence Forces. Before this task was completed, our Army and Air Force had to be rushed to Kashmir to protect that beautiful country from the raiders who had attacked it. Ever since then a hard and bitter struggle has been carried on against organised and trained armies in the mountains and valley of Kashmir. Lately the operations in Hyderabad have exhibited the efficiency and discipline of our Defence Forces.

Like millions of our other countrymen, a great many members of our Defence Forces have also been uprooted from their homes and have lost everything that they possessed and cherished.

During this time of hard testing and trial, our Defence Forces have acquitted themselves well and have rightly earned the gratitude of their

1. Appeal for donations by Jawaharlal Nehru and Baldev Singh, New Delhi, 27 September 1948, *Hindusthan Standard*, 28 September 1948.

countrymen. They have to function as a force owing allegiance to India as a whole and not to any group or province. It is that unity of outlook, devotion to duty, loyalty to the motherland, discipline and efficiency, gallantry in the field, and restraint and generosity towards those opposed to them, that go to make a great Army and Air Force and Navy. It is in this spirit that we want our Defence Forces to function as true soldiers of India.

Government have frequently conveyed their appreciation and gratitude to the officers and men of the Defence Forces of India. In order to enable the public to express their appreciation in a more tangible form, Government have fixed this 1st of October as "Flag Day". Donations will be entirely voluntary. Government trust, however, that the people of India will give liberally for this worthy cause and thereby show their appreciation for the great work of our Defence Forces.

XI. b. THE I.N.A.

### 1. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13 July 1948

My dear Bidhan,

You know that we have been anxious to help ex-I.N.A. personnel to find employment. We have undertaken this responsibility as a Government and we hope that provincial governments will cooperate in this process. In Bombay, at my suggestion, a small committee was formed consisting of one local representative officer of the I.N.A., and I think two provincial government representatives. This committee was supposed to keep in touch with the employment situation in regard to the I.N.A. and to help them as far as possible.

May I suggest that some similar steps might be taken by the West Bengal Government also. The committee may consist of just two persons or three as you like, but one should be an I.N.A. representative. It will act as a kind of liaison between the Government and the people seeking employment.

I understand that there are some ex-I.M.S. doctors belonging to the I.N.A. in Bengal. Presumably, it should be easy to find employment for them in view of the great demand for doctors.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal


1. J.N. Collection.





LAYING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRO-CHEMICAL RESEARCH, KARAIKUDI, 25 JULY 1948





AT KARAIKUDI, 25 JULY 1948

## 2. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13 July 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

... I am writing to you now, however, about the general I.N.A. position in regard to employment. This has nothing special to do with General Mohan Singh.

You know that we have undertaken responsibility for finding employment for the ex-I.N.A. personnel, officers and men. A good number had been employed in East Punjab and elsewhere; many still remain. Possibly a number of them are unemployable. We have, therefore, to take out those who are employable and can be employed either in some semi-military or in civil capacity.

To help in this business the Bombay Government appointed a small committee of three persons, I think, consisting of one representative officer of the I.N.A. and two Government representatives. This committee was to keep in touch with the question of employment of I.N.A. people. I think it would be a good thing for your Government also to appoint a small committee of this kind. ...

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

## 3. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22 July 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 21 July about the I.N.A. budget.<sup>2</sup>

I rather like the idea of a sum being set aside in trust for assistance to the daughter<sup>3</sup> of Subhas Bose. Sarat Bose has refused to have anything to do with her. But do you think it is quite in accordance with the object of the collection for I.N.A. relief? In any event, it would be desirable to consult the I.N.A. Committee about it.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-1950*, Vol. 6, p. 475.
2. Patel wrote on 21 July that he was sending Rs. 50,000 for July-September period from the I.N.A. Relief Fund and the remainder after 1 October could be placed in trust for the daughter of Subhas Bose who was in Germany.
3. Anita Pfaff Bose.



I have no idea how much money you have left. I do not think that any large sum need be set aside for the daughter. Probably about Rs. 25,000 would do.

I would suggest that meanwhile some money, say, Rs. 1,000 be sent to the mother<sup>4</sup> for the daughter. This could easily be arranged through Nambiar,<sup>5</sup> who will be returning to Switzerland early next month and who knows the mother well. He could also supply us with further particulars about the mother and daughter.<sup>6</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

4. Emilie Schenkl.

5. A.C.N. Nambiar.

6. On 26 July 1948, Patel replied that assistance to Subhas Bose's daughter out of the I.N.A. funds was justified as Bose was C-in-C of the I.N.A. He thought there were ample funds and upto Rs. 1000/- could be set aside for her.

#### 4. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
24 September 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Your letter of 23 September about the I.N.A. Relief Fund.<sup>2</sup>

I really do not know what to suggest. I do not know how they are spending the money and what the state of the Fund is. I agree with you that the sooner we wind this Fund up the better. If you could ask some competent person to go into this matter of how they are using the funds and how many of the old I.N.A. are still at a loose end and deserving support, this report would help you in coming to a decision. It should not take much time to prepare this report. Meanwhile, if you like, you can give them some sum to tide over any present difficulty.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 477.

2. In his letter, Patel informed Nehru that he had received another request from the I.N.A. Inquiry and Relief Committee. Some cases of misappropriation of Fund and of large amounts of loans granted by the committee being still outstanding. Proposing that the Fund should be wound up he asked for Nehru's views.



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## XII. Science



## 1. The Department of Scientific Research<sup>1</sup>

The Department of Scientific Research<sup>2</sup> was formed from the point of view of future scientific development in the country and to give an identity and importance to scientific research. Matters connected with Atomic Energy involve dealings with other countries, and control of raw materials connected with atomic energy development and production is also essential and hence requires special attention in the hands of a separate department. Close liaison will, however, be maintained with the Ministry of Industry and Supply which is chiefly connected with industrial development in the country. The setting up of an Atomic Energy Commission to enforce the Atomic Energy Act is under Government's consideration, but the present Board of Research on Atomic Energy will also continue to function as an advisory body to the Government.

1. Remarks at the meeting of the governing body of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 17 July 1948. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. The Department of Scientific Research was set up on 1 June 1948 directly under the Prime Minister to give scientific advice to the Government, to organise research and to establish scientific liaison with other countries. Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar was appointed the Secretary of the Department.

## 2. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31st July, 1948

My dear Syama Prasad,

Thank you for your letter dated the 30th July about atomic research etc. I entirely agree with what you say, that is, that we should help deserving scientific workers in universities and other research institutions. It is essential that we should increase our scientific man-power and give it opportunities for good work.

I am sorry that we shall miss you at today's informal Cabinet meeting to discuss economic affairs. This discussion will, of course, go on for some time and I hope you will participate in them later on.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(60)/37-PMS.



### 3. Clearance for Scientific Instruments<sup>1</sup>

I am informed that a large stock of goods received from Germany, probably as reparations, has been lying in Bombay for a considerable time past and no action has been taken to dispose of it. This consists of, among other things, scientific instruments and the like. If these facts are true, it is unfortunate that these valuable instruments are lying there and deteriorating when they can be used by our laboratories, universities, etc.

2. Further I am told that no particular attempt has been made to find out whether they can be so used. Could you kindly let me know what the facts are?

3. In a matter of this kind it would be desirable to send an officer to Bombay to investigate on the spot, to report and possibly to bring the boxes containing the delicate instruments with him. There is danger of their being damaged if left to the tender mercies of the railways without personal supervision.

1. Note to the Ministry of Industry and Supply, 1 August 1948. File No. (44)7/48-PMS.

### 4. To M.N. Saha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

5th September 1948

My dear Saha,

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd September. I am sorry I missed seeing you during your last visit to Delhi.

I am in a difficulty about any grants at present because the whole financial and economic position is being closely analysed and considered. General orders have been issued that except for very special reasons, no further commitments should be made. This of course does not mean that work should be left half done. It does mean that during the next two or three weeks there will be some delay in considering any such matter.

Meanwhile, I am having this question fully considered.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(16)/56-PMS.

5. To Joseph B. Chifley<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th September 1948

My dear Prime Minister,<sup>2</sup>

I have received your letter 74/1/864, dated the 5th August, and wish to thank you for it. There has been some delay in answering it as I wished to make certain enquiries regarding the next session of the Indian Science Congress;<sup>3</sup> the timing of the Congress session would have an important bearing upon the possibility of a mission of scientists from India visiting Australia about the time mentioned by you.<sup>4</sup>

I have ascertained that the Indian Science Congress will meet in the first week of January 1949. It should, therefore, be possible for a group of selected scientists from this country to be in Australia in the second half of January or any time in February, depending upon your convenience. I think we shall be able to send half a dozen persons, each distinguished in his own field. As soon as you let me have a definite indication of the date when you would like the party to be there, I shall have the necessary arrangements put in train.

Meanwhile, I should like to assure you that the visit of your own scientists last year gave great pleasure to the conference in India<sup>5</sup> which derived much benefit from these contacts. I fully share your view that visits of this kind are of the greatest importance in cementing friendly relations between our two countries and you may rely upon me to cooperate in this respect to the utmost of our ability.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(105)/48-PMS.
2. Joseph Benedict Chifley (1885-1951); Minister for Defence, Australia; 1931-32; Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, 1942-45; Prime Minister, 1945-49; Leader of the Opposition, from December 1949 to 51.
3. The Indian Science Congress Association was founded in 1914 for the advancement of science in India and holds annual sessions. Nehru was at this time the President of the Association.
4. The scientists selected for a visit to Australia in 1949 were Dr. S. Krishna, Lt. Col. M.D. Ahuja, Dr. B.P. Pal, V.P. Sondhi and Dr. K.N. Mathur.
5. In 1947 a programme for international scientific cooperation had been initiated through invitations to eminent foreign scientists and representative scientific bodies. At the session of the Science Congress in January 1947 thirty foreign scientists representing Australia, Britain, Canada, France, China, and other countries were present.



## 6. To Pattom Thanu Pillai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

The 23rd September, 1948

My dear Thanu Pillai,

Please refer to your letter of the 10th September, 1948, regarding the agreement of the Travancore Government with the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom for the supply of monazite sands. Our State Ministry is writing to you on this subject formally. I am also writing as I am specially interested in this matter being in charge of the Department of Scientific Research.

In the changed political circumstances, it is necessary to arrive at a fresh agreement with the U.K. Government. The old agreement between the United Kingdom and Travancore has obviously lapsed for various reasons. It is a good thing that it has lapsed because some of the terms in it were not advantageous to Travancore.

We are writing to the U.K. High Commissioner on this subject and pointing out that the old agreement no longer holds, further expressing our desire for a new agreement on this subject. The new agreement would be on the one hand for the supply of monazite sands by Travancore, on the other hand for the erection of a processing factory in Travancore. We are pointing out that the estimated cost of this factory, given in the previous agreement, was very excessive. In fact we have offers from other countries for a similar plant at a much lower price. We suggest further to the U.K. Government that the price of the plant from the U.K. firm should be lowered accordingly.

Obviously, if we cannot get the plant at a reasonable price from the U.K. we should get it from other places. There is a choice of the size of the plant which we might require. A small pilot plant would cost about Rs. 6 lakhs. This would be just enough for our needs and for some small experiments. A better-sized plant would cost 20 to 30 lakhs, and a larger size plant would cost about Rs. 50 lakhs. The previous British estimate was for over Rs. 1 crore.

While we are prepared to enter into a fresh agreement with the U.K., in the event of our not buying their plant, the agreement will be one-sided. I see no reason why we should not supply them with some monazite even though we do not buy their plant. We have plenty of monazite, specially in the lower grades, and it will be a friendly gesture on our part to give them some of this. That will be a way of getting foreign exchange.

Two of the members of our Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha and Dr. Krishnan, are going to be in Europe next month. I am

1. File No. 7(70)/48-PMS.



asking Dr. Bhatnagar also to go there so that all three of them can examine these various plants in England and elsewhere and come to a quick decision. I am likely to be in England myself then and might be able to help. I am anxious from the point of view of both Travancore and the larger interests of Atomic Energy development in India that we should push through this scheme.

I think it will be in the interests of Travancore that the policy in regard to the development of atomic energy and the use of various materials connected with it, should be closely coordinated with that of the Indian Dominion. This will lead to speedy decisions. I suggest, therefore, that the Travancore Government might appoint some expert to represent them on our Atomic Energy Commission in so far as matters connected with the Travancore Government have to be considered. I think one expert will be enough. Our Commission at present consists of three expert scientists. If you want to add two experts I have no particular objection, but it would be undesirable to have any one there who is not a scientist with special knowledge of this problem. The Atomic Energy Commission will be given authority to deal with this matter fully for the whole of India, including Travancore. Of course the Commission will keep your Government fully informed and all matters of principle will naturally be decided by you in so far as they concern your Government.

I have mentioned above that the members of our Atomic Energy Commission will be in Europe next month to enquire into and examine various plants that might be put up in Travancore for processing. Should you consider it necessary to send an expert on behalf of your Government to Europe to cooperate with our Atomic Energy Commission, he will be welcome there. I do not myself consider this very necessary and it will be a needless expense, but that is for you to judge. If you desire to send any one, please inform Dr. Bhatnagar immediately. Also please authorise our Atomic Energy Commission to take necessary steps in this matter in England.

I enclose a copy of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948 as passed by the Dominion Parliament. This will give you the necessary information on the subject.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

**7. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
September 27, 1948

My dear Syama Prasad,

I had a visit today from the Secretary of the Czech Technical Mission in Delhi and he told me of the many projects that he had discussed with officers of your Ministry. In particular he mentioned the building up of a thermal power station, of a machine tool making factory, of chemical dye-stuffs, of boilers, and of a coal washing process. I was very glad to find that your Ministry is giving earnest thought to these important matters. Of course, we cannot take everything in hand simultaneously and certain priorities will have to be observed. But I hope that urgent attention will be paid by your Ministry to these various proposals which are of great importance in any scheme of India's development. We might fix upon one of these to go ahead with immediately. Probably the most important is the thermal power station. If I am of any help in expediting these matters please do not hesitate to call upon me.

The Secretary of the Czech Technical Mission expressed a desire to serve the Government of India directly, that is to say that we should engage him as a consulting engineer or in some other capacity. I find that he is a British subject. He has been long in India and knows a great deal about conditions in India. He strikes me as a very energetic and competent person. Why he wants to join the Government of India's service in preference to Czech service, I do not know. If we want him we should probably approach the Czech Government on the subject. I am myself inclined to think that he can be of very great use to us and it will be worthwhile therefore to engage him on some contract basis for a term.<sup>2</sup>

The kind of work he will do will be of interest not only to the Industry and Supply Ministry but also to the Works, Mines and Power Ministry as well as to the Department of Scientific Research. I am therefore sending copies of this letter to H.M.P. and the Department of Scientific Research.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17 (108)/48-PMS.

2. S.P. Mookerjee replied that he was in touch with Czech representatives. Offers had come from other countries for the same projects and final decision could be taken only after Nehru's return from the U.K. He would talk with the Secretary of the Czech Mission on how his services could be utilized by India.



## NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

## XIII. Art and Culture





# **1. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
9th August, 1948

My dear Syama Prasad,

You will remember that some time ago I spoke to you about the Indian Institute of Art in Industry and suggested that it was worthwhile continuing this. There has been a lot of wastage in this Institute. Nevertheless, it has turned out some remarkably fine work and it would be a pity to stop some thing which was working on new lines. Much of the old staff has gone and the new persons in it are eager to carry on in accordance with the directions of Government and in an economical way. I pointed this out to you and you told me then, so far as I remember, that you had decided to continue this Institute and to give it financial help.

Today Mrs. Nellie Sen Gupta came to see me about this matter. I have referred her to you.

I am enclosing a note she gave me on this Institute.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 5 (139)/48-PMS.
2. Not printed.

# **2. Telegram to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
1st September 1948

I am informed that important collections of Buddhist manuscripts from Gilgit are now in Research Department in Srinagar. In view of their historical importance it is desirable to have photostat copies made of them. For this purpose would like them to be brought to Delhi by air. Later they may be returned to Srinagar if needed there. Please let me know if you approve of this so that arrangements can be made.<sup>2</sup>

1. New Delhi, 24 August 1948. File No. 2(211)/48-PMS.
2. Sheikh Abdullah agreed on 23 August 1948 to send the Buddhist and other manuscripts to Delhi for repair and photostating, classification and preservation.

3. To A.K. Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th September 1948

My dear Maulana,

Regarding your query about the purchase of pictures,<sup>2</sup> I would suggest that those paintings which have actually been purchased or in regard to which commitments have been made, should certainly be finally purchased and paid for. Apart from these, fresh purchases should be stopped, unless for some very special or exceptional reasons. We should try our utmost to economise in fresh purchases in view of the economic situation. This is what my previous circular meant. If something very special comes up before us and there is a chance of our losing it, we should buy it for the nation. But where possible, the purchases should be postponed.

In regard to the paintings of the Hungarian lady<sup>3</sup> which are now hanging in Government House,<sup>4</sup> obviously these must be paid for. We have definitely purchased them and used them. Regarding the Shah Jehan picture,<sup>5</sup> if you have entered into any commitment, they should be purchased and paid for. Any fresh proposals for purchases should be very carefully examined.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Finance Ministry.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(47)/48-PMS.
2. Maulana Azad informed Nehru that the payment for certain paintings by Government of India against the current budget provision had been stopped because of Nehru's circular disallowing expenditure on new schemes, until the economic problems were settled finally. Azad felt that the circular could not be interpreted to include urgent payments against the current budget and requested Nehru to direct the Finance Ministry accordingly.
3. Sass Brunner (1889-1950); a Hungarian painter, came to India in 1930 with her daughter Elizabeth on invitation from Rabindranath Tagore; primarily a landscape painter; in India, engaged herself with effects of light, enormous skies, the Himalayas, trees, flowers, hills, ancient temples, the Ganges, folk life, village scenes and huge masses of people; well known paintings are Gandhi in Prayer, Mahatma in Meditation, Jain Tirthankars, Shiva, and a series on enlightenment of Buddha from early stages to Nirvana.
4. Painted in 1940, it was a series of seven paintings on a pilgrimage to Amarnath including the picture of the image inside the cave. Besides, there were two paintings of Mahatma Gandhi in Prayer.
5. One of the paintings was a Mughal miniature depicting Shah Jahan in the company of women musicians in a garden.



4. To A.K. Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
20th September 1948

My dear Maulana,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th September<sup>2</sup> about Dr. Charles Fabri.<sup>3</sup>

I was personally rather impressed by Fabri, both by conversation with him and by his qualifications and experience. But of course that does not mean much and undoubtedly the opinion of Dr. Wheeler,<sup>4</sup> Dr. Chakravarti<sup>5</sup> and Dr. Stella Kramrisch<sup>6</sup> is far more important. In view of their unanimous opinion it would be difficult to employ Fabri. I would not suggest to you to go against that opinion.

There is one matter, however, which might be considered by you and your archives. Our museums do not cater for the public at all. Somehow there is a big hiatus between the public and the museums. I do not know if you

1. File No. 2(237)/48-PMS.
2. Azad asked for Nehru's advice while informing him that all responsible officers in the Archaeological Department had an unfavourable opinion of Dr. Fabri.
3. Charles Louis Fabri (1899-1968); an authority on Indian Art; served in the Archeological Survey of India and Lahore Central Museum, 1934-49; art critic in *The Statesman*, 1950-68. Fabri had found it difficult to continue in his post at Lahore after partition as his wife's family who were Hindus, were refugees in India. He had applied to the Education Ministry for employment in India. Nehru wrote to Education Ministry on 14 July (not printed) that his qualifications were extraordinarily good and strongly recommended his case for the post of Inspector General or adviser to museums.
4. Sir Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler (1890-1976); Keeper and Secretary of London Museum, 1926-44; Director General, Archeology, Government of India, 1944-48; Professor of Archeology of the Roman Provinces, University of London, 1948-55; his books include *Prehistoric and Roman Wales*, (1925), *5000 Years of Pakistan*, (1950), *The Indus Civilization*, (1953), *Still Digging* (autobiography), (1955), *Early India and Pakistan*, (1959), *Civilizations of the Indus Valley and Beyond*, (1966).
5. Niranjan Prasad Chakravarti (1893-1956); Lecturer in Calcutta University, 1917-28; Government Epigraphist, 1934-40; Deputy Director General of Archeology, 1940-45; Joint Director General, 1945-48; Director General, 1948-50.
6. (b.1898); Professor of Indian Art, Calcutta University, 1923-50; Professor in the Art of South Asia, University of Pennsylvania, 1950-59; Lecturer on Indian Art, Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London, 1937-41; Professor of Indian Art, Institute of Fine Arts, New York University, since 1964; author of several books on Indian art.

have any persons in your department who have the flair to deal with and attract the public to the museums. The whole object of the museum is rather lost unless it is used for an educational purpose both for young people at school and college and for grown-ups. This has to be definitely aimed at and worked for, as in other countries. Have you got any plans to this end?

It was in this connection that I thought of Fabri and his gift of talk may be useful for this purpose. Again this is a suggestion only for you and your advisers. If you think there is anything in it, it might be worthwhile to ask Fabri when he comes here to present to you a plan or a scheme for the popularisation of museums. If that plan is attractive, he might be given a strictly temporary appointment to see how he can work that plan. The period should not exceed one year and might be six months. This would be an appointment out of the ordinary run. At the end of the time your Ministry can judge of it and his work. My point is that a fresh outlook and specially an outlook from the popular point of view is very necessary. Otherwise we function in academic ruts and do not get full value out of work or our museums. If Fabri can introduce this popular element in our museums, he would be doing a useful bit of work, even though from the point of view of high scholarship he might not be much good.

If you and your advisers think that even this suggestion is not suitable so far as Fabri is concerned, then the matter ends there and nothing more need be said about it. Fabri, when he comes here, could be told that we regret we cannot offer him anything.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To A.K. Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 21, 1948

My dear Maulana,

Humayun Kabir has written a letter to Mathai about Mrs. Sass Brunner's paintings which I brought from Naini Tal and which are now in Government House here. He says that, according to the valuation of some artists or art critics, all the eight pictures should not cost more than Rs. 4000/-.

I am no expert at this game and it is quite impossible for me to value any picture. But *prima facie* the valuation suggested by Mr. Chakravarty<sup>2</sup>

1. File No. 2(152)/48-PMS.
2. N.P. Chakravarti.



and Mr. Barada Ukil<sup>3</sup> rather surprises me. I have personally bought four pictures from Mrs. Sass Brunner. One of them is of Mahatma Gandhi and I have paid Rs. 3500/- for it. Three others are mountain scenes, less ambitious than the ones in Government House now. In all I paid Rs. 5000/- for these four pictures. The pictures in Government House are on a bigger scale and personally I think they are exceedingly good. Mahatma Gandhi at a prayer meeting appears to me to be a fascinating picture which grows upon one. To value it at Rs. 500/- seems to me very wide of the mark.

I might mention that it was with some slight difficulty that I got Mahatma Gandhi's picture from the Brunners.<sup>4</sup> There was another picture of Tagore which I wanted to acquire, but they refused to sell it. For my part I did not argue with them about the pictures I have bought and I thought they were worth the money I paid, which was Rs. 5000/-. I adopted more or less the same attitude about the other pictures which are in Government House. I just do not see how we can make an offer of Rs. 4000/- to the artist for these pictures now. Perhaps some slight reduction might have been suggested, but even that would have been a suggestion only in the circumstances. If it is not possible for the Government of India to acquire these pictures, I feel I am committed and I should buy them myself at the price stated.

I suggest, however, as a possible step to begin with that a letter might be sent from your Ministry to Mrs. Brunner asking her if it is possible for the prices of these pictures to be reduced in view of the fact that the experts and advisers of your Ministry have suggested a considerably lower price than the one asked. I would not mention the figure. You can await Mrs. Brunner's answer, but I am almost sure that she will not agree to sell them at any other figure. Even before a letter is sent to Mrs. Brunner, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu should be contacted because it was through her that this business was done. I am not quite sure if she has already paid for the pictures on our behalf.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. (1892-1967); a noted organizer of art exhibitions; Chairman of All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society, New Delhi, which he founded in 1929-30; founder and managing editor of *Roopa Lekha*, an art magazine in 1929-30; organised the first exhibition of Indian art in London and Paris in 1931; first secretary of Lalit Kala Akademi, 1954-60.
4. Sass Brunner and her daughter Elizabeth Brunner (b. 1910); visited Santiniketan with her mother, 1930-31; painted portraits of many world personalities including Nehru.
5. Azad replied on 23 September that he was asking the Ministry to arrange the payment of the bill.





## MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION





I. CABINET CHANGES AND COORDINATION

1. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

8 July 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 7th July about your meeting Ministers from time to time.

I shall be meeting you, I hope, pretty frequently but perhaps it is desirable to fix some time once a week for us to meet. This time may occasionally have to be varied because of my absence from Delhi or for some other reason. I suggest that Mondays at 10 o'clock in the morning might be provisionally fixed if that suits you.

As for the Deputy Prime Minister, his interviews with you will depend upon his state of health. Perhaps you could write to him and ask him what he suggests.

Yours,

Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. To B.R. Ambedkar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

17 July 1948

My dear Ambedkar,

Your letter of the 17th July.

The proposals you make deal with important changes in the present procedure. I have no doubt that they should be considered. But it would be better, I think, to deal with the whole matter of governmental organisation as a whole and not in a piecemeal way. That was why sometime back I had suggested that Gopalaswami Ayyangar should look into this question and present proposals for the Cabinet to consider. This matter was postponed because of Sardar Patel's absence.<sup>2</sup> It can be taken up now.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru had asked Gopalaswami Ayyangar to look into the question of administrative reorganisation of Government machinery.

I hardly think that the matter is of great urgency. If we have followed a procedure for a considerable time past, it can do no great harm to follow it for some little time longer. I remember that sometime back for some odd reason, perhaps because you were away, papers from your ministry were referred to me. In a mercy petition I took a different view from that of the Home Ministry. Such differences are bound to arise sometimes, but they can be adjusted.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 8, 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,  
Thank you for your letter of the 7th August.

This matter has come up before the Cabinet repeatedly and there has been considerable feeling about it. I have also consulted all the members of the Income-Tax Investigation Commission both from the legal and practical point of view. There appears to be a divergence of opinion even in regard to the law.

The present position is that the old withdrawal has itself been withdrawn and a new application for withdrawal has been put in, in accordance with the terms of the amended act, that is to say, it is for the Commission to decide whether they will permit withdrawal or not after examination of the papers. Presumably this gets over the legal and other difficulties and the burden is cast upon the Commission. I do not quite know what else we can do in the matter at this stage. This step was taken in consultation with the Governor General, the Deputy Prime Minister and myself as well as the members of the Commission.

The members of the Commission pointed out to me the great difficulties they would have to face in arriving at any conclusions and in any event this would take an enormous time. They even hinted that it would be far better if we could compound individual cases. I dislike this business of compounding, and yet I do not like this enquiry to proceed for years without producing results and meanwhile bottling up many other activities. I want to put this up before the Cabinet preferably informally at first.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



4. To R.K. Shanmukham Chetty<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16th August 1948

My dear Shanmukham Chetty,

Thank you for your letter of August 15th.<sup>2</sup> I appreciate what you have written.

The question of withdrawal of some cases from the Income-Tax Enquiry Commission has been repeatedly considered by the Cabinet and ultimately, as you pointed out, it has been decided that the consent of the Commission should be sought before any case is withdrawn. This is in conformity with the spirit and letter of the amending act, and I am quite sure that is the correct procedure to adopt. This decision was made in consultation with some of our colleagues and in full concurrence with them. At no time during these discussions about the propriety of the procedure to be adopted was there any question before me of your *bona fides* in the matter.

When, subsequently, another aspect of this matter was brought before me relating to certain dates concerning the Amendment Bill<sup>3</sup> and the withdrawal of the cases, I felt that an error had been committed, and that the Members of the Assembly might well raise an objection to this. I have gone into this matter very carefully now, and it seems to me clear that the decision to withdraw the cases was taken before the bill was introduced into the Assembly, though the actual order was passed subsequently. So far as I am concerned no question of doubting your *bona fides* arises in this matter; and indeed, it was hardly possible to bypass the provisions of the amending bill without the fact being known. I feel however that in the circumstances, when you had already sponsored the bill before the Cabinet, with the express provision that no withdrawal should take place without the consent of the Commission, and this bill was on the point of being introduced into the Assembly, there should have been no withdrawal without reference to the Commission. In view of the fact that mention was made

1. File No. 195-GG/47, President's Secretariat.

2. Shanmukham Chetty wrote on 15 August 1948 that though the order of withdrawal of the income-tax cases was issued on 13 March 1948 the actual withdrawal took place on 19 February which was prior to the introduction of the Amendment Bill on 1 March. So the decision to withdraw cases had no relation to passing of the bill by the Select Committee. But he agreed that it would have been better if the communication of the order of withdrawal had been kept in abeyance in view of the provisions of the Amending Bill.

3. The Income Tax Amendment Bill sought to authorise the Income Tax Enquiry Commission to ask any person to give information which it might consider relevant; to proceed with investigations notwithstanding obstructionist tactics by persons concerned; to appoint officials to inspect the account of any assessee; and to make the decisions of the Commission final and not open to revision by any court of law.



about the possibility of withdrawals in the Assembly debate, information about the steps already taken should have been placed before the Select Committee of the Assembly. I feel sure myself that this was an error of judgement, and you had not applied your mind to this matter. This error has naturally led many Members to think that the ignoring of the Assembly in regard to this particular matter was a discourtesy. If this aspect had struck you, you would no doubt have informed the Assembly, and referred the withdrawals to the Commission for their consent. It was unfortunate that you had not thought of this at the time, and thus a certain degree of misapprehension has arisen.

I have given deep thought to this matter. While there is no question in my mind of *bona fides* being challenged, I feel that an error of this type having been committed, it is right, as you yourself have done, that you should place your resignation in my hands. I think you have acted perfectly correctly. As you told me in the course of your talk, you feel yourself that this mistake should not have occurred and that it was essential for us to maintain the highest standards of public conduct in our work. I am sure that my colleagues in the Cabinet as well as the Members of the Assembly will appreciate the action you have taken.

I am accepting your resignation, but I do so with deep regret. During the year we have worked together in the Government of India, I have admired your ability and your application to the heavy and intricate work that you have had to face. We shall miss you in the Cabinet and in the Government. But though you will not be associated with us in the Government, I have no doubt that you will continue to apply your great abilities to the service of the Nation.

Pending such other arrangements as we might make, you might hand over charge of your portfolio to Neogy. I am informing him of this.

I think it will be desirable for a brief statement to be made in the House tomorrow,<sup>4</sup> so that the Members of the Assembly might be directly informed of the development that has taken place.

With all good wishes to you, I am,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Giving his reasons for resignation from the post of Finance Minister, Shanmukham Chetty said in the Assembly on 17 August 1948, that though the Prime Minister had no doubts about his *bona fides* he was resigning because "we must set the highest standards of integrity in public life". While absolving his advisers from all blame since the decision was his own, he justified his withdrawal of the income-tax cases because his understanding of the aim of the Amendment Bill was different. He had not known that the Amendment Bill had been already introduced in Parliament when he gave orders for withdrawal of cases.

## 5. On the Resignation of Shanmukham Chetty<sup>1</sup>

Sir, after the full and very frank statement<sup>2</sup> by my honourable friend and colleague, there is very little that I need say in this matter. In various ways this question has been before us and the Government for some time. Ultimately, in so far as those references to the Tribunal were concerned, we came to certain decisions, which the House knows and which were in full conformity with the Amending Act and the wishes of this House. So there is little that need be said about that particular matter. That is over.

But it was pointed out to me only a very few days ago—about four or five days ago—that many of these steps were taken at a time this House was actually considering, or the Select Committee was considering this amending bill and it seemed to me that no such step should have been taken without the knowledge and consent of the House or the Select Committee at that time. I have no doubt myself that there was no question of *mala fides* in the matter, apart from any other reason, if I may say so, because any attempt to take such step could not possibly be kept secret from the House for long. It had not come to the knowledge of the House, the Government and others. So I was convinced of that. But the question did arise in my mind that whether a thing was done carelessly or not it was an error, and a grave error, and an error of this kind is bound to create suspicion in the public mind, and an error of this kind is not a thing which normally should be passed over. Probably the same chain of thought occurred to my honourable friend and he wrote to me the letter that has already been published, offering his resignation. Normally speaking, I would have hesitated a great deal in accepting that resignation, partly because, firstly, I felt that what had happened was an error of judgment—however serious—nevertheless it was an error; secondly, because Government has profited a great deal by his ability and by his hard work in the very responsible office that he held; thirdly, that in this very session there are certain important measures which he was going to pilot. There is the nationalization of the Reserve Bank measure; there is the Banking Bill. These are highly important measures and it will not be easy for a newcomer to handle them. Nevertheless, in spite of all these consideration, it seemed to me that the very first consideration that I should have—and that I was sure this House would like me to

1. Statement in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) following the resignation of R.K. Shanmukham Chetty, 17 August 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates*, Vol. VI, Pt. II, 1948, pp. 357-60.

2. See item 4, fn. 4.



have—was that when any kind of a mistake or error of this kind was committed, we should accept the consequences of that error and try to remedy that in the way we have tried to do so.

We, this House, and even more so the Government live, and ought to live, in the full blaze of publicity. There should be nothing hidden. There are many secrets that the Government have to deal with, of course, and we shall have secrets of that kind, but otherwise our activities must be completely public, open to public questioning and open to public condemnation. No democratic system can function otherwise satisfactorily. Therefore, when anything occurs that is open to public criticism of this kind, we must frankly face the issue and not try to slur over it or gloss over it.

I should like to congratulate the honourable member on the way he has faced this issue, bravely and frankly, and accepted the fact that he had made a serious error at that time, and has in consequence offered his resignation. I replied to him in the terms which members of the House might have already read, and I have nothing more to add to those terms. It was not technically for me to accept his resignation, because appointments and acceptance of resignations are the business of the Governor General. But I recommended to the Governor General to accept his resignation and I have received from him in writing that he has accepted it.

Now, may I just add one or two words more. As I said in my letter of reply to Mr. Shanmukham Chetty I requested him to hand over charge for the present temporarily to my colleague, Mr. Neogy, the Minister for Commerce. Mr. Neogy, when I requested him to take over charge, was singularly reluctant to do so, partly of course, because he is heavily worked, and it was at my earnest request that he consented to carry on till more permanent arrangements could be made. I think, if I may say so with all respect, that this question, unfortunate as it is, and much as we regret its outcome, resulting in the resignation of a respected and valued colleague, may I say this incident reflects credit in the ultimate analysis on my colleague and on this House.



**6. To S. Varadachari<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
The 22nd September 1948

My dear Shri Varadachariar,<sup>2</sup>

I shall be glad if you could kindly let me know what the prospects are of your Commissions's work. When you last saw me you mentioned that this will be a long drawn out affair and may even take years. Obviously this delay would be harmful and yet you have to face a mass of material as well as a great deal of obstruction.

Would it be possible for your Commission to select a very few strong cases and proceed immediately with them so that, in so far as these cases are concerned, quick results might be obtained? This would have a good effect on the others too and perhaps all your other work might as a consequence be expedited. What I am a little troubled about is a feeling, rather prevalent among many people who are on our list for examination, that they can play about with this matter for a long time and thus prevent any results being achieved. Even two or three results would put an end to this feeling.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Ministry of Finance.
2. Chairman, Income Tax Investigation Commission.

**7. Coordination between Finance Ministry and other Ministries<sup>1</sup>**

There is a great deal of financial patronage and favour which is at the disposal of the Government in the various Ministries, and which is ultimately conferred upon various industrialists and businessmen in one form or another. For instance, there is the grant of contracts, orders placed for supplies and services, grant of import and export quotas and licences, the sale of goods through the Directorate of Disposal, etc. The grant of this patronage and favour should naturally be exercised with care so that, inso-

1. Note, 23 September 1948. File No. 37(26)/48-PMS.

far as possible, the right persons get it and, more especially, the wrong persons do not get it. Apart from the usual tests employed for this purpose, there is one particular aspect of it to which I should like to draw the particular attention of every Ministry and Department of Government.

The Revenue Division of the Finance Ministry is directly interested, from the point of view of public revenues, in the persons upon whom such patronage is conferred, and in the profits which they make therefrom. This is a most important governmental agency and it has at its disposal a great deal of information about businessmen, industrialists, etc., who pay, or sometimes succeed in evading payment of taxes. It is obviously desirable to take full advantage of this information before conferring any patronage or favour. It would be improper and inconsistent for patronage to be granted to any individual who has a black mark against him in the records of the Revenue Division.

I am told that at present there is hardly any coordination between the Revenue Division on the one hand, and those Ministries which incur heavy public expenditure or confer valuable patronage in other forms, on the other. I am told that the methods adopted in conferring Government patronage are such as place no difficulties at all in the way of those who seek to obtain such patronage, in a manner and sometimes by means deliberately calculated to avoid their ultimate tax liabilities on the profits accruing to them therefrom.

I am anxious that this lacuna should be filled and there should be full coordination, in this respect, between the various Ministries and the Revenue Division of the Finance Ministry. I suggest therefore that immediate instructions should be issued in every Ministry to ensure the achievement of the following objectives ;

- (1) that Government patronage should be extended only to honest tax payers and genuine newcomers into their particular line of trade, commerce, business or industry;
- (2) that forms of contract or licence, the terms and conditions of sale of Government goods, etc., should be such as will facilitate the assessment of the profits made out of such transactions by private individuals and concerns for the purpose of taxation;
- (3) that there should be adequate liaison arrangements with the Income Tax Department in order to ensure that :
  - (a) patronage is conferred only upon persons of the type indicated in (1) above; and



- (b) all relevant information concerning the grant of any such patronage is indicated in a suitable form soon afterwards to the Income-Tax Department.

I trust that early steps will be taken, in consultation with the Revenue Division, to give effect to the above suggestions. Unless this is done, the loss of revenue on the profits made out of Government contracts, orders, and other privileges will continue to be as great in future as apparently it has been in the past.

## 8. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 25, 1948

My dear Mohanlal,

As Gopalaswami Ayyangar has taken charge of the Railways and Transport portfolio, the Ministry without Portfolio has faded away. The work of this Ministry has to be allotted to others and much of it has gone to your Ministry. You will have received a note of mine to this effect.

2. You will now have to deal with many matters pertaining to Pakistan, inter-Dominion relations etc. These are all very ticklish matters. I have personally kept in touch with them throughout. Most of our communications to Pakistan go through External Affairs, but the chief responsibility for this has fallen on Gopalaswami Ayyangar. He has drafted the telegrams and he has often attended the conferences. Thus he knows all about it. I have, therefore, requested him to keep up his interest in this matter and to keep in touch with you insofar as these matters are concerned. I hope you will consult him whenever necessary. If there is an important inter-Dominion conference, I should like him to attend to it in addition to you.

3. Our present relations with Pakistan are rather peculiar. There are many points of dispute. But, as a result of Hyderabad, a new situation has arisen

1. File No. 2(19)/47-PMS.



which may well lead to greater cooperation. Of course, the big obstruction is Kashmir and we are certainly going to carry on in Kashmir. Leaving this aside, it is true that the atmosphere is much more favourable than it has ever been since the establishment of Pakistan. We should take advantage of this insofar as we can. Hence some of the telegrams I have sent to Liaquat Ali recently. I am likely to see Liaquat Ali in London and discuss some of these matters also.

4. Meanwhile, you have to deal with Pakistan here and I suggest that while we should be firm in regard to important matters, we should also be as cooperative as possible in regard to other matters and our general attitude should be a friendly one.

5. Difficult questions will no doubt arise and it is quite possible that we may take up a stiff line in regard to the supply of military stores or even civil commodities. But that can be considered apart from our general attitude.

6. In regard to another matter also, that is, our general treatment of Muslims in India, we have to take full advantage of the new situation that has arisen and deal with them as gently as possible. I think we can win them over to a large extent. Hardly anyone in India has any hope from Pakistan. They have to look on India and India alone and they want to fit in in the Indian structure. Let us make it as easy as possible for them to do so and for them to feel that they are full citizens of the Indian Union and that we shall stand by them if they are in trouble.

7. I know that there are somewhat different approaches to this problem, but I am dead clear in my mind as to what we should do and I would deeply regret that any step was taken which could be interpreted otherwise.

8. It was because of this that I took up a fairly strong attitude in regard to the Meos of Bharatpur and Alwar. That problem is not merely a local one but one of large significance for the future relations of Hindus and Muslims in India. It affects Kashmir also.

9. Again, there are the petty problems of Muslims and Burias. All these petty problems assume a significance in the larger context. We have it in our power. I think, today on account of the situation created by Hyderabad to liquidate to a large extent communal tension and antagonism in India. Every step should be viewed from this point of view.

10. During the past year Mridula Sarabhai has been working very hard in India and Pakistan. She has worked for the recovery of abducted women and for many other causes. In her enthusiasm or excitement she has sometimes made mistakes or gone a little far. But the work she has done has been of extreme value. I have the greatest regard for her capacity, energy and fearlessness. Her work has been connected to a large extent with inter-Dominion relations. She has thus had to deal with the Ministry without Portfolio, as well as the Ministry for Relief and Rehabilitation. Now that

the Ministry without Portfolio has ceased to be, most of her work will be concerned with the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation. I should like you to encourage her in every way and to make her feel that her work is appreciated not only by you but I should like the officers of your Ministry to function in this way also so that we can take full advantage of her work.

11. You used to come to me from time to time to discuss certain matters connected with your Ministry. I shall be going away to England on the 5th October for about three weeks. During my absence I should like you to confer with and consult Gopalaswami Ayyangar in regard to the matters you used to refer to me.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 9. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 25, 1948

My dear Gopalaswami,

I have already told you that it is my intention to appoint Santhanam as Minister of State to work in the Railways and Transport Ministry under you.<sup>2</sup> I am not quite sure how to describe this business of working in this Ministry under you, and therefore, I have requested you to supply me with the form of words. I am very glad that you will have his assistance in your Ministry as he is a hard and earnest worker and knows a good deal about Railways. This will also perhaps free you to some extent from routine work and give you time to devote to more important matters.

2. There are two other relatively small burdens that I wish to place upon you. As you know, I am going to London on the 5th October and I expect to be away for about three weeks. I should like you to deal with any important papers that may come in the External Affairs Ministry during my absence. I do not want you to give too much time to this business. A great deal of the U.N. and allied business will be dealt with by me directly from London or Paris, though references may occasionally be made here. If any

1. File No. 2(19)/47-PMS.

2. On 1 October 1948, K. Santhanam and Khurshed Lal took charges as the Minister of State for Railways and Transport and as the Deputy Minister for Communications respectively.



really important matter turns up here, it would presumably be referred to me. But there are a certain number of formal matters which have to be disposed of in the External Affairs Ministry. I shall be grateful if you could deal with them.

3. Another important function of the External Affairs Ministry has been dealings and correspondence with Pakistan. To a large extent this has been done by you. I should like you to continue taking interest in this.

4. There has been an exchange of very sweetly worded telegrams between Liaquat Ali and me recently. Mridula, who has been to Karachi recently, met Ghulam Mohammed and the latter pointed out to her that Liaquat Ali had made a friendly approach for an inter-Dominion conference and that it was up to us now to respond to it. He further suggested that a meeting of Prime Ministers might take place before I went to London. I am afraid that is impossible. As Liaquat Ali is likely to go to London also for the Premiers' Conference, it is quite possible that we may have talks there.

5. Here at this end I think we should continue our friendly approach and have an inter-Dominion conference also as soon as this can be arranged. Of course, the major issue is Kashmir and that cannot be dealt with at such a conference. I may talk to Liaquat Ali about it.

6. I am quite clear that in Kashmir we must push ahead in the military sense and I hope that before I go away definite directives will be issued and all our work expedited.

7. Unfortunately, there is a lack of cooperation between the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander. Some way out will have to be found for this. Perhaps it will be difficult to do so before I return from England. All we can do is to tone it down. I propose to have a talk separately with Bucher and Cariappa.

8. Another matter. According to your suggestions much of the inter-Dominion work that you have been doing has been transferred to Mohanlal Saksena. I feel, however, that some kind of supervision from you will still be necessary, partly because Mohanlal has not been in touch with these developments and partly because he may not always be a successful negotiator. I would, therefore, be very grateful if you could keep a general eye over this business and advise Mohanlal Saksena.

9. Mridula Sarabhai is rather upset at these recent changes. She is apt to get upset rather soon. At the same time she is a unique and excellent worker and we should take full advantage of her. She got on very well with you and has great faith in your judgment. She feels a little lost now that perhaps you may not deal with her problems. I would suggest that you might keep in touch with her and make her feel that you are still interested and can advise.

10. I enclose copy of a letter I am sending to Mohanlal Saksena.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



10. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 3, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am asking Gopalaswami Ayyangar to look after any urgent matter, requiring the attention of Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, during my absence. You are terribly over-worked as it is and so I do not wish to burden you with this additional task. In any event, as Deputy Prime Minister, your work will increase in my absence.

I do not expect much important work in External Affairs during these few weeks. So far as the United Nations are concerned, Bajpai and I will be there and we shall deal matters on the spot. So far as Pakistan matters are concerned, all Indo-Pakistan relations, Gopalaswami Ayyangar has already been requested by me to look after them. If any really important question arises, it might of course be referred to me.

I am glad you made a reference to Burma in your speech this evening,<sup>2</sup> I should like, however, for you to send me a note which would help me to send an answer to the Burmese Embassy.<sup>3</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Patel said, "the Indian Government had to guard against the effects of unrest prevailing in the neighbouring countries. There was disorder in Burma and the Government forces were fighting the insurgents ten miles from Rangoon".

3. Burmese Charge d'Affaires had, in a letter of 2 October 1948, expressed surprise at an earlier statement of Patel from *The Statesman* of 2 October that "In Burma, which attained freedom only a short while ago, there was no Government ten miles from Rangoon."

## II. GOVERNMENT HOUSES AND BUILDINGS

### 1. To Sushila Nayar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
5th July 1948

My dear Sushila,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th June that you sent to me prior to your departure. I am glad that you have gone at last and I am sure your visit to America will do you good and make you an even more efficient servant of the nation than you have been in the past—and that is saying a great deal. I think it is good for all of us to go abroad for a while and get wider perspectives. We all are apt to lose ourselves in the problems of the moment and of a particular place. Of course you know that you have my affection and that you can always count on such help as I can give you....

What you have written about Government House,<sup>2</sup> etc. is something to which we have given considerable thought. We do not want any pomp and splendour but a State has to keep up certain dignity as a State. It is not a question of any individuals. Apart from this, the kind of intensive work that one has to do requires certain facilities. It is all very well to say that we should live in simple huts but those simple huts are most complicated places for work and require a tremendous deal of organisation and even then work cannot be carried on efficiently. None of us of course can try to copy Bapu's methods of work. He was a class by himself but even Bapu had behind him a good deal of organisation which may not have been so obvious. Even he had to live in Birla House with the whole of the Birla apparatus behind that management. For my part I think it is far better that the State owns those houses than for any public person to rely on private generosity and management.

The whole atmosphere of Government House<sup>3</sup> has changed since Rajaji went there. It is simpler and much less expensive. He occupies only a part of it; the rest will be used for public purposes as well as Government guests. It is the man that makes a difference and not the building. If we

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Sushila Nayar wrote that people thought that Congress leaders "would set a standard of simplicity and live as the leaders of India's poverty-stricken masses should live. The Viceregal House and other similar buildings would be used as hospitals. I wish you were not going in to the C-in-C's house and Rajaji also did not go to live in the Government House... what a tremendous moral influence it would have on the whole country!"

3. Rashtrapati Bhavan.



put Rajaji elsewhere our expenditure would go up and there would be no proper arrangement for various State ceremonials which are considered essential by every State.

It is true that I am moving into the Commander-in-Chief's House.<sup>4</sup> I have agreed to this with very great reluctance not so much because of the objection that you have pointed out but for other objections including the one that this will be a great burden on me.

But looking at it objectively, I think it is a right decision. A Prime Minister has to have a number of foreign guests all the time, he is continually dealing with ambassadors and the like, he must have peace and quiet for his work and so on and so forth. The arrangements we are making are really far more economical than those that have existed thus far.

Of course what you have written to me has not offended me. You can always write as you feel without any fear of offence.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

4. Teen Murti House.

## 2. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
16th July 1948

My dear Gadgil,

Many thanks for your D.O.No. 2793-WIII/48 dated the 25th June, 1948.<sup>2</sup> I find that in a memorandum dated the 22nd April 1948, with which a note by the Foreign Secretary of his talk with the American Ambassador on the 17th April was forwarded to your Ministry, it was clearly indicated that the U.S. Embassy wanted the Bahawalpur House instead of the Bikaner House, and in addition desired to purchase what are known as the Taj buildings. It is possible that this information was not brought to your notice by the Ministry of Works, Mines and Power.

However, I am glad to learn that conversations regarding the sale of Bahawalpur House and the lease of the building known as the Taj to the

1. File No. 7(58)-PT./48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Gadgil wrote that even though he did not favour the transfer of Bikaner House to the American Embassy, at Nehru's request he agreed. He said he had not been officially informed that the Bikaner House deal fell through and it was from Nehru's letter that he came to know that the Americans wanted Bahawalpur House *in lieu* of Bikaner House and added that he had no objection to that transfer.

American Embassy are proceeding satisfactorily and hope that the matter will soon be satisfactorily settled.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 31, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Of course you can send the two letters, copies of which you have sent me.

I am told that I have to move to the new house day after tomorrow early morning, i.e., the 2nd August. I have had little to do with these arrangements. Padmaja and Indira have taken charge of the whole business. As Indira is going away to Lucknow on the 2nd morning for a few days, she wants me to shift over there before she goes.

Some time fairly soon I should like to go into this business of how this house should be run. I am rather worried about it and I feel that the application of Government House standards would needlessly send up expenses. Of course the house must be kept in good order, whether any guests come or not. Nobody can live in a house which is not kept in good order throughout. But this does not involve any heavy expenses in a properly run house. However, I hope you will allow me to go into this matter after I have installed myself there. The arrangements being made now may be considered provisional.

I am told that it is proposed to increase the salaries of some people who will be supposed to supervise this house. I am not quite clear why this should be necessary.

I am returning the two draft letters.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.



4. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 5th August 1948

My dear Kailas Nath,

You know that at the instance of the West Bengal Government we have given them Hastings House. Now there is a persistent demand from them to take Belvedere or part of it.<sup>2</sup> I have repeatedly written that we are not prepared to give any part of Belvedere for office or residential purposes to the West Bengal Government. We have reserved it for the Imperial Library.

I find from certain notes that you have written that floor space has been calculated and it has been shown that a great part of the building will not be needed by the Library. I am surprised at this approach. The Imperial Library is our principal all-India library. It has not been cared for in the past. We must build up a great national library and we have chosen Belvedere to be the home of it. This national library cannot be judged by what the Imperial Library is now but from the great libraries in other countries which not only collect vast numbers of books but also provide for study and research work, conferences, exhibitions and the like on a big scale. However big Belvedere might be it will not be big enough ultimately for the kind of library we envisage. We cannot possibly, therefore, agree to give up a part of Belvedere buildings or grounds, for office or residential purposes to the West Bengal Government. That would ruin our scheme completely from every point of view.

Then again if for some time we cannot use Belvedere fully as a library we have many other uses for it from the Central Government's point of view. There are many international offices coming to India associated with the United Nations, etc. Ultimately we shall have to provide them with big buildings but temporarily we might accommodate some one of them in Belvedere. I mention this, but we have no present intention of doing so because we attach importance to the library and its development as such and we do not want anything to come in its way. I might add that a good part of the India House Library might be coming to India. It is quite possible that we may have to house it in Belvedere.

Will you kindly make this perfectly clear to your Premier and Government? There is no point in raising this issue repeatedly when the Government of India have considered fully and come to decisions.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(197)/48-PMS.

2. An old beautiful mansion on 24 acres of land Belvedere was the winter residence of viceroys since 1912. B.C. Roy wanted a part of Belvedere for housing his record office.

**5. To Sushila Nayar<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
6th August, 1948

My dear Sushila,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd July which I have just received. I am passing on your comments to the people concerned.

I entirely agree with you that our embassies should be specimens of Indian culture but it takes a little time to do that in any embassy. And it is a little costly.

I am myself greatly distressed by arrests and imprisonments without trial. Most of these persons however who have been arrested thus have been released. We have to deal with a very critical situation and some people are bent on creating every kind of trouble and chaos.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

**6. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
6th August, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Some time before Mountbatten's departure the question of how to use Government House fully was repeatedly discussed with him and was mentioned in the Cabinet. A Committee was appointed consisting, among others of the Military Secretary<sup>2</sup> to the Governor General and my Principal Private Secretary, H.V.R. Iengar. This Committee made various proposals.

Among these proposals was that a good part of our Foreign Office might move into a wing of Government House. Our Foreign Office at the present moment is in desperate straits. We had hoped a year ago to spread out a little and take some of the rooms which then belonged to the Political Department. But the States Ministry has hung on to all those rooms and in

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Bimanesh Chatterjee (b. 1907); surgeon to the Governor of Bengal 1947; Military Secretary to the Governor of West Bengal, 1947-48; Military Secretary to the Governor General, 1948-50 and President, 1950-55; High Commissioner to Mauritius, 1955-58; author of *Thousand Days With Rajaji* (1973) and *The Presidential Predicament—Rajendra Prasad Remembered* (1974).



fact taken some more. Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry is itself growing and some of our officers have no room to sit or work properly. We have no proper reception rooms for ambassadors and others who are frequently coming here. The other day a counsellor of an embassy had to sit on a bench in the corridor because there was nowhere else for him to go to. All this is very unsatisfactory and is creating a bad impression among the foreign embassies.

Foreign offices as a rule are something entirely different from normal governmental offices. They deal with ambassadors and they keep up a certain state which is not necessary for other government offices. In London, Paris, and indeed in all big capitals, the Foreign Office has a very special building with reception rooms etc. Shanmukham Chetty recently visited Prague in Czechoslovakia and came to me to tell me of the fine Foreign Office there. He looked with great disapprobation on our offices here and said that we must do something better.

I suppose the right thing to do would be to construct a new building for the purpose but that just cannot be done for lack of material etc., and it would take time. Another alternative is to buy one of the Princes' houses which may perhaps be suitable. Even that will take some time before the various processes are gone through and it is fitted for our purpose. For the present we do not know if such a house will be available.

I came back therefore to the possibility of a wing of Government House, as suggested by Mountbatten and the Committee, being made available for this purpose. It would not be big enough to accommodate the entire Foreign Office establishment but the principal officers and their staff might be able to go there. This is of course subject to your convenience and the other uses that Government House might be put to. The main uses are, apart from the Governor General's personal establishment, guests and entertainment rooms. The guests to some extent can now be divided between Government House and the P.M.'s House.

There has been also some talk of an art gallery or exhibition in Government House. Such a gallery or exhibition would normally be accommodated in the public reception rooms and halls and would not interfere with other arrangements.

I shall be grateful if you could kindly let me know what you think of these proposals.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

7. To Tara Chand<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8th August 1948

My dear Tara Chand,

I have received a note of a meeting held in Calcutta at which you were present. This meeting discussed the use to be made of Belvedere.

I am surprised that such a meeting should have been held because the Government of India have made it perfectly clear that they will not give any part of the building and land to the West Bengal Government for any purpose whatsoever. I do not want Belvedere for the mere purpose of stacking books. We want to convert it into a fine central library<sup>2</sup> where large numbers of research students can work and where there would be all other amenities which a modern library gives. The place must not be judged as something just like the present Imperial Library. It is not merely a question of accommodation but something much more. Would you please, therefore, not commit yourself in any way about the West Bengal Government's proposal?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(197)/48-PMS.
2. Founded in January 1903, Imperial Library at Metcalfe Hall, Calcutta, was renamed National Library in September 1948 and shifted to Belvedere. On 1 February 1953 it was formally opened by Abul Kalam Azad.

8. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
11 September 1948

My dear Gadgil,

I have seen some correspondence about the fixing of some gate lights at Mohanlal Saksena's house. This is a small matter and I should not like to interfere in it, but I find a statement in your letter which I think should be corrected.

2. A Minister of State is something new in our Governmental set-up and consequently there are no particular rules governing him. He is in fact a

1. File No. 45(10)/48-PMS.



Minister of Government with full powers such as any other Minister or Cabinet Minister has. The only difference is that he is not supposed to be full member of the Cabinet for other purposes. Therefore a Minister of State should normally be treated as a Cabinet Minister in regard to various privileges or conveniences, unless there is some provision to the contrary. In my order dealing with this appointment I stated that the Minister of State would draw the same salary as a Cabinet Minister but they would not have a free house or entertainment allowance. That was the only difference.

3. Therefore generally speaking, no differentiation should be made between a Cabinet Minister and a Minister of State.

4. As regards gate lights, you will be justified on other grounds of feasibility or lack of electric power or material not to provide them at present, but the reason should not be that the Minister of State is in this matter different from a Cabinet Minister. Normally speaking, the wishes of a Minister of State in such matters should be respected unless there are special reasons when there is some difficulty about giving effect to them.

5. I am glad that you did not agree to the installation of boundary lights at my new residence. They are absolutely unnecessary and it would have been wasting money and electric energy. I find however that there are some flood lights being used in my house. I think they are totally unnecessary and they should not be used except possibly on special occasions. I am therefore directing that they should be removed or at any rate should not be used. This will mean some saving in electric power etc.

6. In view of what I have written above, you will decide as you think fit. But that decision should not be based on a difference between the Cabinet Minister and the Minister of State.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 1. Salary of Governor General<sup>1</sup>

Shri J.C. Kumarappa is reported to have said at a recent meeting that he regretted that I had attempted to justify the Governor General's salary. As similar criticisms have been made in other places, I should like to correct the misapprehension that has arisen.

I did not seek to justify the Governor General's or anyone else's salary. In answer to a question in Parliament, I gave various facts and figures. There were some supplementary questions which I answered partly, but could not answer fully because the Speaker stopped further discussion on the subject.

The Governor General's salary and allowances still continue at the old figure, although we have reduced the salaries and allowances of provincial Governors. The old figure was maintained because at that time Lord Mountbatten was the Governor General and we wished to make no change during his tenure of office. After that we wanted to have some experience of the working of the new establishment and the advice of the present Governor General before we suggested any changes. The matter will no doubt be considered.

I did not refer to the Governor General's salary when I said that a certain dignity of the State had to be maintained. I referred to the Government House which was a State building meant for State purposes.

We have given some thought to this question of using Government House. Even when Lord Mountbatten was here, in July 1947, he and Lady Mountbatten wrote to me suggesting that they might move into a smaller house after the 15th August. We appreciated this offer and considered it. We found that any change would only involve considerable trouble but would not bring about any saving in expenses. We thought that as Lord Mountbatten was only staying for a few months longer, it was not worth while upsetting the existing arrangements.

When the time for his departure came near, we again considered this question and we came to some conclusions about the various properties in Government House Estates in Delhi and in Simla. Some of these houses were decided to be put to public use. As for Government House,

1. Note, 27 September 1948. PMS.



Delhi, we came to the conclusion that a part of it should continue to be occupied by the Governor General, the main reception rooms should be kept for State receptions and entertainments for which they were eminently suited, a part should be kept for State guests, a part for the Cabinet meetings and Secretariat and possibly other offices, and a part possibly for an art gallery. We felt that this was the most economical arrangement. If the Governor General resided in some other house, this might have meant some additional expenditure as in any event Government House and its large gardens had to be kept up. That house was specially suited for State entertainments and for State guests and could be used for some other purposes as indicated above. It was not particularly suited for any other public use.

I referred to the necessity of a certain dignity being maintained at State functions. I think that this dignity and discipline is desirable. It is the dignity of the State and not of an individual and the discipline is conducive to efficiency. We in India are too apt to lapse from discipline with the result that we become rather sloppy in our work and our play and inefficient. Inefficiency leads to waste almost more than anything else.

I have no doubt that we have to reduce many of our larger salaries and I shall be glad if we can change our whole approach to the question of status and income. I am all in favour of our approaching an equality of income as far as this is possible. That results from our changing our whole social system. So long as we maintain that social system with its money awards for ability and sometimes for unscrupulousness, it is a little difficult to make changes in some tiny section of it.

Whatever the social system, the State as a State has certain functions to perform and so far as I know, every State whether capitalist, Socialist, Communist, or any other, maintains a certain dignity in order to perform those functions satisfactorily.

## 2. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 2, 1948

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for the note about the Governor General's salary which you had sent to me.

As a matter of fact I did not mention this matter in my speech today. I

1. J.N. Collection.

did not forget it, but the speech became a very long one and I did not quite know how to fit it in without going into considerable detail. I have decided not to say anything about it for the present.

But I hope the matter will have to be considered before long. The salary should be completely separated from the entertainment account. It does not much matter what the entertainment amount is, though of course we should try to keep it within some fairly reasonable figure. Perhaps the salary might be free from income tax as is the usual case with Heads of States. I am generally against this principle, but an exception might be made in case of the Governor General. In that case, the salary could be very much reduced. I should like you to give some thought to this matter, so that when I come back from Europe we might discuss it.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

#### IV. OFFICIAL SECRECY

### 1. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2 July 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

Reports reach me that some of our military officers do not take sufficient care in talking about military and other matters to people who should not be trusted. For instance, I am told, that senior military officers or others sometimes meet foreign newspapermen in restaurants and other places, or officers of the U.K. High Commissioner's Office or of other embassies, also people from the office of the Agent General of Hyderabad. In view of the present tension it is desirable for all of our officers to take particular care in meeting such people. In fact any private meeting should be avoided. I am quite sure that foreign newspapermen as well as foreign diplomatic personnel are constantly trying to get information about Kashmir, Hyderabad, etc. Indeed some messages that we have seen indicate that they are trying to do so. Our people therefore should be extra careful and avoid becoming very chummy with them.

1. J.N. Collection.



I am also told that certain Pakistan Army officers living in the Pakistan mess here are constantly meeting some of our officers. This also has to be checked for the same reason.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. Secrecy of Military Information<sup>1</sup>

There has been frequent complaint of military secrets leaking out. I should like particular care to be taken. Normally speaking, no members of the foreign colony or diplomatic corps are allowed to visit any rooms of Defence Headquarters dealing with operations, maps, plans etc. Is this rule being strictly observed? I write to ask because I have been told that the representatives of the U.K. High Commissioner's office have free access to our operations room and maps. This should not be allowed, quite apart from any individual concerned. We cannot distinguish between one Embassy or High Commissioner's office and another. We must treat them all alike in such matters. If under some arrangement we have to supply a particular kind of information, say, to the U.K. High Commissioner's office, we do so, but that does not mean free access to the operations room.

There has been a report that the Maharaja of Patiala has granted land to some of our senior officers both in the Army and in the Air Force. In one case it is said that 3000 acres have been granted. I should like to know how far this is correct. This raises rather important issues which will have to be considered carefully.

1. Note to Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 15 July 1948. J.N. Collection.

V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE AND APPOINTMENTS

1. To Khurshed Naoroji<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10 July 1948

My dear Khurshed,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th which has just come. I expect to see Maharao of Kutch<sup>2</sup> on the 15th. We shall certainly try to fit him in somewhere. I can only deal with a possible foreign appointment or a foreign delegation.

So far as working in Kutch is concerned, this is a matter for the States Ministry. Normally, I believe, they do not like appointing the Ruler himself in his area. But I shall tell them of what you think.

I am tired it is true then, but all of us are tired in mind and body. The whole world seems to be tired and in a slow process of disintegration. Whether it will pull up or not, I do not know.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 35(6)/48-PMS.

2. Mirja Maharao Shri Madansinhji.

2. To C.S. Ranga Iyer<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
23 July 1948

Dear Ranga Iyer,

I have your letter of July 16th. I am afraid I have not seen your previous letter. I get such a multitude of letters that only a few ultimately reach me.

I have little doubt that Vijayalakshmi would be a suitable Governor in a province but we must remember that she is doing a good job of work in very difficult circumstances, and it is not easy to withdraw her. She has taken trouble to learn Russian and our staff in our Embassy in Moscow has become fairly fluent in Russian. I could not therefore think of withdrawing her from her present post.

I realise that the Madras Governorship is important and we are doing our utmost to find a suitable person.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 13(10)-Eur/47-M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. Maharaja of Bhavnagar was appointed Governor of Madras on 13 August 1948.



**3. To G.P. Hutheesing<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
30th July 1948

My dear Raja,

Nambiar, I think, gave you a slightly wrong impression of my conversation with him about you. I had mentioned rather casually, in answer to some questions of his, that I had suggested your going to Malaya, but that you could not go. I know that at that time you were booked to go to America and you were right in not upsetting that arrangement.

As for the Development Board, I have been worried about it for some time past. I had hoped that things might right themselves and work to that end. But thus far nothing much has happened. If anything, conditions are little worse than they were. I am so overwhelmed with all kinds of work that I have been unable to give too much time to this. To some extent, the future of the Development Board depends on other factors, which have to be decided separately.

You are quite right in thinking that in existing circumstances especially I do not want anyone to feel that I am pushing you anywhere. That would not be fair to you. There is no question of pushing when the merits are obvious and I want those merits to tell. We are passing through a very difficult period and the burden of it lies rather heavy upon me.

As I have said, I cannot just yet say much about the future of the Development Board. But I suggest that you might keep in touch with Aftab Rai and Mehr Chand Khanna.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

**4. To Amrit Kaur<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
4 August 1948

My dear Amrit,

I have just received your two letters.

I entirely agree with you about the employment of women. Marriage as such should not be a bar either for entrance in service or for continuance in

1. J.N. Collection.

### 3. Leakage of Official Secrets<sup>1</sup>

There have been many instances in recent months of publication in the press of top secret information, including proceedings of the Cabinet meetings, and Cabinet committees.<sup>2</sup> Government take a very serious view of this and are determined to stop it. They have decided to institute proceedings under the Official Secrets Act or other legislation against newspapers which may publish any such top secret information.

Recently *The Statesman*<sup>3</sup> has repeatedly given full accounts of our secret proceedings. So have some other newspapers.<sup>4</sup>

It would be desirable for editors of newspapers to be informed that Government take a grave view of such publication and propose in future to take steps under the Official Secrets Act against any newspaper publishing secret information. Editors should be appealed to cooperate with Government in this matter in the public interest and to help Government, through the Press Advisory Committees or otherwise, in tracing leakages as well as in preventing any improper publication. It is obviously to the advantage of newspapers generally that any one newspaper should not be allowed to profit by improper publication.

While Government intend to take action through the courts against any offending newspaper in this matter, they realise that the most effective way of tackling this question is through the goodwill and cooperation of newspapermen themselves and by creating public opinion against such leakages and publication.

1. Note to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 5 August 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. Proceedings of the Cabinet Committee meetings on Gandhi Memorial and on dispersal of government offices outside Delhi were published by *The Statesman*.
3. Accounts of secret proceedings of Standing Advisory Committee of the Legislature attached to the Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, were published on 21 July 1948. Namely *The Hindustan Times* and *The Bombay Chronicle*.



#### 4. To Devadas Gandhi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 5, 1948

My dear Devadas,

Your letter of today's date. The Cabinet is greatly exercised over this leakage of news. We do not propose to tolerate it in future and we have decided to enforce the Official Secrets Act in future and if necessary to have special legislation. So instead of adopting a flexible attitude, *The Hindustan Times*<sup>2</sup> should adhere even more strictly to the normal rules of propriety in such matters. I do not know what you mean by saying that the period of anxiety is passed.<sup>3</sup> There was never any period which was so full of problem and anxiety as now.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. On 24 July 1948, at the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference at Bombay, Devadas Gandhi said : "I am disclosing no secret when I say that a public announcement on the Indian press of its inherent right to own and administer the country's internal news agency is in the offing."
3. Devadas Gandhi had in his speech stated "where the detailed descriptions of ugly events are liable to arouse passions it is our duty to impose restraint upon their reporting. Happily that acute stage has passed and we can feel freer than before."

#### 5. Action against Leakages of Secrets<sup>1</sup>

The attention of Cabinet has been repeatedly drawn to leakages of secret information and even of Cabinet proceedings.<sup>2</sup> They take a very grave view of this matter and they are determined to stop it. With a view to do this, it is proposed to take proceedings under the Official Secrets Act against any newspaper publishing secret information, proceedings of the Cabinet or its committees and the like.

Honourable Minister for Law is requested to consider this matter in both its aspects:

1. How far the existing law is adequate for this purpose and if so, what steps should be taken to give effect to it.
2. Whether any fresh legislation is necessary for the preservation of official secrets.

1. Note to the Ministry of Law, 5 August 1948. J.N. Collection.  
2. See preceding items.

it. I think the simplest way of putting is this that in case of marriage it will be open to Government to terminate the service. That is to say, the contract may be terminated if on a consideration of the case it is found that it is difficult for the woman concerned to perform her duties adequately after marriage. Each case would have to be considered separately.

It is likely that on marriage some women would themselves resign from the service because they would not like to live in a different place from their husbands. The test should be solely as to whether the married woman can discharge her duties properly in the service.

I hope you will come to the Cabinet meeting even though you cannot stay there for all the time.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 5. To Archibald Nye<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4th August, 1948

Dear Sir Archibald Nye,

A few days ago I saw a telegram from you to the Governor General saying that you are likely to sail about the 8th or 9th September. You seem to think that a few days' delay in your departure might upset our programme. Please disabuse yourself of this idea. The longer you can stay on, the better and the more welcome for us.

It may interest you to know what your premier told me about you. He was loud in praise of you and when I asked him if he had any suggestions about your successor, he said "send us someone like Nye". That is praise enough. Unfortunately, we cannot find Nyes easily.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



6. To B.V. Keskar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6th August 1948

My dear Keskar,

Your letter of the 3rd August. I have noted what you have written and if any memorandum reaches me from Bangalore, we shall no doubt attend to it.

About the Cypher staff in our Embassies abroad, it has been exclusively non-Indian in the past. We have been trying to change it as rapidly as possible but the process of training people for this work takes time. There is no doubt that people dealing with secret work must be our own nationals. I understand that in Washington we have now an Indian and an Anglo-Indian doing Cypher work.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

7. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 11th August 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of August 10th about the Posts and Telegraphs people in Kashmir. I think this matter might be discussed with Sheikh Sahib when he comes here in the course of the next few days. Normally the proposal as you say is that those persons who have opted for Pakistan might be asked to go to Pakistan. It is possible, however, that some of the staff, some of which may be Hindu staff, may have opted because they simply wished to continue where they were and felt that they had little choice. In such cases, they might well be allowed to continue. But generally speaking it would be undesirable to keep people who may be potential fifth-columnists.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

## 8. To K.C. Neogy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st September 1948

My dear Neogy,

Your letter of September 14th about Chintaman Deshmukh continuing as Governor, Reserve Bank, for six months after 31st December 1948. I entirely agree with you that he should be asked to do so. Indeed I personally asked him when he was here and he gave me the impression that he agreed. Please, therefore, make an official approach to him on the subject.

As a matter of fact I have an idea that he may stay on for a longer period, provided he is given two or three months' leave in between to go to England and look after his domestic affairs. Perhaps this would be a better arrangement. You can discuss this matter with him. The point is that the longer we have him with us, the better.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

## 9. To Amrit Kaur<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 24th September, 1948

My dear Amrit,

Your letter of the 24th.

It would be a good thing if Agatha Harrison came here. If Ghanshyam Das Birla is prepared to pay her passage money, I have nothing further to say about it. I do not myself like to ask him or anyone else for any such favours. But, as I have said, I have no objection.

I am not going to England in a chartered plane. That would have been frightfully expensive.

About the East Punjab High Court, I have twice written to Sardar Patel putting forward the argument you raise. Khosla,<sup>2</sup> the Judge, also came to

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Gopal Das Khosla (b. 1901); joined I.C.S., 1926; served as District and Sessions Judge at various places in the Punjab, 1930-44; Judge, Punjab High Court, 1944-59, Chief Justice, November 1959-61; Chairman of many commissions of enquiry and author of several books including *Murder of the Mahatma*, *Our Judicial System*, *Indira Gandhi-A Patriot*, *The Last Days of Netaji*, *Pornography and Censorship in India*, *Of Mountains and Men*, *The Price of a Wife*, *A Taste of India* and *Memory's Gay Chariot*.



see me about this matter. I wrote at length for a second time to Sardar Patel and to the Chief Justice of India. I have no answer from the Chief Justice but Sardar Patel is firmly of opinion that nothing should be done. Of course nothing can be done except by legislation and it is not a very easy matter to legislate. That legislation cannot be passed by ordinance in this particular case but has to go through the Central Assembly.

No one yet knows what will be decided in our Constitution. The proposal is that the question might be left to provincial legislatures. That would delay matters still further. So I just do not know what more I can do about it. I am sorry for East Punjab.

You can always see me by ringing up a little before and finding out where I am.

I have just had a letter from Ram Lall about the High Court. I am sending all the papers to Sardar.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 10. To Sudhir Ghosh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Sudhir,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of 27th September.

I am afraid I can hardly see you now before I leave for England. In any event a brief meeting is not worthwhile.

I have on several occasions discussed the question of your entering the Foreign Service. There are a number of difficulties in the way. You are not junior enough to enter as most newcomers do. You are not senior enough for a senior appointment. Of course there are sometimes some middling appointments also which might go to others. Just at present, for various reasons including the economic situation, we have practically stopped all expansion.

But it is true that I have found reluctance among a number of people who normally have to deal with this matter to offer you any post in the Foreign Service. I am not myself directly concerned with this except for some very senior appointments. This reluctance is a little hard to analyse but it is

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Sudhir Ghosh then Regional Commissioner of East Punjab States, was later appointed Public Relations Officer in the office of India's Agent-General in Hyderabad.

basically derived from the fact that it is thought that you lack discipline and therefore would not easily fit into any regular service. I have no particular feeling about it although I am inclined to think also that you tend to function on your own account a little bit more than is fitting in a service. I do not normally overrule the various people who are in charge of such matters and I have therefore not tried to do so in your case.

For the moment the question does not arise because there are no appointments that are going to be made. But there is this difficulty which I have pointed out to you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## VI. BENGALIS IN ASSAM

### 1. To Gopinath Bardoloi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2 July 1948

My dear Bardoloi,

I have received a number of reports about conflicts between Bengalis and non-Bengalis in Assam, especially in Gauhati. I am told that even the Bengali Muslims line up with the Assamese as against Bengali Hindus.<sup>2</sup> Further that members of Bengali Muslims continue to pour into Assam.

Information has reached me that the Bengalis serving the Assam Government are all feeling very nervous at these developments. They feel they are not trusted by the Government and do not have its confidence.<sup>3</sup>

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Conflicts between Bengalis and non-Bengalis in Assam started when a Bengali ticket inspector in a local train fined student commuters, mostly Assamese, who were travelling without tickets. The Assamese students retaliated by attacking Bengalis in Guwahati city causing damage to their business and other establishments. There were reports that shops of Bengalis were attacked.
3. Alarm was prevalent among Bengalis due to the feeling that job opportunities for their fellowmen would be decreased and because the Government of Assam, especially Bishnuram Medhi, the Finance Minister, was not considerate enough. Sylheti Bengalis opting for service in Assam were in many cases refused the opportunity to do so.



There is widespread fear among Bengalis that when the colleges reopen there might be aggression on the part of Assamese students. All these may be exaggerated. But there does seem to be a great deal of truth in it. You will appreciate of course that this kind of thing is bad for Assam and leads to evil consequences elsewhere also. I hope your government will take up a strong line to prevent this aggression and conflict and to see that your Bengali officers are treated fairly. Otherwise your own work would suffer and your services would crack up.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Akbar Hydari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9 July 1948

My dear Akbar Hydari,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th July about the Bengali Assamese situation in Assam.<sup>2</sup> Your letter is very helpful in understanding the situation. I am afraid I cannot do much to influence the Calcutta press,<sup>3</sup> but I shall certainly try to bring some of these facts to the notice of people who might be able to exercise some influence in Calcutta.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Akbar Hydari wrote that Assam was among the last regions of India to come under British rule and the Assamese kept themselves aloof from public life for long allowing Bengalis to man the public services. After independence the Assamese started resenting the predominance of Bengalis in the Government and in social life.
3. Hydari felt that the Calcutta press, which was critical of Assamese, was responsible for the deteriorating situation in Assam.

## 3. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
9 July 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a copy of a letter from Hydari.<sup>2</sup> This is in reply to a letter I had sent to Bardoloi about the situation in Assam. I wish you could influence the Calcutta press and the Bengal P.C.C. leaders to tone down their aggressive attitude towards Assam.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See preceding item.

## 1. Cleanliness and Discipline in Office<sup>1</sup>

I desire to draw the attention of Ministers and Heads of Departments to a certain deterioration that is visible in the general conduct of business in the corridors of the Secretariat and other Government Offices. I am unable to speak from personal knowledge of what happens inside the rooms of the Secretariat. But the corridors present an appearance of disorder, uncleanness and lack of discipline among the people who wander about there. *Chaprasis* are often not in uniform and it is a little difficult to distinguish them from others. They lounge about presenting a general scene of slackness. Other people wander about aimlessly in the corridors. I do not suggest that any very strict rules, which might bear down heavily in this hot weather, should be applied. But it is essential for the sake of work as well as from the point of view of health, sanitation and an agreeable appearance that certain rules should be followed and a certain discipline observed. I trust therefore that Heads of Departments will inform the members of their staff that the rooms and corridors should always be kept in proper condition.

1. Note circulated to all ministries and departments of Government, 17 July 1948. File No. 2(223)/48-PMS.

## 2. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31st July, 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I am told that a practice is growing in East Punjab among M.L.As and local Congressmen to interfere in the discharge of duties of governmental officers. One case was brought to my notice. A man accused of abduction of women was arrested by the Gurgaon S.P. It is reported that the President of the District Congress Committee, who is a lawyer, insisted on the release of this person who had been arrested for abduction. If this is true, then it was very wrong behaviour on the part of that D.C.C. President and all our administrative apparatus will collapse if people functioned in his way. I trust

1. J.N. Collection.



that you will make this perfectly clear. If you like, you can refer the matter to the Congress President.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In view of complaints received from several provincial administrations, Rajendra Prasad had issued a directive on 25 July 1948, pointing out that while any kind of constructive suggestions from Congressmen through proper channels would be welcome to the A.I.C.C., no Congressman should try to dictate to the officials to cause inconvenience to their work.

### 3. To Go vind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31st July, 1948

My dear Pantji,

I understand that a practice is growing of M.L.As or local Congressmen to interfere with executive officers. You must, of course, be aware of this, if it is happening in the U.P. I was told specially of a case in Meerut and of how the Commissioner there and the D.I.G. complained that it was becoming progressively more difficult to carry on their duties or maintain discipline because of this. Neither of them complained to me. The matter reached me through our normal Intelligence channels.

I suppose you are aware of all this and are taking necessary steps. Still I thought it desirable to bring it to your notice.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31 July, 1948

My dear Mr. Reddiar,

I must thank you for the warmth of the welcome I received in Madras and for the excellent arrangements made there. My three days in Madras were very full, but I enjoyed them wholly and I am very grateful to you and your Government.

You will remember that I mentioned at the meeting of Congress workers and Party members of the reports I had received about Madras M.L.As sitting at the doorsteps of Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries and trying to get jobs for people. Indeed I have heard that money was being made out of this business. This is a very serious matter and I hope you will tackle it immediately and make it perfectly clear that no such thing should be permitted. There should be no weakening on this issue or otherwise all our administration will crack up and our reputation will be mud.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

#### VIII. LAW AND ORDER

##### 1. To Reginald Sorensen<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 10th July 1948

My dear Sorensen,

I must apologise to you for the delay in answering the joint letter dated the 3rd June which you and Julius Silverman<sup>2</sup> have sent to me. It reached me a little before the Mountbattens went away and the consequent changeover in India took up all my time. I also had to tour about a good deal during the last three weeks.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (b. 1905); Member of Parliament (Labour), 1945-83; Secretary, the India League, London, 1947-71 and its Chairman from 1971.



May I assure you that anything coming from such good friends of ours as you and Silverman must command attention and respect. I do not complain at all that you have drawn my attention to events in India which have caused you grave concern. We shall, of course, welcome friendly criticism and seek to profit by it.

Among the many things that have happened in India during the past year, few have distressed me so much as the action that Government has had to take in regard to individual and civil liberty.<sup>3</sup> You know that our movement has been closely associated with conceptions of individual freedom and any deviation from them must necessarily go against the whole spirit of that movement.

The preservation of peace and law and order within the country are largely the functions of the provincial governments, though of course, the Central Government has a great deal to say in the matter. There has been a natural tendency for provincial governments, faced by great difficulties, to function autonomously in this matter. It is difficult for the Central Government to consider or interfere with individual cases when the provincial government is in a position to judge the situation far better in its own area and to shoulder responsibility for it.

You know well that during the past ten months we have had to face disasters of unparalleled magnitude. The whole structure of peace and law and order crumbled for a while in parts of the country and communal passions affected vast numbers of people. This was a very difficult situation which was ultimately controlled by us. But the control is often rather superficial, any little incident may lead to a flare up. It has been a tragedy which has nearly broken my heart that after all these years of Gandhiji's teachings and of nonviolent technique, we should have fallen so low. It was Gandhiji himself who saved the situation, though he became a victim to it.

In this kind of situation normal conceptions of civil liberty have little place; when murder may take place at any time anywhere and of any person ordinary procedure and rules can seldom deal with the situation. Inevitably special rules have to be framed.

In this context ordinary labour disputes might also become communal rather suddenly and lead to widespread disturbances. We have tried our utmost not to interfere in any way, except by making attempts at a settlement, in such industrial disputes. But in certain cases we found that behind the industrial disputes lay a definite policy of sabotage of industry and a deliberate attempt to produce chaos in the country. This would have been bad at any time, but at a time when the country was facing a most difficult communal situation, this became exceedingly dangerous.

3. A large number of communists were arrested in early 1948 on suspicion of violent insurrection.

Perhaps you know that I have personally no ill-feeling towards Communism and Communists. I have been attracted towards them in many ways and I count some of them as my friends. But latterly there has been evidence enough of a deliberate policy adopted by the Communist Party in countries of South East Asia, such as Burma, India, Malaya, etc.,<sup>4</sup> which is a mixture of political revolt, sabotage and individual killing. In Burma this has been evident enough; in Malaya it has also recently drawn attention. In India quite the same thing has not happened partly because the Communists are not so strong here and partly because of the effective measure taken against them.

Could we at any time take the risk of an upheaval in India such as has recently taken place in Burma? Could we above all take this risk after all that had happened during the last ten months in India?

The changeover in India in August last led to the release of many forces, good and bad. All the reactionary elements in India tried to create difficulties for the new Government. We have faced and overcome many of these difficulties and in so far as the States are concerned, we have advanced a very great deal in absorbing and coordinating them with the Indian Union. Still the reactionary jagirdar or feudal elements are bitter against us and are continuously giving trouble. They line up with communal elements, they even line up with people who would normally be their extreme opponents. Nothing is more extraordinary than a certain peace or other armistice that took place between the authorities of feudal and reactionary Hyderabad and the Communist Party there. The Communist Party, of course, denies any such agreement but the facts are patent and the conflict between the Communists and the Hyderabad authorities has largely vanished. This was not because they loved each other or because they could cooperate for long but they thought that their principal enemy was the Government of India and so they arranged some kind of a stoppage of hostilities in order jointly to face the Government of India.

In the French possessions in India there has long been a consistent demand for union with India.<sup>5</sup> Now the Communist Party is opposing it. In the whole of industry the Communist Party is lowering production and creating continuous difficulties

We sit on the verge of widespread trouble and violence and murder. No government can face such a situation without taking action. And so we took action which as a whole has met with considerable success.

Such action was inevitably left to provincial governments and each such

4. Isolated acts of terrorism by Chinese Communists occurred from time to time in different parts of Malaysia.

5. The French-Indian settlement of Chandannagore had voted, in a referendum on 19 June 1949, for union with India.



government functions according to its own lights. It may be that local officials, as they are apt to, show excessive zeal. We have tried to pull them up, we have tried to examine individual cases and make our recommendations. We have tried to impress on provincial governments and all others concerned that they must not use these very special measures except in extreme cases where they have adequate justification. We shall continue to do this.

The development of the situation in Hyderabad State as well as in some other places prevents a return to normality and anti-social forces take advantage of these crises. It is quite possible that we make mistakes, indeed I know mistakes have been made which we have had to rectify later but I would like you to take into consideration this background of India in this very dynamic phase of our existence.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31st July, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I have received information from reliable sources that the Home Minister<sup>2</sup> of your Government has organised a band of ruffians or *goondas* in order to use them to break up Communist and Socialist meetings, further that, in fact, they have been so used and the police have looked on while these *goondas* beat Communists or Socialists who had gathered for some meeting. We are informed that there was a bad effect on the police force as indeed it must have.

I have been greatly surprised to receive this information as I cannot conceive of any responsible government or Minister adopting these tactics. Our Government will be completely discredited if this was known and proved. I write, of course, on the information received by me and I shall be happy indeed if you can contradict it. I would not have written unless the information had not come from a normally reliable official source. Could you kindly look into this matter for it is of the most serious consequence?

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kiran Shankar Roy.

### 3. To B. G. Kher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 4, 1948

My dear Kher,

Lord Mountbatten has forwarded to me a copy of a telegram which was received by the Editor of the *Daily Worker* of London, whom he met at a luncheon party. I enclose this telegram. I know nothing about this incident. But I am writing to Lord Mountbatten that the Communist newspapers are carrying on a vicious and virulent campaign.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, p. 336.

### 4. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddier<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 10, 1948

My dear Premier,

I should like to draw your attention to the leading article in *The Hindu* of August 6, entitled "Law and Orders". This article criticises very forcibly some steps taken by the Government of Madras and more specially the reasons given for them.<sup>2</sup>

*The Hindu's* criticism appears to me to have great weight. For a newspaper like *The Hindu* to criticise governmental activities in this way should be a warning to us of what we are doing and where we are going. As I have written to you previously, we are getting a very bad name all over the world. It is

1. File No. 7(70)/48-PMS.

2. *The Hindu* observed that while the Government of Madras, following a ruling of the High Court, gave up the attempt made in May 1948 through Ordinance II amending the Public Order Act of 1947, to deprive the court of its *habeas corpus* jurisdiction, a recent bill again attempted to restrict judicial scrutiny by substituting the words "if satisfied" by "of opinion", implying that while Government's satisfaction could result only from reasonable grounds, an opinion could be more easily formed. "It is amazing" the newspaper commented "that any Government should fight shy of a contention that there should be reasonable grounds....even though the government do not have to reveal them to the Court.... We should not be surprised if the Court continues to interpret the new section as if there has been no change in the wording."



better for some mischief-makers to be free than for the whole government to be condemned by moderate and reasonable people. I would beg you therefore and your Government to consider this point with great care.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To Gopichand Bhargava<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 16th August 1948

My dear Gopichandji,

I had a telephone message sent to you today about Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon's fast.<sup>2</sup> As you know I am entirely opposed to this fasting business and have little sympathy with it. Nevertheless it does create a commotion in people's minds, specially young people. Dhillon has been some kind of a hero in connection with the I.N.A. trials and there is some distress in the schools and colleges here over this matter. I have received a large number of telegrams in regard to Dhillon's fast. I do hope that you will be able to induce him to give up the fast.

The larger question of General Mohan Singh and his Desh Sewak Sena has unfortunately taken a very wrong turn.<sup>3</sup> I have no doubt that you are right in not agreeing to General Mohan Singh's proposals but I confess that the press statement issued on your Government's behalf rather took my breath way.<sup>4</sup> It was not the kind of statement that Governments issue and the language used was unnecessarily harsh and such as cannot be justified easily. Much the same thing could have been said very differently and without commitment. Government's statements have to be restrained in manner and in language and have to commit themselves as little as possible. That statement I am afraid has done us some harm.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Dhillon, on 11 August, started a fast unto death as a protest against the East Punjab Government's allegations that General Mohan Singh wanted to capture power through the Desh Sewak Sena.

3. General Mohan Singh had said that the Government was proceeding very slowly with the military training scheme in East Punjab. The Government in a press note on 4 August offered him cooperation for imparting military training to the people to begin with in Hissar, Rohtak and Gurgaon districts. However, Mohan Singh wanted to work in border districts; consequently the negotiations broke down.

4. The East Punjab Government accused him of having plans to create an army to seize power and administration at a later stage.

I have seen today another statement which you have issued, which, I hope, will help a little. Meanwhile, I have to answer a short notice question in the Assembly on the subject and I find it a little difficult to frame my answer. Of course some answer will be given.<sup>5</sup>

This whole affair will have to be tackled carefully and tactfully, or else it may do us injury. Mohan Singh may often go wrong and he is a little headstrong but my own impression is that he is completely straight forward and is a man of integrity. Normally, I should have liked him to do some constructive national work. Perhaps it is difficult for you or for us to make him do this in a proper way because he has got used to functioning by himself and in his own way. Anyway, for the present, this question does not arise. An attempt however might be made to lessen the bitterness that has been caused. Of course, on the question of private armies, there can be no compromise.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. B. Shiva Rao asked on 17 August whether the East Punjab Government had obtained sanction of the Government of India before assigning the districts of Hissar, Gurgaon and Rohtak to Mohan Singh to recruit men for a national volunteer corps. Nehru replied that no such step was taken and the Government policy was to disband the organisations which might develop into private armies. The East Punjab Government was raising a national volunteer corps and proposed to merge Desh Sewak Sena with it.

## IX. FOREIGN VISITS AND ASSISTANCE

### 1. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15 August 1948

My dear Pantji,

With reference to your letter of August 10th about provinces dealing directly with procurement in foreign countries, I am forwarding your letter as well as Keshav Dev's letter<sup>2</sup> to the Finance Minister.

1. File No. 44/6/48-PMS.
2. K.D. Malaviya, Development Minister for United Provinces, had suggested that provincial governments be allowed full initiative in their development schemes. This should include visits to foreign countries by provincial ministers. Experts could not keep themselves in touch with the different development schemes.



I do not think it is intended that any hard and fast line should be drawn in this matter, or that provinces should be prevented from obtaining the necessary machinery etc. from foreign countries. But it seems clear that unless there is cooperation with the Centre there is likely to be wastage of effort.

As for provincial ministers going abroad, here too there is no absolute bar. Normally Ministers do not go out for such purposes. It is the experts who are sent abroad. This I think is the rule in most countries. In very special cases a Minister may go. Apart from this general practice, it was felt that too many Ministers were going abroad from various provinces, and hence attention was drawn to this matter. Sometimes one expert going abroad can deal with the needs of several provinces, and there would be a saving of time, energy and expenditure.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Lakshminarayan Sahu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
26 August 1948

Dear Lakshminarayanji,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of the 20th August. I do not myself understand why you should be in pain and anguish. Your province is doing rather well at present and is free from many of the difficulties which other provinces have to face. As for deputations abroad, it is just impossible to have every province represented, when only a limited number of persons are sent. No doubt Orissa's turn will come. But please remember that normally deputations are sent for a particular purpose and choice is made from that point of view.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1890-1963); educationist and social reformer of Orissa; founder editor of *Sahakar*, Oriya monthly magazine, 1919-1930, and of *Vaitarani* and *Star of Utkal*, English magazine; organised Utkal Union Conference in 1936; elected to Orissa Legislative Assembly and Constituent Assembly, 1947; President, Utkal Sahitya Samaj and Orissa Sahitya Akademi; author of *Hill Tribes of Jeypore* and several other books.

3. To Keshav Dev Malaviya<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
27 August 1948

My dear Keshav Dev,  
I have your letter of August 24.

I am entirely in agreement with you<sup>2</sup> that individual provinces should be given full scope to go ahead in their task of expediting development schemes. There is no final objection to a provincial minister visiting foreign countries. There is a general rule however that Ministers, whether Central or provincial, do not go abroad except for very special reasons.

As for your complaints against the Government of India, I have no doubt that many of them are justified.

If you and your Government feel that you should go abroad you can certainly do so. I would suggest, however, that the date of your going might be postponed a little to enable us to know exactly what steps we are going to take in order to meet the economic and other crises. These matters have an urgent and vital significance. As the policy that we lay down in the near future will govern many things, including our development schemes, it is better to wait a little now and then go abroad rather than to go before that policy is quite clear. I do not think this need delay you very much.

Pantji is expected here on the 4th or 5th of September for the Working Committee meeting. I shall discuss this and other matters with him then.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 44/6/48-PMS.

2. Malaviya had complained that provincial ministries were not consulted when foreign parties were contacted for national schemes. It would be quicker for provincial governments to negotiate for their small demands themselves. Further, students abroad were not being adequately looked after.



#### 4. To Harekrushna Mahtab<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2 September 1948

My dear Mahtab,

Thank you for your letter of 30th August.<sup>2</sup> I am referring this matter to our W.M.P. Ministry here and shall write to you again about it. It is open to you of course to make enquiries from any foreign firms as to what they can do, but perhaps it is better to deal with foreign firms not directly but through the Central Government.

All these questions have now to be considered in terms of the economic crisis which affects all our schemes of development.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(101)/48-PMS. Also available in H.K. Mahtab Papers N.M.M.L.
2. Mahtab had asked whether he could contact some American firms for damming the smaller rivers for which the Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission lacked the staff. Negotiations with foreign firms for setting up industries and taking up large scale construction would break the obstruction of Indian industrialists.

#### X. LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND EXECUTION

##### 1. Petition of Mercy of Ladlesahab and Mashak Dastgir<sup>1</sup>

I have considered these papers including the judgements and the notes of the Hon'ble Ministers. As in all cases dependent on circumstantial evidence alone there is a lack of that certainty which can come from direct evidence. It is even more difficult for a person reading the papers and the record to judge of circumstantial evidence than direct evidence. Unless there are very special reasons to the contrary the findings of the first court and the court of appeal have to be accepted. Any other course would mean a complete rejection of those findings. That may be the function of a court of appeal which goes closely into all facts and circumstances of the case and

1. Note dated 21 July 1948. J.N. Collection.

hears arguments on both sides. It is hardly the function of a person considering a mercy petition. I feel therefore unable in the circumstances to upset completely the findings of the Sessions Court and the High Court, which would be necessary if I agree with the recommendation of Honourable Minister for Law.

But I agree with Honourable Minister for Home that in view of all the circumstances a death sentence is not indicated or desirable. I would therefore recommend the commutation<sup>2</sup> of the sentence to transportation for life.

2. The percentage of execution of pronounced death penalties were 81% and 80% during the years 1931-40 and 1941-47 respectively. It came down to 13% during 1948-50.

## 2. Petition of Mercy of Sitaram alias Haddu<sup>1</sup>

I have considered the judgements and the opinions of Honourable Minister for Law and Honourable Minister for Home.

On the evidence and the findings of the courts there is little to be said in favour of upsetting the conviction of the sentence.

Normally if there is a difference of opinion between two ministers, I would certainly be against the death sentence. In the present case the reasons advanced by Honourable Minister for Law for a reduction of the sentence have little to do with the findings. I do not see how it will be of any help to the wife or to the property if Sitaram is, for personal and family reasons mentioned, sentenced to transportation for life instead of being rewarded the death penalty. I agree therefore with the note of Honourable Minister for Home should be allowed to take its course.

1. Note, dated 21 July 1948, J.N. Collection.



### 3. To the Maharaja of Jeypore<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 26th August 1948

Dear Maharaja Sahib,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 20th August.

In theory I agree with you that capital punishment should be abolished. But I must confess that in practice and at the present moment this will be difficult. In fact we discussed this matter a few days ago and the majority of the opinion was that we should make no change in the existing law at present. We are living through difficult times and it may not be safe to take this step when political murder is commonly talked about and indulged in.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Vikrama Deo Varma (1869-1951); poet and philanthropist; Raja of Jeypore, 1931-51; author of many books in Sanskrit, Oriya and Telugu.

### X. KING'S LETTER TO THE NIZAM

#### 1. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
7 August 1948

My dear Krishna,

Suddenly and most unexpectedly last night an event happened which has upset me greatly. You will know about the details from the two enclosures.<sup>2</sup> These are copies of letters from me to the King and to the Governor General. It is a most unfortunate occurrence but there it is and we have to put up with it.

You will receive a cover from the Governor General addressed to the King—the outer cover probably to the King's Private Secretary. This contains the G.G.'s letter to the King, my letter to the King, and a copy of my letter to the G.G., also the original letter from the King to the Nizam and connected papers. All this should be delivered personally by you as early as possible. But before you do so you should, of course, consult Dickie Mountbatten

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *post*, both of same date.

and show him the papers. I am writing to him briefly and referring him to you.

This matter must be kept entirely secret. At this end the only persons who know about it are the G.G., Sardar Patel, G.S. Bajpai, V.P. Menon, Mathai and myself. At the other end there is no reason why anyone should know besides you, Dickie and Edwina.

These letters are being carried by Sardar Balwant Singh Puri<sup>3</sup> whom the Mountbatten know very well. He is a responsible and reliable man for many years connected with the Red Cross organisation and lately functioning as a member of the Federal Public Service Commission. Of course he does not know anything about this incident or these papers and should not be told. He is a mere messenger so far as these letters are concerned.

Please send us a brief telegram to say that you have received the papers sent through Sardar Balwant Singh Puri.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. (1892-1961); after serving the Government of the Punjab for some time, joined the Red Cross and St. John's Ambulance organisations in India in 1916; Secretary-General, Indian Red Cross Society, 1941-58 and its Vice-Chairman, 1958-66; member, Public Service Commission, 1948-49.

## 2. An Apology to the King<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

7th August 1948

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru presents his humble duty to His Majesty the King<sup>2</sup> and has the honour to submit the following :

1. On the evening of the 6th August, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru received a sealed cover from His Excellency the Governor General. This was brought to him by his confidential Private Secretary<sup>3</sup> who, in Shri Jawaharlal Nehru's presence, opened it and took out two other sealed covers from it. Thinking that both of these were addressed to the Prime Minister, his confidential Private Secretary opened them both. One of these contained a letter from the Governor General to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru in which His Excellency stated that he was sending a communication from His Majesty's Private Secretary,<sup>4</sup> along with

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. George VI.

3. M.O. Mathai.

4. Alan Frederick Lascelles, Private Secretary to King George VI.



a sealed cover for His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad and a copy of the contents of the letter inside the sealed cover. The Governor General asked the Prime Minister to arrange to send the sealed cover to the Nizam with the utmost expedition.

2. As Shri Jawaharlal Nehru was reading the letter from the Governor General, he found that, by an error, the confidential Private Secretary had already opened the other cover without noticing that it was addressed to H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru was greatly shocked at this occurrence but could not undo what had been done. He feels distressed and humiliated that such a thing should have happened to a letter from His Majesty and that he should be responsible for it. He begs to convey his most profound apology to His Majesty for this grave error for which he holds himself entirely responsible.

3. It was Shri Jawaharlal Nehru's intention to send His Majesty's letter in its present condition to H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad, together with a letter of apology. But, after consulting the Governor General, it seemed more appropriate to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru that he should seek His Majesty's direction before proceeding further in the matter. The original letter of His Majesty to H.E.H. the Nizam is, therefore, being returned. The other papers which Shri Jawaharlal Nehru received from H.E. the Governor General are also being submitted for His Majesty's inspection.

4. The Prime Minister ventures to submit, for His Majesty's consideration, that the letter to H.E. the Nizam be either returned for transmission to H.E.H. in a new cover or, if His Majesty should be so disposed, a new letter be addressed to H.E.H. These are only suggestions. Any other directions that His Majesty may be pleased to convey will be carried out.

5. In conclusion Shri Jawaharlal Nehru wishes to repeat the expression of his deep regret that this delay should have been caused in the delivery of His Majesty's letter to H.E.H. the Nizam and to seek His Majesty's forgiveness for an error which, however inadvertent, must be the cause of inconvenience and annoyance to His Majesty.<sup>5</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The King's Private Secretary wrote on 12 August 1948 that the King was "sincerely sorry that so much trouble should have been given to so many busy people, fully accepts the explanation . . of this unlucky mischance . . that has afflicted many a private secretary in the past including myself" and returned the King's letter to the Nizam in its original form but in a new envelope and seal with a request to have it transmitted to the Nizam.

### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
7th August 1948

My dear Governor General,

Last evening I received a sealed cover which you had sent me. This was brought to me in my house by my confidential Private Secretary who, in my presence, opened it and took out two other sealed covers from it. Thinking that both of these were addressed to me, he opened both. One of these contained a letter from you to me, in which you stated that you were sending me a communication from His Majesty's Private Secretary, along with a sealed cover for H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad and a copy of the contents of the letter inside that sealed cover. You asked me to arrange to send the sealed cover to the Nizam with the utmost expedition.

2. As I was reading the letter of yours to me I found that inadvertently and through an error, my Private Secretary had already opened the other cover without noticing that it was addressed to H.E.H. the Nizam of Hyderabad. I was shocked and distressed at this very grave mistake that had occurred which I was unable to set right.

3. I informed you of this misfortune immediately and, after consulting you, I decided to send the King's letter as it was to H.E.H. the Nizam together with a letter of explanation and apology. It was also my intention to write to His Majesty explaining the circumstances and offering my humble apology.

4. On further consideration, however, and after consulting you again, it seemed a better course to follow to place the whole matter before the King and take His Majesty's direction before any further step was taken. I am, therefore, writing to His Majesty and enclosing in my letter all the papers you sent me last evening, including the original letter of the King addressed to the Nizam. I am sending all this to you and would request you to send it to His Majesty.

5. I shall be grateful if the King's directions are conveyed to me. If His Majesty so wishes, his original letter can be sent to H.E.H. the Nizam in a new cover and sealed and then forwarded to the Nizam, or a new letter may be sent. Whatever course is suggested, I shall endeavour to follow it.

6. I have already expressed my humble apology to the King for this grave error for which I am fully responsible. To you also I must apologise for having failed to carry out your direction in the matter. I am greatly distressed because of having failed in my duty in many ways and put my Government in a difficult and embarrassing position. This is a matter about which I shall venture to speak to your later.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.



7. I deeply regret that this delay has been caused in the delivery of His Majesty's letters to the Nizam. I am anxious to avoid further delay as far as possible and am arranging, therefore, for a reliable officer to carry the covers addressed to the King by air this evening. He will hand over the sealed covers to our High Commissioner in London who will take immediate steps to deliver them personally.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

XII. MISCELLANEOUS

1. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4 July 1948

My dear Pantji,

I have received your letter of July 1 about the instructions issued to District Officers regarding collections to the Gandhi Memorial Fund. I must confess that I do not like any government officers as such to be connected with these collections and for District Magistrates to convene meetings for this purpose seems rather undesirable. The whole thing reminds one too much of war collections. There has been already some criticism of the U.P. Government's action in this matter. You will remember that it was referred to in Mussoorie.<sup>2</sup> Again it was mentioned at some committee meetings here in Delhi. I do not think that we shall get very much out of these. But however much we might have got it will have a bad odour.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, pp. 430-431.

## 2. To Baldev Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

8 July 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

I should like you to convey my appreciation and congratulation to the engineers and others connected with our Defence Ministry who have participated in the building of the Ravi Bridge near Pathankot as well as other bridges and causeways on the Pathankot-Jammu road. I think both the military and the Works, Mines and Power Ministry deserve praise for this fine piece of engineering work done in record time.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

## 3. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 8103 dated 21st July.<sup>2</sup> We propose to celebrate Independence Day in India in a very simple manner. In view of the internal situation and the fact that Mahatma Gandhi's death is still fresh in our minds, we have advised against any ostentations or extravagant display of enthusiasm. Subject to this we leave it to you to observe Independence Day in such manner as you think fit. Prior sanction should be obtained for incurring any expenditure beyond that is provided in the budget. For this a rough estimate of expenses will be necessary.

We do not propose to send any messages or proclamation on August 15.

1. New Delhi, 25 July 1948. File No. 2(178)/48-PMS.
2. Krishna Menon sought instructions in connection with the Independence Day celebrations in London.



#### 4. Cooperation between People and Police<sup>1</sup>

The three days of my visit to Madras have caused a heavy burden on the authorities and the police of the city. Vast and unprecedented crowds had gathered along the routes and meeting places and it was a difficult task to arrange them in a disciplined order. Yet this task was ably and efficiently performed and I wish to congratulate the authorities and the police of the city of Madras on this achievement. This could not have been done, of course, without the goodwill and cooperation of the people who behaved in an exemplary manner everywhere I went. I was particularly pleased to notice how the police and the people cooperated with each other. This was as it should be.

1. Statement, Madras, 26 July 1948. From *The Hindu*, 28 July 1948.

#### 5. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15th August, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am enclosing a letter from Gopichand Bhargava about grants of land to provincial M.L.As. I do feel that this kind of thing must be sternly discouraged.

The Maharaja of Faridkot's<sup>2</sup> grant too is obviously most objectionable. You will notice what Gopichand says about Maharaja of Patiala<sup>3</sup> criticising in public the East Punjab Ministry as well as Sardar Baldev Singh.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Harindar Singh.
3. Yadavendra Singh.

## 6. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

11 September 1948

My dear Rajendra Babu,<sup>2</sup>

Sunder Lal<sup>3</sup> has been coming to me from time to time and telling me about the progress of the Hindustani translation of the draft Constitution. Meanwhile I have received Hindi printed copy of the Hindi translation. I was under the impression that the Hindi, the Urdu and the Hindustani translations would be printed separately to enable Members of the Constituent Assembly to examine each one of them before finalising any draft. It was possible of course that no single draft might be approved in toto but that certain variations may be introduced in them. Sunder Lal however says that he is not clear whether this Hindustani translation will be printed or not by the Constituent Assembly. I think it would be a pity if this was not printed as this would mean not utilising, and indeed wasting, many months' labour of a number of people who have done it. What is more, we shall not have the advantage of comparing these various translations.

This question of language has unfortunately roused a great deal of heat and argument. We may not be able to ignore this but still I hope we shall consider the question as objectively and dispassionately as possible. For this as well as for the purpose of evolving the best possible draft, it is necessary to have printed copies of all the three translations before the members. It may be that the variations are not great as between two translations. But even those minor variations may count and may give a certain twist to the language or to the meaning. We have to produce something with simplicity, precision, and dignity. I am a lover of languages and words and phrases and I have often spent a good deal of time in thinking about the turn of a single phrase. We dare not miss taking advantage of anything that might help us to arrive at a correct conclusion.

Therefore I feel that it is necessary to have this Hindustani translation printed on behalf of the Constituent Assembly. It should be printed both in the Nagari and the Urdu scripts. If there is any difficulty about the Urdu script it should certainly be printed in the Nagari script. I know this will involve expenditure but that extra expenditure is worthwhile if it helps us in any way to produce a noble document in the end which will be the hallmark of our independent existence.

1. File No. 32 (98)/48-PMS.
2. Rajendra Prasad was the President of the Constituent Assembly.
3. Copies of this letter were sent to Abul Kalam Azad and Sunder Lal, both members of the Constituent Assembly.



I am sorry to trouble you when you are unwell and when, as I understand, you are thinking of going to Pilani. But the matter seemed to me an urgent and vital one and so I have taken the liberty to write to you about it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 7. To Sardul Singh Caveeshar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12th September 1948

My dear Sardul Singhji,

I must apologise to you for the delay in answering your letter of the 12th August as well as a previous letter on this subject.

Certainly I feel that there should be a proper memorial in the form of some institution serving the people. I do not believe in any other types of memorials.

I feel however that this is not a suitable time to raise this question. We are in the midst of great difficulties and problems. There is an economic crisis. There is further the Gandhi Memorial Fund which should absorb our energy and our surplus money.

I am afraid I do not agree with you about changing the name of Delhi and calling it Moti Nagar. This is a poor way of honouring the memory of any great person. It is simple and does not cost anything. Names of cities have a certain historical significance and they should not normally be changed.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

**8. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddiar<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
21st September 1948

My dear Mr. Reddiar,

I have received a copy of a pamphlet containing "Charges against the Madras Ministry (1948) by certain M.L.As". This pamphlet<sup>2</sup> contains a signed covering letter addressed to the Congress President.

Any such charges publicly made must be publicly answered. I know nothing about the charges, but I am very much concerned that a Provincial Ministry of ours should be publicly accused of serious offences. Will you kindly let me know what steps you have taken to answer these charges?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Two M.L.As, M.S.A. Majid and P. Natesan, had charged the Government with (1) thrusting trade into unwilling hands of the cooperative agencies and (2) adopting measures which were not in line with policies enunciated by the Government of India viz. Prohibition, Cloth Control, measures and non-interference with the ordinary trade channels. Since Congress M.L.As had been taking commercial licences. Natesan charged them as brokers and blackmarketeers.

**9. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
22 September 1948

My dear Syama Prasad,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd. I am glad you are considering the possibility of a river service on the lower Ganges up to Allahabad and Kanpur. There was undoubtedly such a service in the old days. I do not know what kinds of boats came, but in Allahabad there are still remains of piers.

If the Ganga is not navigable above Allahabad, the Jamuna, I think, is certainly navigable and the boats might come up the Jamuna from Allahabad.

Would it not be possible to use steam boats?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 27(60)/48-PMS.



## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## I. Problems of Policy





## 1. On External Publicity<sup>1</sup>

... 2. I should also like to know what steps are being taken to reorganise the information and directives sent for external publicity.<sup>2</sup> Previous to transfer of this work to the External Affairs, many complaints were made about the ineffectiveness of our external publicity. What is being done to remedy this? Apart from frequent telegrams, it seems to me necessary that specific information about current topics should be sent giving facts. This may have to be written separately for different sets of countries. For instance, for the Arab or Muslim countries, our approach will be somewhat different, emphasising a Pakistan or Hyderabad or Kashmir problem, more specially giving facts about the large Muslim population at present in India. Few people abroad realise that India has still got an enormous Muslim population. Indeed our Muslim population is probably greater than that of any other country except Pakistan. The fact that we have Muslims in the Cabinet, in high offices as judges, as ambassadors, etc. should be brought out. This information indeed might well be sent to other countries apart from the Muslim countries.

3. Some stress should be laid on our constructive activities, i.e., the big schemes of constructing dams, reservoirs, hydro-electric works, etc., our health schemes, our educational schemes, industrialisation, etc., so that people should have proper balance of what is being done in India. All this should be done in a brief and concise way giving facts rather than comments.

1. Note, 23 July 1948. File No. 147-XP/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. Extracts.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 5, pp. 521-526.

## 2. Basic Principles<sup>1</sup>

Our performance in the General Assembly has of course to be in tune with our foreign policy.

2. India's foreign policy is in the process of being formulated. Indeed

1. Guidelines for the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly, 12 September 1948. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

there can be no finality about it. While it is to be, or should be, based on certain fundamental principles, it is also something which is to be evolved in the light of experience, something which is to be adjusted to changing circumstances. In a world that is continually changing this latter part of the foreign policy must also necessarily be dynamic.

3. Foreign policy normally has a long distance objective as well as short distance objectives. The latter must be generally in keeping with the former. The latter may occasionally vary, in the light of experience and circumstances, but even while varying, they must keep the former in view.

4. What is our long distance objective? Apart from maintaining the independence of India and her rapid economic and social progress, India, by virtue of her position and resources, is bound to play an increasing part in world affairs. This part in world affairs can be divided up into:

(1) Asian Affairs:

- (a) in South East Asia,
- (b) in China and Far East,
- (c) in the Middle East and Western Asia, and
- (d) in the Soviet part of Asia.

(2) General world affairs.

We are most intimately concerned with South East Asia and we should therefore develop these contacts as much as possible. This means that we should particularly help in every way in the freedom of the countries of South East Asia and their closer cooperation with India in political and economic matters, and ultimately in defence. South East Asia would include Australia and New Zealand.

In regard to China and the Far East, nothing much can be done at present except to maintain friendly relations. China is in a state of utmost turmoil.<sup>2</sup> We should not attach ourselves too closely to any party in China so as to make the other party hostile to us. Naturally as a Government we incline towards the present Government of China. In regard to Japan our general policy is to welcome the growth of the Japanese economy.

2. The civil war in China which had been temporarily suspended after the defeat of Japan in 1945, broke out again. Mismanagement and corruption resulted in widespread popular discontent with the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek and enabled the Communists to extend their influence in the countryside. The Communist blockade from 29 June to 2 July 1948 of Manchuria and Changchun had starved 800,000 civilians. Nanking charged on 1 July that Communist troops had killed 5,000 Government troops and workers during their occupation of Kaifeng during 22-25 June.



The Communist movements and revolts<sup>3</sup> in South East Asia are so tied up with the movements for independence that it is difficult to separate them. While we must condemn acts of terrorism and the like, we cannot take part in any measures to suppress these movements. In fact we are not in a position to do so, and any attempt to do so would merely make us vastly unpopular with large masses of people in South East Asia.

5. India is the natural leader of South East Asia if not of some other parts of Asia also. There is at present no other possible leadership in Asia, and any foreign leadership will not be tolerated. Nevertheless it is entirely wrong for any representative to talk in terms of India being the leader in any part of Asia or to discuss the formation of any Asian bloc. This does not help us in any way and merely irritates others and creates suspicion.

6. The Middle Eastern countries are very difficult to deal with at present. They want our help and we have certain ties with them which we wish to retain and strengthen. Still, it is probable that as a result of Pakistan coming into existence and the growth of an Islamic sentiment, the Middle Eastern countries will tend to become somewhat hostile to India. Probably these Islamic countries are not in a position to play an important part in world affairs. The importance they have thus far has been largely adventitious and partly due to the rivalries of western powers. Our general policy in regard to them should be one of friendship as well as firmness. There is no reason why we should vary our basic policy just to please these Middle East countries. But we must remember that apart from the Islamic sentiment, there are some reasons which would incline these countries towards India if they take a long view. Afghanistan, being anti-Pakistan, automatically is a little more friendly to India. We should take full advantage of this fact. Turkey also is not very much affected by the Islamic sentiment.

7. As for Soviet Asia, this is part of the larger world problem and need not be treated as an Asian problem.

8. In world affairs generally we should stand for everything that promotes peace and avoids war and everything that puts an end to any imperialist domination of one country over another. At the same time we should work for close cooperation between nations with a view ultimately to help in the establishment of some world order.

9. We have repeatedly stated that India should not ally herself with any of the power blocs.<sup>4</sup> This policy fits in with our basic principles and is at

3. Communists were involved in every front in South East Asia. In April 1948, the Burmese Communist Party revolted against the Government headed by Thakin Nu. In June, the Malaysian Communists took up arms against the British Government. In September, a *coup* was attempted in Java. In India the Communists came into open conflict with the Government.

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series) Vol. 5, pp. 495-507.

the same time beneficial even from the narrow opportunist point of view. Indeed there is no other policy which we can pursue with any advantage. The idea that we can gain some immediate end by alignment with one of the power blocs is essentially wrong. If once we do so, we will even lose our bargaining power, though we may gain some petty temporary advantage. If India ceases to have a neutral policy in regard to these power conflicts, many other countries would also be forced to line up with this or that power bloc. There would be no neutral countries left and no lead in any direction away from war. Indeed India's lining up might bring the world war nearer.

10. Our proclaimed neutrality apparently has little effect on the cleavage among nations, and sometimes results in our being isolated and gaining the ill-will of both sides. That perhaps is to some extent inevitable and need not alarm us. If we adhere honestly and consistently to the policy we have laid down, we shall certainly gain the respect of most countries. India may not count today from the point of view of defence forces or industrial capacity, but India does count in the eyes of other countries because of her potential capacity and the certainty that she is going to play an important role in the future.

11. There is a psychological reason also for our continuing our policy of neutrality at the present juncture in world affairs. Any deviation from it will weaken us and will make us camp-followers of some group. We will not think of relying on our own strength but will progressively place our reliance on some other country which may or may not help us in time of need, and which will no doubt extract its pound of flesh whenever it can. We will cease to be looked upon as a possible leader of Asian as well as some other nations.

12. Therefore in the many questions that arise—in Germany<sup>5</sup>, in Greece<sup>6</sup>, in China, in Korea<sup>7</sup>, over the Veto<sup>8</sup>, over the Interim Com-

5. Berlin remained the storm centre of east-west relations. On 7 June 1948, the western allies announced their intention to create a federal state in their zones and, on 20 June, introduced a currency reform. The Soviet Government rejected it and started a land blockade of Berlin. The western powers fed Berlin by air.
6. A civil war was going on since 1946 in Greece between the troops of a right-wing government led by the Populist Party and the communist guerrillas. With British and American assistance the Greek army was able to repulse the guerrillas.
7. The National Assembly in Seoul adopted on 12 July a constitution for a Democratic Republic of Korea. But a North Korea broadcast the same day announced plans for a rival constitution of a Democratic Korean People's Republic and for elections on 26 August.
8. Russia, Britain, the U.S., France and China disagreed on the principle governing the exercise of the right of veto in the Security Council. The U.S. and Britain opted for conditional use, but Russia adhered to the "rule of unanimity". This had been a subject of heated debate since 1946.



mittee, and over the Atomic Energy issue—India must decide her attitude from the long distance point of view and on the merits of each question. Of course certain minor variations may be made in order to suit circumstances.

13. During recent months we have had evidence of a certain coolness towards India both in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This is regrettable, but we need not get alarmed or excited about it. On the whole with the U.K. our relations have improved, though it is yet too early to say how long this improvement will last. Generally speaking, our trade and economic contacts, and even to some extent cultural contacts, are with the western world. There is no reason why we should not maintain and encourage these economic contacts. If ultimately there is some kind of tenuous political bond between India and the U.K., this will also encourage contacts. But such contacts should not lead to any political or military subservience or commitments. Nor should it lead to the development of any economic vested interests of foreign countries in India. In other words, while we should develop all these contacts with the U.K., the U.S.A. and other countries of the western world, we should avoid any alignment with them on the world issues.

15. With the U.S.S.R. we can try to develop such trade or cultural relations as are possible. But we must keep clear of political entanglements. Russia's policy usually swings between two extremes and it is a little difficult to become really friendly with a country which adopts a hostile attitude or which expects you to become just a camp-follower. That we are not prepared to do on any account. It is probable, however, that the U.S.S.R. might realise that the policy they have recently pursued towards India does not pay, and they might change that policy somewhat though not very greatly. In any event our attitude to the U.S.S.R. should be as friendly as possible subject to all this. We are not getting tied up in any way with its world policies, some of which we disapprove. Even if Russia adopts an offensive policy against us, we should meet it with firmness but without any attempt to retaliate in the same way.

16. We should avoid, in the case of the U.K. or the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., adopting a self-righteous pose and making remarks and aspersions, which may wound the self-respect of nations and individuals. On no account must we reduce ourselves to the position of a satellite of any country.

17. In our talks with representatives of other powers we should be frank about our general position and policy. We are too busy with our own country to desire any entanglements elsewhere. We want peace and avoidance of world war. (The fact that we are carrying on little wars in India or roundabout obviously weakens our position.) To the U.K. we

should make it clear that while maintaining our full independence even as a Republic, we want close relations with what is now called British Commonwealth. We may even think of some vague bond. To the U.K. and the U.S.A. we should however make it clear that in the world as it is today there is not the least chance of our lining up with the Soviet in war or peace. To the U.S.S.R. we should point out that while we have every intention of maintaining an independent policy, we have no hostility towards it and would like to maintain our neutrality in case of conflict.

18. Obviously if any country carries on a hostile policy against India, whether this is governmental or apparently non-official, the reactions of India would lead against that country. We are not only newly independent but are sensitive about such matters, and we have not the mentality of submitting to coercion.

19. In our talks with representatives of other powers we should try to understand their points of view and try to meet them as far as possible without compromising our basic attitude.

### 3. On Serving of Alcoholic Drinks<sup>1</sup>

In this report some stress has been laid on the disappointment of many of the guests in Tokyo on the occasion of the Indian Independence Day celebration at the absence of alcoholic drinks. Our representative suggests that it would be better, indeed he says that it would be more dignified, if Government of India serves alcoholic drinks to their guests while prohibiting Indian officials from accepting alcoholic drinks at official parties.

2. I do not agree with this proposition, and I think it should be pointed out to our representatives abroad that, so far as official parties are concerned, no alcoholic drinks should be served. We are very sorry if some people who might otherwise come to these parties keep away because the inducement of alcoholic drinks is absent.

3. Reports from some other embassies show that the absence of alcohol has in no way come in the way of guests coming and appreciating the function. We should, therefore, adhere strictly to this direction.

4. In doing so care should be taken of course to provide alternative

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 21 September 1948. File No. 2(244)/48-PMS.



drinks, that is soft drinks. If proper soft drinks are provided, the absence of alcoholic drinks is not felt so much.

5. Government do not wish to interfere with the private lives of individual officers, but it is apparent that those private lives, in so far as the public sees them, must be in line with our public policy. Thus, while we do not lay down that our officers should become teetotallers absolutely, it is desirable that they should not indulge too much in alcoholic drinks, more specially at other public functions. Indeed it would be desirable for them wherever possible to abstain, though we do not wish to make any rule of this.

6. Embassies and legations may provide alcoholic drinks at small non-official functions or to individual guests, but on no account must whisky or brandy or the like be provided even on such occasions. Wines might be provided.

7. It is perhaps a little difficult to draw a hard and fast line between official and non-official functions and the discretion might well be left to our ambassador or other representatives. Normally it is not difficult to distinguish between a formal party consisting of many persons and a small informal group.

#### 4. Role of Communists in South East Asia<sup>1</sup>

Question: Do the measures now being taken to suppress Communist activities in India portend any change in your Government's policies in regard to the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the western democracies on the other?

Jawaharlal Nehru: They may be explained by domestic considerations. When the state is attacked it must hit back. We do not fear propaganda. We are engaged in putting through agrarian and industrial reforms. Until three years ago individual Communists were admitted to membership in the Congress Party. Then we pushed them out as a group—there were only a handful of them.<sup>2</sup> They criticized us bitterly but they were not "rebellious critics". Early this year they turned to sabotage and other methods

1. Interview to Earnest K. Lindley of *Newsweek*. Extracts from *The Bombay Chronicle*, 26 September 1948.

2. The attitude of the Communist Party towards the Second World War led to the removal of the Communists from the A.I.C.C. in December 1945.

of creating disorder. We in India are busy with our own problems, trying to put our own house in order. Hence the problems that affect Europe are not so close to us.

Q: But would it not be of immediate concern to you if the Communists were to gain control of Burma, Malaya, or other areas close to India?

JN: Yes. What are you hinting at?

Q: Only that many people in the United States have the impression that India has been trying to steer a sort of neutral course between the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet democracies.

JN: The policy proclaimed a year ago was not to line up with any bloc in the United Nations. We have tried to judge each question on its merits. We are concerned first with the problems of India. Next, we are concerned with our neighbours. For example we are very much interested in Indonesian freedom.<sup>3</sup> We believe that the continued attempts of the Dutch to maintain their rule in Indonesia will not succeed—that they will only encourage upheavals of other types. Third, we are interested in world peace. We want to avoid war. But if war should come we probably could not keep out of it. Admittedly, India would ultimately become entangled.

Q: Do you expect to seek American assistance for the river valley developments you are planning?

JN: We have some twenty projects in various stages of planning and development. We already have had the advantage of consultation with your engineers. It is the intention to give some of the contracts to American firms. These are multipurpose projects, flood control, power generation, irrigation, and so forth. We expect them to enable India to become self-supporting in food.

Q: Is the situation in Palestine causing you much anxiety?<sup>4</sup>

JN: Yes, since any conflict is likely to grow. As a government we have tried to play a neutral role. An Indian was appointed to the U.N. Palestine Commission.<sup>5</sup> Generally speaking, the Indian people have shown

3. Notwithstanding the intervention of the Security Council in the Indonesian question, its solution was delayed and eventually thwarted by the attitude adopted by the Netherlands, which had gone back on the assurances given by her to the United Nations and had restarted war with the new Republic.

4. Count Bernadotte, U.N. mediator for Palestine, was assassinated in Jerusalem on 17 September by Jewish Stern Group extremists.

5. India had stood against the partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent State of Israel as such a step was bound to destabilize the region. As a member of the Palestine Commission, she had signed a report suggesting a federal government for Palestine, giving complete local autonomy to Jews in areas populated by them and vesting the sovereign authority in a federation. India recognised the need of the Jews for a homeland of their own but held that it was not proper that the U.N. should force a partition of the country on the unwilling Arab majority.



sympathy for Arabs. But they are not anti-Jew. They have sympathy for the Jews as victims of persecution in Europe. However, they have a feeling for the Arabs as Asiatics. They think nothing should be done to injure the Arabs. Personally I have long felt Palestine should be a federation.

Q: What has caused your Government to embargo the export of certain strategic materials which the United States wants to buy? Prohibitions or restrictions have been placed on exports of such ores as beryllium, manganese, chrome, and monazite sands, which contain thorium, a mineral which is fissionable when combined with uranium.<sup>6</sup>

JN: We have just woken up to the idea of keeping valuable minerals to ourselves. We don't want private interest to sell for a profit resources which belong to the nation. We want to be sure that when these minerals are exported we get in return things of comparable value to India. The present prohibitions are temporary while we work out a policy. We have an Atomic Energy Commission, and we are guided by its advice. We want to develop atomic energy here in India. Not for atomic bombs—they are not for us—but for productive purposes.

Q: Are you satisfied with the progress India has made during its first year of independence?

JN: Definitely no. We have spent most of the year meeting troubles. We have not had time to do the things we wanted to do. Our economic problems have been aggravated by development which we had hoped to avoid. For example, one of our richest provinces Punjab has been put completely out of production. Millions who were producing are now jobless refugees—a double loss.

Q: What measures are you taking to control inflation?

JN: Inflation is a major problem. After the war we gradually removed wartime controls, although some, particularly on food and textiles, have been continued throughout. We probably removed some controls too soon. The results have not been good. We are considering the problem afresh and probably will reach a decision within a month.

6. About one-third of U.S. imports of manganese came from Soviet Russia and the U.S. Government was anxious to develop alternative sources of supply. India could fill that gap. But the Government of India had reimposed in September 1948 control over the export of these metals to encourage the setting up of metallurgical and allied industries in the country.

5. To Louis D. Gibarti<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

Dear Mr. Gibarti,

Thank you for your letter of 13th September and for sending me a copy of the special issue of the *Corps Diplomatique*.<sup>2</sup> This issue is a very interesting and attractive one.

There is a slight error at page 14 in the transposition of the pictures of the High Commissioners of India and Pakistan.

I regret I cannot send you any message such as you desire. But, briefly India stands for peace and freedom and for the development more and more of an international order. We are against all forms of colonial domination and economic exploitation.

Although the United Nations have to face a great many difficulties and the success they have achieved thus far is limited only, nevertheless they represent something of value and significance round which the world order can gradually develop. It seems essential that the growing rifts between the great powers should be healed not only for the future of the U.N. but for the peace of the world. The splitting up of the world into two great power blocs would be most unfortunate and might well lead to disaster. Therefore it should be our effort to prevent the breakdown of the U.N. as that is the one forum and a meeting ground for the different nations. So long as that endures, there is hope for cooperation or at any rate of absence of major conflicts.

The recent upheavals in Asia demonstrate that the pace of change from colonialism to freedom has been too slow. This situation in South East Asia can only be met adequately by recognising that colonialism has no further place in the world.

Another important factor to be remembered is that racialism also must be given up completely. That is another source of conflict. Until it disappears the seed of conflict would remain. If I may say so, in the organisation and in the working of the U.N. too little emphasis is laid on Asia and the countries of Asia and relatively too great emphasis is attached to the problems of Europe. Important as these latter problems are, Asia's problems are at least equally important today from the point of view of the world.

Yours truly,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(53)/48-PMS.

2. Gibarti, the editor of *Corps Diplomatique* (Paris), had asked for certain facilities to bring out a special issue on India.



## 6. Cable to Virgil Pinkley<sup>1</sup>

I do not think any country desires war or is prepared for it. It would be idle, however, to ignore that the relations between the world's great powers are in a state of acute tension and this is a real threat to peace. I think the threat will not materialise and war will not come. But to prevent war we have to be vigilant, and every responsible person must avoid saying or writing anything which is provocative and which increases the tension between nations and peoples. I feel convinced that ultimately war can only be outlawed by a new approach to some extent in line with Mahatma Gandhi's basic principles. Meanwhile, we must endeavour to find solutions, even though these might be temporary, for the present differences in a spirit of conciliation and compromise and by firm adherence to the Charter of the United Nations.

1. New Delhi, 1 October 1948. J.N. Collection. Virgil Pinkley was Editor and Publisher of *The Mirror-News* (Los Angeles).





12

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### II. External Relations





## I. BRITAIN

1. British Commercial Interests in India<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister referred to an *aide memoire*<sup>2</sup> handed over to him by the United Kingdom High Commissioner regarding British commercial interests in India. The British Government desired an assurance from the Government of India that the United Kingdom concerns in India shall not be put at a disadvantage as compared with Indian concerns. They also desired to be shown the draft of the proposed industrial policy legislation sufficiently in advance of publication to enable them to study it and make any representation that may seem to be required in the interests of the commercial relations between India and the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister remarked that the questions raised were so important that no reply could be given to them without careful examination by the Ministries concerned. The Ministries of Commerce, Industry and Supply and Finance were already considering the *aide memoire*, but such an examination was bound to take some time. In fact the issues involved were such that before a reply could be given to the United Kingdom Government, the matter might even have to be considered by the Cabinet. He was, therefore, proposing to inform the United Kingdom High Commissioner, who was likely to see him during the next day or two, accordingly. The Cabinet approved of the views expressed by the Prime Minister.

1. Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 11 August 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. The *aide memoire* was handed over to the Indian Government because the United Kingdom had been disturbed by some recent signs that India might intend to treat the U.K. business less favourably than those of her own citizens and to class the United Kingdom with other foreign countries in matters of economic and commercial treatment.

2. Record of Interview with Terence Shone and A.C.B. Symon<sup>1</sup>

The High Commissioner and the Deputy High Commissioner of U.K. called on me and discussed the *aide memoire* that they had previously given us regarding British commercial interests in India.

1. 13 August 1948. File No. 44(8)/48-PMS.

2. They told me that there was a great deal of apprehension in the minds of Britishers in India and outside about their future position here and the opening for them in regard to industry and commerce and they would very much like to have the position cleared. Further that they would welcome the opportunity of being consulted whenever any legislation affecting them was intended or a declaration of policy was going to be made. It was possible that they might be able to point out something in the course of consultation which had not occurred to us but which affected them intimately. For instance, they referred to the Dentist Bill<sup>2</sup> which apparently might push out British as well as other non-Indian dentists from India.

3. I told them that we were always prepared for consultation and I shall inform the Ministries concerned that where British interests are concerned they might give the U.K. High Commissioner an opportunity of a discussion with them. In the same way we expected the U.K. Government to consult us where our interests were concerned. To this the U.K. High Commissioner agreed.

4. I then pointed out that the matter was a highly intricate one and it was not possible for me to say anything definite at this stage. It was being examined by our different Ministries. It raised many issues. For instance:

- (i) should we not give preference to Indian nationals over non-Indians in matters of industry and commerce;
- (ii) India might have some special relations with some of her neighbouring countries like Burma, Ceylon and Nepal (I forgot to mention Nepal at the time), as we considered these countries nearly related to us in many ways;
- (iii) whatever answers we might give to the U.K. might very well affect our position vis-a-vis other foreign countries like the U.S.A. We were actually considering a draft of a treaty of friendship and commerce, etc., with the U.S.A. in which the U.S.A. wanted the most favoured nation treatment?

5. In regard to the first point it was clear that any Government in India would try to encourage Indian industry and commerce to the best of its ability and they would not like any obstruction to be placed in the way of this growth by any foreign interest. We could not possibly agree to a return in any form to the clauses protecting British interests which occurred in the 1935 Act. At the same time we have no desire to harass or injure British interests in India and indeed we would like them to continue and prosper. We may even prefer them to other foreign interests unless there was some special reason.

- 2. The Dentists Act was passed to regulate the profession of dentistry and institute Dentist Councils for that purpose.



6. The U.K. High Commissioner said that he realised that there was a strong feeling in India about this matter and he could not ask for a return to the 1935 Act position. He also realised that Indian industry will necessarily be encouraged by the Government of India and Indian nationals would have a special place. Nevertheless, he felt that India being a Commonwealth country the nationals of other Commonwealth countries should be given more favoured treatment than nationals of other countries. Indeed he said that they did not like being referred to as foreign interests and would prefer to be called non-Indian interests in India because of their long association with India. Normally the most favoured nation treatment which might apply to a country like the U.S.A. or any other like country should have no bearing on Commonwealth countries which still stood somewhat apart because of the Commonwealth nexus and should therefore be given somewhat better treatment. I said that I appreciated what he said but the matter was very intricate and I could not go further into the question before it was examined fully by our respective Ministries. But it was quite clear that our whole policy would be determined by furthering Indian interests. In doing so we shall avoid injuring the British interests and indeed we should like to be on as friendly terms as possible provided they did not come in the way of Indian growth.

7. Finally I assured him that as far as possible we would be prepared to consult them where British interests were concerned before final decisions were taken and that I would inform the Ministries concerned to keep this in mind.

### 3. Review of Indo-British Monazite Venture<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister informed the Government that some time back the Travancore Government had entered into an agreement with the U.K. Government for supply of monazite.<sup>2</sup> The U.K. Government were, on their part, to use their good offices with a U.K. firm to set up a plant in the State for the utilisation of monazite. Neither of these two agreements had been implemented satisfactorily. It was also clearly recognised by both the parties that the carrying out of the agreement was dependent on the con-

1. Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 22 September 1948. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

2. In January 1947.

continuance of normal conditions and that any large political changes would be regarded as a disabling factor. In view of the subsequent political and constitutional changes there was, therefore, scope for the revision of the agreement. The cost of the plant proposed to be set up by the U.K. firm was very high and a Swiss firm had recently made a much more attractive proposition. The first thing, however, was to tell the U.K. Government that owing to the changed political conditions in the State, the previous agreement stood terminated and then to negotiate with them either a fresh agreement or some other satisfactory arrangement. To facilitate negotiations with the U.K. Government and the Swiss firm, it was considered desirable to confer full powers on the Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the matter in consultation with the Travancore State. For this purpose it was proposed that the Travancore State should be invited to appoint a member on the Atomic Energy Commission who will function only when any matters, in which the interests of the Travancore State are involved, come up for consideration.

The Government approved of the Prime Minister's proposal.

#### 4. To George E. De Silva<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear De Silva,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th September.

I have read with interest your account of what happened at the conference in Poland.

We have been following the ways of the British press and I am afraid they cannot easily adapt themselves to changed conditions and they still try to sermonise as if they were our monitors. This does us little good but it does far more harm to them, for it is obvious that India is going to shape her own destiny with the goodwill of others as far as possible, without it if necessary. We want their goodwill but on no account are we going to suffer patronage and superiority from others.

I hope to be in London soon and if you are there, perhaps you might meet me.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



## II. THE UNITED STATES

1. Greetings to U.S.A.<sup>1</sup>

On the occasion of American Independence Day it gives me great pleasure to convey to you, and through you, to the Government and people of the United States of America the greetings of the Government and people of India.

This day has significance not only for the United States of America but for all freedom-loving countries of the world. India's own movement for freedom received inspiration and encouragement from the story of American independence.

The Government and people of free India extend to the Government and people of the United States their cordial good wishes and an assurance of their desire to work in close cooperation with your great country in the cause of world peace and prosperity.

1. Message on the occasion of American Independence Day, 4 July 1948. *National Herald*, 5 July 1948.

2. Implications of Special Treaty with the U.S.A.<sup>1</sup>

I have read the various notes on this file from page 74 onwards.<sup>2</sup> I have not read the draft of the Treaty.<sup>3</sup> Without reading the draft I should not like to express any definite opinion about it. For the present, however, I am only indicating two or three lines of approach to this question.

The subject is obviously of such importance that the Cabinet must consider it before any final decisions can be taken. There is no particular reason

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 12 August 1948. File No. 512-FEA/48 M.E.A. & C. R., N.A.I.
2. These notes were written by C.C. Desai, K.P.S. Menon and G.S. Bajpai on the merits and demerits of the draft treaty.
3. The proposed treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation granted "national "and" most favoured nation treatment" to nationals and companies of either country on a reciprocal basis in various matters such as in business and education.

why this reference to the Cabinet should be delayed pending Mr. Desai's<sup>4</sup> return from Geneva.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, there is no special hurry either. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, it would be better to discuss this matter with the new American Ambassador<sup>6</sup> when he comes. This delay would be advantageous, from another point of view also. The Premiers' Conference would have been held by then and we shall be in a better position to judge our general policy vis-a-vis England and America.

It is clear that we cannot isolate our relations with the U.S.A. from our relations with other countries, notably the British Commonwealth countries. We must, therefore, have the complete picture before us before we decide on any part of it. We have already been approached by the U.K. Government for special consideration of British interests. If we give special treatment to U.S.A. then there can be no other distinctive treatment of British or British Commonwealth interests.

It is possible that we might like to give some special treatment to our neighbouring countries like Burma or Ceylon or Malaya or Indonesia because of geographic and other factors. It is to be considered whether we should give up our right to do so by agreement to some general clause in our Treaty with the U.S.A.

The question of economic domination of India by the U.S.A. is not one that frightens me although one should be careful not to do anything which might encourage it. I agree that a frequent reference to this in the press is totally uncalled for and is irritating for the other party. What is to be considered, however, is how far any agreement on such issues with the U.S.A. might come in the way of the general development of our economic policy, for instance, of the policy and programme we have laid down in the Government's industrial policy statement.<sup>7</sup> It would be undesirable to be bound

4. C.C. Desai (b. 1900); I.C.S., held a number of important posts in the Government of India; member-secretary, Indian Tariff Board and later its Chairman, 1945-47; leader, Indian delegation to Conference of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1948; Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, 1948-51, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply and Ministry of Production, 1951-53; High Commissioner for India in Sri Lanka, 1953-54, in Pakistan, 1955-58.
5. Bajpai had felt that the Commerce Ministry might not wish to refer Desai's suggestion to the Cabinet before his return from Geneva where he was leading the Indian delegation to G.A.T.T.
6. Loy Wesley Henderson (b. 1892); held various diplomatic posts; Director, Near Eastern and African affairs, Department of State, 1948; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to India and Nepal, 1948-51, to Nepal 1951-55, Director, Centre for Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, American University, 1961-68; delegate to Baghdad Pact Conferences; member, Suez Canal Commission.
7. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 6, pp. 297-304.



down in any way and, in any event, this will be subjected to great criticism in the country.

A far more vital issue is raised on the political side when there is talk of an "alignment" with the U.S.A. in world policies. This affects our foreign policy. It may be divided up into two parts.

- (i) Our general attitude to colonial and semicolonial countries as Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, South-West Africa etc. It is patent that we cannot give up our well established policies here in order to please the U.S.A.
- (ii) Opposition generally to those who oppose U.S. world policies, notably the Slav bloc. This would mean following the U.S. policy whether on merits we agree with it or not. Any such line, I think, will not only be wrong in principle but harmful in practice, even from the opportunist's point of view, which would yield no results.

There is too much of a tendency to think that there are just two solid blocs in the world, the Anglo-American bloc and the Slav bloc. As a matter of fact, even the U.K. is a very reluctant member of the former, so also some European countries. It is true that all these countries are more or less opposed to Russian policy and may combine against it. But it is also true that they do not like being ordered about by the U.S.A., and fear the consequences which will fall on them much more than the U.S.A. In domestic policy, the U.K. is much more advanced, socially speaking, than the U.S.A. For India to align herself in world policy with the U.S.A. would be to give up the general stand she has taken in such matters for a long time which has given her a certain definite status in world affairs. It would also increase tendency to world war. On the other hand, it is quite important for India not to align herself with the Slav group.

I think it is wrong to say that India is of no consequence in world affairs or has lost such position as she had. India's actual and potential importance is sufficiently recognised by the foreign offices of the world who are eager to woo her. If we line up on one side that potential importance and bargaining power are lost. We gain possibly some trivial advantage at the cost of much greater advantages which might come somewhat later. In fact, it is the very importance of India that brings her up to some extent against other powers in world affairs.

America is the most powerful and the richest country in the world and can certainly help India a great deal. There is no reason why we should not get that help and remove causes of friction between us. But it is also true that America represents a reactionary policy in world affairs, and I think, a policy which will not succeed. Even internally, continued inflation and

rise in prices indicate that all is not well with the U.S.A.<sup>8</sup>; externally they are not liked by even those who are supporting them. The safest policy, therefore, appears to be is to be friendly to America, to give them fair terms, to invite their help on such terms, and at the same time not to tie ourselves up too much with their world or their economic policy. Keeping a free hand we will ultimately get more from them and at the same time get the friendship and cooperation of other countries also.

These are just some immediate reactions after reading the notes on this file. The matter should be considered more fully after the full examination of the draft, and at some stage or other it should be placed before the Cabinet. It is not necessary perhaps to reject the draft (I am saying all this without reading the draft). A better policy would be to point out certain basic approaches of ours and then offer to consider the draft.

It should be remembered that all our long distance plans might be completely upset by the developing world situation and the possibility of war. It is important, therefore, that we should not take any steps which might perhaps bring world war nearer. Many people in all countries look up to India even now with some hope. It would be a great pity if we gave up that position and at the same time gain little in exchange.

8. U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics reported that the cost of living index in the U.S.A. in June reached the record level which was 9.3 per cent higher than in mid-1947.

### 3. Disapproval of Alignment<sup>1</sup>

...on material idealistic and even opportunist grounds, it would be in India's best interest to maintain an attitude of dignified, friendly aloofness rather than to align herself politically with the United States of America. The latter course would mean that India would have to accept a subordinate role; it would also bring war nearer and would lead to greater loss than gain.

1. Remarks on the proposed treaty with the U.S.A. at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Legislature for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, 21 August 1948. File No. 23(48)-AWT/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. Extracts.



## III. BURMA

1. Cable to M.A. Rauf<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to our last telegram No. 9418 dated 15th August. We have given full consideration to situation in Burma specially Rangoon and protection of Indian population there.<sup>2</sup> It seems clear to me that it is impossible for us to take effective steps to give adequate protection in case real danger threatens. Any attempt at half-hearted measures would not only be ineffective but might well irritate Burmese population and army and thus lead to greater danger to Indian population. Evacuation by sea or otherwise must necessarily be a long drawn out process with increasing danger for those left behind. It would mean final elimination of Indians from Burma even though some may perforce remain behind. If Rangoon is in possession of disorderly elements even process of evacuation will be dangerous. People evacuated will leave almost everything they possess behind and come as paupers. New problems of relief and rehabilitation will arise.

We feel therefore that safest policy to adopt is for Indians in Burma to remain aloof from internal conflicts and rely on protection of such Burmese Government as might exist. If there is widespread trouble probably this will last for a few days only in Rangoon. It is better to face it quietly during that period by not going out too much and by organising some method of self help. What is to be avoided is antagonism to Burmese people which will make position of Indian population exceedingly difficult. Greatest danger comes from panic and this has to be avoided at all cost. Any partial step taken by us for evacuation is likely to lead to panic.

We should like you and your staff to remain at your post whatever danger may threaten. Your presence will help in keeping their morale. You can also help them in many ways through your contacts with such authorities as may exist.

Please keep us informed of all developments. We shall of course do what we can to help our people.

1. New Delhi, 16 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

2. Communist-led insurrections were reported from different parts of Burma. Rebel activities near Rangoon menaced the capital. The Communists' main demand had been for the seizure of foreign capital without compensation.

## 2. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Paragraph 1 of your top secret telegram No. 8783 dated 16th August. We have never even thought of armed intervention in internal difficulties in Burma. Suggestion that we might send troops or naval vessels for protection of our nationals was put forward, but after full consideration, we have decided against any such action. Our view is that it is impossible to take effective steps to give adequate protection in case real danger threatens. Half-hearted measures would not only be ineffective but might well irritate Burmese population and Army, and thus lead to greater danger to Indian population. We have informed Ambassador in Rangoon that safest policy is for Indians in Burma to remain aloof from internal conflicts and rely for protection on such Burmese Government as might exist. Ambassador and staff have also been instructed to remain at their posts, whatever the danger, as their presence would help to keep up morale of our people.

1. New Delhi, 17 August 1948. J.N. Collection.

## 3. To Vallabhbhai Patel<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October 2, 1948

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received this evening from the Burmese Charge d'Affaires. I would be grateful if you would kindly let me know what the facts are, so that I can communicate them to him.

When I read the report of your speech this morning<sup>2</sup>, I was rather tro-

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Vallabhbhai Patel, addressing officers and men of the R.I.A.F., had said: "If we have to fight it out and if the Security Council is not able to do anything, then it might as well be called an insecurity council, a disturber of peace". He also said that in Burma, which attained freedom only a few months ago, there was no government ten miles away from Rangoon.



bled by certain references which might cause us embarrassment not only in Burma but in the U.N. which,<sup>3</sup> as you know, is now meeting. I shall be myself there in Paris. On the whole there has been a turn for the better in the United Nations, so far as India is concerned.<sup>4</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. Patel wrote on 3 October: "My views are by no means original in the sense that they are shared by a large number of people in India and outside and even in the U.N.O. itself. You will find them expressed in a different way in the general debates that took place in the U.N.O. only last week". He quoted extensively from the fortnightly summary of External Affairs Ministry and reports from *The Statesman* about insurgents being in control of areas near Rangoon.
4. In a letter to Patel on 4 October (not printed) Nehru wrote that the position in Burma was difficult and "we can hardly say anything which will increase those difficulties by embarrassing the Government of Burma. This was the main theme of the Burmese Charge'd Affaires", Nehru proposed to write to the Burmese official that Patel was misreported.

#### 4. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
October, 2 1948

My dear Rajaji,

This evening I received a strong protest from the Burmese Charge d'Affaires about Vallabhbhai Patel's speech yesterday. I enclose a copy of the letter from the Burmese Embassy. I am hard put to it what to say in reply. I am writing to Vallabhbhai and I enclose a copy of my letter to him.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection,

**1. Cable to D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>**

I have just received your telegram No. 28 dated 14th July.<sup>2</sup> I need hardly assure you of our wholehearted support of Ceylon's application for membership of the United Nations. The opposition, as I see it, is likely to be from the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine; and the former can, if so minded, veto Ceylon's admission.<sup>3</sup> In my opinion, therefore, the thing to do is to concentrate on overcoming the objections of the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine, I consider a statement, on the lines suggested by you, whether made by me or by the Chinese delegate to the Security Council, would have the effect of stiffening rather than overcoming, the opposition of the U.S.S.R. As you must know, the Soviet looks upon China as a henchman of the United States, and public opposition by me of the Soviet point of view is not likely to please Moscow. I am, therefore, telegraphing both to our Ambassador in Moscow and to our Permanent Representative with the United Nations<sup>4</sup> in New York to explain the former to the Soviet Government and the latter to the Soviet and Ukraine delegates, Ceylon's real constitutional and political status and to use their best efforts to overcome opposition to Ceylon's application.

1. 15 July 1948. File No. 42 (6)/48-PMS.
2. Senanayake had expressed his concern at the possibility of Russia vetoing Sri Lanka's application for U.N. membership. He requested Nehru to issue a statement supporting his country's application for U.N. membership and to request China to make a similar pronouncement.
3. Russia vetoed Sri Lanka's application three times as she was not convinced of Sri Lanka's independent status. Sri Lanka became a U.N. member only in December 1955
4. P.P. Pillai.

**2. To D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
July 17, 1948

My dear Prime Minister,

Many thanks for your letter dated June 22, 1948 regarding the acquisition

1. File No. 69-1/47, O.S. II, Vol. II., M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.



of Ceylon citizenship by Indians resident in Ceylon.<sup>2</sup> I regret that, owing to the difficulty of finding time to consider this important question among my other preoccupations, my answer has been somewhat delayed and trust that I shall be forgiven.

2. As regards the observations made in paragraph 3 of your letter,<sup>3</sup> I wish to assure you that, during these negotiations, I have constantly borne in mind the radical change in the political circumstances of our two countries which makes the solution of the problem easier and, at the same time, more urgent. I should also like you to know that I have approached this problem, not as one between two disputing parties in which each has to make concessions to the other but as one requiring a joint effort by two Governments to do justice and to bring contentment to an important section of the population of Ceylon which, though Indian in origin, has made substantial contribution to the economic development of Ceylon.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, I have felt that, in arriving at a solution, we should have regard not so much to the past as to the future.

Adverting to this last consideration, I should be failing in my duty if I did not make it clear that any suggestion that Indian labour proceeded to Ceylon solely for temporary employment on plantations in that country would be contrary to the facts of history. One of the conditions for emigration to other countries to which the Government of India have always attached the utmost importance from the very beginning of Indian emigration has been that an emigrant labourer should be given facilities to settle in the country to which he emigrates on equal terms with members of the indigenous population. The so-called "special" privileges sanctioned by the Government of Ceylon were benefits considered necessary to attract immigrant labour and to ensure that assistance in returning to their homes

2. Negotiations had been going on for some time between Nehru and D.S. Senanayake on granting citizenship to Indian residents in Sri Lanka. The Indian residents and the Government of India in the beginning wanted full rights of citizenship to all Indians on their completing residence of five years and who were prepared to settle permanently in Sri Lanka. The main qualifications proposed by the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, which were embodied in the Citizenship Bill to be introduced in Sri Lanka Parliament in November 1948 were: (1) residence of seven years for married persons and ten years for the unmarried before 31 December 1945 and continued residence up to the date of the application; (2) assured income or adequate means of livelihood; (3) ability to comply with the laws of Sri Lanka; (4) renunciation of Indian citizenship.
3. This paragraph stated that Sri Lanka wanted to satisfy herself, by reasonable tests, that Indian residents who were going to be admitted to citizenship had a genuine interest in the country of their adoption and desired to sever their connection with India.
4. At this time there were about 9,00,000 Indians in Sri Lanka, of whom nearly 700,000 were workers in tea and rubber plantations which produced over 40 per cent of the national income of that country. About 50,000 were traders and the rest were employed as workers, clerks and in other professions.

in India would be available to those migrants who did not want to settle down in the country of immigration. To argue from the existence of these special stipulations that no settlement of Indians in Ceylon was contemplated would not be justified.<sup>5</sup>

3. However, as I have said, I wish to approach the Indo-Ceylon question in relation not to what happened in the past but to what should happen in the future. I recognize, in the light of your letter, that your present proposals do represent an advance in some respects on the views expressed by you last December. For this improvement, I wish to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude. But I still think that on certain fundamental points which are dealt with later on in this letter, changes are necessary. In this connection, I wish to recall that the proposals which I made to you last December went beyond the stand taken by the Government of India in earlier discussions. In fact, in subsequent correspondence, I have agreed to the period of residence being raised to eight years in order to meet your point of view. In deference to your wishes I have also accepted a more elaborate procedure for dealing with applications for citizenship. If I still press certain suggestions upon you for change, it is because I consider them necessary to give satisfaction to the just claims of Indian residents in Ceylon, and because I am anxious that the settlement which I hope may be reached now should be such as to solve the Indian question in Ceylon once and for all in a manner which would be fair and honourable to our two countries and would leave behind no sense of injustice in the minds of those affected. I would ask you to look upon the comments that follow as made solely with this objective.

#### 4. Qualifications for Citizenship

##### (i) *Period of Residence Section 3 (2)*

It would not be correct to suggest that the proposals in the Joint Report of 1941 were acceptable to the Government of India, and that only the final decision was postponed on account of the war.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, the Government of India communicated to the Government of Ceylon their view that several provisions of the agreement were unacceptable. It was only the re-examination of the question in the light of that decision that was interrupted by the War.

5. Senanayake had mentioned in his letter that the large majority of Indians went to Sri Lanka not for settling down there but to work in plantations and to return to their home country in due course.
6. The Government of Sri Lanka had ruled out citizenship to those who were not qualified under the proposals of the Joint Report of 1941 on the "ground of the fortuitous circumstances which compelled the Government of India to postpone their decision on the earlier agreement until after the end of the war."



The period of residence which would qualify an application for citizenship was put forward on previous occasions as only five years. In view of the considerations urged by you, I was willing to agree to a longer period. I therefore proposed that the qualifying period of residence should be 7 years, this period being reckoned backward from 31st December 1947. The provisions of your Bill require, in effect, continuous residence for married persons of  $9\frac{1}{2}$  to  $11\frac{1}{2}$  years and for others from  $12\frac{1}{2}$  years to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  years at the time when application for citizenship is made. This period is far longer than is common in the naturalisation laws of other countries and seems particularly harsh when required of persons with the background of Indian emigrants to Ceylon. As I have already informed you, I am even prepared to agree to continuous residence for eight years for all persons, married or unmarried. This would mean that an applicant would have to prove continuous residence in Ceylon for 8 to 10 years preceding the date of application. I feel that this period is long enough to meet your requirement of an additional period of residence for an unmarried person, and hope that you will find it unnecessary to prescribe a still longer period of residence for such a person.<sup>7</sup>

(ii) *Means of livelihood*

The assistance available from the Immigration Fund to the Indian Estate labourers who wish to return to India has not been overlooked by us in making our proposals under this heading<sup>8</sup>. I believe that in the administration of your law relating to the registration of voters, it is usual to rely on the intention of the prospective Indian voter to settle in Ceylon after retirement as proof of his domicile for the purpose of registration as voter. The labourers who have now retired from active work and continue to live in Ceylon may be said to have established their Ceylon domicile by this very act. Admittedly, people of this age group will not have much interest in such incidents of citizenship as employment in Government departments or land colonisation. But this argument does not appear to me to justify their exclusion from citizenship. Their number is not insignificant. And their exclusion from citizenship would mean that not only they but their minor children also would be permanently debarred from acquiring Ceylon citizenship.<sup>9</sup> I find it difficult to believe that public opinion in Ceylon would be opposed to the grant of citizenship to these persons who have lived and worked for long years in Ceylon and who intend to spend their

7. In his reply of 17 August, Senanayake refused to reduce the period of residence.

8. Under this clause of the bill, full rights of citizenship were not granted to the Indian residents who were destitute and could be repatriated at the expense of the Immigration fund.

9. Senanayake stated in his reply that his Government wished to safeguard itself against accepting liability for the retired persons in the event of their becoming destitute.

remaining days in that country. I hope therefore that your Government will reconsider their attitude in this matter.

I am glad to observe that you are willing to consider alternative drafts of Sec. 5(2)(1). I suggest the following redraft for your consideration:

“that the applicant is not a destitute or a vagrant or a person who is unemployable owing to physical disability and has no means of subsistence”.<sup>10</sup>

(iii) *Residence of family in Ceylon*

I note that you are prepared to delete the provision in Clause 5(2)(ii) regarding the manifestation of intention by the applicant to settle down in Ceylon. I believe that most boys and girls on estates begin to work when they are 12 and that they do not always live or work on the same estates as their parents. To make provision for these cases the following redraft which is substantially the same as the one proposed by you may be adopted.<sup>11</sup>

“that where during the qualifying period of residence required by this Act, the applicant was a married person, his wife and such minor children as were dependent upon him were ordinarily resident in Ceylon”.<sup>12</sup>

(iv) *Compliance with the laws and customs of Ceylon*

I have considered carefully the arguments set out in your letter. It is certainly not my intention that any encouragement should be given to polygamous marriages.<sup>13</sup> I think, however, that the complications of criminal law to which you refer could be avoided by a simple provision, exempting from the provisions of the relevant penal law, marriages contracted prior to the date on which the applicant becomes a citizen.<sup>14</sup> As far as civil law is concerned, I have no doubt that the civil courts in Ceylon will continue satisfactorily to administer the existing law as it affects those who become citizens; it will not be necessary to enact any law specially to meet the re-

10. Senanayake agreed to adopt the redraft proposed by Nehru.

11. The draft of this clause made by the Government of Sri Lanka read: “that where during the qualifying period of past residence required by this Act, the applicant was a married person, his wife and each minor son and unmarried daughter were ordinarily resident with him in Ceylon and that they continued to reside until the date of application”.

12. Senanayake decided to retain the draft of his Government in the confidence that no injustice was intended or would be done thereby.

13. The Government of Sri Lanka declared that no compromise was possible in respect of persons born of marriages illegal according to their own laws.

14. Senanayake had written: “We would naturally like persons admitted to Ceylon citizenship to fit themselves into the laws applicable to one group or the other. In the matter of the Criminal Law particularly, we do not wish to have a new complication introduced which would run counter to the accepted legal principles of the Island”.



quirements of citizens of Indian origin. I therefore urge the deletion of Section 5(2)(iii) which, by virtue of its wide and inclusive wording, is likely to lead to more legal complications than it is intended to avoid. It should be pointed out, incidentally, that a disqualification of this type had not been contemplated before and was put forward for the first time last Christmas.<sup>15</sup>

#### 5. Procedure to be prescribed for acquiring Ceylon citizenship affidavits and certified copies of documents

I note that the provision that the applicant "shall" enclose affidavits by persons other than himself and certified copies of certain documents is not intended to be obligatory and is intended only to enable him to do so if he desires. I understand that it would be difficult for the estate labourers to secure affidavits or certified copies of documents of the type contemplated. An ordinary estate labourer will also find it difficult to cite the list of witnesses in advance. An adverse inference against him is inevitable if at the initial stage he fails to file a comprehensive list. For all these reasons I suggest that sub-clause (c) of Clause 6(1) be omitted and sub-clause (b) be amended to read as follows:

"(b) be supported by affidavit of the applicant".

It should be noted that the class of persons with whom we are dealing will find the procedure laid down difficult unless the application form itself is made as simple as possible and not overburdened with details and by insistence on the provision of additional documents.<sup>16</sup>

#### 6. Enquiry by the Investigating Officer

The position of the Government of India appears to have been misunderstood. There is no objection in any particular case to the investigating officer making the fullest enquiry into the application. However, Section 7(2)(a) makes it obligatory on the investigating officer to visit every place in which the applicant resided during the qualifying period. The main document on which the estate labourer will have to rely will be his identity certificate lodged with the Superintendent of the estate where he is currently employed. This document is prescribed by Ceylon law and contains entries showing the history of employment throughout the life of the labourer in Ceylon. A reference to this document alone should in most cases establish the required residence and further enquiry in estates of earlier employ-

15. Finally, Senanayake did not agree to the deletion of this provision. "We dislike individual exceptions to the Criminal Law of the land".

16. Senanayake agreed to the modification suggested by Nehru.

ment should not be necessary. While any doubts regarding the truth of a statement in the application should certainly empower the investigating officer to visit any or all previous residences of the applicant, a mandatory direction that he shall visit all such residences seems superfluous and might lead to needless delay in the disposal of applications. This point of view would be met if the word "shall" in Section 7(2)(a), (b) and (c) were replaced by the words "may if he considers necessary".<sup>17</sup>

### Objections

I note that you have not found it possible to agree to the prescription of a deposit fee in the case of objections. I am glad, however, to have your assurance that the onus of proof of the grounds of objection will rest upon the objector while the applicant will be able to abide by his statements in the application as verified by the investigating officer.<sup>18</sup> In order to bring this onus home to the objector, I suggest that specific provisions be included to the effect that the objector should set out his objections in specific terms, indicating the particular disqualifications alleged and the grounds on which he bases them.<sup>19</sup>

### *Refusal of Applications*

It is rather surprising that even after the exhaustive enquiries by the investigating officer, only a *prima facie* case should be considered to have been made out by the applicant and a notification inviting objections should be considered necessary. If this provision is to be retained, it seems only fair that, before a commissioner refuses an application on an investigating officer's report, he should give notice to the applicant with a copy of the officer's report and should also give him an opportunity to establish his claim. This is particularly necessary as the investigating officer will not necessarily contact the applicant during his investigations. I hope that you will find it possible to accept this suggestion which will have the beneficial effect of diminishing the need for filing appeals to the Supreme Court.

17. Senanayake agreed to replace the mandatory directions given to the Investigating Officer by a discretionary power to visit such places and examine such documents as might be necessary.
18. "Regarding doubtful cases, the onus of proof of the grounds of objection will be cast on the objector while it will be sufficient for the applicant to abide by his statement in the application as verified and reported as correct by the Investigation Officer".
19. Senanayake replied: "I do not think there is any need to make specific provision in regard to onus of proof and define a procedure admitted in our law".





WITH THE PAPAL NUNCIO, NEW DELHI, 11 AUGUST 1948



AT PALAM AIRPORT, NEW DELHI, 5 OCTOBER 1948



The period of one month allowed for the filing of appeals in Section 14(2) appears to be too short and may be increased to three months.

Further, the principle that the procedure should be inexpensive to an applicant would require that the witnesses for the applicant should be summoned at Government expense. A provision to this effect may also be included.

## 7. Full Citizenship

The Citizenship Bill draws a distinction between citizenship by descent and citizenship by registration. Section 16 of the Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill provides that citizens registered under the latter enactment shall have the same rights and obligations in law as citizens registered under any other Act. I am glad to see that in paragraphs 4(1) and 4(2) of your letter you have referred to the conferment of "full citizenship". The Ceylon Citizenship Bill, however, contains certain provisions which discriminate against citizens by registration. Thus Section 11(1)(b)(iii) of this Bill makes no provision for the wife of a citizen by registration to become a citizen, although it provides for the registration of the wife of a citizen by descent; Section 20(1) requires the minor children of a registered citizen to take certain steps in order to retain Ceylon citizenship while the children of a citizen by descent are not subject to any such requirement. And, Clauses 21 and 22 which provide for loss of citizenship go much further than the corresponding provisions of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. You will remember that, in all past discussions the Government of India have attached the utmost importance to an Indian admitted to Ceylon citizenship being granted the same rights over the whole field of citizenship as a citizen of Ceylonese descent, and that in the past Indian residents in Ceylon agitated against certain disabilities which specifically applied to persons of non-Ceylonese origin. It is only fair that Indians who will be admitted to the Ceylon citizenship after the fulfilment of the somewhat rigorous tests now under discussion, should be assured of the same rights and obligations as citizens of Ceylonese origin. I would suggest, therefore, that in the Ceylon Citizenship Bill a specific provision should be made analogous to section 3 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.

8. I have written somewhat in detail because we are now at the final stage of these prolonged discussions, and I am anxious that there should be the fullest appreciation of our respective points of view. I hope and trust that the suggestions in the preceding paragraphs will be acceptable to you as a fair basis for a settlement and that you will find it possible to modify the Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill on these lines. Once this fundamental issue is solved in a spirit of amity and goodwill on both sides, I am con-

fidant that the ties of friendship which have bound our two countries in the past will be greatly strengthened and India and Ceylon will be able to face the common tasks of the future with the confidence that comes of complete mutual trust and understanding.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. Cable to D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to your letter of 26th July. I note that, owing to preoccupation in budget sessions of your Parliament and other matters of pressing importance, you have not been able to consider immediately matters relating to Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill dealt with in my letter of 17th July. As you know, from standpoint of Indian residents in Ceylon this bill is of the highest importance and urgency. I should be most grateful if you could give me some idea by telegraph as to when you expect to be able to consider our representation regarding its provision and to bring matter before your Parliament.

2. My immediately following telegram deals with our comments on Ceylon Citizenship Bill.

1. New Delhi, 6 August 1948. File No. 69-1/47-0.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

### 4. Cable to D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>

My immediately preceding telegram No. 1488 dated 6th August, 1948.

A. Clause 11 (1)) (b) (iii): I am glad that you have accepted our view that citizens by descent will have same facilities as citizens by registration.

B. Clause 20 (1): I am advised that in the naturalisation laws of all other countries of the British Commonwealth the rule is that where minor

1. New Delhi, 6 August 1948. File No. 69-1/47, O.S. II, Vol. II, ME.A. & C.R., N.A.I.



children are naturalised through the naturalisation of the father, the child has a right to make a declaration of alienage within one year after attaining majority. A provision to this effect has been made in Section 7 of the recent British Nationality Act. The principle adopted in the Ceylon Bill seems to be just the opposite: that is to say the previous nationality of the minor cases, unless certain steps are taken to retain it after the attaining of majority. I suggest, therefore, that this clause be amended so as to do away with the requirement of a confirmatory declaration after the attaining of majority.<sup>2</sup>

C. Clause 21: In the light of what you state I would not press my earlier comment on this clause.<sup>3</sup>

D. Clause 22: I suggest that sub-clause (b) be confined to offences amounting to waging war against the State and that it would be better to mention these offences specifically rather than refer to the entire Chapter VI of the Penal Code, which, I understand, contains certain sections which deal with offences other than waging or attempting to wage war or abetting war against the State.<sup>4</sup>

E. I note that you are unable to accept my suggestion to include a clause in the Bill on the lines of Section 3 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914. I am not particularly anxious for a statutory provision of this kind so long as we have an assurance from the Ceylon Government that there will be no discrimination, either legislative or administrative, between citizens by descent and citizens by registration, for example, in respect of eligibility for the franchise or for office. You will no doubt appreciate that in the absence of an assurance of this kind, it will be difficult for Indian residents to decide whether they should acquire Ceylon citizenship by registration or not.<sup>5</sup>

2. From our point of view, Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill is essential complementary of Ceylon Citizenship Bill; otherwise large number of Indians now resident in Ceylon, whose claim to become Ceylon citizens has been recognized in principle by both Governments, will be left unprovided for. I would, therefore, strongly urge that Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill should receive immediate attention.

2. Senanayake had contended that this provision was an accepted principle of naturalization. He assured that any lapse in making the declaration within the prescribed period might be rectified at any time, for good cause shown.
3. Senanayake had stated that this clause was a necessary safeguard against the probability of Sri Lanka being saddled with responsibility for large numbers of her citizens who might leave the country after registration and settle down elsewhere and be a source of embarrassment after some time.
4. Senanayake had declared that there was justification for registered citizens convicted by a court for waging war against the adopted state to be deprived of their citizenship.
5. Senanayake had refused to include in the citizenship bill the question of rights and privileges for citizens whether by descent or by registration.

## 5. Changes in Citizenship Bill<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister explained to the members<sup>2</sup> that there was no question of breaking off negotiations. The Government of India's position in this matter was rather peculiar in that Government were trying to induce Ceylon to accept as part of its population a large number of Indian citizens; in other words it was not a question of extending citizenship of India but of facilitating the renunciation of such citizenship by Indians. Ceylon was a small country with a population of about seven million and had its own difficulties to face. The Prime Minister's view was that the Government of India should press their views on the Ceylon Government for necessary amendments of the Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill and at the same time request the Ceylon Government to enact the bill at an early date. This view was generally agreed to by all the members.

1. Remarks at a meeting of the Standing Committee for the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, 2 September 1948. File No. 69-1/47-O.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The members present included H.N. Kunzru, Seth Govinddass, N.G. Ranga, H.V. Kamath, Begum Aizaz Rasul, Kameshwara Singh, Thirumala Rao, V.N. Pillai and S.V. Krishnamurthy Rao.

## 6. To V.V. Giri<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8th September, 1948

My dear Giri,

I enclose a letter for Senanayake which contains my reply to his letters of August 17 and 19 respectively. I have given careful consideration to the suggestions<sup>2</sup> contained in your letter of September 2 to Dutt.<sup>3</sup> I have also

1. File No. 69-1/47-O.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. V.V. Giri was of the opinion that the Sri Lanka Citizenship Bill which had become law, should have been deferred till negotiations on the Indian Residents Citizenship Bill had been concluded between India and Ceylon.
3. Subimal Dutt (b. 1905); joined I.C.S., 1928; served in Bengal; Agent to Government of India in Malaysia, 1941; Secretary, Ministry of Commonwealth Relations, 1947-50; Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1949-52; Ambassador to West Germany, 1952-54; Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1954-55; Foreign Secretary, 1955-61; Ambassador to Moscow, 1961-62; first Ambassador and later High Commissioner in Bangladesh, 1972-74; author of *With Nehru in the Foreign Office*, (1971).



consulted the members of the Standing Committee of the Legislature on this subject, I have now come to the conclusion that it would not be in the interests of our countrymen in Ceylon to prolong the controversy with the Ceylon Government on the contents of the Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill. Continuation of this controversy would mean that there would be no citizenship law for Indians for an indefinite period and 90 per cent of the Indian residents in Ceylon would, as a result, be subject to all the disabilities of an alien. This, I am satisfied, would be against their interests. Will you please explain the position informally to the Ceylon Indian Congress leaders?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 7. To D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8th September 1948

My dear Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letters of the 17th and 19th August respectively on the subject of citizenship for Indians resident in Ceylon.<sup>2</sup>

You will forgive me if I am unable to accept your interpretation of the history of Indian immigration into Ceylon; this is a subject on which, I suppose, we must agree to differ. I also do not think that the amendments suggested by us to the qualifications for citizenship which have been included in the Indian Residents (Citizenship) Bill are not justified. Your letter of the 22 June, in which you stated that "the present proposal of the Government of Ceylon extends to Indians resident in the Island full rights and privileges of Ceylon citizenship" had led me to think that, once an Indian had been admitted to Ceylon citizenship he would have all the rights and privileges as well as the obligations and liabilities of a Ceylon citizen. That you should have found it impossible to remove the legal restrictions under certain existing ordinances, which would affect citizens by registration, has, if I may say so, come to me as a great disappointment.

I do not wish to prolong this discussion over the provisions of the Bill as I am anxious that provision for the acquisition of citizenship by Indians resident in Ceylon should be made without further delay. I shall, therefore, appeal to your sense of justice and your desire for friendship with India and in the name of both, ask for the following:

1. File No. 69-1/47-O.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Senanayake had written that it had not been possible "to agree to any further modifications in the qualifications or procedure for admission to Ceylon citizenship".

- (i) that, even at this late stage, you may find it possible to accept the suggestions that I have already made regarding the qualifications for citizenship by registration; and
- (ii) an assurance that, in future, there will be no administrative or legislative discrimination against Indians who become citizens of Ceylon by registration.

I do not feel that we shall carry this matter forward by further argument. You and I have both had our say and some action must be taken to relieve the Indians in Ceylon of their suspense. I would, therefore, earnestly request that immediate steps be taken to enact legislation for the acquisition by Indians resident in Ceylon of the citizenship of your country.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

- 3. However, the Ceylon Citizenship Bill was at last passed in the House of Representatives in the face of the united opposition of all opposition parties. The main ground of the opposition was that it intended to deprive the Indian plantation labourers of the right of citizenship.

## 8. India's Regrets<sup>1</sup>

I think we might send a brief acknowledgement to Mr. Senanayake in which we might say that I regret he has found himself unable to agree to our proposals. Nothing more need be said. This would not mean our breaking off, and it would also give freedom of action to the members of the Ceylon Legislature to act as they wish.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, 2 October 1948. File No. 69-1/47-O.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.



**9. To D.S. Senanayake<sup>1</sup>**

New Delhi  
4th October 1948

My dear Prime Minister,

I thank you for your letter of September 21 on the subject of citizenship for Indians resident in Ceylon. I do not propose, after what I have stated in my last letter, to enter upon a detailed discussion with you in regard to the restrictions to which citizens by registration will continue to be subject. I can only regret that you have found yourself unable to agree to the proposals in my letter of September 8.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 69-1/47-O.S. II, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

**V. INDONESIA****1. Indonesia's Case in the U.N.<sup>1</sup>**

I am not clear why Shiva Rao has taken up a somewhat neutral attitude in regard to Indonesia. The press report stated that he did not vote. Nothing should be done on our behalf which might weaken Indonesia's case.<sup>2</sup>

1. Note, 11 September 1948. File No. 1(43) U.N. II/48, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. Russia's minister had protested against inclusion by the Netherlands Government of the Indonesian republic territories in statistics and other information submitted to the U.N. and proposed their exclusion. Britain, France, Belgium and Denmark decided to move amendments to this proposal. Shiva Rao appealed for time to study the Russian proposal. He said: "The situation in Indonesia being fluid, it is difficult to take a decision at this stage".

## 2. Cable to Mohammad Hatta<sup>1</sup>

Many thanks for your telegram. We deeply sympathize with you and your difficulties<sup>2</sup> and shall continue to do all we can on the diplomatic plane. As for your foreign relations I can well understand your desire to extend them.<sup>3</sup> I also realize that the Renville principles<sup>4</sup> have been violated more than once by the Dutch. Whether any such violation on your part will not prejudice your position in international eyes is a point on which you are the best judge. The entire situation is so fluid; and if there is any possibility of important developments in the next month or two, it may be wise to await them.<sup>5</sup>

Whatever action you may take you can count on the full sympathy and support of the Government of India. If you have any suggestions to make to us we should gladly consider them.

1. New Delhi, 20 September 1948. File No. 136(TS) FEA/48, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. In Indonesia, the Communists, who were partners in the coalition government, broke away and made an unsuccessful armed revolt against the Hatta Government. Meanwhile, the Dutch were conducting a blockade to strangle the Republic.
3. Hatta had written on 15 September that, according to Renville Agreement signed on 17 January 1948 they had agreed to restrict their foreign service, but their parties wished their Government to extend foreign relations.
4. The Renville Agreement put a stop to the Dutch "police action" and Indonesia's fight against it. Article 5 of this agreement stated "that as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic, activity, trade transportation and communication be restored through the cooperation of both parties taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts of Indonesia". The Dutch had, however, been violating this provision of the Renville Agreement.
5. He wrote that these problems would cause confusion until a final settlement was reached and had suggested that they should wait for a month or two.

## 3. Communist Revolt in Indonesia<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Ubani, the representative for the Indonesian Republic,<sup>2</sup> came to see me this morning. He told me that he had received a message from his Gov-

1. Note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, 21 September 1948. File No. 136-FEA/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. B.A. Ubani.



ernment for me. This was to draw our attention to the serious developments in Indonesia arising from the Communist revolt in Java. They were going to deal with this of course to the best of their ability but they were apprehensive lest the Dutch might misbehave at this juncture and in the name of some police action take military measures against the Republic.

2. If this happened, the Republic would of course be placed in a very difficult position between these two fires. The Communists would be strengthened and relatively moderate elements in Indonesia would suffer a collapse.

3. The Indonesian Government therefore requested us to use our good offices on their behalf with the U.S.A. Government and point out to them the dangers of any so-called police action by the Dutch. Also that any delay by the Dutch in coming to terms with the Republic would also strengthen the Communist factions.

4. I think there is substance in what the Indonesian representative told me and we might draw the attention of the U.S.A., and, I would add, of the U.K. Governments to these possible dangers and to suggest to them the desirability of impressing upon the Dutch that they should refrain from any aggressive action and come to a settlement with the Indonesian Republic.

5. We might also speak on these lines to the Netherlands' Ambassador here.

#### 4. To A. Soekarno<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear President,

I am grateful for the copy of your book, *Sarinah*, which you have sent me.<sup>2</sup> I am very sorry that owing to ignorance of the Indonesian language, I am unable to read it.

We have been following with the greatest anxiety developments in Indonesia and all our good wishes are with you. We are doing whatever we can at this end. I am going to England in a few days and to Paris. At both places I shall try to help your cause, which is ours also.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The book dealt with the problems of women in general and was named after Soekarno's nurse.

Our new Consul-General<sup>3</sup> will be going to Indonesia soon. We shall give him the fullest instructions to give you every cooperation and help. Indeed that is the reason why we send him.

With all good wishes to you and to Indonesia.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. S.C. Alagappan.

### 5. To Mohammad Yunus<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

My dear Yunus,

I have your letter and President Soekarno's book. I enclose a brief letter of thanks for President Soekarno which please hand over to him.

You mention in your letter the previous letter that you wrote. I think I have answered that already. Indonesia is going through a severe crisis and I think you should stay there at present. Raghavan will be coming here soon and his successor will be sent as soon as possible. At this moment we cannot afford to have you away from Indonesia.

From another point of view also, your coming here at present will not be worthwhile. I am sorry to say that conditions in the Frontier Province are not good. Badshah Khan, Dr. Khan Saheb and so many of our other colleagues are in various prisons. The property of some of them has been forfeited. The Pakistani Government, and more specially the Abdul Qayyum Government, is behaving in a scandalous way. Abdul Qayyum is in a sense fighting for life and power against the growing forces against him. Manki Pir is deadly opposed to him and so are others and he is very unpopular. So he is relying on ever-growing repression.

To some extent the position of Pakistan as a whole is also deteriorating and disintegrating. We feel very sad and helpless at being unable to do anything when our friends are suffering so much. There is no direct way of helping, or even indirect. We have to wait for the turn of events, but events are marching fairly fast and may turn before very long.

The success of the Hyderabad operation has produced very great results. Among them the chief result is that communal tension all over India is infinitely less than it has been for a long time past. There is a feeling of

1. J.N. Collection.



security and stability both amongst Muslims and Hindus in India. Just as India has gained greatly by this operation, so Pakistan feels frustrated and weak. Because of this they tend to misbehave even more than before. The Pakistan press nowadays is a horror, full of the most amazing falsehoods and vulgarities and personal attacks.

Mian Iftikharuddin has been in America for some months.

Please tell President Soekarno that we are watching developments in Indonesia with great anxiety. We are doing everything we can to bring pressure upon the great powers in favour of Indonesia. Please tell him also that our new Consul-General, who will be going soon, will have specific instructions to help him and his Government in every way.

I am going to England in another week's time. I shall return at the end of October.

Indira has just come here from Lucknow. Her children are still in Lucknow. I am going with her for a day to Srinagar on the 1st October, returning on the 2nd. Journeys to Srinagar by air are very easy and very swift nowadays.

Love to you and Laj.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## VI. MALAYSIA

### 1. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Government of India are seriously concerned about the present situation in Malaya.<sup>2</sup> According to information furnished by their representative, Thivy, the present terrorist activities and guerilla fighting are led by the Malayan Communist Party with the assistance of wartime Resistance Army,

1. New Delhi, 24. July 1948, File No. 46-4/48-O.S. II, Part II, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. British authorities in Malaysia imposed an emergency on 16 June 1948 to deal with communist-inspired strikes and violence. In May and June 1948 over 50 persons were killed by terrorists. On 23 July, the British authorities in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore outlawed the Malayan Communist Party and three subsidiary organisations as the "directing force" of terrorists.

known as the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army. This army is now fighting under the name of Anti-British Army. The guerilla plan of operation is designed to demonstrate championship of the cause of labour by killing and terrorising planters and other employers and thus to enlist labour's sympathy and even active support.

2. From August 1945 till June 1948 when federations of trade unions were declared illegal and office-bearers of federations and affiliated unions were arrested, the Malayan Communist Party and members of the former Resistance Army controlled almost all labour unions, as they held key positions in these unions and had played a leading part in organising them. There were some Indian office bearers in these unions and federations also but their number was small and they did not form part of the high command which framed and directed policy. During this period frequent strikes took place throughout Malaya. The strikers were mostly Indian labourers in plantations, dockyards, railways, municipalities. They took part in strikes because ostensible object was amelioration of the conditions of daily-paid workers, and Indian labour forms the bulk of daily-paid labour in Malaya. (The Chinese are mainly contract workers). Since top labour leaders were Chinese Communists, and decision to call strikes usually rested with them, the Indian rank and file were in effect exploited by them, but Indian labour had neither knowledge of nor sympathy with those aims of these leaders which were unconnected with amelioration of labour conditions.

3. Sometimes the strikes proved ineffective. On occasions, however, they resulted in some slight improvement in the conditions of labour which the employers had to concede under the compulsion of events. These successes helped to secure to Communist leaders confidence of Indian labourers who, unfortunately, were without leadership from other sources. Along with the Chinese, some Indian labour leaders have also been arrested. Many of the Chinese leaders who have escaped arrest have joined the rebels or gone underground. No Indian leader is known to have joined the rebels.

4. Government of India have no sympathy with terrorists, whether Chinese or Indian, and recognise that first responsibility of H.M.G. is to restore law and order and ensure their maintenance. They wish, however, to make two comments :

(1) For reasons given in preceding paragraphs, they consider that it would be unfair to hold great mass of Indian labour as associated



with or in any way responsible for violent activities of Communists, mainly Chinese. It follows that it would be unjust to take strong measures against rank and file of the Indian labour and there is real danger that such promiscuous severity would result in a serious deterioration of labour situation in Malaya, deterioration which must also affect political situation. Some cases of victimisation of Indian labour are reported to have already taken place. Exact information is not available as estates are now cordoned off by the Military.

(2) Such success as Chinese Communists have had with Indian labour has been due to their championship of its cause. If, along with the measures adopted by Malayan Government to deal with campaign of violence, immediate action could be taken to remove Indian labour's legitimate grievances, great mass of this body could be effectively weaned from the subversive and violent elements which have disturbed the tranquillity and threaten the security of Malaya.

5. The Government of India would like you to make representations in this sense to the United Kingdom Government. If the U.K. Government are prepared to receive our suggestions as to how labour conditions should be improved, we shall send Thivy to London with all necessary details to assist you in discussions with U.K. Government. We are advised that there is room for improvement in respect of the following among others:

(i) Daily rates of wages are not adequately related to cost of living. The increase in wages granted in April was neutralised by increase in the task and hours of work. The quantum of task is so regulated in relation to productivity that it is almost impossible to bring in extra latex and thus earn bonus.

(ii) Indian labour engaged on direct contract rates is paid for less per pound of latex than the rates paid to the Chinese. Indians are offered employment at contract rates mainly in those areas where the trees are less productive and their earning capacity is thereby reduced. On the other hand, Chinese are invariably given more productive areas to work in.

(iii) A task like spot marking is a separate operation from tapping and cannot be performed at the time of tapping. Yet no overtime or separate payment is allowed for such work. Women tappers perform the same task as men and yet are paid less.

(iv) Labour lines are insanitary and rooms are overcrowded. The

law is not followed in regard to hospital facilities and personnel. Children below age limit are often permitted to work instead of going to school.

(v) In view of shortage of foodstuffs like rice, dal etc., and distances involved, proper arrangements should be made to ensure regular supplies on the estates.

(vi) There is constant resort to the Law of Criminal and Civil Trespass against labourers who have no choice but to live in labour lines built on estates. These estates being private properties, a dismissed worker continuing to live on the estate for more than 24 hours or a visiting trade unionist or other interested parties, are liable to be prosecuted. This legal power is used indiscriminately by employers. Such prosecutions affect security of tenure of the employee and his family and his freedom of association. Workers are dismissed without being accorded proper reasons or sufficient time and followed up by trespass proceedings.

(vii) Labourers employed by harbour boards, municipalities etc., have legitimate grievances of their own in respect of wages and method of employment. Details would make telegram unwieldy.

6. Other desirable improvements such as those relating to education, medical care, land settlement etc., can wait until after the present critical situation is over, but Thivy can also provide details in regard to these.

7. If Thivy goes to London, he may also have discussions with the headquarters of Employers' Associations, but we should not think of sending him unless you consider his presence desirable for discussions with His Majesty's Government.

## 2. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to our telegram No. 8548 dated 24th July regarding situation in Malaya.

We are naturally concerned to protect Indian interests in Malaya. In the past these have been sacrificed and wages and conditions of work of

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1948. File No. 46-4/48-O.S. II, Part II, M.E.A., N.A.I.



Indians have been worse than those of Chinese in Malaya. We are not concerned with taking sides in Malayan politics but we certainly desire that Indian labour should keep away from terroristic activities in Malaya which we cannot approve of. There is no question of Indians lining up with any imperialism. Fortunately thus far Indians in Malaya have had good relations both with Chinese and Malaysians although there is deep rift between latter two. Unless Indians keep completely aloof from violent upheaval, they will be crushed and would lose sympathy of Malaysians.

Our Consul in Singapore is well-known labour leader popular not only with Indians but also with Chinese and Malaysians.

In our last telegram we requested you to draw attention of U.K. Government to necessity of immediate reforms in regard to labour conditions. This is the only sensible way of meeting present situation in Malaya. I trust that you have done so.

### 3. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 4, 1948

My dear Krishna,

Your letter of the 28th July about Malaya. The telegram you referred to was of course officially drafted.<sup>2</sup> I did not give it any careful consideration as I had previously had a talk with Thivy and others. Perhaps some parts of it might have been differently expressed. But the main object of the telegram is to press for the betterment of the lot of Indian labour with whom we are principally concerned. It has long been our complaint that Indian labour is treated even worse than Chinese labour. The main purpose of the telegram was for you to draw the attention of the U.K. Government to these conditions of Indian workers.

2. As for paragraph 8, there was no question in anybody's mind of asking the rubber planting or employing interests in Malaya to give protection to our people, at the most to deal with them as employers are dealt with on behalf of workers<sup>3</sup>. In Malaya there are very few responsible persons

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Krishna Menon received a telegram dated 26 July from Government of India about Indians in Malaysia. He objected to its approach which "is casting us in the role of an ally of imperialism and rushing in to defend the empire... This telegram could be justified only if it came from the Government prior to 15 August 1947".

3. He wrote about para 8 of the telegram, "the Government of India do not ask me or itself participate in dealing with the rubber planting and look to them for the protection of our people. As I feel sure these implications of para 8 will be clear to you and both their sinister and humiliating character would not meet with your approval".

on the part of the employers. They have their agents there who are unable to take the initiative in anything and everything has to be referred to London. It was because of this that Thivy said that it might be useful to press the matter firmly before the employers in case he went there.

3. Whether Thivy is a Roman Catholic or not, I do not know.<sup>4</sup> But he certainly is not a religious man in the normal sense of the word. He is extraordinarily popular with Indian labour for whom he has worked hard for many years. Indeed he has been popular with Chinese and Malayan labour also and has got on very well in the past with trade unions including the communist trade unions. I do not think he has even any bias in communism as such.

4. But I found him worried at the turn events were taking in Malaya where terrorism and murder were increasing. This was creating a rift between the Chinese and the Malaysians or rather it was widening the rift between the two.<sup>2</sup> The Indian workers were in an unenviable position and likely to suffer greatly.

5. I hardly think we can compare what is happening in Malaya or Burma with Indonesia. Certainly the Indonesian leaders, so far as I know, would disapprove of such a comparison. Whatever the motives, the fact that murder and terrorism are made methods of political action, does not appeal to me. In any event I would disapprove of them. For Indians to be associated with them especially in Malaya is to invite disaster, for that means trouble for the indigenous Malaysians. There is no question of Indians there allying themselves with imperialism. But I certainly should not like them to become partners in murders.

6. In some parts of India, notably Malabar, there was a parallel movement, though on a smaller scale. What happened there was that a large number of people, who neither understood nor appreciated the communist doctrine, allied themselves with certain communist groups and started behaving in an amazingly brutal way. Some accounts I had were pretty ghastly. There was plenty of murder and there was chopping of hands and feet as punishment often because the money demanded was not forthcoming, or something else had happened. The result of this was that the people generally in Malabar gradually turned against this kind of thing and began hunting these terrorists.

7. I am not prepared to condemn any violent revolution in favour of political or economic freedom. But I am convinced that the methods of murder and terrorism of the kind practised in Malaya, Burma and to some extent in Malabar do not bring any kind of freedom, but only produce horror and disruption. In Burma the Government is certainly not rightist

4. Krishna Menon had written: "I would be interested to know (for my private information) whether Mr. Thivy, who is no doubt a good and conscientious officer is a Roman Catholic."



by any means. It is very left wing. In spite of this, a rebellion has taken place against them. If that rebellion even partially succeeds it will reduce Burma into a state of absolute chaos. So I do not see why we should not condemn these methods while at the same time demanding political or economic change.

8. If as I hold, the Indians in Malaya are not to associate themselves with a movement which is so intimately associated with terrorism and individual killing, I am equally clear that they must not become allies of imperialism in opposing any demand for the betterment of the people generally or the workers. Malaya is a curious mixture of races, chiefly Malaysians and Chinese with a good proportion of Indians. Between the Chinese and the Malaysians there is no love lost and the Malaysians are terribly afraid of being dominated over by the Chinese. In these circumstances the Indians have to move varily. They have thus far succeeded in keeping the friendship of both Malaysians and Chinese which was rather remarkable. There is no reason why they should not continue to try to do so. But they can and should keep away from the campaign of individual terrorism and at the same time stand for the world's rights.

9. Essentially this is the attitude which we should like to take up and which we wanted you to place before the U.K. Government.

10. The Chinese in Malaya call themselves communists and I suppose there are some of them who are communists but most of them are just Chinese and nothing much more, although they take this label on. There seems to me an essential difference between the Chinese communists of the north-west of China and these Malayan Chinese communists who have had no proper training or background.

11. You refer to this upheaval in South East Asia. Undoubtedly it represents a powerful urge of the people and as such it must be understood and appreciated. But I do feel that the turn it has taken in action is deplorable and likely to lead to very harmful results for the people concerned.

12. So far as Malayan planters are concerned, no one need waste any sympathy on them. They have been a bad lot and have treated their workers callously often enough.

13. In one of your previous letters you expressed your great apprehension at the denial of civil liberties in India. I share that apprehension to a large extent and I am trying to do my utmost to impress my wishes and my fears on provincial governments. This has had some effect upon them. But ever since the partition, and what happened as a result of it, we live surrounded by fear and the possibility of war or something like it prevents any normality from returning. The result is a continuous state of tension in the

public mind and the provincial governments behaving in the manner they have done. I shall continue to impress upon them my views on the subject, but I rather think that in the near future no substantial results can be obtained.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

#### 4. Indian Labour in Malaysia<sup>1</sup>

I am entirely opposed to the proposal made by Mr. Thivy.<sup>2</sup> Labour can never be organised properly with Government funds. These funds are suspect, just as employers' funds are suspect. I am opposed also to the Malayan Government being asked to contribute.<sup>3</sup> All that the Government of India can do is perhaps to help in establishing some welfare centres for Indian labour.

1. Note to Additional Secretary, 10 August 1948. File No. 46-4/48-O.S. III, Part III, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Thivy had suggested that the Government of India should provide 50,000 dollars for organising trade unions among Indian plantation labour in Malaysia to sustain for six months young enthusiastic Indians who were willing to undertake this task.
3. He had also said that any funds provided by the Malaysian Government would be suspected by Indian labourers.



## VII. CHINA

1. To H.H. Kung<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

1 July 1948

My dear Dr. Kung,<sup>2</sup>

I was glad to receive your letter some time ago and I must apologise to you for the great delay in answering it. As you perhaps know, we are overwhelmed with our problems and the last few months have been particularly trying.

I entirely agree with you that India and China are united by close and common bonds of culture and friendship, and that they should cooperate in the East as well as on the world stage.

I have not heard much about the proposal to which you refer for the convocation of an East Asia conference. There have of course been many suggestions for regional conferences comprising East and South East Asia. You will remember that last year we had an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi. I have no doubt that the countries of East and South East Asia, as also Australia and New Zealand, should find ways and means for greater cooperation and when possible should meet for this purpose.

You suggest that the conference should be specifically to combat communism and promote economic cooperation. I think any such specific object would rather defeat the constructive purpose of the conference and make it chiefly negative. I realise that the Communist Party has played much mischief in some Asian countries and we are having a good deal of trouble from it in India. But the way to meet it is not just negatively but rather positively to have policies and programmes which solve the economic ills of our respective countries.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1880-1967), supported Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek in the revolutionary years, 1911-17; acting minister of finance, Canton Government, 1924-27; minister of industry and commerce, 1928-31; member, central executive committee of the Kuomintang after 1931; minister of finance, Nationalist Government, 1933-44; Governor, Bank of China, 1933-35; after the War, he retired from politics and lived mainly in the United States.

## 2. To Anna Wang<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 3, 1948

Dear Anna,<sup>2</sup>

K.P.S. Menon brought me your letter.<sup>3</sup> I am afraid I have taken a long time to reply to it. Yes, indeed, I remember you well. Did you not almost fly with me to Burma, and then you did not because of some passport difficulty and you were a little afraid lest you might be kept back in Burma. It was an unnecessary fear.

I am afraid there is no chance of my going to China for some time to come and the distant future is equally uncertain. I am utterly tied up in work and worry. If possibly I can leave India I shall go to Europe next October. But I would like to come to China of course, and one of the main attractions there would be to meet again Madame Sun Yat-sen. If you admire her with all your heart, I am of your company and I admire her equally. In this dark and dismal world she has been a bright star of steadfast hope.

You write to me about Dr. Kotnis' child.<sup>4</sup> I think I sent the photograph of the child to Dr. Kotnis' family. I forget what happened next. But I shall try to find out and let you know.

If ever it is possible for Rewi Alley to come to India, he will be very welcome and I think he would help us a great deal. I am not suggesting that he should leave China for good. But it would be worthwhile from our point of view for him to come here for a few months if he could. I remember some years ago speaking to Gandhiji about him and he expressed a wish that he might come to India.

As for you, you will be welcome whenever you can manage to come here and you will help in bringing India and China nearer to each other. Do not think that this is just a formal wish. You will find many friends here.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(169)/48-PMS.

2. Dr. Anna Wang; a German journalist married to Dr. Wang Bing-nan; engaged in child welfare programmes through China Welfare Fund, Shanghai, assisted the members of Indian Medical Mission to China in 1938; helped in establishing contacts between Mrs. Kotnis and her son and their Indian relatives; later returned to Germany; author of *Second Motherland—China*.

3. Along with the letter of 10 April 1948 to Nehru, Anna Wang had sent a photograph of the son and wife of D.S. Kotnis and offered to escort the son to his father's family in India.

4. Ing-Hwa (1942-1967); son of Dwarkanath S. Kotnis and his Chinese wife Kuo Ching-lan. He remained in China and visited India along with his mother to meet members of his father's family in August 1958. Ing-Hwa means flower of India.



3. To Madame Sun Yat-sen<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 July 1948

My dear Madame Sun,

K.P.S. Menon brought me your letter when he came here from China. He also gave me a little later the lovely book of woodcuts that you sent. There could have been no more charming or welcome present. But indeed anything that you would send me would be welcome and charming.

How true your letter is when you compare India and China in their troubles.<sup>2</sup> We have had our fill of trouble and perhaps you have had more than your fill. And yet there is no peace and quiet visible, and we have to labour on to the best of our ability. As you say, all of us work under the yoke in different manner and in different fields. Only a faith in the future and in the people, not very logical but nevertheless vital, carries us on.

I was happy to read in your letter about the growth of the China Welfare Fund and the good work it has done especially among the children.<sup>3</sup>

It is more than 20 years since I had a glimpse of you in a Moscow hotel.<sup>4</sup> Ever since then I had hoped and wished to meet you again, for to see you and meet you is to gain faith in the vital things of life, and sometimes one wants that faith very badly. You have been a beacon not only to China but to many people in other countries. I do not know if you would realise how much your radiant personality has meant to others. I wish I could come to China and meet you, for I fear you will not come to India. But why should you not come to India for a little while? It will be good for us and good for you also if I may say so. But whether we meet or not, I think of you often and the photograph you sent me long ago looks at me and cheers me up.

With all good wishes to you and China.

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Sun Yat-sen had written on 9 April 1948, "India and China are like giant oxen, burdened with an irritating yoke of outside interference pulling against the weight of feudalism and exploitation.... It will come to pass. Our people, like the common people the world over, have an indestructible essence, a great inner strength which will never allow failure".

3. She informed Nehru about the participation of China Welfare Fund in National Children's week and the result of their work among Shanghai's poorest children.

4. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 2, pp 374, 440.

#### 4. To Madame Chiang Kai-shek<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 July 1948

My dear Madame Chiang,

Your brief letter reached me sometime ago<sup>2</sup> and ever since then, and indeed before, I have been thinking of writing to you. I owe you a thousand apologies for this delay. But you know how the mind works when it has to face a continuous difficulty and worry. One does one's daily round of work because one must. But the things that one really wants to do remain undone for in order to do them one seeks a little leisure and peace of mind, a proper mood when one can empty the mind of its present troubles and seek repose and some content in memories and fancies. And so I did not write to you although I have been wanting to write ever so much.

I have been thinking of you so often for a variety of reasons, both personal and public. The memory of your visit to India, six long years ago,<sup>3</sup> remains fresh in my mind and I remember how I had then thought of visiting you in the not distant future. But that visit never came off and I do not know when it will come off, for we are all prisoners in prisons of our own making, and no prison is harder than that.

I have thought of you with all the enormous problems that you have to face from day to day and hour to hour, and curiously I have found some relief in that thought when my own problems and difficulties encompass me, and then, so often, I have compared China with India, both struggling hard to find a new life, both for the moment stopped and delayed by high barriers.

Six years ago and more since you came here for a brief while, what a lot has happened since then. I fear that I have grown much older than even these six years of life, and feel worried and rather disillusioned. How much more time is spent on trivial activities which have little meaning. How full indeed is human life of triviality. We think and work for the high moments of life when the flame burns brightly for a brief while. But the high moments come rarely and when they come, they pass away too soon. And then again triviality and ever more of triviality and sometimes something even worse. But how have you fared during these long years? With

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Madame Chiang Kai-shek had written on 13 May that the General and she would be seeing K.M. Panikkar the next day and would be glad to get first hand information of Nehru. "We think of you often and suffer with you the difficulties and trials attendant upon the setting up of a new government. For we in China, too, are faced with somewhat the same dilemma".

3. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife visited India from 9 to 21 February 1942. See *Selected Works* (first series) Vol. 12, pp. 466-479.



your great courage and vitality you must have faced problems and difficulties with a smile. But however much we may smile, each experience leaves its mark somewhere on the screen of our minds. We grow wiser, they say, but I sometimes wonder if that kind of wisdom is so desirable after all.

You know my sister, Nan is in Moscow. She has rather liked the place and Lekha has got on particularly well and now speaks Russian fluently. Nevertheless, the environment and the life in Moscow are very trying and Nan has had a feeling of frustration there. I do not think I shall keep her in Moscow for long. Probably some months later we shall call her back.

It is rather futile to talk of what will happen some months later, for the pace of events is such that none can tell what will happen even a few weeks later. In spite of war and disaster, humanity does not learn, and again the world seems to be drifting to fresh disaster.

I would love to come to China, more specially to see you again, but I fear there is little chance for me to do so in the near future. There is some talk of my going to Europe in September or October, at about the time when the United Nations Assembly meets in Paris. I am very fond of Paris and if there is an excuse to go there, I shall try to avail myself of it. But I rather doubt if I shall be able to leave India at all this year.

What a lovely jade ring you sent to Indira. When that ring came to me through K.P.S. Menon, Indira was away and it was some time before she got it. She was enchanted. I think she wrote to you about it. Did you receive her letter?

I sent you, was it last year, my last book, *The Discovery of India*. I do not know if you received it. As usual, this book was written in prison. If you did not receive it, may I send it to you again?

With my affectionate regards.

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To Tai Chi-tao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10 July 1948

Dear Friend,<sup>2</sup>

I have not thanked you yet for the lovely fan you have sent me on which is

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Tai Chi-tao (1890-1949); also known as Tai Chuansien; served as a government official for several years; member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and minister for information, 1924; President, National Sun Yat-sen University. 1926-30; President, Examination Yuan, and member, standing committee, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1928-45. State councillor, National Government, 1942-45.

inscribed in your beautiful calligraphy a poem written by you in memory of Mahatma Gandhi. I was waiting for a translation of that poem to be made and I requested the Chinese Ambassador here, Dr. Lo Chia-luen to be good enough to make this translation. He has now sent me a fine translation and I have read this with very great interest and appreciation.

I shall treasure this for many reasons, both because you have sent it and because of the fine writing that is inscribed upon it. It is a symbol to me of not only your valued friendship but of the friendship of China and India.

Ever since you came to India, and I unfortunately could not meet you, a great many things have happened in both our countries, and we have had to face a multitude of troubles. I do not know when these troubles will end. But it is a comfort to know that there are friends, though far remote and distant, yet actuated by common spirit.

I do not know when I shall be able to meet you, for I am tied down to my work here and you are fully occupied with your own work. I look forward to another meeting, but whether we meet soon or not we remain close to each other in thought and spirit.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To M.S. Kotnis<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
12 September 1948

Dear Mr. Kotnis,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of 3rd September.<sup>3</sup> My Secretary will write to you more fully about this matter.

Some time ago I received a letter from a friend<sup>4</sup> in China saying that Dr. Kotnis' child could be sent to India if his family here so desired. It is

1. File No. 2 (169)/48-PMS.

2. Mangesh S. Kotnis (1907-1979); elder brother of Dwarakanath S. Kotnis, one of the five members of the Indian Medical Mission sent to China in 1938; in official service in Bombay, 1974; visited China in 1957 and 1976 and wrote *The Bridge for Ever*, a biography of Dr. Kotnis, published in 1982.

3. M.S. Kotnis stated that the boy of six years, unaccompanied by his mother, must not get bewildered by the sudden change of environment and thus leave a permanent mental ill-effect.

4. Dr. Anna Wang. See *ante*, item 2.



for you to decide what answer we should send to China. Of course every care should be taken of the child if he comes here, but before we take any step we must know definitely what his family here proposes to do about it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 7. To K.M. Panikkar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21st September 1948

My dear Panikkar,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 31st August. I was interested to read the report of your conversation with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang.

I am sorry I could not meet Dr. Wang Shih-chieh<sup>2</sup> when he passed Delhi. He arrived at Palam at 2 a.m. and left at 4. I hope to see him, however, in Europe and we have already asked him to spend a few days in India on his way back from Paris.

I like your proposal to present Madame Chiang a copy of the Ajanta portfolio on my behalf. I do not know where I can get this. I am going to enquire from the Archaeological Department. As, however, you suggest that you might get it from England, certainly you can do so on my behalf. In addition to that I should try to collect Ajanta pictures here from the Archaeological Department and send them later to you for Madame Chiang.

I am going to London on the 5th October. Bajpai will accompany me. I am likely to be away for at least three weeks in the course of which I intend visiting Paris for a few days.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Wang Shih-chieh (b. 1891); President, National Wuhan University, 1929-34; Minister of Education, 1933-37; Secretary-General, Peoples Political Council, 1938-42, Central Planning Board, 1940-43; Director of Counsellors' Office, National Military Council, 1938-46; Member, Presidium, Peoples Political Council, 1943, Minister of Information, 1944-45; Minister for Foreign Affairs for some time.

1. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

August 19, 1948

Darling Nan,

I have just seen your letter to K.P.S.<sup>2</sup>, enclosing a report of an interview with Madame Kollontai<sup>3</sup>. This interview is indeed most surprising. And yet it is the culmination of the many small things that had been continually happening.

Three days ago, however, I received a message of congratulation from Stalin<sup>4</sup> for August 15th. That was an innovation and I thought that it might lead to somewhat better relations. I do not know how far my expectation was correct.

The situation is a difficult and a delicate one. Anyhow you will be going away to Paris fairly soon and I hope I shall meet you there. There is no point in our taking any step in this matter during these few weeks. If however you see any senior official of the Soviet Foreign Office, you might express your surprise at the behaviour of the Soviet Government towards India. In spite of all this, you can tell them that we want to have friendly relations with the Soviet. Obviously, however, it is not a one-sided matter. Unfortunately the attitude of the Soviet press and Government are producing a most unfavourable impression on the mind of the public here.

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Krishna Menon about this matter.

Thank you for the telegram you sent me on the 15th. I am feeling a little excited already at the prospect of my going to Europe next month and meeting you there. I should like to reach Paris at least two days before the Assembly. But conditions are so extraordinary here that I just cannot say what I might have to do at the last moment.

Tomorrow is Rajiv's birthday and a crowd of children are going to gather here.

Love,

Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

2. K.P.S. Menon.

3. Alexandra Kollontai said that she was not permitted to send a letter thanking Nehru for acknowledging her message on the death of Mahatma Gandhi as she would be considered a traitor if she wrote to the Head of a 'reactionary state' that was suppressing 'our comrades'. The Soviet Government was concerned about all communists everywhere, and by suppressing them, the Indian Government was suppressing the forces of progress and democracy.

4. Marshal Stalin wrote: "On the occasion of the Indian National holiday, I beg you, Mr. Prime Minister, to accept from the Soviet Government and from myself personally, congratulations and best wishes for the success of the Indian people."



2. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

August 19, 1948

My dear Krishna,

I am enclosing a copy of a note of an interview which Vijayalakshmi had with Madame Kollontai in Moscow on August 3rd. Vijayalakshmi had often seen her. Madame Kollontai, being an invalid, does not go out herself. Normally they fixed up their interviews directly. This time it was the Foreign Office which informed Vijayalakshmi that Madame Kollontai would like to see her at a particular time. The interview lasted nearly two hours and the report, I am sending, is a brief resume of it.

This interview confirms what I wrote to you some time back<sup>2</sup> and to which you sent a reply. As you know, we are very anxious to have friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. But almost throughout this period of one year we have had very little encouragement from them. For some months past there has been active discouragement and bitter criticism in the press about the Government of India. I do not mind the criticisms very much and I am quite prepared to admit that much that has been done and much that has not been done here is open to serious criticisms. Nevertheless, there is something more than criticism in the articles that appeared in *New Times* and other periodicals.<sup>3</sup> This finds confirmation in the report of this interview.

The attitude that the Soviet Government is taking up in regard to India is, I think, very shortsighted. It is just impossible for them to gain the goodwill or cooperation of India in anything by adopting bullying tactics. We do not easily submit to that kind of thing and the only result is a growing bitterness against the Soviet Government.

As for the Communists here, they have, since February last, adopted a policy of near rebellion. There are only two ways of meeting such a policy. One is of course to submit and the other is to fight it. There are no halfway places. There are not many persons in India who would agree to submit to the Communists in such a matter. Ever since P.C. Joshi was

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series) Vol. 6, p. 481.

3. The banning of the C.P.I. and the subsequent arrests of the Communists in March 1948 provoked strong criticism in the Russian press. On 8 April, *Pravda* reported the "massive arrests of democratic workers in India". On 26 July, it condemned the decision of the Bombay Government to ban the exhibition of Soviet films. India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth also produced adverse reaction. *The New Times* of 4 August accused the Indian Government of "acquiescing" in the policies of the West and of cutting off Indians from "their natural allies and freedom-loving people".

kicked out of the Communist Executive here<sup>4</sup> the standard of war was unfurled by the Communist Party in India. Presumably this was a common policy of Burma, Malaya, Siam and India. Some of our provincial governments went further than they should have done. But there was no alternative except to face this challenge. I have no doubt that whatever we may suffer in the process, the Communist Party will fair badly.

As for the U.S.S.R., whatever they may do, we are not going to function in anger and do anything to spite them. That would be silly. But it is next to impossible to feel friendly when daily insults are hurled on us. Madame Kollontai's interview with Vijayalakshmi makes an extraordinary reading. What is still more extraordinary is the obvious desire for us to know their minds in this respect and to be given the message that was conveyed by Kollontai.

This kind of diplomacy seems rather crude to me and excessively lacking in intelligence. But there it is. If our embassy is treated in this way, there is no particular reason why we should keep up a large staff there. We can carry on in a simple way with a small staff.

I am going to do nothing about this matter, but I thought I might as well inform you.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

4. P.C. Joshi had urged all progressives to rally round Nehru. This policy did not find favour with the majority within the C.P.I. and B.T. Ranadive eventually replaced Joshi as General Secretary of the party in March 1948.

### 3. Syama Prasad Mookerjee's Interview with the Russian Ambassador<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had a long talk with the Russian Ambassador<sup>2</sup> last night, lasting over three hours. He repeated this to Mrs. Pandit, who gave a brief account of it to me.

2. The Russian Ambassador had come in contact with Dr. Mookerjee at the Ooty Conference<sup>3</sup> and hence perhaps felt that he could approach him more easily than other ministers. He invited him to dinner.

1. Note drafted by Nehru to the Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary, 11 September 1948. J.N. Collection.
2. M. Novikov.
3. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had met the Russian Ambassador during the E.C.A.F.E. conference at Udagamandalam on 1 June 1948.



3. He complained about the tension that existed between the U.S.S.R. and India. Tension is perhaps too strong a word; anyway their relations were not satisfactory. He wanted to talk about this with the Prime Minister but the Prime Minister was very busy. He said that the U.S.S.R. had gladly exchanged ambassadors with India in the hope that their relations would become more and more friendly and cooperative. Unfortunately, however, various factors had contributed to the growth of a certain coolness. He seemed to make out that this was not the fault of the Russians, but for some reason India had not paid very much attention to them. They had hoped to increase trade relations, but nothing much had been done, possibly through carelessness. They were prepared to help in other ways, as for instance by lending the services of their expert engineers, more specially for the river valley schemes. Russian engineers had a great deal of experience of such major schemes.

4. Dr. Mookerjee mentioned that perhaps the attitude of the Indian Government towards the Communists in India had influenced the Russian Government and M. Novikov said that they were not much concerned with this internal matter. But they were concerned with our international policy. In spite of everything, we seemed to rely upon the Anglo-Saxon group, although we were repeatedly ignored or rebuffed by them. In the Kashmir issue the Americans and the Britishers had treated us very badly, and yet we had not cared to approach Russia for her assistance. This was likely to happen in Hyderabad also. The U.S.S.R. felt that we had a good case both in Kashmir and Hyderabad and would gladly help if their help was sought.

5. He referred also to India House in London dealing with Indo-Russian matters. This seemed absurd when we had exchanged ambassadors.

6. He mentioned that Russia could easily send us foodstuffs but in this matter also there had been a great deal of slackness on the part of the Government of India and a lack of interest.

7. This is a very brief summary of what the Russian Ambassador said. Dr. Mookerjee could not say much in reply to him as he did not know the facts. Of course a great deal could have been said in reply.

8. It seems clear to me that this talk of the Russian Ambassador represents a slightly new approach, probably under instructions from Moscow. This may be due to the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly meeting or to the world situation generally, or to a realisation that Russia could not get much out of India by an attempt to bully. Being realists, they might well try another line of action. Whatever the reason might be, it is a new approach and there is no reason why we should not take advantage of it.

#### 4. Note on Interview with the Russian Ambassador<sup>1</sup>

1. M. Novikov, the Russian Ambassador, dined with us tonight. After dinner he and I and Mrs. Pandit had a talk lasting over an hour and a half.

2. I referred to the Secretary General's conversation with him some two months back and to the comments in the Russian press and other matters which had reacted unfavourably on Indian opinion and which had made us think that the official Soviet policy had changed to our disadvantage. I told him that we would not have attached too much importance to what the press said except for two reasons:

(i) that this naturally created an unfavourable reaction in India, which we were anxious to avoid; and

(ii) because we thought it indicated to some extent at least the trend of Soviet policy.

3. M. Novikov repeated what he had previously said to the Secretary General and what the Soviet Foreign Office people had said to Mrs. Pandit, namely, that the press did not necessarily represent the Soviet viewpoint in such matters. It was true that the general principles governing foreign policy were meant to be followed by the press, but that the press was completely free to discuss internal conditions in any country, from the Marxist viewpoint. They would consider, for instance, as to who owned the means of production—land, factories, forests and mines—and draw the Marxist conclusion from this fact. They were trained in this way.

4. Marshal Stalin had however made it clear repeatedly that the Soviet did not wish to interfere with the internal conditions or policies of any country. The Soviet foreign policy was entirely based on the external policy of other countries insofar as it affected Soviet interests.

5. The Russian Ambassador went on to say that while we complained of some articles in Soviet press, he could make that charge with much greater reason against the Indian press which was 90 per cent hostile to the Soviet. Except for one or two newspapers nearly all the others were not only generally hostile to the Soviet but actively supported the policy of India attaching herself fully to the American bloc. He referred to Louis Fischer's articles in the Indian press, mentioning specially *The Hindu*, in which Fischer had called for an early war against the Soviet Union and appealed to India to line up with the U.S.A. in such a war. He mentioned also Fischer's

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 12 September 1948. J.N. Collection.



lectures<sup>2</sup> at the Constitution Club in Delhi and in other cities. This kind of thing was clear war-mongering which had been condemned by the U.N., and he was surprised that the Government of India could tolerate it.

6. Mrs. Pandit and I dealt with his questions and arguments and put forward our viewpoint. I am not referring to our replies here, as this note is being dictated in some haste.

7. Some reference was made to the visit of the Jambhekars to Moscow and the reception accorded to them. Novikov stated that it was quite untrue that the Jambhekars, or either of them, had an interview with Stalin. Also neither the Soviet Government nor the friends of the Soviet Union provided a special plane to the Jambhekars to tour about the Soviet. He had asked Mr. Molotov about this and he had his authority to make this statement.

8. Novikov repeated that the Soviet could not possibly have any designs on India and they had no intention whatever to interfere with our internal policy, whether they liked it or not. No mention was made in the course of our talk to the activities of the Communists in India or to Government's repression of them. It appeared that the Russian Ambassador was chiefly concerned with our policy in regard to certain international questions coming up before the U.N. None of these was however specifically mentioned or discussed. What seemed to trouble him most was the general consensus of opinion, as represented in the press, for lining up of India with the American bloc.

9. He mentioned that while there was vague talk about encouragement of cultural relations, nothing had been done to that end here. An invitation by the Soviet for some Indian writers to attend a conference at Tashkent did not bear fruit because certain provincial governments would not issue passports. Russian periodicals were often held up by customs authorities and he was constantly receiving complaints from the subscribers about these hold ups. He had written about this matter to the External Affairs Ministry, but had received no reply.

10. This is just a very brief summary of what the Russian Ambassador said during a longish conversation. What was said in reply to him is not stated here. This followed the usual lines.

11. I had to go away for a brief while in the course of the conversation to answer a telephone call. During my absence Novikov said to Mrs. Pandit that he found some difficulty in speaking to the Prime Minister. He felt that they were two persons—Jawaharlal Nehru and the Prime Minister. He would gladly talk frankly to the former, but he felt some constraint in talking to the latter.

2. Addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, Louis Fischer referred to India's endeavour to remain neutral in world politics, and added there could be no neutrality in the face of dictatorship, aggression and totalitarianism. He urged India to align herself with democracies not because they were perfect but because they were imperfect and would gain by her association.

IX WORLD GOVERNMENT

1. To T.G. Griessemer<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

8 July 1948

Dear Monsieur Griessemer<sup>2</sup>,

Thank you for your letter of June 30th.

I am afraid it is difficult for me to agree to broadcast any special message to your convention on the date you mention. I do not know where I shall be on that date. But there is another reason also. As Prime Minister of India, I cannot broadcast any message committing the Government of India to any particular policies to which they have not formally agreed. Generally speaking of course, most of us here are in favour of world cooperation which your movement represents and we wish that movement success. But while the general ideal may be favoured, it is to be interpreted in existing circumstances in particular ways. Each government has to consider these ways and circumstances very carefully. The situation in the world, as you know, is a highly dynamic one and I cannot say what the position will be two months later.

With greetings,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Griessemer was Secretary General of the Universal Movement for the World Confederation, Switzerland.

2. To B. Shiva Rao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

15 July 1948

My dear Shiva Rao,

Your letter of the 14th. I have no objection to Hanchow being selected for the next conference. I am entirely neutral about this matter. I do not know if I shall be able to go, though I would like to do so.

On the whole I am in agreement with the proposals in the note you have sent.

About the One World Government movement, it is hardly correct to say that I have taken active interest in it. I have accepted the principle and said something in favour of it. But as an organisation and movement I do not

1. J.N. Collection.



think very much of it. I am not particularly interested in the headquarters coming to India. Indeed I would rather that they did not as nothing much is going to happen through this movement. If Ramakrishna Dalmia is connected with it in any important capacity<sup>2</sup>, I shall certainly have nothing to do with it whatever.

I shall gladly meet you one of these days and discuss these matters with you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Seth Ramakrishna Dalmia was head of the Indian delegation to the second annual convention on the World Federal Government.

### 3. Inevitability of World Government<sup>1</sup>

The great powers must make sincere efforts to settle their disputes instead of making deliberate attempts to annoy each other.

I think that the danger of a third world war has lessened somewhat recently. Nevertheless I see the powder keg still smouldering because Britons, Russians and Americans are not making a real effort to resolve their differences.

Some kind of world government is bound to come either in our generation or the next. Otherwise the world tends to commit suicide. In what shape and how it will come about is difficult to say. It has to grow through the goodwill of peoples.

Looking back on first year of India's independence, despite the ordeals of migrations and the strife through which she has passed I am on the whole optimistic about the future. I admit that India is beset by inflation and is in bad economic condition, but her soundness is attested by her ability to stand the trials of the past year.

The Government has taken some steps to remedy the economic situation and we will take others in the course of the next few weeks. Basically our economic position is sound. India needs capital resources from the United States and others to accomplish her reconstruction but want it only on terms that will safeguard her economic independence.

1. Interview to *The New York Times* in New Delhi, 14 August 1948. *The New York Times*, 15, August 1948.

I agree with the United States policy of rebuilding the Japanese economy<sup>2</sup>. It will be foolish trying to suppress a people like the Japanese completely. It just cannot be done. Besides, it is morally wrong as well as impractical. It would only delay their recovery as well as that of all Asia. Recovery in Japan on a democratic basis is the only right policy to pursue. At the same time I must warn that there must be adequate guarantees against a resurgence of Japanese militarism.

The recent upsurge of Communist activity in Asia is the result of economic conditions. These must be remedied before the Communist threat is alleviated.

I believe that I will be unable to visit the United States this fall after attending the conference of the Premiers of British Commonwealth of Nations in September at London. I love to visit the United States but it would be better not to be away from India too long. I am planning a separate visit to the United States later.

Question: What do you have to say about the Hyderabad and Kashmir problems?

Jawaharlal Nehru: If Hyderabad were independent, it would make Indian independence a mockery. The whole of South India would be in jeopardy. Nowhere in the world was there any independent nation entirely surrounded by the territory of a single other independent nation. Only Hyderabad's foreign affairs, defence and communications would pass to the hands of the Indian Governments should Hyderabad accede to the demand that she join India.

I am disappointed by the way the United Nations has handled the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Pakistan's admission that her troops has been fighting in Kashmir has proved that the Indian case has been right all along.

To understand the Kashmir situation one must understand the basic fact that there was aggression from outside, from Pakistan. It could not have taken place without the encouragement of Pakistan.

India went to the United Nations, making the simple request that Pakistan be asked to stop aiding these aggressors. Either our facts were right or they were wrong. The United Nations never gave us an answer.

Now it is clarified by the fact that Pakistan admitted her troops are fighting in Kashmir. This admission is a reversal of her claims before the United Nations.

2. A five-year plan for restoring Japanese economy to the level of 1930-34 by 1952 had been prepared by the Japanese Government with the help and encouragement of the Allied Headquarters. It was expected that the entire foreign capital of 1630 million dollars, required for the plan would be made available by the U.S.



#### 4. Inter-Parliamentary Union<sup>1</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, this debate has attained higher levels than I anticipated. My proposition was a fairly simple one. This Inter-Parliamentary Union<sup>2</sup> is not, by any means, something that might develop into one world or one universe. It is a body which has no executive authority. It is a body which does not want to consider any big controversial issues which the United Nations or the Security Council do.

H.V. Kamath: I never said that it would itself develop into one world or one universe.

Mr. Speaker: Let there be no interference.

JN: Well, Sir, as I say, it is not an organisation which will concern itself with psychic matters either. It is an organisation chiefly meant to promote intercourse between parliamentarians all over the world. It is a public forum to discuss parliamentary matters without committing anybody—either any Government or even any individual—and in the world today it is important that people should know each other and that legislators in various parliaments should profit by each other's experience and by each other's failure. Therefore, from that point of view, it is desirable that we should go there and take a part in the public forum.

There has been talk of democracy etc.—a very complicated subject, which it is not easy to answer in a phrase this way or that way, even in the way that my honourable friend, Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar answered it<sup>3</sup>. We need not, therefore, go into that question. So far as this organisation is concerned, it is open, as far as I know, to every country. Even now, it has within its ranks legislators from countries of varying types of government. It has certainly from the legislatures of western Europe; it has from the legislatures of eastern Europe also. I do not think that the

1. Speech while moving a resolution requesting the Speaker to take steps to form an Indian parliamentary group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on 16 August 1948. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. VI, Part II, 1948, pp. 311-17.
2. The Union, formed in 1888, was an association of various national parliamentary groups. Its aims were to promote personal contacts between members of the world's parliaments, development of democratic institutions, international peace and cooperation and to settle disputes by parliamentary action.
3. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar said. "We do want that kind of democracy where the hero of the war, Churchill, was thrown overboard immediately the War was over. We have to learn a lesson from the British democracy. In Russia, is it possible after the end of that War to throw out the person in charge of the administration? That democracy was exercised in Great Britain and therefore, that is the kind of democracy that we want so far as democracy is concerned".

U.S.S.R. is there, although representatives from the U.S.S.R. have also come in touch with this organisation; but some of the other eastern European countries are represented on it. So far as Asian countries are concerned, Mr. Kamath is perfectly right in saying that at the present moment we are not adequately represented,<sup>4</sup> but that is I think, due to various factors. Some of them have only recently come into the international scene like Burma, like the Philippines, like Ceylon. I believe both Burma and the Philippines have expressed their willingness to join. Japan was of course in this organisation till this war when various things happened which terminated its connection. At the present moment, as the House knows Japan is in a peculiar position. Thus there is no question of any country being kept out—Asian, European or any other. It is an inclusive organisation and it wants to include any country that wants to come in except possibly—I cannot say—that there may be some exceptional cases, but none of that kind has been brought to my notice.

Therefore, I do not think, while I put this Resolution to the House, that it should understand anything much more than what it says. I say this because Mr. Kamath's speech might, I feel, delude the House into imagining that they are deciding some very high matter of principle or policy or that they are going to an organisation which will make a vast difference to the world. It is a useful organisation which we should encourage, which should help us in promoting international contacts, but no important question in the world is going to be decided there or is being considered there at present. The other organisations will do that.

Mr. Kamath suggested that this House should consider various matters that are coming up. This is entirely for you to decide. The various matters that are coming up are important; nevertheless, they are not, normally speaking, of political importance. The care of infants is highly important, but on this political parties do not differ, and it is for you, Sir, to consider these problems—certainly—or, it may be that some members of the House interested might consider the Draft Resolution, but in any event, the representatives of this House will go there and I do not think in matters of this kind the House should give specific mandates on issues of this kind. They can discuss and they can generally say what they feel and leave a certain measure of freedom, because as I said, it is not a highly political matter. It is not a matter which will lead to executive action and the House should not attach too much importance to a particular activity, which probably would not be quite correct.

4. H.V. Kamath said that in the forthcoming Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Rome no South Asian country was to be represented and only five Asian countries were mentioned. Russia, one of the great powers, was not at all in the picture.



Mr. Speaker : As regards the contribution, I understand that it will come to about Rs. 14,769 a year.

J.N: It will be much less, but the maximum is about Rs. 14,769; it is open to us to determine a smaller figure in consultation.

## 5. To B. Shiva Rao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
22nd August 1948

My dear Shiva Rao,  
Your letter of the 21st.

In regard to the One World Government Movement I have certainly expressed my general sympathy on several occasions, but I have been reluctant to associate myself in any capacity with it.<sup>2</sup> As Prime Minister, that would have been improper for me to do so. But in my personal capacity I rather doubt if I would have agreed to be formally associated. These movements and conferences are usually a collection of well-meaning odd individuals who represent at the most a prevailing sentiment, but who somehow are not very effective. They fade away during the crisis. Nevertheless there is no reason why we should not express our sympathy with a good idea. They go a little further and have certain proposals for elections in 1950 or thereabouts. This seems to me rather premature.

I have no objection to one or two of our delegates who are going on the Parliamentary delegation in September visiting Luxembourg.<sup>3</sup> If that is not

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Shiva Rao had written that Nehru had in general terms commended the idea of a One World Government which was noticed in the U.S.A. Leading men of Europe and several British M.P.s were actively associated with this movement.

3. The Parliamentary delegation to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference to be held in London during September-October 1948, consisted of G.V. Mavalankar, Satyanarayan Sinha, S.V. Krishnamurthy Rao, Thakur Das Bhargava, Hansa Mehta, Frank Anthony, Upendra Nath Barman, Balkrishna Sharma, and Thirumala Rao. M.N. Kaul, Secretary to the Indian Parliament accompanied the delegation. Shiva Rao had suggested that one or two of these delegates could go ahead of the rest to Luxembourg to attend the One World Government Conference to be held from 6 to 11 September 1948. Alternatively, Dr. Appadorai could be asked to go there.

possible, Dr. Appadorai<sup>4</sup> can go there.

I do not think it is desirable for Mr. Mavalankar to be actively associated as a Vice-President of the movement.<sup>5</sup> In view of his position this would involve us in some commitment.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. A.Appadorai (b. 1902); Lecturer, Loyola College, Madras, 1930-44; Secretary-General, Indian Council for World Affairs, 1944-55; Director, Indian School of International Studies, 1955-64; Member, Union Public Service Commission, 1964-67; author of several books including *Dyarchy in Practice*, *Bandung Conference*, *Essays in Indian Politics* and *Foreign Policy*.
5. Mavalankar had no objection to becoming Vice-President of the movement but wanted Nehru's views on this.

## X. FOREIGN ENCLAVES

### 1. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of Portugal<sup>1</sup>

I met the Papal Charge d'Affaires this morning and among other things discussed with him the concordat and the *padroado*.<sup>2</sup> I pointed out that the whole question of Goa's future will have to be taken up soon as Goa must inevitably become part of the Indian Union. The Indian Union could not accept a slice of foreign territory in India. He agreed with this. I said, however, that this political question will be dealt with later. Meanwhile, the question of the concordat and *padroado* had to be taken up immediately and settled. It was wholly inconsistent with the new political set up in India, i.e., the independence of India, to permit a foreign power, namely Portugal to nominate in any way religious functionaries in India as they have done under the *padroado* for a long time past. At present this patronage is

1. Note to the Secretary General, 6 July 1948. File No. 19 (83) Eur. I/49, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. *Padroado* was the name for the ecclesiastical "managing agency" granted by the Vatican to the Portuguese Government.



more or less confined to Mylapore and Cochin and to some extent to Bombay where apparently a bishop or archbishop has alternately to be a Portuguese or English. The practice in all these matters has apparently been for the Portuguese Government to submit a panel of names to the Holy See to choose from them.

2. It is understandable that the Holy See should have a voice in the appointment of Catholic bishops but it is absurd for the Portuguese Government to have any voice in it. The Papal Charge d'Affaires agreed with me completely and said that the Holy See had a lot of trouble with the Portuguese and to some extent with the Spanish Government also over the exercise of patronage in regard to ecclesiastical appointments. The Portuguese Government is a very difficult and obstinate one. Nevertheless this change had to be made. He informed me that very recently some thing had happened which in fact rather broke through the whole concordat. This was the appointment of a bishop in Karachi apparently at Portuguese instance. Karachi thus far had been connected with the Bombay diocese. It was not quite clear what had happened in Karachi in regard to this matter but a bishop had appeared on the scene. So that in fact the concordat was breaking up.

3. I pointed out that we had no objection to a separate diocese being created in Pakistan by the Holy See but this appointment of a Bishop in Karachi with Portuguese backing had evidently a political significance and Pakistan and the Portuguese were intriguing in Goa against the Indian Union. We could not tolerate this. The Charge d'Affaires suggested that we might take up this question of concordat and *padroado* officially, now that diplomatic relations had been established and he would try to help us in every way, and indeed the Holy See was interested in the matter also.

4. I understand that some correspondence on this subject has already taken place through our High Commissioner in the U.K. with Portugal and that copies of this have been sent to the Papal representative in India. I suggest that this matter might be pursued immediately and a formal communication sent to the Papal Charge d'Affaires giving a brief history of the case and attaching copies of previous notes on the subject. The matter should be treated as an urgent one.

5. The Papal Charge d'Affaires told me that what Portugal was afraid of was that this change might affect their political position in Goa and that is why they were reluctant to make it. I agreed that this might very well affect it and indeed the political position had been affected powerfully by the political changes in India and Portugal could not escape this. Anyway, for the present we shall confine ourselves to this matter of the concordat and *padroado*. Soon after the other matters will have to be taken up also.

## 2. Municipal Elections in French Settlements<sup>1</sup>

16 July 1948

Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has received your letter<sup>2</sup> of the 11th July containing copies of the resolutions passed by the Council of the Action Committee of the Karaikal National Congress.<sup>3</sup>

2. The Prime Minister would gladly meet your representative, but he fears that he will have no time during his short visit to Madras to do so. If it is possible he may be able to give you a few minutes there. If this cannot be done there a representative of yours can come to Delhi.

3. The Prime Minister is surprised at the resolutions passed by your Council. They seem to be based on a complete misconception not only of the principles governing the policy of the National Congress and the present Government of India but also of the agreement arrived at between the French Government and the Government of India.<sup>4</sup>

4. The Government of India has repeatedly declared that it will abide by the will of the people concerned, provided of course that this is properly ascertained. All that has been done is to make provision for this reference to the people. The Municipal elections are only a preliminary and the body elected by them will only decide the procedure for a referendum. Any organisation boycotting these elections will naturally be at a disadvantage.

5. It is completely against international law and practice for the Government of India to supervise directly any elections in the French possessions in India. But they have made it perfectly clear that these elections should give full and free opportunity to every citizen to express his opinion. If there is any interference in this or malpractice or violence, the Government of India will have the right to object to it.

Yours truly,

A.V. Pai

Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister

1. Letter of A.V. Pai, Secretary to Prime Minister, to A.S. Vengadashalabady Pillai, President, Karaikal National Congress. File No. 117-GG/47, President's Secretariat. This letter was drafted by Nehru.
2. In his letter Vengadachalabady Pillai had expressed fear that the forthcoming municipal elections would be marred by violence and malpractices unless the Indian Government supervised it.
3. The French Government announced on 8 June that elections would be held in Chandannagore, Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam forming French India to decide their future status. Particulars of each referendum were to be fixed by the municipal councils concerned. The French Government was to maintain order till the results were known. The resolutions passed on 9 June condemned this as "calculated to perpetuate the French imperial domination" and expressed dismay at the Indian Government's assent to it. It also drew attention to the dictatorial and undemocratic nature of the French India administration.



### 3. Elections in French India<sup>1</sup>

I met a deputation from Pondicherry in Madras and they told me of the steps being taken by the French authorities to prevent fair and free elections. I do not quite know what we can do in the matter but we might draw the attention of the French Ambassador to these complaints and hint that unless the elections are free and full opportunity is given to all parties, they will not serve the purpose for which they are intended.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs., 2 August 1948. File No. 15(4)-X/48. M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

### 4. To O.P. Ramaswami Reddjar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
2nd October, 1948

My dear Premier,

On my return to Delhi from Kashmir this morning I have received your two letters dated 28th and 29th September relating to the elections in French India.

You have referred in one of these letters to the interview you had with the French Ambassador in India and with the Governor of French India. I was going to write to you on this subject as we had a visit from the French Charge d'Affaires in Delhi who has communicated to us a message from his Ambassador.

The Ambassador has complained bitterly of the reception you gave him, of the violent language you used to him during the interview and generally about what you said and how you said it. This has created something in the nature of an international incident so far as we are concerned.

It was not necessary for the Ambassador to call upon you as his dealings are with the Government of India only. Nevertheless, he went out of his way to pay you the courtesy of a visit. Unfortunately the reaction on him has been most unfavourable and has put us in a false position. Diplomatic usage requires certain formalities and certain types of behaviour and if this usage is not followed the relations between nations are apt to suffer. I have not the full report of your conversation with him but the mere fact

1. J.N. Collection.

that your interview with him has led to this tremendous reaction and a protest to us, is itself a matter of significance. We have, therefore, had to express our regret to the French Ambassador.

I realise that you are not used to this diplomatic etiquette and protocol and probably have had no dealings on the international plane with Ambassadors and the like. Nevertheless, the fact remains that we have been put in a most delicate and difficult position owing to what you said to the French Ambassador. This has nothing to do with the merits of the question. I would beg of you to restrain yourself in future in regard to any matter concerning other countries, both in speech and writing. All our dealings with foreign countries should be through our Foreign Office. Pondicherry may be a small area near Madras but it happens to be associated with France at the present moment and our dealings are with the French Republic which is represented here by their Ambassador. Therefore, we cannot treat it as a small matter and we can only deal with the French Republic in the manner in which nations deal with each other.

As for the merits of the question, I need not discuss them here as, at our request, the French Government have postponed the municipal elections in the French establishments.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## XI. MISCELLANEOUS

### 1. To Eamon de Valera<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15 July 1948

My dear Mr. de Valera,

Thank you for your letter of the 7th July. It was a great pleasure to have you here and our only regret is that your visit was so short.<sup>2</sup> I hope I shall

1. J.N. Collection.

2. de Valera was in India from 13 to 15 June 1948.



have the pleasure to meet you again either in India or Ireland. It has long been my desire to visit Ireland again. I went there once a very long time ago when I was a student.<sup>3</sup>

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. I, pp. 30-32.

## 2. To Surjit Singh Majithia<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
31 st July 1948

My dear Surjit Singh,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 19th July. I have had a report also about the negotiations at Kathmandu from our representatives. I think the agreement arrived at is on the whole a good one.<sup>3</sup> I am glad everything went off well.

I have written to express my pleasure to the Prime Minister and to thank him for what he did.

We shall, of course, show every courtesy to Major-General Sarada Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana.<sup>4</sup>

I am sorry to learn of the activities of the British Ambassador.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 4(9)/C.A./47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. (b. 1912); joined I.A.F., 1939; Commander No. 2 I.A.F. Squadron, 1943-44; member, Central Legislative Assembly and Defence Consultative Committee, 1945-47; Ambassador to Nepal, 1947-49; President, Khalsa College, Amritsar; Life Member, Sant Attar Singh Gursagar Mastuana Trust, P.E.P.S.U.; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-67; Deputy Minister for Defence, August 1952-62.

3. On 19 July 1948, the Government of India signed an agreement with the Government of Nepal for the loan of ten battalions of Nepalese troops which arrived in India during August and were posted to strategic centres for internal duties.

4. Majithia had written that Maj-Gen.Sarada Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana, eldest son of the Nepal Prime Minister who would come with the Nepalese contingent as its commander, was favourably inclined towards India.

5. The British Ambassador had asked the Nepal Government to increase recruitment to the agreed quota under the Tripartite Agreement of 1947. Majithia felt that, India being one of the parties to the agreement, the British should have consulted the Indian Government before approaching Nepal.

### 3. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 3, 1948

Nan dear,

I have not written to you for some weeks now. Meanwhile I have received your delightful letters, both official and personal.<sup>2</sup>

Yesterday I moved into the old Commander-in-Chief's House, which is now called the Prime Minister's House.<sup>3</sup> Indira and the others in charge of my destiny, have been fussing about this house for some weeks now and I must say that they have improved it greatly. It is a fairly bright and agreeable place, though its vast empty expanses rather oppress one. As I spend the entire day in my office I see little of the house except at night. We came here early yesterday morning, very early for two reasons. One was that Indira had to go to Allahabad and Lucknow by the morning plane and we had to be here before that. The other, you will be interested to learn, was a sudden urge of Indu to come at the auspicious moment. A holy gentleman in Uttar Kashi, who apparently takes interest in my career, sent word about the auspicious moment. Indu felt that it would be unwise to challenge fate. So we arrived here at 6.45 in the morning yesterday to find Sarojini and Leilamani standing on the steps with a big coconut in their hands.

The sage at Uttar Kashi has sent a brief account of what is going to happen to me in the future. I am going to have plenty of troubles and occasionally danger, nevertheless I survive and go from height to height. In 1952, so we are told, apparently I retire from politics, or at any rate normal politics, and lead some kind of a world crusade. So now you know all about it.

I saw your telegram to Bajpai about your visiting India before the U.N. Assembly. There is some force in what you said, but it would be rather absurd for you to come here when I am going to Europe. I hope to go there, indeed the urge to go outside India for a while has become very strong. And yet I just cannot be certain about it because of what might happen in India. Still I intend going. If I go, it is obviously desirable for me to get there a little before the U.N. Assembly so that I might take part in our Delegation's conferences. I might be present for two or three days in Paris,

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, on 6 July, condoled the death of Brigadier Usman and acknowledged the receipt of the special issue of the *Blitz* which contained G.K. Reddy's story on Kashmir invasion. In her letter of 13 July she wrote that "what bothers me most is the fact that there is no human being within hailing distance who talks your language or is remotely capable of sharing your thoughts".

3. Now called Teen Murti House.



meeting people, and then go to England for the Premiers' Conference, etc. Later I can go to Paris again on a brief visit before I return to India. This U.N. Assembly is in some ways far more important than the last two you have attended. Not only is the conflict between India and Pakistan likely to come up in various forms, whether it is Kashmir or Hyderabad or some other issue, but the present European crisis will be fiercely discussed. We have to be prepared for all this. I am afraid we are not giving you a good delegation. But people are so tied up here that it is difficult to have them. If the problems before the U.N. Assembly are more difficult and intricate, you have also grown with the times and your experience in Moscow specially has fitted you much more to deal with the European situation. I hope that Bajpai will be able to attend the U.N. Assembly for some time at least.

We have to be very careful this time about these European and Russo-American problems. We must understand them fully and map out our course and not to be taken by surprise. Our Delegation must function as a homogeneous unit and must work hard.

I have written a letter to Krishna Menon today in answer to his. I enclose a copy of it. He has hinted on more than one occasion that he might be added to our U.N. Delegation.<sup>4</sup> For the reasons I have given in my reply to him I am not doing so. Although I have great admiration for his ability and understanding of problems, I do not think he will fit in with the Delegation. But I have always found that a talk with him on any subject has thrown light and helped me to understand a problem better, even though I disagreed with him. We shall take advantage of this by conferring with him whenever necessity arises. Treat him gently and understandingly. He is a frightfully sensitive and rather emotional person. The Mountbattens are his great admirers. I must say that he has done a very good job of work in London. There are some Indians, including Bhandari and Katial, who criticise him very much. But the great majority of Indians there have appreciated his work, and as for the U.K. Government, from Attlee downwards they all praise his work. He has grown considerably during the last year. But of course he continues to be a little difficult to get on with at times and inclined to take rather partial view.

You wrote to me, I think, that Chand and Tara will be returning to India soon after you go to Paris. If you feel that Chand can be useful to you in any way in Paris, you can keep her there.

Amiya Chakravarty is bringing out what he calls a *Nehru Anthology*.

4. The 1948 delegation comprised Vijayalakshmi Pandit, B.N. Rau, Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, M.C. Setalvad and B. Shiva Rao. J.R.D. Tata was one of the alternate delegates.

He has sent me from America his introduction to this. I enclose a copy of this....

I received the pictures you sent me of the cultural evening which you had in Moscow. I read with great pleasure and interest your account of Leningrad. Your letters are always interesting.

Yours,  
Jawahar

#### 4. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 4, 1948

My dear Krishna,

This afternoon I received your letter of 1st August. It was brought to me by Col. Northcroft.

I am fully conscious of the fact that the next session of the U.N. Assembly<sup>2</sup> is going to be an important and ticklish affair, and that we have to take good care to steer the right course.<sup>3</sup> For the last month we have been thinking of our delegation for the Assembly and I confess that in spite of all the thought we have given, we have not arrived at any very satisfactory decision. It is largely because of the importance of this session that I have been thinking more and more of going to Europe during the autumn. Not that I intend remaining in Paris for long, but I want to be there if possible for our preliminary talks and conversations and to meet some of the representatives of other countries. I have today sent you a telegram on this subject asking you of the probable dates of the Premiers' Conference in London. I should like to fix up my programme fairly soon, though it is difficult to be certain owing to possible developments here. Even a day's absence from Delhi makes some difference. There are of course the Hyderabad and Kashmir problems. But what is troubling me most at present is the economic situation here which has got into a bad mess. Then the refugee problem has again become acute.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The third regular session of the U.N. General Assembly met in Paris from 21 September to 12 December 1948. Among the items on its agenda were the Palestine dispute, the future of the Italian colonies and the veto.

3. Krishna Menon wrote: "The session is likely to be ticklish especially behind the scenes, and far more than in New York, the context will be one where European fears and tensions will have play".



However, I do want to go to London and Paris and only some extreme developments will prevent me from doing so. So I want you to advise me about dates, etc, and the probable length of my stay there, that is, of my absence from India. Whatever programme I may make, I may have to hurry back.

As I intend going to London etc., I want Bajpai to be with me, specially at the time of the Premiers' Conference. When he is free from that he can join our U.N. Delegation. In between of course if we are round about, both of us will be available for consultations, etc. As I have mentioned above, I should like to be there before the Assembly starts so that we can discuss fully our line of action.

About your going as our delegate to the U.N. Assembly, I have given a good deal of thought to it.<sup>4</sup> I feel that in view of daily developments in India you cannot leave London for long. If you are away there will be no one else who can take charge and deal effectively with the U.K. Government. Also if I am in London, I want you to be there with me. You will of course join us, if I am there, at our preliminary talks with our delegation and you will always be available for consultations whenever necessary.

The U.N. Assembly will be mostly concerned with the European crisis and with other matters like Korea<sup>5</sup> etc. We have to take full part in them. At the same time naturally Indian opinion concerns itself mostly with Indian question such as Kashmir, Pakistan and Hyderabad, apart from South Africa. Kashmir is bound to come up, possibly Hyderabad also.

We have decided to have Vijayalakshmi again as the leader of our delegation and she has agreed. The other delegates are not a strong lot. They are, as at present advised, Setalvad, J.R.D. Tata, Shiva Rao and the Jamsaheb of Nawanagar. Why, in heaven's name the Jamsaheb, you might well ask. Well, really I can give no satisfactory answer, for he will be at the most a negative figure and he might be worse. But according to our custom, we are supposed to choose a representative of the States and after all this merger and accession we did not want to change this convention. The States Ministry went ahead a little fast and invited the Jamsaheb, who accepted with alacrity. This put us in a somewhat difficult position. Apart from this there was no other outstanding person in the

4. Krishna Menon had written that there would be a large collection of diplomatic representatives from London at the Paris session. "I hope I could be of some use, perhaps, but you are the best judge of that. I would have come back here and keep in touch with things here. So would all the London men from the other missions".
5. On the question of Korean independence in the United Nations, India acquiesced in the holding of elections in South Korea with a view to the calling of a constituent assembly at an early date in the hope that this might lead to the establishment of a national government.

States whom we could take. We approached some others, but they could not go.

Then there are five alternates and some advisers. We hope that some of these persons will be good and sound. As soon as Bajpai is free from the Premiers' Conference he will join the delegation as a delegate, pushing out some one. If I am there for two or three days, I shall naturally function as the leader for the time being.

I quite agree with you that specific instructions should be issued to the delegation<sup>6</sup>, that there must be regular delegation meetings where issues are discussed and decisions taken, and that the members of the delegation and the officials attached to it should give all their time to delegation work. We are going to lay the greatest stress on this.

I do not think Bajpai is going to ask you to supply much of a staff for the delegation. Perhaps he may ask you for one or two persons.

After all that has happened in India during the past year, I have little conceit left about my capacity to handle any difficult problem. Nevertheless it does surprise me how the great powers of the world behave to each other. Quite apart from the principles involved, there is an extraordinary crudity about their utterances and activities. I do not suppose that there will be any war because nobody is prepared for it. But anything may happen to this unhappy world when the men in charge of its destiny function in the way they have been doing.

If I go to England, etc., I should like to be back in India by the 20th October or at the very latest by the 25th. Our Constituent Assembly will be meeting about that time. It is better therefore for me to go a little earlier and finish the other part of my work before the Premiers' Conference begins. After that I might pay a brief visit to Paris again and then come back to India. I can hardly afford to go elsewhere, though I would have liked to pay brief visits to Berne and Prague.

I should like to bring Indira with me to England. Mathai will also probably come.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

6. Krishna Menon wrote, "In addition to briefs etc., some organisational instructions should be issued to the delegation this time, so that there are regular delegation meetings and issues are discussed and officials give their whole time to delegation work. . . the principal officer. . . should be accustomed to hard work and not be overbearing or pompous as this makes a lot of difference to work".



## 5. To Angelo Poli<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
8th August 1948

My dear Bishop<sup>2</sup>,

Thank you for your letter of July 22nd.<sup>3</sup> I remember still Mr. Gilani's telling me about you when I was in the Naini prison and the books you sent us.

I am happy that the Government of India have established formal relations with the Vatican.<sup>4</sup> The Government is interested in the welfare of the large Catholic population of India and in maintaining friendly relations with the Roman Catholic Church.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 13(10)-Eur./47 M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Angelo Poli (1878-1970); ordained priest of the Franciscan order, 1901; in charge of various mission stations in India from 1901-1912; Bishop of Allahabad, 1917-46.
3. Angelo Poli reminded Nehru of the religious books he sent him in Naini prison and thanked him for establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
4. In June 1948 the Holy See and the Government of India decided to establish diplomatic relations with an exchange of representatives. Angelo Poli hailed it as 'the best and the highest of your diplomatic acts'.

## 6. Cable to Count Folke Bernadotte<sup>1</sup>

I am in receipt of your telegram of 16th August drawing our attention to desperate condition of Arab and Jewish refugees in Palestine.<sup>2</sup> We can fully appreciate nature of human disaster as our Government has had to deal during past year with appalling problem of giving relief to and rehabilitating six million refugees most of whom were deprived of all they possessed and suffered terrible hardships. We are still grappling with this vast human problem which is straining our resources to the utmost. Nevertheless we extend our full sympathy to unfortunate refugees in Palestine, and Government of India have decided to contribute one hundred thousand rupees for their relief. Please telegraph how and to whom the amount should be remitted. Your appeal and my reply are being published in daily papers.

1. New Delhi, 19 August 1948. File No. 46(18)-AWT/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I. The U.N. Mediator in Palestine, (1895-1948), since May 1948.
2. Bernadotte had appealed for help to alleviate the suffering of 3,30,000 Arab refugees and 7000 Jewish refugees. Of these, 30 per cent were children under five years and over ten per cent pregnant women and nursing mothers who were going without enough food. Epidemics were also spreading among the refugees.

## 7. To Achyut Patwardhan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

12 September 1948

My dear Achyut,

You will remember that some months ago I suggested to you to accept a diplomatic post abroad. You told me then that you could not do so and you said that you would send me some names of suitable persons for our consideration. I do not remember having received any such list from you.

Later we invited you to join our U.N. delegation this year. Again you refused. I was sorry for this but I did not know what I could do about the matter. Jayaprakash met me long afterwards and he told me that he had advised you to accept, and so had Narendra Dev. I did not know this and in any event I could hardly do anything about it after your refusal and at that late stage.

I had a general talk with Jayaprakash when I met him last and I expressed the wish that we should try to lessen the gap which had unfortunately come into existence between the Congress and the Socialist Party. It was not easy to bridge this suddenly but it was certainly possible to improve the situation and to find out some avenues of cooperation. Each step might well lead to another.

This becomes even more important in the present crisis. I hope every one realises that we are up against something which will strain our resources to the utmost. We cannot waste our energy in mutual squabbles and conflict when we have to face those dangers.

Because of these larger considerations I would very much like you to reconsider the previous decision that you had made. I should like you to accept an ambassadorship. I know the objections that you can raise to this. Nevertheless, I feel that the time has come when all of us should take some steps forward in a new direction. In the balance the goodwill outweigh the objections.

To be precise, I would like you to be our Ambassador in Italy. This is an important place and as you know many forces are in conflict there. It is important to us from the political and economic points of view. World affairs, whatever some people may think here, press upon us more and more and we just can't ignore them.

Italy as you know is just a day's journey from here, indeed less. I am sure that if you accept this offer it will be good for all concerned, including you. The Socialist Party tends to become very sectarian and rather isolated. That is not good for it or for the country. I shall not write much

1. J.N. Collection.



more to you about this but I do feel strongly that your going there is a right thing.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jayaprakash. I should like to have an early reply.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 8. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21 September 1948

Nan dear,

I have just received your letter of the 16th September from Geneva.

There is a great deal in the suggestion you make, that is that I should go to Paris first and then to London.<sup>2</sup> I had given thought to that matter at one time and then, for a variety of reasons, decided against it. As a matter of fact it is too late to reconsider that decision because my programme is fully made up now. Also because I would be at a somewhat loose end in Paris, if I suddenly descend upon it direct from India.

My present programme is: start by Air India on the 5th October night from Bombay, reaching London on the 6th night. On the 7th I stay in London and probably see the Prime Minister there, Stafford Cripps and one or two others. On the 7th night or early 8th morning I go to Broadlands for the week-end, returning on the 10th evening. From the 11th the Premiers' Conference begin and continue from day to day. I am not quite sure how long I shall stay there and whether I shall even stay till the end of this conference. Apart from certain essential London engagements, I am trying to avoid visits outside London or even many engagements in London. In spite, however, of my desire, I am bound to be tied up all the time. I have promised a visit to George Bernard Shaw, who lives in the country, nearly two hours drive from London. I may also go to Oxford for a short while.

I want to be in Paris for four or five days, preferably after I have finished with London. But it may be that I could go to Paris and return to London and then take off from London for India. In any event I cannot get the Air

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit had written: "It will make a great deal of difference to India's position, prestige and future if your first appearance is at U.N.... Once you have been in Paris—spoken however briefly, with main people, our attitude towards Premiers' Conference falls into a proper perspective". She thought that Nehru's appearance in London first might be taken to mean that India attached greater importance to the Commonwealth issue than to the wider world issues.

India at Paris and I shall have to go to Geneva to catch it on my way back. My departure might be on the 25th October from Geneva or the 28th. The latter is more or less the last date because the Constituent Assembly here begins early in November.

Of course much depends on developments in India and it is just possible that I might have to cut my stay short. But in view of the Hyderabad debacle, it is unlikely that I shall have to hurry back suddenly.

Now for some of the reasons for my not going to Paris first. If I went there, it would have to be rather a deliberate effort and I would have to get down at Geneva for the purpose. If I had not been going to London, I rather doubt if I would have gone at all to the U.N. Assembly. Prime Ministers do not normally go to the U.N. meetings and I would not like to go just to meet a number of persons, whom I would certainly like to meet. My visit would have a certain significance and I would not like to make it a casual one. I do not want to make myself cheap in this way. I had two alternatives: (1) to go right at the beginning, before the session started, more or less when you went, to meet people there, stay for a while and then proceed further. Or else to go there right in the middle of the session at a suitable moment. Much would depend on developments there. Recent happenings in the Security Council make me a little averse to going there at all, though I do not think ultimately this will come in my way. If and when I go two persons that I must see, or rather should like to see, would be Marshall and Molotov or Vyshinsky. I cannot just see one of them. I would inevitably have to see, being in Paris, the French Foreign Minister and the President. I would also have to see Dr. Wang of China. Naturally I would like to see others too. But the others need not be seen individually and separately.

All this has to be carefully arranged beforehand and reactions taken. Otherwise difficulties might arise putting me and possibly some others in an embarrassing position. The early days of the U.N. meetings will clarify matters to some extent, and when I am in London, it would be easier to find out what the position there and how I should proceed about the matter.

Because of these and other considerations I decided to go to London first. I think the point to which you draw my attention, important as it is, is outweighed by other factors. If I may put it rather briefly, I want to avoid the risk of going to Paris without exactly knowing how such a visit would turn out. In some ways it would have been better for me to begin with but riskier. I well realise that I have a certain world position. The question is how best to function in regard to it. I go to London first, not because I attach greater importance to it, but because I want to appear in the U.N. or near it at a psychological moment if that is possible. It may be Britain's policy, as you suggest, to play us down. They will succeed only in the mea-



sure that we are superficial or lacking strength in our own country. I am not going to London for the main purpose of discussing whether we stay in the Commonwealth or not, though that matter will no doubt be discussed.

Dr. Wang Shih-chieh passed Delhi in the dead of night and I did not see him. He sent me a word that he was going to propose your name for the Vice-Presidentship of the General Assembly.

Your telegram came today about Mudaliar continuing as a delegate. That would mean pushing out Setalvad, although you have suggested another course. I would be prepared to push Setalvad out, but I rather doubt if it would be right at this stage to make such a change in favour of Mudaliar. He will be there sometime anyhow in connection with the Hyderabad issue.

This Hyderabad affair has been an education in many ways. The reactions in foreign countries have been much worse than I expected.<sup>3</sup> Yet I am rather glad that we have this experience. So far as India is concerned, the consequences have been almost hundred per cent good thus far. It is upto us not to spoil them by rash and unwise behaviour. Whether we were right or wrong in the steps we took, if anything has been justified by results, it is our action in Hyderabad. I am not for the moment thinking of our military triumph there, but rather to other and more far-reaching consequences. The weight of fear has been lifted from the Indian people, both Hindu and Muslim. I have received vast numbers of telegrams of congratulation etc. Almost a majority of these are from Muslims of all grades and from all parts of India. It is not enough to say that these people are behaving in this way just out of fear and to gain our goodwill. Their position was becoming more and more difficult because of Hyderabad, and there was among many of them a growing bitterness against Kasim Razvi and his crowd. Now they feel safe.

The Hindus also were full of fear of Pakistan attacks, etc. That fear too has gone. The communal situation in India has not been so healthy for the last year or more as it is today. We have at last got an opportunity to deal with it in a sane and sober way, provided we are wise enough. All the fears we had about the Hindus in East Bengal trekking in their millions to West Bengal have been largely set at rest, though some exodus still continues.

The fear of war with Pakistan is much less now, indeed I do not think one can reasonably think in terms of it. Pakistan, which was shouting for war, is now in a much feeble position relatively speaking. It is clear now that whatever happens there will be no major communal trouble in India, and that is a great gain. Of course, I cannot be certain of Pakistan's reactions, but everyday that passes makes conflict less likely.

3. Vijayalakshmi Pandit had written that propaganda against India on the Hyderabad question was almost hysterical in the British conservative press. The rumours were that the Nizam's gold was flowing.

Our position in Kashmir has been strengthened both militarily and much more so psychologically and in morale.

Lastly, we have solved once for all the problem of Indian States and a number of princelings, who were thinking of giving us trouble, have subsided. The Central Government in India is admittedly paramount all over India.

These are great gains, if we know how to utilise them. Unfortunately all of us do not know that and all kinds of wild statements are being made. We are trying to check them.

In the Security Council or the U.N., we should be friendly and cooperative in regard to Hyderabad or Kashmir and we cannot ignore the volume of opinion against us. It was because of this that we agreed to the line of action suggested by you, Mudaliar and Rau. But one must not go too far on this and certain statements made in the Security Council, notably by the Argentinian, have to be met firmly and squarely. We must not allow ourselves to be insulted by anybody whoever he might be. We are not going to allow the Hyderabad issue to tie us to the apron strings of the Security Council.

The Kashmir U.N. Commission is gone. On the whole they have been friendly to us and progressively they have got rather annoyed with Pakistan. The Czech and the Belgian have been more friendly than the others. The American, Huddle<sup>4</sup>, has been least friendly and Richard Symonds has always been pro-Pakistan. I believe that they are going to recommend some kind of partition of Kashmir. I do not exactly know of course, but I have some reason for thinking that they will recommend that the Kashmir Valley proper, Ladakh, Kishtwar, and Jammu and minus certain western areas of Poonch and Mirpur, should remain attached to India. The rest, i.e., Gilgit, Muzaffarabad area, and western Poonch and Mirpur, to go to Pakistan. I do not personally object strongly to certain border areas and to Gilgit being cut off from Kashmir. But I would be very sorry indeed if Muzaffarabad town and the area surrounding it was cut off from Kashmir. However, this is for your private information only and we shall have to deal with the matter later when the report comes out.

I wrote to Rajaji today about some foreign press criticisms of our action in Hyderabad and sent him a cartoon by Low. His comment is interesting...

Your loving brother,  
Jawahar

4. J.K. Huddle (b. 1891); journalist and diplomat; counsellor of Legation, Berne, 1941-45; U.S. Ambassador to Burma, 1947; member, U.N.C.I.P., 1948.



9. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
26 September 1948

Nan dear,

Today I read your speech in the U.N. General Assembly. Of course it was a very good speech as was to be expected and I congratulate you.<sup>2</sup>

I have been thinking a great deal about your suggestion that I should visit Paris as soon as possible and before I went to London. As I wrote to you, I think there is a great deal in this suggestion, though I am sure I should not go in connection with Hyderabad. The real reason why I wanted to go to Paris was to meet Marshall, Vishinsky etc. I do not think I would have attended the General Assembly. It would undoubtedly have been better if I met these people before I went to London.

But it is hardly possible for me to arrange this now. I just cannot leave before the 5th October. I have been working at a very high pressure, trying to tie up various loose ends, and there are many of these. Fortunately the Hyderabad affair has ended happily. But, as always happens, it has given rise to innumerable difficult problems and I greatly fear that a wrong step might be taken unless it is checked.

My attention is now concentrated on Kashmir and on the economic situation here. We are having several conferences and meetings with various people concerned with these two matters during the next week. I cannot leave them. If I did so, many important matters might remain undone or might be wrongly done. Therefore it is just not possible for me to go before the 5th.

The second possibility was my going to Paris on the 7th from Geneva and spending two or three days there before I went on to London. I should have liked to have done that, but this would mean upsetting certain arrangements already made in England. As I have written to you, I have promised to spend that weekend at Broadlands with the Mountbattens. This may have no great significance, but my not going there then would undoubtedly upset the Mountbattens greatly. They have made special arrangements and probably invited special persons to meet me. I would feel rather unhappy to upset this at the last moment.

1. J.N. Collection Extracts.

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit said at the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly that racial discrimination was one of the gravest dangers to world peace. She spoke about the disharmony between big powers, India's policy, disarmament, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, fundamental freedoms of all mankind, conditions in South East Asia, Hyderabad, Kashmir and India's allegiance to the U.N. Charter.

There is a certain physical reason, though not very important why I would prefer this weekend at Broadlands. I am tired out and likely to be still more tired by the time I start from here. The journey will be tiring and if I go to Paris straight, I shall arrive there in a stale and worn out condition. I wanted very much to have two or three days rest at Broadlands to compose my mind and my body before I started on more serious work.

For these and other reasons, I have decided to adhere to my original programme.

But I should like to visit Paris as soon as I can and the only time that I can see, is the next weekend. Bajpai has sent you a message to this effect and suggested that you might inform Marshall, Vysbinsky, Dr. Wang and others concerned that I am anxious and eager to meet them and regret it greatly that certain previous engagements have delayed my visit to Paris. I hope to come during the weekend, that is, round about the 17th of October and to meet them then, I hope that would suit them.

We have sent a telegram to Krishna Menon also to this effect. I am sure he must have fixed up any number of engagements for me even for that weekend. I cannot escape engagements wherever I might go, and Paris will also be no pleasure trip.

I have suggested that if it is possible for you, without in any way affecting your work in Paris, to meet me in England and to spend the first weekend with me, it would be a good thing. That would mean your meeting me either in Geneva and travelling with me to London, or meeting me on the morning of the 7th in London. If you can spend the weekend with me, that would mean your spending it at Broadlands. I am sure the Mountbattens would welcome it. Even if you cannot spend the weekend, a day with me in London, that is the 7th October, would be good as affording us an opportunity both of discussing the situation and of fixing up provisionally the programme of my visit to Paris later.

Yesterday morning I went out for a ride with Rita, Yola<sup>3</sup> and a sowar. Unfortunately Rita had a fall. The horse could not be controlled by her and she just rolled off in front of me. It was a clean fall on soft ground. Naturally she had a bit of a shock. I did not attach much importance to it. However, I thought I had better sent for a doctor and Bhargava,<sup>4</sup> the civil surgeon, came. He has been fussing about a lot. He said that he could find nothing wrong except that there was slight concussion of the brain, but he would not like to take any risks. So she was installed in bed absolutely, that is, she is not supposed to leave it for any purpose

3. Yolanda, daughter of Prince de Ligne, the Belgian Ambassador in New Delhi.

4. D.P. Bhargava (1892-1949); served in the army, 1925-36 and 1941-45; Professor of Surgery, Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, 1936-41; Superintendent, Willingdon Hospital, New Delhi, 1947-49.



whatever. Nurses were sent for and are in attendance. I suppose it is all right, but I have an idea that Bhargava is just showing off. Tomorrow morning we are having an x-ray taken. After that I hope the poor girl will be allowed to get up and walk about. She says she feels quite all right, except for heaviness in the head.

About Hyderabad, there is a new story. The Hyderabad Government had 2 million pounds in a London Bank last year. Evidently they spent a million in the course of the past year. You can well imagine how they spent this. Two or three days ago the Nizam sent a telegram to the Bank in London asking them not to pay out any part of this money with them. Their answer came that on the 15th of this month Moin Nawaz Jang, who had authority to draw on the account, had actually drawn out a million pounds, or rather transferred it to the Pakistan account with that Bank—the Westminster Bank in London. You will remember that Moin Nawaz was not traceable in Paris, when you were hunting for him to give him the Nizam's message. Probably he had gone to London to make sure of this money. Well, he has got a tidy little sum to keep the wolf away, or perhaps Pakistan has got it. Anyway, this shows up the state of Hyderabad affairs. Probably the Nizam will send some further directions and then after a day or two we shall release this story. . . .

Your loving brother,  
Jawahar

## 10. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 29, 1948

Nan dear,

I am glad to learn from your telegram that you will be able to accompany me on the 6th evening from Geneva to London and to be able to stay with me there for a while. I want to see you of course and to talk to you about various developments in the U.N. and the Security Council. I do not want to keep you away from Paris for long. I would suggest, therefore, that you should stay with me on the 7th in London and the 8th at Broadlands. You can return on the 9th morning.

As I have informed you, I hope to be in Paris for the subsequent week-end. Probably I shall get there on Friday the 15th evening and spend Saturday and Sunday there. I shall return to London either on Sunday late evening or Monday early morning. During my stay in Paris the engagement

1. J.N. Collection.

with Marshall has already been fixed up. I should like to see Vyshinsky or Molotov if that is possible; also the Chinese representative and the French. If I could meet some others informally at a small party, I would welcome it, but I leave this to your discretion and the time available. A press conference should be ruled out at this stage.

I intend to visit Paris again after I finish the London Conference and to spend three or four days there.

I have been rather intrigued by your telegram suggesting that Ramaswami Mudaliar should be called back after this last Security Council meeting. I might inform you that I am not very happy at his performances at the Security Council. I think the matter has not been dealt with properly. Presumably what you referred to is something behind the scenes. We can make vague guesses but no more. To recall him suddenly would lead to certain repercussions not only in India but in the U.N. and therefore we should like to have more information before we take any such step.

I would have preferred to deal with this matter after my arrival in England. This means another week now. Whether the Hyderabad affair will come up again before the U.N., I do not know. We are sending by telegram strict and definite instructions as to the line to be taken up, in case the matter comes up before the Security Council. Ramaswami Mudaliar has rather gone beyond his brief and given certain assurances which we do not wholly approve of.<sup>2</sup>

We are telegraphing to you also and we shall await your reply before making any final decision.

Rita is up and about now from today. As a matter of fact, there was nothing wrong with her but the doctor here with his nurses and medicines and x-ray made such a fuss that it was difficult for me to restrain myself.

I suppose Lekha and Tara are in Paris. I think that they had better remain there when you come to London with me for the 7th and 8th. A little later they can come to London, if that is in their programme. What I mean is that I do not wish to ask the Mountbattens to invite them also for the weekend. That would be putting too much of a burden on their limited accommodation. Their house is very big but most of it functions as a hospital.

Your loving brother,  
Jawahar

2. Ramaswami Mudaliar said on 20 September in the Security Council that India was prepared to furnish the Council with full information on developments in Hyderabad and on Indian action to establish law and order and a Government conforming to the will of the people.



## 11. International Cooperation for Health<sup>1</sup>

I join the Health Minister in offering you, delegates, a very warm welcome on behalf of our Government. I would just like to add a few words to that welcome and tell you that not only we welcome you in a formal sense, but we really attach the greatest importance to the significance of the work that this great organisation is doing, more especially from the point of view of South East Asia which compared to many other parts of the world is backward in its health conditions. Now "health" is a very big word and I see it is defined in the objectives of your Charter. I am happy to read that you have defined health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". If you achieve that objective, I am sure you would have solved the whole problem in the world, because if we can achieve that nearly every problem disappears from the world. So I am happy that you too may eventually, even though perhaps we cannot achieve that end quickly, reach that goal, or something really worthwhile. ¶

In the political sphere the United Nations Organisation has been functioning for two or three years. It is struggling hard against very great problems and not always finding it easy to make progress. Nevertheless, with all its weaknesses, which are weaknesses not so much of the organisation as of the world we live in, it is making progress and it is the only thing in this world today which offers some hope of ultimate solution of the political problems of the world. Whether the world is wise enough to take advantage of that opportunity, I am not a prophet enough to say. But it appears to me that the only possibility of achieving real peace lies in greater and greater international cooperation on every plane. Therefore, it becomes our duty on the political plane as well as other planes to endeavour to bring about that cooperation. On the political plane there are big conflicts, but on other planes there are no such conflicts, but you must have enough resources to tackle them. Therefore if we have more and more international cooperation in this and like activities, not only do we do good in a sphere which is essential for the progress of the world, but indirectly we really solve the other major political and economic problems of the world also, partly because we create an atmosphere of international cooperation, and this is a very big thing, because I feel today, looking at the world, there are these

1. Inaugural address at the World Health Organisation's Regional Committee for South East Asia meeting in New Delhi, 4 October 1948. From *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 5 October 1948.

big conflicts and these are due to many causes and reasons, but probably the biggest cause is that there are certain psychological conditions in the world which are dominated by a sense of fear, fear of everyday, fear of one another and fear of another country. Now if that sense of fear should go, there would be more international cooperation in every field of activity.

Therefore, if I may say so, speaking as a person who has to move largely in a political field and looking at things, then, from the political field, these approaches to an international cooperation in other fields are an essential preliminary to a solution of the other political and economic problems. Some people may imagine that in these times, this cooperation in other fields is somewhat isolated from the other political or economic questions, but national life is ultimately an integrated whole. If there is something wrong it upsets the whole structure. If the health of an individual goes wrong, the physical health of a nation goes wrong and it affects the world too. Thus from every point of view the subject of health in this World Health Conference is a most essential matter, for the future well-being of this world both in the material sphere and in other spheres also.

There has been complaint in the past, which, no doubt, many of you gentlemen have heard, perhaps voiced, that in these great international organisations a certain special emphasis is placed on the problems, shall I say, of Europe or America or certain other parts of the world and not on parts of Asia. I make no complaints of that because in the nature of things the people who take a prominent part in these organisations are interested in the great problems of Europe. And yet if you look at the question of health, obviously you will have to undertake the treatment of those great tracts of Asia and some other parts of the world. It is also well-known to-day that you cannot isolate the world and make one part of it healthy and leave other parts of it unhealthy because infection spreads; if there is disease, it spreads and, therefore, you have to tackle the world as a whole. Then tackling the world as a whole, it becomes more necessary to tackle those parts which have been backward in any particular respect. Therefore, the tackling of the health problems of South East Asia is particularly important and I am happy that this regional system of tackling these problems is developing so that more attention may be paid to these particular problems of particular regions. I can assure you that so far as the Government of India is concerned, they will do their utmost to help you in this organisation and to carry out the decisions that you may make.



13

MISCELLANEOUS





## I. PERSONAL

1. To Clare Boothe Luce<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

July 1, 1948

Dear Clare Luce,

I received your letter nearly two months ago. As you took more than two years to answer my letter, perhaps I need not apologise for the slight delay in my writing to you.<sup>2</sup>

Need I say that I was happy to receive your letter and to have news of you. I have often thought of you ever since we met six long years ago. These years have been full of tragic events, both for you and for me, and I suppose these events have affected us both.<sup>3</sup>

It is a little difficult to pick up old threads again and to know where exactly to begin. You remember our last conversation. You were very tired then after return from some journey late in the evening, and I was leaving early next morning. I have an idea that I had stayed on an extra day in the hope of seeing you. That hope was fulfilled. But that meeting left me unsatisfied. That feeling had to remain, for I have not seen you again and I do not know when we might meet.

Am I to discuss religion and atheism with you in this letter? I do not know what exactly I believe in and what I do not. Perhaps you have seen my last book, *The Discovery of India*. I tried to find out while writing that book what exactly I believed in. I fear however that will not satisfy you and I am not sure if it satisfies me. But I just cannot believe in any kind of dogmatic faith, though I can well understand how soothing that must be.

Your great sorrow led you to a certain faith,<sup>4</sup> and if you have found peace in it, it is well with you. I do not myself see any peaceful or safe anchorage for my mind anywhere. I have to wander through life, pulled in various directions, often doubting as to what I should do and what I should avoid. I have a certain standard of values which perhaps keeps me together, though why I stick to it I cannot logically explain. A strange fate threw me into a kind of life for which I was not temperamentally made. In a sense I succeeded in that life and gained public approbation and what was infinitely more, the love and affection of large numbers of human beings. That very love and affection became a burden to me, for I did not know how to repay it and how to live up to what was expected of me.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru wrote on 4 May 1946. See *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* (first series) Vol. 15, pp. 597-599.

3. In her letter Clare Luce wrote about the deaths of her only child and of Mahatma Gandhi and added: "Hiroshima was not enough. The Punjab will not be enough, we shall all stagger on from horrors to horrors multiplied".

4. Clare Luce said that she found solace in her Christian faith.

I am sorry I am writing about myself when really I should like to know about you. You told me not to work too hard and not to sacrifice my health, vitality and energy.<sup>5</sup> Very true. And yet the only satisfaction I have is in working. Perhaps that is mere escapism, for much of my work is undoubtedly trivial. Isn't life itself mostly trivial? We live for the high moments which seldom come and when they come they pass too soon.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Clare Luce had said "I have seen a number of politicians and statesmen in a number of countries exhaust themselves in effect on trivial matters...which they knew were trivial, but others thought crucial", and "it is unwise to spend your mind and heart beyond a certain point in details, personages, or issues that are not crucial".

## 2. To J.R.D. Tata<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 4, 1948

My dear Jeh,

Thank you for the lovely cherries you sent me today. Where did they come from? Were they brought from Europe in one of your Constellations? As a matter of fact I have been having plenty of cherries this summer. They have been coming from Kashmir. The season there for cherries has just ended.

Thank you also for your attempt to send me the stamp, etc., of the Air Mail carried by your Constellation to Europe. As a matter of fact you did not wholly succeed in the attempt largely due to the lack of intelligence of the people who deal with my mail. I get a very large number of letters daily, over 1500 or so, and a number of people open them and sort them out. Only such letters as they think worthy of my perusal or which may have special marking, reach me. In the case of this particular letter of yours the card inside reached me and the envelope had been torn away. I tried to find it out but without success. In future if you wish any of your letters specially to reach me, please mark it on the envelope "FOR HIMSELF".

I have had plenty of information from various sources, both official and non-official, about the running of your air service to Europe. All accounts agree in speaking well of it and praising it for its general efficiency. Congratulations. Perhaps I might use it some time or other. There is a

1. J.N. Collection.



chance of my going to Europe in the second half of September or early in October. But thus far it is only a chance.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

### 3. To Lady Colleen Nye<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 4, 1948

Dear Lady Nye,

Thank you for your letter of the 23rd June.<sup>2</sup> As you must know, my visit to Madras has now been fixed up and, unless the unforeseen happens, I hope to reach there on the 24th afternoon. On the 25th morning I shall go to Karaikudi, returning the same afternoon. I shall stay on in Madras for the whole of 26th and leave on the 27th morning for Delhi. I shall therefore be with you when Stafford Cripps' sister<sup>3</sup> is there.

I should love to attend any party that you may give. My programme becomes more and more crowded in spite of my attempt to keep some time free. Still I hope I shall have some little leisure, and I would like to visit the woods about which you spoke to me. I have not accepted any engagement for a meal outside. I shall of course visit your Health and Recreation Centre.

Very probably my daughter, Indira, and my niece, Rita, will accompany me to Madras. My Secretary, Mathai, will also be coming with me.

The last fortnight of the Mountbattens' stay in India was rather hectic with numerous functions and parties. And then suddenly there was a fall and Government House looked forlorn and deserted. We miss them greatly. They seemed to have become such an essential part of Delhi that it will take some time to get used to their absence.

I am looking forward to my visit to Madras and to seeing you again.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Lady Colleen Nye, the wife of the Governor, Sir Archibald Nye, in her letter of 23 June 1948 said that she was looking forward to Nehru's forthcoming visit to Madras and that wished she could arrange for him a meeting of the leading non-political citizens of Madras. She also wanted to show him the Health and Recreation Centre which she had started.

3. Ruth Julia Egerton. She along with her husband Alfred Egerton toured India from July to September 1948.

#### 4. To Sarojini Naidu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
6 July 1948

My dear Sarojini,

Thank you for your letter of July 1st. I sent you a telegram yesterday agreeing to your suggestion to bring Brunner's<sup>2</sup> pictures of Gandhiji's prayer meeting and the series of seven Amarnath Cave to Delhi with you.

Certainly you can come to Delhi when you feel like it. Your visit here is always welcome. I have been rather confused about your programme. Somehow I thought that you were going to Lucknow and indeed when I went to Lucknow a few days ago I half expected to find you there. Then I wrote a letter to Bebee<sup>3</sup> and sent it to Lucknow.

Owing to developments of which you are no doubt aware, Hyderabad has become rather cut off from us. No aeroplane service runs and letters may or may not reach. Thus far telegrams are fairly safe.

Papi<sup>4</sup> applied for the Foreign Service. We are prepared to take her but certain formalities are necessary, among them being an interview with a Selection Board. We have, therefore, asked her to come here round about the 27th of this month when the Selection Board would be sitting. As it is pretty certain that she will be approved of we are suggesting to her to come here to stay if that is possible.<sup>5</sup>

I am going to Madras on the 24th for three days. I shall return on the 27th. I have suggested to Papi to join me in Madras so that she can accompany me to Delhi on the 27th morning. This will fit in with her programme. She will have no other way of coming here except by train which itself may not be a very certain or agreeable method.

I miss the Mountbattens a good deal. They were such live persons and they kept things humming. Edwina and Pamela were really sorry to go and shed copious tears. I should not be surprised if both of them return some time in the winter for a visit.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Sass Brunner.

3. Padmaja Naidu.

4. Leilamani Naidu.

5. Leilamani Naidu joined I.F.S. in 1948 as officer on special duty.



## 5. To Vaman Tukaram Nigade<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10 July 1948

Dear Vaman Tukaram Nigade,  
I have your letter of the 30th June.<sup>2</sup>

It is always difficult to advise on personal matters when the persons concerned are not fully known. Therefore all that I can say to you will be in the nature of general principles.

If you love the Telugu girl and she is equally fond of you and both of you desire to marry each other, I do not think that the objection to such a marriage being inter-provincial or against old tradition should come in the way. But you must make sure that both of you really like each other and are going to be happy with each other. Any momentary feeling may perhaps not last. If both of you are sure of yourselves and can face the future together with confidence, then there should be no objection to your marriage.

Conditions in India are changing and there are now many inter-provincial marriages. I do not see why we should object to this. What we should seek is the happiness of the persons concerned and their capacity to cooperate in life's journey.

Of course the goodwill of your mother is important and you should seek to gain it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Nigade, a Maharashtrian, living in Kirkee railway quarters, had sought Nehru's advice about marrying a Telugu girl.

## 6. To Marie Romain Rolland<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10 July 1948

Dear Madame,  
Thank you for your letter of July 1st, which I have just received.

As I think I wrote to you I shall very gladly send you the original or copy of any letter which Romain Rolland wrote to me, if I can find it. He did not write many letters to me. As far as I remember I had one or two letters in Switzerland more than 20 years ago and two or three letters subsequently. I shall certainly try to find them.

1. J.N. Collection.

I did not know that Romain Rolland had kept any record of his conversations with me. I shall be happy to see this. I am not at all sure if I shall be visiting Paris this year. If I do so, I shall get into touch with you. Perhaps it would be easier for a copy of his notes to be sent to me here. This would save time. In any event, of course, I should like to have the pleasure of meeting you when I go to Paris.

I did not know that Raja Rao was going to issue a book of mine in Russia. This little book<sup>2</sup> was a mere collection of newspaper articles written 20 years ago. It is completely out of date today and hardly worth publication.

With warm regards,

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. A 147-page book titled *Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and Impressions*, containing sixteen articles which appeared in *The Hindu* and *Young India* during 1927-28, was published by Lala Ram Mohan Lal of Allahabad in December 1928. The articles were (1) The Fascination of Russia, (2) The Journey, (3) Impressions of Moscow, (4) The Soviet System, (5) The Constitution of U.S.S.R., (6) Some books on Russia, (7) Lenin, (8) More books, (9) The Peasantry (10) Criminal Law, (11) A Prison, (12) The Problem of Minorities, (13) Education, (14) The Peasant and the Land, (15) Women and Marriage and (16) Russia and India. For the text see *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 2, pp. 379-447.

## 7. To Reginald Sorensen<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
10 July 1948

My dear Sorensen,

I have greatly appreciated your personal letter of the 7th June. Please do not think that we can misunderstand anything that you may say or do. I know that whatever you do will be done out of your love for peace and freedom in India and elsewhere.

In my separate letter<sup>2</sup> to you I have already said something which I need not repeat here. We are having very great difficulties but we hope to win through.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 586-589.



## 8. To Harji Malik<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 15, 1948

My dear Harji,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of June 11th.

The incident that you describe is indeed interesting. As an author it is pleasing to me.

I can very well understand the feelings of Indians abroad who have been away from their mother country for many years. I have met many such people in my travels abroad and noticed for myself this nostalgic feeling.

Your father<sup>3</sup> sent me the poem you wrote some months ago and I liked very much.

Certainly you will have my photograph. I am arranging for one to be sent.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Harji represented Sonntagsblatt of Hamburg, West Germany, and wrote articles on Indian social problems and politics for newspapers and magazines.
3. H.S. Malik.

## 9. To Mrs. Charles F. Brush<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 21st July 1948

Dear Mrs. Brush,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of July 2nd.

I am glad to learn that there is a proposal for Smith College to award Margaret Sanger<sup>3</sup> an honorary degree for her work for the welfare of women and children all over the world. I am quite sure that such an appreciation for work is richly deserved. People in the four corners of the world have been influenced by her work and have admired it. I am rather surprised that any such recognition should have been so long delayed.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Wife of Charles Francis Brush, an American scientist.
3. (1883-1966); American leader of birth-control movement; a trained nurse by profession; indicted (1915) for sending pleas for birth control through the mails; organised first American Birth Control League; author of books and pamphlets on birth control.

My sister, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, is at present our Ambassador in Moscow. I am sure she will be happy to associate herself in our high appreciation of Margaret Sanger's work. Perhaps you could write to her direct.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 10. To Amiya Chakravarty<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
3 August 1948

My dear Amiya,

Thank you for your letter of July 24th and for the copy of the introduction to the Nehru anthology<sup>2</sup>. I have sent this introduction to the Signet Press.

I wonder if you or Dilip Gupta<sup>3</sup> have taken the trouble to get permission from the holders of the copyright for some of my books. This will be necessary if you produce extracts from those books. These publishers are very troublesome. Of course I am perfectly willing.

Your introduction is too warm and if I may say so, rather extravagant. But then this is for you to judge.

I have read Julia Abrahamson's<sup>4</sup> letter with interest. The Chancellor of the University of Chicago<sup>5</sup> is no doubt a learned and a well-meaning man. But his proposal<sup>6</sup> that I should convene some kind of a conference of noted individuals in various countries for a friendly discussion appears to me to be wholly impracticable<sup>7</sup>. If the world's problems could be solved

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Amiya Chakravarty had written that the publication of a Nehru anthology would interpret the fundamental Indian thought in the modern context. This book was not published.
3. Dilip Kumar Gupta (1918-1977); founder and publisher of Signet Press, Calcutta.
4. Julia Abrahamson with her husband Dr. Harry Abrahamson directed the Friends Service Unit in Calcutta during 1945-47.
5. Robert M. Hutchins.
6. Amiya Chakravarty had sent to Nehru Julia Abrahamson's impressions of a conversation with Hutchins who felt that only Nehru commanded respect, admiration and confidence of all nations and people in the existing suspicion and distrust.
7. He suggested that Nehru as "an individual of world stature known for his character, moral integrity and intellectual gifts should call a conference for peace in the same spirit of Asian Relations Conference" inviting a cross-section of various countries including business and labour leaders, educators and scientists. He felt that the State Department would not dare to oppose this.



by such discussions among a few men of goodwill, there would be no difficulty whatever. It is curious that such proposals should come to me repeatedly from America and from no other country. There is a delightful optimism and immaturity in America, which rather fascinates me. I wish I could feel that way, but when I see my own present incapacity to deal with India's problems, it seems absurd and presumptuous to tell the world what it should do.

There is a possibility of my going to England and France in September-October. Many friends in America invite me. But I fear I cannot go there on this occasion. I am rather afraid of going to America. Somebody said that no one should go to America for the first time. I think there is a great deal of truth in that, however absurd it might sound. I know I shall be overwhelmed with kindness and hospitality there. I suppose I shall go there sometime or other but not this year.

I shall welcome news cuttings of your lectures.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 11. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4 August 1948

Nan dear,

Yesterday I dictated a long letter to you. Today I received your letter of the 23rd July. I just want to say a few words in reply.

I have long got used to a state of complete uncertainty about my future. This affects me less than almost anyone I know. I carry on as if I was doing for eternity or worse and at the same time I have a feeling that the work I am doing may suddenly end. Something may happen which emphasises one aspect of it or it may be my mood at the moment. Now it does not much matter and I really do not know how I shall function in the future. I may remain the Prime Minister for a considerable length of time or I may not. Here I am at present moving into this vast mansion as if I was going to stay here for years, Indu and Padmaja and others fitting it all up. It amused me to think that all this labour might not bear fruit.

I wrote to you because at that time that mood was dominant. It returns

often enough. But I should not bother if I were you. When something happens we shall inevitably adjust ourselves to it.

One thing I want you to realise even if I have to leave the Prime Ministership, I do not want you to resign from such offices as you may be holding. This is for two reasons. First that it is not the right thing for a person to do so. Of course, if later difficulties of another nature arise then it is open to you to reconsider the matter. Secondly even if I resign I do not fade out of the picture and it may well be that after a little while I come back. I am too vital a person and too necessary to the scheme of things in India to retire to the mountains.

Everything here leads to a climax, Hyderabad, Kashmir, the economic situation, refugees. Tonight I went to dinner with the Nawab of Pataudi.<sup>2</sup> Sarojini was also there and a large number of persons. The dinner was to celebrate the birthday of Patuadi's wife,<sup>3</sup> who is the daughter of the Nawab of Bhopal. As soon as we arrived there<sup>4</sup> people started complaining of pain in the eyes. I felt my eyes smarting too. I thought at first that this was due to the smoke from the photographers' flashes. But then the smarting grew and all of us were shedding tears. We discovered that this was the effect of teargas. At some place about 400 yards away there had been a demonstration by refugee students before Mohanlal Saksena's house. He is the Refugee Minister. Oddly enough he was in Calcutta. There was some violence and the police threw a teargas bomb. This wretched gas floated as far as Pataudi's house and made all of us shed tears. We had to apply large quantities of water to our eyes for some time. This is just a little incident in the life of Delhi today which will probably get a few lines in the press in the morning and nothing more.

I wonder if you know that we have practically decided to hand over Swaraj Bhawan<sup>5</sup> to the Save Children Committee which was started some years ago. There is going to be a children's home there. Everything is all right except the fact that we have to find 125,000 rupees for immediate repairs to the entire building as well as some sanitary arrangements etc. I have told them to go ahead. I am glad of this decision, for I like the idea of children playing about in that house.

Your loving brother,  
Jawahar

2. Mohammad Iftikhar Ali (1910-1952); a well-known cricketer and polo player; played for England in test matches in Australia and England, 1931-32; Captain of Indian Cricket Team to London, 1946; Deputy Secretary in Ministry of External Affairs, 1950-51.
3. Begum Sajeda Sultan (b 1915); second daughter of Hamidullah Khan.
4. Pataudi's house was situated on Barakhamba Road.
5. See *post*, pp. 717-718.



12. To Rajan Nehru<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4 August 1948

My dear Rajan,

I received today your letter of the 25th July.

About the donation to the Kamala Nehru Memorial Hospital, it should be sent direct to the Superintendent....<sup>2</sup>

Things are working to a climax here in many directions. But we have got used to living in a continuous crisis that we grow callous.

I have had very good accounts of the work you have done.<sup>3</sup>

Two days ago I moved into the old Commander-in-Chief's house. This is very spacious and for the present I feel rather lost in it. Indu has spent a lot of time in fitting it up and has managed to make it quite cheerful which it was not previously.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection Extracts.
2. An American lady, Ward Las, had offered \$500 for any hospital in India and Rajan Nehru had suggested her giving it to the Kamala Nehru Memorial Hospital, Allahabad.
3. There had been an incessant number of visitors from India including I.L.O. delegation and so many others. Rajan Nehru had been extending assistance to them at Washington.

13. To Asaf Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
4 August 1948

My dear Asaf,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st August.<sup>2</sup>

I have been following D.F. Karaka's choice efforts.<sup>3</sup> He has got a particular grouse against me. I think his dragging you in or Nan<sup>3</sup> or Rajan<sup>4</sup> is chiefly done with a view to discredit me, . . . I do not quite know how to deal with such specimens except to leave them strictly alone to stew in their own juice.

Two days ago I moved into the old Commander-in-Chief's House.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection Extracts.
2. Asaf Ali wrote: "D.F. Karaka's latest about me is that I held dance classes at the Embassy and Rajan comes for lecturing for money. He will not stop until he goes there as ambassador himself".
3. Vijayalakshmi Pandit.
4. Rajan Nehru.

#### 14. To Louise Morin<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 26, 1948

My dear Louise,

Your letter of the 15th August has just come. Previously during the last few months I have received some other letters from you and I am rather ashamed of not having answered them. It is always a pleasure to hear from you or of you. But you will appreciate that my life is hardly my own and I find it difficult to write many letters apart from my official correspondence.

There is some slight possibility of my going to England in October next and possibly to Paris also for two or three days at the time of the United Nations session there. If I do so, we shall of course meet. My sister, Vijayalakshmi, is leading our Delegation to the United Nations and you will surely meet her in Paris.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

#### 15. To Dorothy Woodman<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
August 27, 1948

Dear Dorothy Woodman,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of May 28th together with the first number of *Asian Horizon*<sup>3</sup> was placed before me today. Why it has taken three months to reach me is a mystery. Perhaps the fault was of someone in my office and it got mixed up with other magazines and papers. I am enquiring into this matter.

Thank you for sending me your new magazine, which is very attractive both in its general appearance and in the quality of the articles in it.<sup>4</sup> I have not read any of these articles yet, but in spite of my many preoccupations

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The companion of Kingsley Martin.

3. The first issue of *Asian Horizon* was published in spring 1948 by Asian Publications Ltd., and printed by the Corwall Press, Paris Garden, London.

4. The articles published in the issue were (i) 'The Spirit of Asia' by S. Radhakrishnan, (ii) 'When Greek and Oriental Cultures met at Seleucia' by Neilson C. Debevoise, (iii) 'The Place of Asia in History and in the Contemporary World' by H. Venkatasubbiah, (iv) 'Social Reforms in Indonesia' by Dr. Subandrio, (v) 'Viet Nam's Struggle for Independence' by Pham-Ngoe-Thach and four articles on contemporary art of Asia.



pations, I shall try to read some of them. I am sure this magazine will serve a useful purpose.

I am afraid I cannot promise to write an article for the *Asian Horizon*, as it is beyond my physical capacity to do any such writing at present or in the near future.

I had a letter from Kingsley some days ago. I have found it difficult to answer it because it raises complicated issues.<sup>5</sup> Evidently he disapproved of a great deal that is happening in India and of my association with it. First of all I should not like to be considered as a helpless victim, pushed about hither and thither by others. To some extent, of course, we are all victims of circumstances and certainly circumstances have not been kind to us for some time past. I am myself very critical of much that has been done in India by others as well as by me. Nevertheless, I am fully responsible for it and have no wish to disclaim that responsibility. We have fought, during the past year or more, against many evil forces and often one has to choose in favour of the lesser evils. Life is not quite so simple as we had imagined it in our more youthful days.

I have a feeling, however, that Kingsley is not supplied with a correct background of information about events in India and so often his appreciation is not only factually wrong, but, what is more important, emotionally wrong. Does he get his facts from the British Information Service attached to the U.K. High Commissioner's Office in Delhi? If that is so, then I can well understand his difficulty in appreciating properly the position in India. That Service has developed a peculiar hatred for India.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. See *ante*, pp. 265-266.

## 16. To George Bernard Shaw<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
September 4, 1948

My dear Mr. Shaw,

I do not quite know why I am writing to you, for we are both busy men and I have no desire to add to your work. But Devadas Gandhi has sent me a copy of a letter you wrote to him on the 16th July and this has produced an urge in me to write to you.

1. *A Bunch of Old Letters* by Jawaharlal Nehru (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958) pp. 516-517.

Forty years ago, when I was 18 and an undergraduate at Cambridge, I heard you address a meeting there. I have not seen you again since then, nor have I ever written to you. But, like many of my generation, we have grown up in company with your writings and books. I suppose a part of myself, such as I am today, has been moulded by that reading. I do not know if that would do you any credit.

Because, in a sense, you have been near to me, or rather near to my thoughts, I have often wanted to come in closer touch with you and to meet you. But opportunities have been lacking and then I felt that the best way to meeting you was to read what you had written.

Devadas apparently asked you as to what we should do with Gandhi's assassin.<sup>2</sup> I suppose he will hang and certainly I shall not try to save him from the death penalty, although I have expressed myself in favour of the abolition of the death penalty in previous years. In the present case there is no alternative. But even now, in a normal case, I have grown rather doubtful if it is preferable to death to keep a man in prison for 15 or 20 years.

Life has become so cheap that it does not seem of very much consequence whether a few criminals are put to death or not. Sometimes one wonders whether a sentence to live is not the hardest punishment after all.

I must apologise to you for those of my countrymen who pester you for your views on India. Many of us have not outgrown our old habit of seeking testimonials from others. Perhaps that is due to a certain lack of faith in ourselves. Events have shaken us rather badly and the future does not appear to be as bright as we imagined it would be.

There is a chance of my going to England for two or three weeks in October next. I would love to pay you a visit, but certainly not if this means any interference with your daily routine. I would not come to trouble you with any questions. There are too many questions which fill the mind and for which there appear to be no adequate answers, or if the answers are there, somehow they cannot be implemented because of the human beings that should implement them. If I have the privilege to meet

2. Bernard Shaw wrote to Devadas Gandhi: "You and Nehru are in a delicate position as to the fate of the assassin. As the son of your father you must say 'Pardon him'. Nehru as Prime Minister must say 'Hang him', whatever his private view of the death penalty may be. If he is not officially and judicially hanged he will probably be lynched. That is for Nehru to consider .... As for me, I am against all punishment as such, but no statesman can abrogate the right of civilised society to exterminate human as well as animal vermin."



you for a while, it will be to treasure a memory which will make me a little richer than I am.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Bernard Shaw replied on 8 September: "I was greatly gratified to learn that you were acquainted with my political writings; and I need hardly add that I should be honoured by a visit from you, though I cannot pretend that it will be worth your while to spend an afternoon of your precious time making the journey to this remote village, where there is nothing left of Bernard Shaw but a doddering old skeleton who should have died years ago.... Though I know nothing about India except what is in the newspapers I can consider it objectively because I am not English but Irish, and have lived through the long struggle for liberation from English rule, and the partition of the country into Eire and Northern Ireland, the Western equivalent of Hindustan and Pakistan. I am as much a foreigner in England as you were in Cambridge". Because of crowded programmes in London, Nehru could not meet Shaw.

## II. GENERAL

### 1. To Ladli Prasad Zutshi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
July 4, 1948

My dear Ladli Bhai,

You must have seen the decision of the Working Committee in regard to the Swaraj Bhawan.<sup>2</sup> They could take no final decision as this is a matter for the Trustees to decide. But they have generally agreed to the proposal that Swaraj Bhawan should be utilised for a children's home run by the Save Children Committee of the All India Women's Conference. They have appointed a committee to look into this matter and to report.<sup>3</sup>

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Swaraj Bhawan had been the Congress Party headquarters since 1930. The Party shifted its headquarters to New Delhi in 1948 and on 1 July 1948 the Working Committee of the A.I.C.C. adopted a resolution allowing Swaraj Bhawan to be used for a children's home to be run by the "Save Children Committee".

3. An ad-hoc committee met on 4 August 1948 and decided to hand over the Swaraj Bhawan to the Save Children Committee. In May 1949 the Children's National Institute of Allahabad took it over. A Jawahar Bal Bhawan has been functioning here since November 1973.

I have been thinking of transferring by gift Anand Bhawan to Indira. I discussed this matter with Kamalnayan Bajaj today. Probably he will write to you about it. He wanted to know if we had the title deeds, etc. I do not know what papers we have got. But I suppose the original title deeds of the house, 1, Church Road, are to be found somewhere.

Yours,  
Jawahar

## 2. A Soldier for Freedom<sup>1</sup>

Rajaji commands the respect and confidence of the Indian masses not because he had assumed the highest office, but because he is an old soldier in the battle of freedom.

Though the problems are delicate, we must face them courageously. The country was faced, is faced and will be faced with such problems but they cannot be overcome by the programme like a brave nation ready to face every obstacle in our way to progress. In this difficult hour what we need is experience, clear-mindedness and tact.

I am proud that our new Governor General possesses all these virtues as a result of his long association with Mahatma Gandhi and I am sure that, under his able guidance, we will march to progress and prosperity.

1. Speech at a public meeting organized by Delhi Municipal Corporation to present an address of welcome to the Governor General, Delhi, 11 July 1948. *National Herald*, 12 July 1948.



3. To Lord Mountbatten<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
21 July 1948

My dear Dickie,<sup>1</sup>

I received your letter of the 12th July yesterday, I shall follow your advice in the Ghulam Mohammed matter. You will have noticed that this has not been allowed to rest by Pakistan on Ghulam Mohammed's statement or even their reply to H.M.G.'s statement.<sup>2</sup> Other people like Ghazanfar Ali Khan<sup>3</sup> have entered the lists against you and *Dawn* has been writing the most vicious stuff. There can be no doubt that all this is not merely connected with past occurrences but is a set policy to influence present events by attempting to discredit you. However, I shall follow your advice and not say anything officially in the matter. Probably that is the best course to adopt. I think you wrote to me that Krishna Menon had sent a copy of my telegram on this subject to Attlee. That is for the present good enough.

As regards the other point raised by you, that is the question of proportionate pensions for the British members of the non-Secretary of State's Services, I am having it examined immediately and as soon as the Home Ministry and the Finance Ministry are ready for it we shall consider it in Cabinet. I myself know very little about the subject but I shall now take a little more interest.

You must have been kept informed by Krishna Menon about recent developments in Kashmir and Hyderabad. There has been open and deliberate gun-running by air as between Pakistan and Hyderabad by a Lancaster four-engined aircraft. A gang of adventurers are making fabulous profits out of Hyderabad by carrying arms nightly by air. The head man is Bennett and number two appears to be Cotton, both old members of the R.A.F. Recently Cotton asked for permission to take medical supplies from Karachi to Hyderabad in one of his Lancasters. We gave him that permission subject to his stopping in Bombay en route for examination. This was the normal procedure for any plane flying over Indian soil. It was all the more necessary when charges of gun-running were being made. We even assured Cotton of his personal safety. However, Cotton declared that he would not accept this and deliberately flouted our decision and rules by going direct to Hyderabad. He was welcomed there with open arms by Laik Ali.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See pages 201 and 339.

3. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Pakistan Minister for Refugee and Rehabilitation, said that before the partition Lord Mountbatten had assured that if trouble started anywhere in the subcontinent he would take strong measures to maintain peace, but when he reminded Mountbatten of the promise in Karachi on 14 August 1947, he found him cold and indifferent.

This business of a so-called "mercy plane" carrying medical supplies was obviously a ruse and an attempt to divert attention from the arms being sent nightly. As a matter of fact considerable medical supplies have actually gone to Hyderabad from Bombay and Calcutta in recent weeks. Our own information is that quite a stock of medical supplies has been accumulated there, and as for salt over a hundred wagons have gone in and they have probably got a year's supply in stock.

You can well imagine the reaction of public opinion here to this flagrant violation of our rules not only by this gang of adventurers but by Pakistan and Hyderabad. The Pakistan Air Force station at Karachi is being used by them and they are being given every facility. The fact that Englishmen are chiefly concerned in this matter is being commented upon and we are asked why the U.K. Government permits this. I fear that sooner or later, if this kind of thing does not stop, some big scale operation will become essential.

In Kashmir, according to the statement made privately by Zafrullah Khan to the members of the Kashmir Commission, three Brigades of the Pakistan Army are fighting the Indian Army in State territory. That is what the Kashmir Commission people have told us. The question therefore of our proving to them that Pakistan has been participating in Kashmir hardly arises. You know that the Pakistan Army is run by British officers and British staff. It is impossible for that army to function there without the full cooperation of the British officer element from the Commander-in-Chief downwards. Indeed our information is that Gracey has been visiting the Kashmir front and that the Pakistan General Staff is directly carrying on his war there.

If this fact is established, as it is now, then the whole case that the Pakistan has built up during the last ten months collapses. But for the moment I am chiefly concerned with this participation in an intimate way of British officers and ex-officers in Kashmir and Hyderabad. This is producing a very bad impression on our people.

I do not know whether to be glad or not at your being posted in the Mediterranean. Perhaps a relatively quiet life, that is quiet from the political point of view, will be good for you for a while but I can hardly imagine that you will remain there for long.

I can assure you that I am exceedingly anxious to visit England next October. My difficulty is the developing situation in Hyderabad and Kashmir. But I still hope to come.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal



#### 4. C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Speaker,<sup>2</sup> Yuvaraj<sup>3</sup> and Friends,

It is both an honour and embarrassment for me to say something on this occasion. When I was approached to participate in this ceremony, naturally, I agreed very gladly, and then when I thought that I shall have to say something, my difficulties began. Not that I am unused to saying various things on various occasions, but it is always very difficult to speak about an intimate friend and colleague. One cannot speak casually or indifferently about him. One cannot be too intimate in public speaking about anyone. So where does one draw the line? However, it is a pleasure to me and a privilege that you have associated me with this function.

For the last 28 years, I have been closely associated with Rajaji and we have faced many crises together, many difficulties, many problems. We have often differed from each other. We have often parted company from each other, on the political field, and we have again met together to cooperate and work together. So when I think of him, I hardly think of him as the Governor General of India, but rather as a close colleague with whom I have worked for all these many years. It has been a curious satisfaction to me that by Rajaji becoming the Governor General that close association continues in a different form.

Now, I just mentioned to you that in the course of these 28 years, occasions have arisen when politically speaking, we differed somewhat from each other. We did not see eye to eye. We felt that in regard to some important matters, our approaches were different. I do not know if that difference in approach may not be evident even now or in the future in regard to any matter as indeed, when thinking persons work together it does not mean that they agree in everything; or that, there must be a certain regimentation of thought. Inevitably there is a difference of opinion, but if there is a basic identity in objective and in matters of approach, and if there is a certain confidence in each other's integrity of purpose, then those differences of opinion do not count so much and if they do then they do no harm and injury to anyone. Democracy does not mean a regimentation or uniformity of opinion, but the capacity to have differences of

1. Speech before unveiling a portrait of C. Rajagopalachari in Madras Legislative Assembly Chamber on 24 July 1948. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.
2. J. Shivashunmugam Pillai (1901-1975); member, Corporation of Madras, 1932-39; Mayor, 1938-39; member, 1937-47 and Speaker, Madras Legislative Assembly, 1947-55; Member, U.P.S.C., 1955-61; elected to Rajya Sabha, April 1962.
3. Yuvaraja of Pithapuram.

opinion, and yet out of them produce uniformity of action, to tolerate differences, to give every freedom to every expression of opinion, but when any decisions have been made, then to adhere to them, even though we might differ from them, otherwise we may go to pieces.

So in thinking of Rajaji all these facts come to my mind. When I was young which happened rather long ago, I used to attach a great deal of importance to what might be called various "isms", various policies etc. Well of course, I still attach importance to them, because they represent a certain objective, a certain method of working, approach etc. But still the importance I attached to them, is relatively less now, than previously. Why? Because I have begun to feel that the primary thing that I seek in an individual is not so much what creed he professes in religion or politics or economics or anything else, important as that is; the primary thing in an individual is his integrity. If he is not a person of integrity, then it does not do very much good what he professes in the way of high ideals of political or economic policy.

In earlier days, of course, I valued integrity, but somehow I felt, that the expression of a certain policy was more important, or, perhaps, it may be that one took for granted other people's integrity, or the integrity of those people who gave expressions to various policies and "isms". But later experience came to show that that could not be taken for granted. Indeed that high ideals, at least the putting forward of high ideals, was often exploited for base purposes. That, apart from deliberate exploitation for base purposes, unconsciously, many of our people thought that they have done their duty to their country by merely giving expression to a certain noble sentiment and then possibly indulging in anything but noble activities. So I began to value much more the integrity of the individual, than merely the expression of a certain political or economic policy that he might give. Although, of course, in dealing with national matters, international matters, one cannot just go merely, on the basis of integrity, important as it is. We must have a certain policy to pursue. Integrity is not a policy. Integrity is a basic thing, out of which policies may grow. One can easily conceive and one does know, indeed, two men of absolute integrity completely opposing each other, they believe differently, they have no reason why they should not oppose each other. They may even honour each other and get to fight with each other. I laid stress on this fact because Rajaji is a person of serious, of strong convictions, strong beliefs, who has adhered to them.

He was, as you know, very much influenced in his early years by Mahatma Gandhi. He accepted basically Mahatmaji's approach to various problems etc. Nevertheless at no time did he become a person who unthinkingly accepted any man's dictum, even Mahatmaji's dictum. He would argue



with him, if he did not agree with something, he would debate with him, he would not give in, and ultimately he did give in, because he thought it best in the circumstances to accept, what Mahatmaji said in a particular matter. It was difficult giving in after the hardest fought battle of wits and arguments. Now, when one has to do with dominating personalities like Mahatma Gandhi, normally, a person collapses before him, mentally collapses I mean. One has so much faith in his judgment that one accepts what he says. Secondly one's mind does not function critically, when dealing with these dominating personalities, and that can be applied to all of us. All our minds did not function quite as critically, as effectively, because of our faith in him and because of various matters. Now Rajaji's faith in Mahatmaji is, of course, tremendous but he never allowed his mind to go asleep whatever happened. He wanted to consider everything on the merits, came to his own conclusions, and if he gave in to somebody, it was consciously and deliberately, having argued the matter, not unconsciously, sort of a being blown away into it. Therefore, Rajaji whether he sometimes disagreed with us, or he very often agreed with us he brought an extraordinarily keen analytical mind to bear on every question, that came before us, and again whether we agreed or did not agree, he threw light on every question that we discussed with him, and there are very few persons in India, with whom I should like to discuss any intricate question or problem more than with Rajaji. I do not know if after the discussion, I would agree with him or not, that is a minor matter, but I am quite sure that the discussion will do me good, will throw light on the problem and very probably I will agree with him. That is immaterial. Now that is a type of keen mind and not only a keen mind, but a mind and person of the highest integrity and self-sacrifice, that is an invaluable asset to a nation.

Now there is another aspect, I should like to put before you. Every country resembles each other, and yet each country has a certain individuality or genius of its own. Now, in India, normally speaking how is greatness measured? Well, of course, the man of money will have a certain honour given to him, and other people like that. But fundamentally in India what has been valued and respected and honoured has obviously not been possessions, have not been decorations and titles, even though we might have crowds and crowds of Rajas, and Nawabs, and Maharajas and Nizams. They are not really thought of much because they may have big titles of highnesses and exalted highnesses, as indeed, it makes no difference to the individual. The fact of a title makes not the slightest difference whether he is good, bad or indifferent. Positions have made little difference in the Indian minds, except that, of course, many people bow down before

the power or position or money. The essential things that India has honoured in the past and even today, are honours, wisdom and learning and even more from that a certain spirit of service. That is a fundamental thing. That has always been placed first in the Indian mind. Well, when I say in the Indian minds, not every individual's mind but in the group or national mind, if I may say. So we honour tremendously above everything a man like Mahatma Gandhi, obviously not for his position or titles or this or that, but for the very opposite thing, for giving up those things and not even for that ultimately because many people give them up, but for his spirit, I do not quite know how to define it for his whole individuality, service, sacrifice etc. He did represent fundamentally the highest type of the mind of India, and so India reacted to him in that way.

Now, we see Rajaji in the highest position of the state in India today, that is rather symbolic, that a man like Rajaji in his personal life, the simplest of us all, in his dress, habits, food, everything suddenly being put in a place which was symbolic of the power and glory of an empire. It is an odd transition, very significant, full of meaning. Naturally, every state must have certain emblems, must have a certain dignity as a state. It is not quite so simple as all that, that in a life of high thinking and simple living, all our state officers should be accommodated in mud-huts, because probably the most complicated way of living is in a mud-hut. So a state has to have a certain dignity and I feel state buildings should have dignity, simplicity certainly. All public buildings, beauty and dignity, of course sometime or the other, every building in the country will have dignity and beauty and stability and comfort and all that. But till then, at any rate, the public building must have that. But what is bad is not the state doing it but is the rather vulgar ostentation of the individual, who tries to do for himself. That is a painful sight not only the building but also the occupant of that building. But what I was telling you was this curious interesting phenomenon, very significant of the present day context of India, of Rajaji the simplest of Indians in his way of life etc. occupying a place which has been a symbol of the reverse of simplicity in the past and occupying it with great dignity and great effect.

I thank you for your giving me this opportunity of unveiling this portrait, which I now proceed to do.



## 5. The Orissa High Court<sup>1</sup>

On the occasion of the inauguration of the Orissa High Court<sup>2</sup> I send my greetings and good wishes. Orissa, the youngest of our provinces, is full of promise of achievement. Let its foundations be firmly laid, so that the structure that is growing up may be worthy of India and of the great objectives we have had in view. These foundations include especially the judicial system which is and should be the guardian of our public standards. To that anchor of freedom and high moral and no partisan standards one must hold if we are to realise our objectives. I trust that the Orissa High Court will always uphold these standards and will be champion of right and justice against all wrong doing.

1. Cuttack, 26 July 1948. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 27 July 1948.
2. The Court was inaugurated at Cuttack by H.J. Kania, Chief Justice of India, on 26 July 1948.

## 6. Popular Government in Rampur<sup>1</sup>

I understand that the newly elected Assembly of Rampur State is going to be inaugurated on the 17th August. There has been some argument and dispute in regard to this Assembly but happily a settlement has been arrived at.<sup>2</sup> How this new Assembly and the Ministers responsible to it function in the future will have to be judged after some time. But it is all good augury that the beginnings of responsible government in the State have the cooperation and goodwill of the representatives of the people. Responsible government and freedom bring new responsibilities and new burdens on the people. I hope that the new Assembly of Rampur and the Ministers there will shoulder these responsibilities worthily, always keeping in view the good of the common man.

I send my good wishes to the new Assembly.

1. New Delhi, 11 August 1948. File No. 9(37)/48-PMP. The message was sent to Syed Bashir Husain Zaidi, Chief Minister, Rampur State.
2. As a result of efforts of the special committee appointed by the U.P. Congress Committee, the Rampur State Parliamentary crisis had been satisfactorily solved.

7. To Surjit Singh Majithia<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
The 26th August 1948

My dear Surjit,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 13th August. I am glad to learn of the Golden Jubilee of the Khalsa College, Amritsar. I am afraid however that it will not be possible for me to promise to go there on that occasion. I am accepting no engagements of any kind owing to the crisis we are facing. Normally I do not go to educational institutions unless I happen to be in the city for some other purpose. I rather doubt if the Governor General will be able to go.

The situation we have to face, both politically and economically, is a grave one and in these circumstances one can hardly think of accepting any engagements outside. Probably in the middle of November the Constituent Assembly will be meeting here also.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



## GLOSSARY

Bharat Mata ki Jai	victory to Mother India
Chapراسى	attendant
Char	alluvial landmass created by a course changing river
Choldari	small tent
Dargah	tomb of a Muslim saint
Devnagari	script adopted for Hindi, Sanskrit and some other Indian languages
Fakir	Muslim ascetic
Goonda	hooligan
Inam	freehold land
Inamdar	holder of freehold land
Jagirdari	holding of a tract of land and its revenue
Jai Hind	victory to India
Jayanti	birth anniversary
Jehad	holy war waged by Muslims
Mujahid	Muslim crusader
Nirvana	salvation
Pir	Muslim saint
Ramazan	the ninth month of the Mohammedan calendar
Thakavi	advance given to cultivator
Zamindari	landlord's estate
Zindabad	long live





## INDEX

(Biographical footnotes in this volume and in volumes in the first series are italicised and those in the Second Series given in block letters.)

- Aavon Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (Cannanore), 473 fn  
 Abdullah, Begum (Akbar Jahan), (VOL. 1, P. 292), 57 & fn  
 —, S.M., (*Vol. 7, p. 308*), 57 & fn-58, 59, 193, 245 fn, 280 & fn, 314, 320, 539 fn, 576  
 Abrahamson, Harry, 710 fn  
 —, Julia, 710 & fn  
*Achilles*, H.M.S., 272 fn, 362 fn, 523 fn  
 Adarkar, B.N., 442 fn  
 —, B.P., 442 fn  
 Advisory Planning Board *see* Planning Board  
 Aeronautical Society of India, 484 fn  
 Afghanistan, 611  
 Africa, South West, 629  
 Aftab Rai, (VOL. 6, P. 120), 577  
 Agra, 86, 89  
 Ahmed, Zulfikar, 111  
 Ahuja, M.D., 535 fn  
 Air Headquarters (New Delhi), 190  
 Air India International, 30 fn, 264, 691  
 Air Traffic Licensing Board, 484 fn  
 Ajanta, 665  
 Ajmer, 30 fn  
 Ajmer-Merwara, region of, 414 fn  
 Akali Conference (Bhatinda), 18  
 Akali Dal, 18 & fn  
 Akbar (Emperor), 385  
*Al Jamait* (New Delhi), 11 fn  
 Alagappa Textiles (Cochin) Ltd., 473 fn  
 Alagappan, S.C., 650 & fn-651  
 Albert Hall (London), 168-169  
 Ali, Mir Laik, (VOL. 5, P. 284), 195 fn, 202 fn-203 & fn, 205, 207 fn, 209 fn, 211, 214, 221 fn, 255 & fn, 258 fn, 719  
 —, Mir Osman (Nizam of Hyderabad), (VOL. 1, P. 291), 5, 165 fn-166 fn, 185 fn-186, 194 fn-196 fn, 197 & fn-198 fn, 199 fn, 203 & fn, 205, 209 fn, 212, 214 & fn, 221-222, 224 & fn-225 & fn, 226-227 & fn, 228-229 fn, 230, 232 & fn, 237 & fn-238, 239-240, 242 & fn-243 & fn, 244 fn-245, 247 fn, 252 & fn-253, 254 & fn-255 fn, 256, 258 & fn, 265 fn-266, 268 & fn, 273, 285, 328 & fn, 334 fn, 343-344, 353, 366, 597-599 & fn, 600-601, 693 fn, 697  
 —, Mohammad Iftikhar (Nawab of Pataudi), 712 & fn  
 All India Congress Committee, 37, 65, 69 fn, 85 fn, 379 & fn, 382 fn, 444, 491, 501 & fn, 585 fn, 615 fn, 717 fn; Central Relief Committee of, 66 & fn, 69 & fn, 72-74; Economic Programme of, 444; Standing Economic Programme Committee of, 443 fn-444, 445, Report of, 444 & fn  
 All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society (New Delhi), 545 fn  
 All India Hindu Mahasabha *see* Hindu Mahasabha, All India  
 All India Muslim League *see* Muslim League, All India  
 All India Newspapers Editors Conference (Bombay) (July 1948), 575 fn  
 All India Radio, 423; Shillong station of, 422 fn  
 All India Spinners Association, Srinagar branch of, 58  
 All India Trade Union Congress (A.I.T.U.C.), 453 fn  
 All India Women's Conference, 55 fn, 71, 717; "Save Children Committee" of, 712, 717 & fn  
 Allahabad, 319, 391, 606, 684, 689 fn, 708, 713 fn, 717 fn  
 Allapichai, A.M., 10 & fn  
 Alley, Rewi, 660

- Alms for Oblivion* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn  
 Alwar, 37 fn-38 fn, 39-40 & fn, 41, 85 fn, 111, 558  
 Alwaye, 473 fn  
 "Amarnath Caves" (Sass Brunner), 542 & fn, 706  
 Ambala, 324  
 Ambedkar, B.R., (*Vol. 5, p. 299*), 549, 575, 596  
 American Birth Control League, 709 fn  
 American University, 628 fn  
 Amrit Kaur, (*Vol. 11, p. 274*), 281, 283, 449 & fn, 475 fn-476, 577, 580, 699  
 Amritsar, 21, 340, 726  
 Anand Bhawan (Allahabad), 718  
 Ancient Monuments Board (Britain), 543 fn  
 Andhra Mahasabha, 505 fn  
 Andhra Pradesh, 239 fn, 505 & fn  
 Aney, M.S., (*Vol. 3, p. 12*), 488, 505  
*Anjam* (Karachi), 89  
 Ansari, Hayatullah, (*Vol. 15, p. 581*), 387-388 & fn  
 Anthony, Frank, (*Vol. 15, p. 211*), 677 fn  
 Appadorai, A., 677 fn-678 & fn  
 Apparao, M.R., 505 fn  
 Arab countries, 196, 333-334, 341, 609, 616  
 Arab-Israel War, 333 fn  
 Arabia, 407  
 Arabs, 196 fn, 334 & fn, 341, 362, 617, 689  
 Archaeological Survey of India (A.S.I.), 543 fn, 665  
 Argentina, 376; Government of, 376  
 Asaf Ali, (*Vol. 6, p. 42*), 263, 713 & fn  
 Asia, 9, 244, 401, 611, 618, 674, 700  
 —, Central, 301  
 —, East, 253 fn, 659; U.S. and Filipino forces in, 253 fn  
 —, Far East, 610, 615  
 —, South, 543 fn  
 —, South East, 352, 360-361, 423, 475, 588, 610-611 & fn, 618, 657, 659, 695 fn, 699 & fn-700; Communist movements in, 610 & fn-611 & fn  
 —, Soviet part of, 610-611  
 —, West, 254, 341, 610-611; countries of, 196 fn, 254, 341  
 Asia Publishing House (Bombay), 715  
*Asian Horizon* (London), 714 & fn-715  
 Asian Publications Ltd., 714 fn  
 Asian Relations Conference (Delhi) (1947), 659; proposal for, 710 fn  
 Asiatics, 617  
 Asok Textiles Ltd. (Alwaye), 473 fn  
 Asoka (Emperor), 385  
 Asoka Vihar (Madras), 80-81, 474  
 Assam, 67-68 & fn, 71 fn, 128, 414 fn, 522, 582 & fn-583 & fn; Government of, 67-68 & fn, 523, 582 & fn-583 fn  
 Assam Rifles, 522  
 Association for Moral and Social Hygiene in India (New Delhi) *see* Association for Social Health in India.  
 Association of Social Health in India, 55 fn  
 Athens, 264  
 Atomic Energy Act (1948), 533, 537  
 Atomic Energy Commission, 352, 533, 536-537, 617, 626; Board of Research on, 533  
 Attlee, C.R., (*Vol. 15, p. 109*), 196-197 & fn, 198 & fn-199 fn, 202 & fn, 208, 210 & fn, 215, 224, 247, 283-284, 300, 342 & fn-343 & fn, 475, 485, 691  
 Australia, 535 & fn, 659, 712 fn  
*Autobiography* (David Low), 265 fn  
 Ayyangar, M. Ananthasayanam, (VOL. 5, P. 81), 441 & fn, 675 & fn  
 —, N. Gopalaswami, (*Vol. 15, p. 248*), 19 fn, 37 & fn, 40-41, 68-69 fn, 99, 101, 111-112, 119 & fn, 124, 127, 131, 189, 256, 281, 289 fn-290 & fn, 291 & fn, 296, 301, 320, 331 & fn, 375, 549 & fn-550, 557-559, 561  
 Azad, A.K., (*Vol. 1, p. 253*), 11, 16, 46, 49 & fn, 135 fn, 139-140, 147, 155 & fn, 384 fn, 514 & fn, 542 & fn-543 & fn, 544-545 fn, 568, 604 fn  
 "Azad Kashmir", 305 fn, 309, 314 fn, 321 fn; Government of, 303-304 fn, 305 fn, 364 fn; forces of, 314 fn; people of, 293  
 Baghdad Pact Conferences, 628 fn  
 Bahawalpur, 111  
 Bahawalpur House (New Delhi), 563 & fn  
 Baig, M.R.A., (*Vol. 12, p. 147*), 214 & fn  
 Bajaj, Kamalnayan, (*Vol. 13, p. 285*), 718  
 Bajpai, G.S., (*Vol. 15, p. 568*), 196-197 fn, 206, 210, 243, 256, 286, 290, 335, 561, 598, 627 fn-628 & fn, 665, 670, 684-685, 687-688, 696  
 Balli Maran (Delhi), 80-81, 89  
 Baltal (Kashmir), 330  
 Baluchistan, 111



- Bandung Conference* (A. Appadorai), 678 fn  
 Banerjee, B.N., 57 & fn-58  
 Banerji, B.C., 505 fn  
 Bangalore, 219, 225, 579  
 Bangladesh, 644 fn  
 Bank of China, 659 fn  
 Banking Bill (18 September 1948), 350 & fn, 553  
 Bara Hindu Rao (Delhi), 80-81  
 Barakhamba Road (New Delhi), 712 fn  
 Baramulla, 59  
 Bardoloi, Gopinath, (*Vol. 8, p. 283*), 67-68 & fn, 421-422 fn, 582-583  
 Barman, Upendra Nath, 677 fn  
 Baron, M., (*VOL. 3, P. 300*), 681  
 Barrackpore, 9 fn  
 Barrackpore Case, 9  
 Barsi, 198 fn  
 Barsi enclave, 202, 343  
 Bassein (Burma), 361  
 Batu Arang (Malaysia), 361 fn  
 Behrampalli, 367 fn  
 Belgium, 292, 295, 646  
 Belvedere (Calcutta), 460, 565 & fn, 568 & fn  
 Bengal (undivided), 566 fn, 644 fn; Legislative Council of, 385 fn, 644 fn  
 Bengal, Bay of, 185 fn  
 Bengal famine, 26  
 Bengal, East, 1-2 & fn, 67-68, 70 & fn-71 & fn, 73-74, 85, 98 & fn-99 & fn, 189, 268, 330 fn, 356 fn, 693; Government of, 71 fn, 127, 356  
 —, West, 1, 9, 19, 69 & fn-70 & fn, 71 & fn, 98 & fn-99 & fn, 268, 330 fn, 356, 394, 414 fn, 424 & fn, 456 fn, 506-507 & fn, 528, 566 fn, 693; Government of, 9, 70-71 fn, 73, 85 fn, 99, 188, 201, 330 fn, 338 fn, 350 fn, 484 fn, 506 fn, 508, 565, 568, 589; Home (Transport) Department of, 484 fn; Legislative Council of, 445 fn; Provincial Congress Committee of, 583  
 Bennet, D.C.T., 190 & fn-191, 192 & fn  
 Berar, 185 fn, 189 fn, 237, 505; Prince of, 202 fn, 237 & fn-238  
 Berlin, 172 fn, 332 & fn-333, 341, 349, 360 & fn, 612 fn  
 Berlin Olympics (1936), 49 fn  
 Bernadotte, Count Folke, 362 & fn, 616 fn, 689 & fn  
 Berne, 688, 694 fn  
 Bevin, Ernest. (*VOL. 2, P. 472*), 247  
 Bezwada *see* Vijaywada  
 Bhabha, Homi Jehangir, (*Vol. 13, p. 536*), 536  
 Bhagalpur, 490 fn  
 Bhagirathi river, 356 fn  
 Bhakra Dam Project, 465 & fn-467 & fn, 469-470, 471 & fn, 487; Reviewing Board of, 467 fn  
 Bhandari, P.C., (*Vol. 15, p. 93*), 685  
 Bharat Sena Sahayak Samiti *see* Indian Army Aid Committee  
 Bharat Sevashram Sangha, 98 fn  
 Bharatpur, 37 fn-38 fn, 39-40 & fn, 41, 85 fn, 111, 558  
 Bhargava, Dwarka Prasad, 696 & fn  
 —, Gopichand, (*Vol. 4, p. 178*), 4, 10, 19, 37 fn-38, 112 fn, 123, 470 fn, 483 & fn-484 fn, 529, 584, 591, 603  
 —, Thakur Das, 436 & fn-437 fn, 677 fn  
 Bhat, Khan Mohammad Umar, 57 fn  
 Bhatnagar, Dr. S.S., (*VOL. 2, P. 605*), 533 fn, 537  
 Bhavnagar, 356, 576; Maharaja of *see* Kukharsinhji Bhavsinhji, Krishna  
 Bhojla Pahari (Delhi), 80-81  
 Bhojwani, N.K., 442 fn  
 Bhopal, 4, 712; Nawab of *see* Khan, Hamidullah  
 Bhutan, 422 & fn; delegation from, 422 fn, Bidar (Hyderabad), 184 fn  
 Bihar, 13-14, 71 fn, 394, 414 fn, 494, 506 fn-507 & fn., 513-514 fn; Government of, 13-14, 488 fn-489, 490-491, 494 fn; Legislative Assembly of, 489-490 & fn, 492; Legislative Council of, 490  
 Bihar Zamindari Abolition Bill, 14, 336, 488 & fn, 492  
 Bikaner, 466 fn, 470 & fn, 487, Maharaja of *see* Singh, Ganga  
 Bikaner House (New Delhi), 563 & fn  
 Bilaspur State, 471 fn  
 Binbu (Burma), 361 fn  
 Birla, G.D., (*Vol. 5, p. 135*), 562, 580  
 Birla House (New Delhi), 562  
 Blackett, P.M.S., 271 & fn, 321  
 Blitz (Bombay), 280, 520 & fn-521, 684 fn; editor of *see* Karanjia, R.K.  
 Bolaram, 251  
*Bombay Chronicle, The*, 574 fn  
 Bombay (city), 15 fn, 55 fn, 65 & fn-66, 144, 159 fn, 201, 245-246 & fn, 247 fn, 270, 283, 362, 431, 443 fn, 523 & fn, 528, 534,

- 575, 679, 691, 715, 719-720  
 —, Central, 431 fn  
 —, Greater, master plan for, 484 & fn  
 Bombay Industrial Relations Act (1946), 461 fn  
 Bombay Municipal Corporation, 484 & fn  
 Bombay Presidency *see* Bombay province  
 Bombay province, 2, 15 fn, 25 fn, 55 fn, 165-166 & fn, 198 fn, 394, 414 fn, 443 & fn., 453 fn, 456 fn, 461, 506; Commissioner of Police of, 443 fn; Government of, 55 fn, 65 & fn-66, 185, 201, 443 fn, 462, 484, 521, 529, 667; Home Minister of *see* Desai, M.R.; Legislative Assembly of, 188  
 Bombay Refugees Act, 65, 187  
 Bonnerjee, W.C., 385 & fn  
 Bose, Sarat Chandra, (*Vol. 3, p. 334*), 529  
 —, Subhas Chandra, (*Vol. 3, p. 46*), 529 & fn-530 fn  
 Brailsford, H.N., (*Vol. 2, p. 411*), 131 fn  
 Brazil, 336  
*Bridge for Ever, The*, (M.S. Kotnis), 664 fn  
 Britain, 79, 92, 107, 168, 185-186 & fn, 196-197 fn, 198, 205-208, 247, 262, 265, 273, 283, 315, 333 fn, 335, 343-344 & fn, 361, 369, 385 fn, 429 fn-430, 439, 461, 477, 523, 535 fn-536, 537-538 fn, 543 fn, 559-560, 572-573, 580-591, 612 fn-613, 614, 623 & fn-624, 625-626, 628-629, 646 fn, 651, 665, 675 fn, 679, 684, 688, 692, 695-696, 711-712 fn, 713, 716-717 fn, 720  
 British Commonwealth of Nations, 200, 614, 625, 628, 642, 644 fn, 667, 691 fn-692  
 British Government, 139, 157, 191-193, 197 fn, 200-201 fn, 205, 207 fn-208, 210, 247 & fn, 283 fn, 286-287, 333 & fn, 339 fn-340 & fn, 345, 352, 429 & fn-430, 520-521, 536, 611 fn-612 fn, 623-626, 628, 649, 652-655, 657, 675, 687, 719-720  
 —in India (erstwhile), 195  
 British High Commission, in New Delhi, 572-573, 715; British Information Service of, 715  
 British Museum (London), 543 fn  
 British Nationality Act, 643  
 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act (1914), 641, 643  
*Britons in Spain* (William Rust) (1939), 205 fn  
 Broadlands (Britain), 185, 227, 285, 691, 695-697  
 Brown, Douglas, 191 & fn  
 Brunner, Elizabeth, 542 fn, 545 & fn, 706  
 —, Sass, 542 & fn, 544-545 & fn, 706 & fn  
 Brush, Mrs. Charles F., 709 & fn  
 Brynley, David, 134  
 Bucher, F.R.R., (VOL. 1, P. 76), 189, 192, 216, 259-262, 284 & fn, 294, 520, 526 & fn-527 fn, 560  
 "Buddha" (Sass Bunner), 542 fn  
 Buddha, Gautam, 140  
*Bulletin, The*, (Sydney), 265 fn  
*Bunch of Old Letters, A*, (Jawaharlal Nehru), 715 fn  
 Burias, 558  
 Burma, 55 fn, 326 & fn, 352, 360-361, 561 & fn, 588, 616, 624, 628, 631 & fn-633 & fn, 656-657, 660, 668, 676; Embassy of, in New Delhi, 561, 633; Government of, 360 & fn-361 & fn, 561 fn, 611 fn, 631-632, 633 fn, 656, 694 fn; Charge d'Affaires of, in New Delhi *See* Win, U  
 Burma Rifles, 352 fn  
 Cabinet (Indian), 12 fn, 18-19, 27, 47, 50, 78, 160 fn, 186, 228, 230-233, 255-256, 284 fn, 291, 298, 305-308, 310-311, 331, 339, 352, 357, 421-423, 429-430, 434 & fn-435, 436-437, 440-441., 446-449, 460, 465, 469, 477 & fn, 499-501, 533, 549-554, 566, 569, 571, 574-575, 578, 609, 623 & fn, 627-628 & fn, 630, 676; Coordination Committee of, 574 & fn  
 Cabinet Mission, 382 fn  
 Cabinet Secretariat, 477, Central Statistical Unit of, 477 fn *see also* Central Statistical Organisation  
 Cairo, 333  
 Calcutta, 19, 71-72 fn, 73, 89, 159 & fn, 201 fn, 245, 408, 475, 477 & fn-478, 568 & fn, 583 & fn, 710-711, 720, University of, 543 fn  
 —, North, 71  
 Cama, Katayun H., 55 & fn  
 Cambridge University, 716-717 fn  
 Campbell-Johnson, Alan, (VOL. 5, P. 180), 214  
 Canada, 184 fn, 204, 219, 535 fn; Government of, 192  
 Cannanore, 473 fn



- Cannes International Film Festival (1946), Grand Prix Award at, 388 fn
- Canton Government, 659 fn
- Cariappa, K.M., (VOL. 2, P. 376), 560
- Cartoon History of Our Times, A*, (David Low) (1939), 265 fn
- Caveeshar, Sardul Singh, (*Vol. 4, p. 97*), 605
- Central Institute of Statistics *see* Central Statistical Organisation
- Central Pay Commission (First), 26 & fn
- Central Planning Board (China), 665 fn
- Central Provinces, 25 fn, 166, 189 fn, 233, 262 fn, 354 & fn, 414 fn, 505 & fn, 522; Government of, 185, 189; Chief Secretary of, 188
- Central Public and Works Department (C.P.W.D.), 337
- Central Social Service Board, 55 fn
- Central Statistical Organisation, 477 fn-478
- Central Water Power Irrigation and Navigation Commission, 465 fn, 595 fn
- Centre for Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (American University), 628 fn
- Ceylon *see* Sri Lanka
- Chakravarti, N.P., 543 & fn-544 & fn
- Chakravarty, Amiya, (*Vol. 6, p. 292*) 685, 710 & fn
- Chand, Bakshi Tek, 499 fn
- Chanda, A.K., (VOL. 5, P. 221), 520, 523
- Chandannagore, 588 fn, 680 fn
- Chandigarh, 483 fn
- Chandni Chowk (Delhi), 30 fn, 425
- Changchun, 610 fn
- Charkha Sangh, 58
- Chatterjee, Bimanesh, 566 & fn
- Chaudhury, Annada Prasad, 443 fn, 445 & fn
- Chettiar, Rm. Alagappa, 473 & fn
- Chetty, R.K. Shanmukham, (*Vol. 6, p. 303*), 55, 349 & fn-350, 362, 429 fn, 433, 476, 551 & fn-552, 553 & fn-554, 567
- Chhatarpur (Delhi), 31
- Chhatari; Nawab of, 232 fn, 268; delegation of, 232 fn; Ministry of, 232 fn;
- Chiang Kai-shek, (*Vol. 10, p. 74*), 610 fn, 659 fn, 662 fn
- , Mayling Soong, (*Vol. 10, p. 85*), 662 & fn, 665
- Chicago Convention (on air transit), 184 fn
- Chicago University, 710
- Chifley, Joseph B., 535 & fn
- Children's National Institute (Allahabad), 717 fn
- China, 143, 146, 371 & fn, 407, 535 fn, 610 & fn, 612 & fn, 634 fn, 657, 659 & fn-662 & fn, 663-664 & fn, 665, 692, Examination Yuan of, 663 fn; Government of, 610; Great Wall of, 143; Indian Medical Mission to, 660 fn, 664; National Children's week in, 661 fn; Nationalist, 610 fn, 659 fn, 663 fn; People's Political Council of, 665 fn
- China Welfare Fund (Shanghai), 660 fn-661 & fn
- Church Road (Allahabad), 718
- Churchill, Winston, (*Vol. 4, p. 52*), 134 fn, 166 fn, 186 & fn, 202 fn, 284, 333 fn, 344 fn, 675 fn
- Christian faith, 406, 703 fn
- Citizenship Bill (Sri Lanka), 635 & fn, 641-643
- Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 162, 285, 520
- Civilizations of the Indus Valley and Beyond* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- Cochin, 473 fn, 679
- Colaba (Bombay), 89
- Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, 677 fn
- Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (1948) (London), 119 fn, 123, 240, 285, 349 & fn, 361, 368 fn-369, 371, 628, 674, 685-688, 691, 698
- Commonwealth Relations Office, 340 fn, 561
- Communist Party (British), 205 fn
- (Burmese), 588, 611
- of India, 326 & fn, 458 fn, 615 fn, 667 fn-668 & fn; Hyderabad branch of, 588; West Bengal branch of, 326, 456 fn
- (Malayan) *see* Communist Party (Malaysian)
- (Malaysian), 651 & fn, 588 & fn
- Communists (Burmese), 326 & fn, 360 fn, 422 & fn, 611 fn, 616, 631 fn
- Communists (Chinese), 326 fn, 361 fn, 588 & fn, 610 fn, 652-653, 657
- Communists (Indian), 205, 239 & fn, 274, 326, 373, 453 fn, 455, 458 fn, 587 fn-588, 611 fn, 615 & fn, 667 & fn-668, 671
- Communists (Indonesian), 648 fn-649
- Communists (Malaysian), 611 fn, 616

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Communists (Malaysian Chinese), 652-653, 657
- Community Church (New York), 133-134 fn
- Comparative Survey of Juvenile Delinquency, Part IV—Asia and the Far East* (Katayun H. Cama), 55 fn
- Congress, Indian National, 2 & fn, 4 fn, 10 fn, 13, 15 fn, 20, 28, 139, 141, 189, 246, 287, 326 fn-327 & fn, 353, 358, 370, 379 & fn-381 & fn, 382 fn-383, 384 & fn-387 & fn, 388, 403, 443-444 & fn, 447 fn, 455, 457, 490-491, 500 & fn-501 fn, 513, 562 fn, 606 & fn, 615, 690; district committees of, 390; provincial committees of, 381 & fn; West Bengal branch of, 70 fn, 72
- Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, 488 fn
- Congress Parliamentary Board, 490 & fn-491
- Congress Punjab Relief Fund, 65-66, 70, 74
- Congress Socialist Party *see* Socialist Party
- Congress Working Committee, 187, 368 fn, 382 fn, 491-492, 501 & fn, 594, 717 & fn
- Congressmen, 2, 28, 49, 189, 399-400, 584-585 & fn, 586
- Connaught Place (New Delhi), 467 fn-468
- Conservative Party (British), 166 fn
- Constituent Assembly of India, 436 fn, 447 fn, 581
- Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative), 11-12 fn, 77 & fn, 160 & fn, 168, 188 & fn, 190, 234, 236, 240, 245 fn, 254, 284, 286-287, 332 & fn, 350 fn, 359, 362, 366, 368 fn-369 & fn, 373, 382 & fn, 400, 403, 423-424, 436 fn, 444, 447 fn, 466, 499 fn-500 fn, 501 & fn, 505-506 & fn, 513, 551-552 & fn, 553 fn, 581, 592-593 fn, 604 & fn, 666, 683 fn, 688, 692 726; Standing Advisory Committee of, 574 fn, on land policy of East Punjab Government, 20; Standing Committee for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of, 630 fn, 645
- Constitution (Indian), 351 fn, 581, Article 226 of the, 351 fn; Draft of, 85 fn, 351 & fn, 604
- Constitution Club (Delhi), 47, 671
- Coorg, 44 fn, 505 fn
- Corbusier, Le, 483 fn
- Corps Diplomatique* (Paris), 618 & fn
- Corwall Press (Paris Garden, London), 714 fn
- Cotton, Sydney, (VOL. 6, P. 261), 167 fn, 190 & fn, 204, 207 & fn, 213-214 fn, 247 fn, 719
- Council House (New Delhi), 291
- Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (C.S.I.R.), 472 fn, 533 & fn
- Courtauld Institute of Art (University of London), 543 fn
- Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.), Special Branch of, 274
- Cripps, Stafford, (*Vol. 7, p. 471*), 429, 691, 705
- Cunningham, George, (VOL. 4, P. 94), 284 fn, 520
- Curzon Road Barracks (New Delhi), 48 fn
- Cuttack, 725
- Czechoslovakia, 148 fn, 292, 336 & fn, 567; Government of, 537, 694; Technical Mission from, 470, 537 & fn
- da Costa, E.P.W., 357 fn, 442 fn
- Daily Herald* (London), 265 fn
- Daily Telegraph* (London), 191 & fn
- Daily Worker* (London), 205 & fn, 590
- Dakshina Bharat Hindstani Prachar Sabha, 511 & fn-512, 514
- Dalmia, Ram Krishna, (*Vol. 12, p. 575*), 673 & fn
- Danger in Kashmir* (Josef Korbel) (1954), 281 fn, 287 fn, 300 fn
- Dar, S.K., 505 fn
- Das, B., (*Vol. 12, p. 290*), 432-433
- Das Gupta, Debotosh, 19 fn
- , Satish Chandra, 98 fn
- Dastgir, Mashak, 595
- Dawn* (Karachi), 90, 92 & fn, 273 fn, 287, 719
- de Ligne, Prince, 696 fn
- De Silva, George E., 626
- De Valera, Eamon, (*Vol. 3, p. 148*), 273, 682 & fn
- Dean, Arthur William Henry, 55 & fn
- Debevoise, Neilson C., 714 fn
- Defence Consultative Committee, 190, 225, 228, 262, 683
- Defence Services, 423, 519
- Delhi, 1, 15-16 & fn, 17, 21 & fn, 25 fn, 31-32, 40, 45 fn-46, 47, 49 fn-50, 56, 60, 68, 72,



- 78, fn-79, 80 & fn-81, 89-90, 93, 111 & fn, 143, 147-148, 155, 158-159 fn, 160-161, 173, 183 fn, 185 & fn, 187, 192, 194, 197, 202 fn-203 fn, 215, 223, 232 fn, 257, 261-262, 267, 269 fn, 272, 281, 283, 288, 293, 301-302, 316, 325, 327, 335, 339, 342, 344, 347, 354 fn, 357, 391, 395, 398, 408-409, 412-413, 414 fn, 416, 421, 425 fn, 437, 442 & fn, 456 fn, 476 fn, 511, 513, 534, 538, 541 & fn, 549, 570-571, 601, 605, 659, 665, 671 fn, 680-681, 693, 705-706, 712, 715, 718 fn *see also* New Delhi
- Delhi Administration, 78 fn, 421
- Delhi Improvement Trust, 55 fn
- Delhi*, I.N.S., 272 fn, 362 & fn, 523 & fn
- Delhi Municipal Committee, 30 fn
- Delhi Municipal Corporation, 718 fn
- Delhi Provincial Congress Committee, 49 fn
- Denmark, 647 fn
- Dentist Bill *see* Dentists Act
- Dentist Councils, 624 fn
- Dentists Act, 624 & fn
- Deo, Shankarrao, (*Vol. 7, p. 617*), 69, 384 fn
- Dera Ghazi Khan, 20
- Desai, C.C., 627 fn-628 & fn
- , M.R., 185
- Desh Sewak Sena, 519, 591 & fn-592 fn
- Deshmukh, C.D., (*Vol. 15, p. 635*), 429 fn, 431, 580
- , P.S., (*VOL. 5, P. 368*), 499 fn
- Dewangiri, 422 fn
- Dey, R.L., 442 fn
- Dhanbad, 507 fn
- Dhar, J.R., 85 & fn
- Dhillon, Gurbaksh Singh, (*Vol. 14, p. 121*), 591 & fn
- Dharma Vira, (*VOL. 6, P. 395*), 21, 30
- Didwana (Merwara), 15
- Digvijaysinghji, Jam Shree (Maharaja of Nawanagar), 685 fn, 687
- Dikshit, Uma Shankar, (*VOL. 5, P. 147*), 31-32, 49
- Discovery of India, The*, (Jawaharlal Nehru), 281, 663, 703
- Domel, 294, 316, 329
- Doulattram, Jairamdas, (*Vol. 4, p. 136*), 66, 430 & fn, 449 fn
- Drew, Jane, 483 fn
- Dutt, Subimal, 644 & fn
- Dyarchy in Practice* (A. Appadorai), 678 fn
- Early India and Pakistan* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- East India Company, 229 fn
- East Indian Railway, 484 fn
- Economic Conference of Asia and the Far East, (E.C.A.F.E.), 668 & fn
- Edroos, Gen. Syed Ahmed, (*VOL. 5, P. 275*), 202 & fn, 205, 255
- Egypt *see* United Arab Republic (U.A.R.)
- Ehsan* (Lahore), 89
- Eire, 204, 717 fn
- Electro-Chemical Research Institute (Karakudi), 472 fn
- Elmhirst, T.W., (*VOL. 3, P. 315*), 184, 189-190, 192
- England *see* Britain
- Essays in Indian Politics* (A. Appadorai), 678 fn
- Essential Personnel (Registration) Ordinance, 1948, 103 & fn
- Estate Office (New Delhi), 48
- Europe, 21, 136, 165, 172 fn, 281, 337, 341, 361, 371, 375, 384, 487, 536-537, 572, 616-618, 660, 663, 665-666, 677 fn, 684, 686, 700, 704-705; J.R.D. Tata's Constellations to, 704
- , Western, 675
- European Parliament (Strasbourg), 371 fn
- Evening Standard* (London), 265 & fn
- Evian (France), 488
- Egerton, Alfred, 705 fn
- , Ruth Julia, 705 & fn
- Fabri, Charles Louis, 543 & fn-544
- Factory Workers' Committee, 453 & fn
- Faizabad, 380 fn
- Faridkot, 603; Maharaja of *see* Singh, Harindar
- Faridkot House (New Delhi), 315
- Farouk, King of Egypt, (*VOL. 6, P. 474*), 196 fn
- Fearful Fifties, The*, (David Low) (1960), 265 fn
- Federal Public Service Commission, 598
- Ferozepur Headworks, 38
- Finland, 336 fn
- Fischer, Louis, (*Vol. 12, p. 358*), 670-671 fn
- Flag Day, 527-528
- Flag Day Fund, 267, 527
- Foreign Policy* (A. Appadorai), 678 fn

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- France, 371 & fn, 461, 535 fn, 612 fn, 647 fn, 711; Government of, 680 & fn, 682
- Franciscan Order, 689 fn
- Friends Service Unit (Calcutta), 710 fn
- Fry, Maxwell, 483 fn
- Gadgil, D.R., (*Vol. 15, p. 248*), 357 fn, 442 fn
- , N.V., (*Vol. 3, p. 68*), 50–51, 465–466 fn, 467 & fn–468 & fn, 471 & fn, 478 & fn, 563 & fn, 568
- Gandhi Birthday-Week, 135 & fn
- Gandhi, Devadas, (*Vol. 1, p. 260*), 575 & fn, 715–716 & fn
- , Indira, (*Vol. 1, p. 232*), 204, 564, 663, 684, 688, 705, 711, 713, 718.
- , Mahatma, 6, 9 fn, 11–12, 16 & fn, 19, 46, 72, 74, 131 & fn–132, 133–134 & fn, 135–139, 141, 143, 145–146, 148, 150–152, 157–158, 167–172, 174–177, 233, 244–246, 261 fn, 265 & fn–266, 269 & fn, 270–271, 287, 311, 316, 339, 348, 365, 379, 384–385, 387–388, 399, 410–412, 511–513, 545, 562, 587, 602, 619, 660, 664, 666 fn, 703 fn, 706, 718, 722–724
- , Rajiv, 666
- Gandhi National Memorial Fund, 135, 574 fn, 601, 605
- “Gandhi in Prayer” (Sass Brunner), 542 fn
- Ganges, 542 fn, lower, 606
- Garhi Habibullah (Pakistan), 279
- Gautam, Mohanlal, (*Vol. 4, p. 351*), 79
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), 347; conference of (Geneva 1948), 628 fn, contracting parties to the, 347
- Geneva, 281, 347, 366 fn, 628 & fn, 691–692, 695–697
- George VI, (*VOL. 6, P. 474*), 204, 220, 225 & fn, 231, 597–598 & fn, 599 & fn–600, 601
- Germany, 360 fn, 529 fn, 534, 612 & fn, 660 fn, 709 fn
- , Federal Republic of, 644 & fn
- Ghani, Abdul, 28 & fn, 117 fn
- Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh), 60
- Ghaznavi, Abdul Halim, 245 fn
- Ghosh, Nibaran Chandra, 484 & fn
- , P.C., (*Vol. 13, p. 1*), 2 & fn, 70 & fn, 72–73, 384 fn
- , Sudhir, (*VOL. 4, P. 515*), 581 & fn
- Gibarti, Louis D., 618 & fn
- Gidwani, Choithram, (*Vol. 3, p. 52*), 65 & fn–66 & fn
- Gilani, Beltie Shah, (*Vol. 5, p. 352*), 689
- Gilgit, 1 fn, 293, 301, 541, 694
- Giri, V.V., (*Vol. 4, p. 63*), 644 & fn
- Goa, 213 & fn–214 & fn, 678–679
- Godse, Nathuram Vinayak, (*VOL. 5, P. 58*), 261
- Good Offices Committee, 280, 330, 361 fn, in Indonesia, 361 fn *See also under* United Nations
- Government House (Delhi) *see* Rashtrapati Bhawan
- Government House (Shimla), Estates of, 570
- Govinddas, Seth, (*Vol. 7, p. 660*), 644 fn
- Gracey, Douglas David, (*VOL. 5, P. 260*), 192, 204, 284 fn–285, 294, 343, 720
- Grady, Henry F., (*VOL. 3, P. 2*), 264
- , Mrs., 264
- Graeffe, Egbert, 292, 295, 305–306, 321
- Greece, 172 fn, 407, 612 & fn; Populist Party in, 612 fn
- Greek Army, 612 fn
- Griessemer, T.G., 672 & fn
- ‘Grow More Food’ Campaign, 449 & fn, 476
- Gujarat, 65, 103
- Gupta, Dilip Kumar, 710 & fn
- Gurais (Jammu and Kashmir), 1 fn
- Gurdaspur, 21
- Gurez, 329 & fn
- Gurgaon, 17, 37 fn–38 fn, 39–40 & fn, 41 fn, 584, 591 fn–592 fn; Superintendent of Police of, 584
- Gyanchand, (*Vol. 15, p. 473*), 357 fn, 442 fn
- Guwahati (Assam), 582 & fn
- Hackney North constituency (Britain), 205 fn
- Hackney South constituency (Britain), 205 fn
- Haddu *see* Sitaram
- Halifax bomber, 185
- Hamburg (West Germany), 709 fn
- Hanchow (China), 672
- Handoo, Mrs., 298
- Handwara, 193
- Harrison, Agatha, (*Vol. 6, p. 208*), 580
- Hastings House (Calcutta), 565
- Hatta, Mohammad, (*Vol. 3, p. 129*), 648 & fn



- Health and Recreation Centre (Madras), 705 & fn
- Health Ministers' Conference (Second) (August 1948), 415, 474 fn
- Henderson, Loy Wesley, 628 & fn
- Hill-forts of Northern France* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- Hill Tribes of Jeypore* (Lakshminarayan Sahu), 593 fn
- Himachal Pradesh, 433
- Himalayan Frontiers* (Dorothy Woodman), (1959), 265 fn
- Himalayan Schemes, 458-459
- Himalayas, 458, 542, mountains of, 458
- Hind Mazdoor Sabha, 442 fn
- Hindu, The*, (Madras), 411 fn, 472 fn, 590 & fn, 603 fn, 670
- Hindu Code Bill, 499 & fn-501 & fn; Select Committee on, 499 fn-501 fn
- "Hindu Government", 186 fn
- Hindu Mahasabha, All India, 12 & fn-13, 354 & fn; Working Committee of, 354 fn
- "Hindu Raj", 15
- "Hindu Rashtra", 403-404
- "Hindu State" *see* "Hindu Rashtra"
- Hindustan Housing Factory (Delhi) *see* Hindustan Pre-Fabs Ltd.
- Hindustan Pre-Fabs Ltd. (Delhi), 474 fn, 476 & fn
- Hindustan Times, The*, 269 fn, 315 fn, 574 fn-575, 699 fn
- Hirakud Dam Project, 470
- Hirohito, Emperor (Mikado of Japan), 253 & fn
- Hiroshima, 703 fn
- Hissar, 591 fn-592 fn
- Holmes, John Haynes, (VOL. 5, P. 85), 134 & fn
- Hopman, Frederik Jan, 319 & fn
- Hossain, Syud, (*Vol. 13, p. 691*), 333
- Hotelling, Harold, 478 & fn
- House of Commons, British, 192, 195, 200-201, 202 & fn, 214, 247, 283 fn, 344, 475
- Huddle, Jerome Klahr, 295, 297, 694 & fn
- Hungary, 336 fn
- Hurs, 238
- Husain, Zakir, (*Vol. 3, p. 67*), 80-81
- Hutchins, Robert M., (*Vol. 15, p. 532*), 710 & fn
- Hutheesing, G.P., (*Vol. 6, p. 207*), 577
- Hydari, Akbar, (VOL. 3, P. 5), 127, 479, 522, 583 & fn
- Hyderabad Radio, 241
- Hyderabad State, 1 & fn, 5, 14 fn, 26, 71, 90-91 & fn, 140, 142-144, 146-147, 152, 160-161 & fn, 164-165 & fn, 166 & fn-167 & fn, 183 & fn-186 & fn, 187, 189-191, 194 & fn-199 & fn, 200-201 & fn, 202 & fn-203 & fn, 205-206 & fn, 207 & fn, 209 & fn-210, 211 & fn-214 & fn, 215, 220-221 & fn, 222-223, 224 & fn-225 & fn, 226-227 & fn, 229 & fn-230, 231 & fn-232, 233 & fn-234, 235-236 & fn, 237-238, 239 & fn-240, 241-242 & fn, 243 & fn-245 & fn, 246-247 & fn, 251-252 & fn, 253-254 & fn, 255 & fn-258 & fn, 259-262 & fn, 263-265 & fn, 266-267 & fn, 268 & fn-269, 270 & fn, 272-273 & fn, 274-275, 283 fn, 285 & fn-286, 314, 316, 325-326 fn, 327 & fn-328, 329-330, 333-334 & fn, 335, 341, 343-344 & fn, 345, 353 & fn-354, 357, 364, 366-369, 370 & fn-371, 372, 376, 381 fn, 384, 397, 402, 408-410, 430, 458 fn, 505 & fn-506, 527, 557-558, 572, 581 fn, 599-600, 609, 650, 669, 674, 685-687, 692-693 & fn, 694-695 & fn, 697-698 & fn, 706, 712, 719-720; Civil Guards of, 241 fn; Communist Party in, 588; Customs Constabulary of, 241 fn; European residents of, 207, 241; Government of, 185-187, 194 & fn-195, 197-198 fn, 199 & fn-200 & fn, 202-203, 207, 211 fn, 221 fn, 224 & fn, 227 fn, 228-229, 232 & fn, 241-242, 244 fn-245, 247 & fn, 253, 268, 328-329, 343-344, 353, 408-410, 430, 588, 697; forces of, 198, 202 & fn, 241 & fn; Delegation to Paris, 256; Home Guards of, 241 fn; Civil Services, 353 fn; Military Administration, 253 fn; Regular Army of, 202, 238, 242, 253; Standstill Agreement with (29 November 1947), 209 fn, 229 & fn, 232 fn, 239-240, 245, 409
- Hyderabad (Sind), 101 fn
- Id, 11
- Iengar, H.V.R., (VOL. 2, P. 192), 61, 256, 566
- Iftikharuddin, Mian, (*Vol. 8, p. 176*), 651

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Immigration Fund (Sri Lanka), 638 & fn  
 Imperial College of Science and Technology (London), 271 fn  
 Imperial Hotel (New Delhi), 101, 468 fn  
 Imperial Library (Calcutta) *see* National Library (Calcutta)  
*Imroze* (Hyderabad), 234 fn  
 Income Tax Amendment Bill, 551 & fn-552 fn, 553  
 Income Tax Investigation Commission, 349 fn, 550-551 & fn; Select Committee of, 551 fn-552 & fn, 553, 555 & fn  
 India, Government of, 8, 12 & fn-13 fn, 15, 21 & fn, 25-26 & fn, 27, 29, 31-32 & fn, 37 & fn-38 fn, 40 fn, 45, 47, 50, 55 fn, 66, 72-74, 77, 79, 85 fn-86, 87-88, 93, 102, 107-108, 111, 127-128, 135, 137, 151, 160 fn-161 fn, 162, 166, 173, 184 fn-185, 187-189, 194 & fn-195 fn, 197 & fn-200 & fn, 203 fn, 211 fn, 213 fn, 219 fn, 224 fn-225, 226, 228, 230-231 & fn, 233 & fn, 235-237, 239, 242, 245 & fn-246, 251-252, 256 & fn-257, 258 fn, 260, 264 fn, 267-268 & fn, 269-270, 274, 279-280, 282, 284 fn, 290-291, 292 fn-293, 294-296 & fn, 297 & fn-298 & fn, 302-303 & fn, 304 & fn-305 fn, 306-307, 309-311, 314-315, 319-321, 327-328 & fn, 330-332, 334 & fn-335 fn, 336-338, 340, 346 & fn-347, 348, 350 & fn-351 & fn, 353 & fn, 357 & fn-358, 359, 362-363, 364 & fn-365, 369-374, 376, 381 fn, 383, 386 fn, 395, 397-399, 408-409, 412, 415, 417, 422 fn, 430 & fn, 432-433 fn, 434, 436-437 & fn, 438 & fn, 439-440 & fn, 441, 443-444 & fn, 445-446, 447 & fn-448 fn, 449 & fn, 453 fn-454, 455-456, 457 fn-458 fn, 460, 465 & fn-466, 467-468 fn, 469-472, 474, 476 & fn-477, 478 fn, 487-488 & fn, 489-490, 492-493 & fn, 499 fn-500 fn, 505-506 fn, 522-523, 526-528, 533, 537-538, 541-542 fn, 543 fn, 545 & fn, 549 fn, 552-557, 561-562, 565, 568-570, 574, 587-589, 592 fn-593, 594-595, 600, 606 fn, 610-611 fn, 614-615, 617 & fn, 623 & fn-624, 625, 628 fn, 635 & fn-636 & fn, 639, 644 & fn, 648, 652-653, 655, 658 & fn, 666-667 & fn, 669, 671-673, 680 & fn-681, 683 fn, 689 & fn, 694, 699-700; Act of (1935), 488 fn, Section 299 of, 494; Civil Aviation Department of, 474 fn; Customs Department of, 204; Department, of Income Tax, 376, 557, of Information, 237, of Post and Telegraph Scientific Research, 533 & fn, 536, 538, Directorate of Disposal of, 555, Economy Committee of, 432; Political Department of, 566,  
 —, South of 210, 213, 226, 235, 375-376, 391-392, 395, 473  
 —, States of, 5, 99, 156, 196 fn, 200 fn, 256, fn, 272  
 India House Library (London), 565, 669  
 India League (London), 586 fn  
 Indian Air Force, 260-261, 279 fn, 519, 521, 527-528, 573, 632 fn, 683 fn  
 Indian Airlines Corporation, 30 fn  
 Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society (I.E.N.S.), 418 fn  
 Indian Army, 18 fn, 85 fn, 192-193, 198 & fn, 202-204 208, 216, 238, 242, 257 fn-258 fn, 260-261, 263 fn, 268, 270 fn, 279 & fn, 288, 293, 302, 308-309, 311, 335, 337, 343 & fn, 353 458 fn, 519, 521-522, 526 & fn-527, 528, 573, 696, 720; Bihar Regiment of, 263 fn; Eastern Command of, 263 fn; General Headquarters (G.H.Q.) of, 237; Headquarters of, 190, 260, 263 fn, 573; Punjab Regiment of, 263 fn, Southern Command of, 274  
 Indian Army Aid Committee, 369 & fn  
 Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.), 432, 628 fn  
 Indian Cooperative Union, 31 fn  
 Indian Council of World Affairs (New Delhi), 671, 678 fn  
 Indian Cricket Team to London (1946), 712 fn  
 Indian Foreign Service (I.F.S.), 581, 706 & fn, Selection Board for, 706  
 Indian Institute of Art in Industry (Calcutta), 541  
 Indian Medical Mission to China, 660 fn, 664 fn  
 Indian Medical Service (I.M.S.), 528  
 Indian National Army (I.N.A.), 423, 528-530 & fn  
 Indian National Army Inquiry and Relief Committee, 529-530  
 Indian National Army Relief Fund, 529 fn-530 & fn



- Indian National Trade Union Congress (I.N.T.U.C.), 208 & fn, 453 & fn
- Indian Navy, 272 fn, 362, 523 & fn, 525, 527-528
- Indian News Chronicle*, 244 fn, 269 fn
- Indian Police Service (I.P.S.), 370 fn
- Indian Red Cross Society, 598 & fn
- Indian Residence (Citizenship) Bill (Sri Lanka), 641-644 & fn, 645
- Indian School of International Studies (New Delhi), 678 fn
- Indian Science Congress (1947), 535 fn; (1949), 535 & fn
- Indian Science Congress Association, 535 fn
- Indian Statistical Institute (Baranagar, Calcutta), 477 & fn-478 & fn
- Indian Statistical Society, 478 fn
- Indian Tariff Board, 628 fn
- Indian Union, 39, 85 & fn, 89-90, 111, 142, 144, 152, 163, 165, 183 fn-184 fn, 185 & fn-186, 188, 197 fn-198, 199 & fn, 202 & fn-203, 209 fn, 213, 221 226, 229-230, 240, 245, 252, 258, 265 fn, 268 fn, 302, 308, 310, 312, 326, 366, 391, 403, 422 fn, 458 fn, 537, 558, 678
- Indian Union Muslim League, 245 fn
- Indira Gandhi—A Patriot* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Indo-China, 361 fn; French rule in 361 fn
- Indonesia, 49 fn, 148 fn, 360-361 & fn, 616 & fn, 628-629, 647 & fn-648 & fn, 649-651, 656; Dutch Government in, 360-361 & fn; Republic of, 647 fn, 649; Government of, 648-649, headed by Mohammad Hatta, 648 fn; Republicans in, 361 fn; United States of, 361 fn
- Indus Civilization, The*, (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- Ing-Hwa, 660 & fn
- Inquilab* (Lahore), 89
- Institute of Fine Arts (University of New York), 543 fn
- Inter-Dominion Agreement (Delhi, 4 May 1948), 123 fn
- Inter-Dominion Conference (Karachi, July 1948), 192; (Lahore, 22 July 1948), 1 fn, 471 fn; (New Delhi, 6-14 December 1948), 1 fn
- Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Rome), 676 fn
- Inter-Parliamentary Union, 675 & fn
- International Abolitionist Federation, Indian Branch of, *see* Association for Social Health in India
- International Brigade (Spain), 205 fn
- International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.), 453 fn
- International Trade Organisation, Interim Commission of, 347
- Ipi, Fakir of *see* Khan, Haji Mirza Ali
- Ireland, 683, Northern, 717 fn
- Irishmen, 527 fn, 717 fn
- Irrawaddy (Burma), 352 fn, 361 fn
- Islam, 3, 8 fn
- Islamic State, 8, 404
- Ismail, Khan Bahadur Mohammad, 285
- , Mirza, (*Vol. 4, p. 557*), 202-203 fn, 205, 214 & fn, 221-222, 224, 226, 285 & fn, 344
- , Mohamed, 245 fn
- Israel, 334, 616 fn
- Italy, 690
- Ittehad-ul-Muslemeen, 165 fn, 99 fn, 214 fn, 285 & fn, 343
- Iyer, C.S. Ranga, (*Vol. 1, p. 128*), 576
- Jagadhri (Ambala district), 4
- Jagirdari system, 487
- "Jain Tirthankars" (Sass Brunner), 542 fn
- Jambhekar, R.M. (*VOL. 4, P. 526*), 671
- , Suhasini, 671
- Jamia Millia Islamia (New Delhi), 81; Institute of Adult Education of, 80 fn
- Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, 11 fn
- Jammu and Kashmir State *see* Kashmir
- Jammu city, 58, 337
- Jammu province, 220, 281, 694
- Jamuna river, 606
- Jana Adhikar Sabha*, 352
- Jana Gana Mana*, 332 & fn, 406, 421-422 fn, 423-425
- Jang, Moin Nawaz, 697
- Japan, 253 & fn, 336 fn, 610 & fn, 673, 676
- Government of, 674 fn; Mikado of *see* Hirohito
- Java, 649
- Jawahar Bal Bhawan (Allahabad), 717 fn
- Jeanneret, 483 fn
- Jedhe, K.M., 188 & fn
- Jerusalem, 295, 616
- Jetly, Brij Bhushan Sharan, 370 & fn
- Jews, 334 341, 362, 616 fn-617, 689 & fn

- Jeypore, 597 & fn; Maharaja of *see* Varma, Vikrama Deo  
 Jhelum valley, 342  
 Jind, 20  
 Jinnah, M.A., (*Vol. 1, p. 168*), 1 fn, 5-6, 8 & fn, 207 fn, 287, 289  
 Jodhpur, 101 fn-102, 325  
 Jodhpur State Railway, 101 & fn  
 Joint Boundary Commission, 128 & fn  
 Joint Rehabilitation Board, 38 fn, 40 fn  
 "JONCM" plan, 89  
 Johore, 326 fn  
 Joshi, J.V., 199 & fn, 343  
 —, N.C., 111 fn, 113  
 —, P.C., (*Vol. 3, p. 321*), 667-668 fn  
 —, Subhadra, 49 & fn-50  
 Jullundur, 20  
 Junagadh, 240; Nawab of, 240  
 Jung, Zain Yar, 183 & fn, 202 fn, 205, 214, 221, 353  
 Jung Bahadur, Nawab Amin, 193-194  
 Juvenile Court (Bombay), 55 fn
- Kabir, Humayun, (*Vol. 15, p. 248*), 544  
 Kachru, Dwarkanath, (*Vol. 11, p. 269*), 320  
 Kaifeng, 610 fn  
 Kamala Nehru Memorial Hospital (Allahabad), 713 & fn  
 Kamath, G.R., 429 fn  
 —, H.V., (*Vol. 9, p. 397*), 448 fn, 644 fn, 675-676 & fn  
 Kanchrapara (West Bengal), 71  
 Kania, H.J., (*VOL. 3, P. 174*), 581, 725  
 Kanpur, 159 fn, 606  
 Kapurthala, 20  
 Karachi, 1 fn, 89-90, 102-103, 123, 162, 184 & fn, 190-192, 207 fn, 215, 223, 242, 284-285, 291, 304, 306-307, 313, 335, 342, 345, 364, 409, 560, 679, 719 & fn-720  
 Karaikal, 680 fn; National Congress of, 680 & fn, Council of Action Committee, 680  
 Karaikudi (Tamil Nadu), 472 fn, 705  
 Karaka, D.F., (*Vol. 13, p. 416*), 713 & fn  
 Karanjia, R.K., (*VOL. 1, P. 560*), 521 & fn  
 Karenins Hill (Burma), 360 fn  
 Karnataka, 505 & fn  
 Kashi Vidyapith (Varanasi), 379 fn  
 Kashmir, 1 & fn, 14, 26, 30 fn, 32 fn, 37, 45 & fn, 57 & fn-58, 59 & fn, 65, 74, 143, 146-147, 149, 152, 160-161, 162 & fn-163, 164, 166 fn, 186 & fn-187, 192-193, 202 fn-203, 204-205, 207-210, 215-216, 220, 227-228, 236, 252, 262-263, 273, 279 & fn-280 & fn, 281-282 & fn, 283-284 & fn, 285-286, 288-289 & fn, 291, 293-294, 295 fn-296, 297, 299-302, 303 & fn-304 fn, 305-306, 307 & fn-308, 309, 311-316, 319 & fn- 320 & fn, 321, 325, 329 & fn-330, 333, 335 & fn, 341-342, 343 & fn, 345, 353-354, 357, 364 & fn, 366, 372, 374-375, 391, 397, 402-403 & fn, 408, 412-413, 430, 520 & fn, 527, 558, 560, 572, 579, 609, 669, 674, 681, 684 fn-686, 687, 694-695 & fn, 704, 712, 719-720; Government of, 296-297 & fn, 298, 301-302, 307 fn, 314, 319-321, 329  
 Kathmandu, 683  
 Katial, C.L., (*VOL. 5, P. 62*), 685  
 Katju, Kailas Nath, (*Vol. 1, p. 154*), 565  
 Kaul, M.N., 677 fn  
 Keskar, B.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 15*), 579  
 Khalsa College (Amritsar), 683 fn, Golden Jubilee of, 726  
 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, (*Vol. 4, p. 293*), 117 & fn, 650  
 —, Abdul Qayyum, (*Vol. 14, p. 98*), 117 & fn-118 & fn, 650; Government of, 650  
 —, Abdul Wali, (*Vol. 14, p. 578*), 116 fn.  
 —, Ghazanfar Ali, (*VOL. 1, P. 191*), 111-112, 719 & fn  
 —, Haji Mirza Ali, (*Vol. 8, p. 472*), 162, 203  
 —, Hamidullah, (*VOL. 1, P. 585*), 4 & fn, 6 fn-8 fn, 712 & fn  
 —, Liaquat Ali, (*Vol. 10, p. 356*), 1 fn, 86-87 & fn, 88 & fn-89, 90 & fn-91 fn, 92 & fn-93, 100, 102, 107-108, 117-118 fn, 119 & fn-120, 207 fn, 242 & fn, 258 fn, 279, 308, 374 fn, 559-560  
 —, Munim, 234 fn  
 —, Shobulla, 234 fn  
 Khanna, Mehr Chand, (*Vol. 14, p. 577*), 16, 59 fn, 68-69, 119 & fn-120, 147, 577  
 Khari Baoli (Delhi), 49 fn  
 Khaksars, 238  
 Kher, B.G., (*Vol. 8, p. 279*), 187, 590  
 Khosla, A.N., (*VOL. 1, P. 368*), 465 & fn-466



- , Gopal Das, 580 & *fn*  
 Khudai Khidmatgars, 117 & *fn*–118 & *fn*  
 Kidwai, Rafi Ahmed, (*Vol. 1, p. 270*), 28,  
 375, 385 & *fn*, 387 & *fn*  
 Kierkels, Leo Peter, (*VOL. 5, P. 544*), 678  
 679  
 Kirkee, 707  
 Kisan Mazdoor Party, 445 *fn*  
*Kishore* (Children's daily, Calcutta), 445 *fn*  
 Kishtwar, 694  
 Koenigsberger, Otto H., (*VOL. 6, P. 122*),  
 337 *fn*, 483–484  
 Kohala (Kashmir), 316  
 Kollontai, A.M., (*VOL. 5, P. 572*), 666 & *fn*,  
 667–668  
 Korbel, Josef, 281 *fn*–282, 287 *fn*–288,  
 289–290, 292–298, 300 & *fn*–301 & *fn*,  
 304–306, 313 *fn*, 315  
 Korea, 148 *fn*, 253 *fn*, 612, 629; Democratic  
 Republic of, 612 *fn*, North, 612 *fn*;  
 South, 687 & *fn*; Nationalist Assembly  
 of, in Seoul, 612 *fn*  
 Kotnis, D.S., (*Vol. 9, p. 250*), 660 & *fn*, 664  
 & *fn*  
 —, M.S., 664 & *fn*  
 Kramrisch, Stella, 543 & *fn*  
 Kripalani, J.B., (*Vol. 1, p. 237*), 384 *fn*  
 —, Sucheta, (*Vol. 9, p. 469*), 70 & *fn*–71,  
 73  
 Krishna, S., 535 *fn*  
 Krishnamachari, T.T., 447 & *fn*–448  
 —, V.T., (*Vol. 10, p. 412*), 429 *fn*  
 Krishnan K.S., (*Vol. 13, p. 605*), 536  
 Kuala Lampur, 360 *fn*–361 *fn*, 651 *fn*  
 Kukharsinhji Bhavsinhji, Krishna, 356,  
 576 *fn*  
 Kumarappa, J.C., (*Vol. 5, p. 32*), 488 *fn*,  
 570  
 Kung, H.H., 659 & *fn*  
 Kunzru, H.N., (*Vol. 1, p. 270*), 447 & *fn*,  
 644 *fn*  
 Kuo Ching-lan, 660 & *fn*  
 Kuomintang, 659 *fn*  
 Kuomintang Central Executive Committee,  
 663 *fn*  
 Kurukshetra, 68–69  
 Kurukshetra Camp, 21 & *fn*, 68  
 Kutch, 576; Maharaja of *see* Madansinhji,  
 Mirja Maharana Shri  
 Labour Party, (British), 192, 586 *fn*  
 Ladakh, 335, 342, 694  
 Ladlesaheb, 595  
 Lady Irwin College (New Delhi), 55 *fn*  
 Lahore, 1 *fn*, 89, 100, 143, 162 & *fn*, 285, 340  
 Lahore Central Museum, 543 *fn*  
 Lajpatrai Municipal Market (Delhi), 269 &  
*fn*, 425 *fn*  
 Lake Success, 309, 401  
 Lal, Jagat Narayan, (*Vol. 7, p. 395*), 505 *fn*  
 —, Khurshed, (*Vol. 7, p. 657*), 357, 559 *fn*  
 Lalit Kala Akademi (New Delhi), 545 *fn*  
 Lall, Panna, 505 *fn*  
 Lalbhai, Kasturbhai, (*Vol. 6, p. 334*), 432  
 Lancaster aircraft, 184 & *fn*, 190–192, 345,  
 719  
 Las, Ward, 713 *fn*  
 Lascelles, Alan Frederick, 597–598 & *fn*,  
 599 *fn*–600  
*Last Days of Netaji, The*, (G.D. Khosla),  
 580 *fn*  
 League of Nations, 283, 288  
*Lectures on Rock Magnetism* (P.M.S.  
 Blackett), 271 *fn*  
 Leh, 335  
 Leighton, Clare, 134 & *fn*  
 Leningrad, 686  
*Jawaharlal Nehru-Letters to Chief Ministers*  
 1947–1964, Vol. 1 (G. Parthasarathi),  
 325 *fn*  
 Levi, Daniel, (*VOL. 4, P. 644*), 681–682  
 Liberal Party (British), 192 *fn*  
 Lie, Trygve Halvdan, (*VOL. 4, P. 407*), 211  
 Lindley, Earnst K., 615 *fn*  
 Linguistic Provinces Commission, 505 & *fn*–  
 506  
*Lions and Lambs* (David Low) (1928), 265 *fn*  
 Lo Chia-luen, 664  
 Lockhart, Rob, (*VOL. 4, P. 283*), 284 & *fn*,  
 520 & *fn*  
 Lok Sabha, 49 *fn*, 188 *fn*, 436 *fn*, 442 *fn*,  
 628 *fn*, 683 *fn*  
 London, 92, 119, 123, 131 *fn*, 134 *fn*–135,  
 142 *fn*, 148, 169, 184–185, 191, 196, 212,  
 219, 222, 227–228, 240, 263–264, 265 *fn*,  
 275, 286–287, 295, 315, 349 & *fn*, 361,  
 371, 403 *fn*, 429 & *fn*, 438, 476, 520,  
 543 *fn*, 545 *fn*, 558–560, 567, 586 *fn*, 590,  
 601–602 *fn*, 626, 653–654, 656, 665, 669,  
 674, 677, 685–686, 687 & *fn*, 691 & *fn*–  
 692, 693, 695–697, 712 *fn*, 714 *fn*, 717 *fn*;  
 Indian High Commission in, Cypher  
 Bureau of, 275

# SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- London Museum, 543 fn  
 London University, 543 fn  
 Los Angeles, 619 fn  
 Low, David, 265 & fn-266, 694  
*Low Visibility* (David Low) (1953), 265 fn  
*Low's Annual* (David Low) (1908), 265 fn  
 Loyola College (Madras), 678 fn  
 Luce, Clare Booth, (*Vol. 13, p. 247*), 703 & fn-704 fn  
 Lucknow, 564, 651, 684, 706  
 Ludhiana, 28 & fn; District and City Congress Committee of, 28 fn  
 Lushai, 422 fn  
 Luxembourg, 677 & fn  
 Lydda, 341 fn  
 Lydda airport, 341 fn
- MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 253 & fn  
 Madansinhji, Mirja Maharana Shri (Maharaja of Kutch), 576 & fn  
 Madhopur bridge, 337 fn  
 Madras, 40, 46, 80-81, 144, 162, 219, 245, 382 fn, 391 & fn-392, 396, 400, 405-406, 408, 410-411 fn, 474, 505 fn, 603, 678 fn, 680, 682, 705 & fn-706  
 Madras Corporation, 80-81, 391 fn, 721 fn  
 Madras High Court, 590 fn  
 Madras Legislature Party, 490 fn  
 Madras Presidency *see* Madras province  
 Madras province, 2-3, 10 fn, 25 fn, 165-166 & fn, 198, 262 fn, 274, 283, 352, 356, 391-392, 394-396, 406-408, 414 fn, 454, 456 fn-457, 458-459, 490, 576 & fn, 586; Government of, 10 fn, 185, 201, 356, 398, 472, 586, 590 fn-591, 606; Legislative Assembly of, 447, 490 fn, 493 & fn, 721 fn; Chamber of, 721 fn; Legislative Council of, 10 fn  
 Madras Provincial Congress Committee, 10 fn  
 Madras Zamindari Abolition Bill, 490 & fn-491 & fn, 493 & fn  
 Mahalanobis, P.C., (*Vol. 11, p. 293*) 477 & fn  
 Mahanadi Dam Project, 470-471  
 Maharashtra, 514  
 Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee, 188 fn  
*Mahatma Gandhi* (Pethick-Lawrence, H.S.L. Polak and H.N. Brailsford) (London) (1949), 131 fn  
 "Mahatma at Meditation" (Sass Brunner), 542 fn
- Mahe, 680 fn  
 Mahtab, Harekrushna, (*Vol. 9, p. 435*), 99 fn, 492 & fn, 595 & fn  
*Mail, The*, (Madras), 245 fn  
 Majid, M.S.A., 606 fn  
 Majithia, Surjit Singh, 683 & fn, 726  
 Majumdar, D.L., 48 fn  
 Makalla, 196 fn; Nawab of, 196 fn  
*Making of Burma, The*, (Dorothy Woodman) (1962), 265 fn  
 Malabar, 205 fn, 656  
 Malaviya, Govind, (*Vol. 1, p. 263*), 15 & fn, 438 fn  
 —, Keshav Dev, (*Vol. 1, p. 260*), 592 & fn, 594 & fn.  
 —, Madan Mohan, (*Vol. 1, p. 127*), 15 fn  
 —, Mukand, 15 & fn  
 Malaya *see* Malaysia  
 Malayan Communist Party, 652  
 "Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army", 326 fn, 652; Anti-British Army of, 652  
 Malaysia, 326 & fn, 352, 360-361 & fn, 577, 588 & fn, 616, 628, 644 fn, 651 & fn-652, 653-654, 655 & fn-656, 657-658 & fn, 668; British Government of, struggle against, 611 fn; Employers' Association of, 654; Federation of Trade Unions of, 652; Government of, 326 fn, 611 fn, 653, 658 & fn; guerrilla warfare in, 360 fn; Law of Criminal and Civil Trespass of, 654; Resistance Army of, 651-652  
 Malerkotla, 17  
 Malik, Harji, 709 & fn  
 —, H.S., 709 & fn  
 Manbhum district, 514 fn  
 Manchester, University of, 271 fn  
*Manchester Guardian, The*, 265 fn  
 Manchuria, 610 fn  
 Mani, C., 475 fn  
 Manipur, 422 fn  
 Manki, Pir of, 650  
 Marshall, George C., (*VOL. 1, P. 566*), 371 & fn, 692, 695-696, 698  
 Martin, Kingsley, (*VOL. 5, P. 261*), 265 & fn, 714 fn-715  
 Masud, M.N., 49 & fn, 61 & fn  
 Mathai, M.O., (*Vol. 15, p. 385*), 47 & fn, 544, 598 & fn-599, 600, 664, 688, 705  
 Mathur, Dr. D.N., 535 fn  
 Matsya Union, 38 fn-39, 40-41  
 Matthai, Achamma, 55 & fn-56, 60  
 —, John, (*Vol. 15, p. 101*), 256, 375



- Mauripore (Pakistan), 190  
 Mauripur Airfield, 345  
 Mauritius, 566 fn  
 Mavalankar, G.V., (VOL. 2, P. 614), 675-677 & fn, 678 & fn  
 Mayer, Albert, (*Vol. 14, p. 593*), 483 fn-484  
 Medhi, Bishnuram, (*Vol. 8, p. 483*), 582 fn  
 Mediterranean region, 720  
 Meerut, 380 fn, 585  
 Mehrauli (Delhi), 31 fn  
 Mehta, Asoka, 442 & fn-443 fn  
 —, Dunichand, (VOL. 6, P. 500), 413  
 —, Hansa, (*Vol. 4, p. 379*), 677 fn  
 —, Krishna, (VOL. 6, P. 500), 57 & fn-58, 59 & fn, 321, 413 & fn  
*Memory's Gay Chariot* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn  
 Menon, K.P.S., (*Vol. 15, p. 326*), 183, 627 fn, 660-661, 663, 666 & fn  
 —, V.K. Krishna, (*Vol. 7, p. 15*), 184, 196, 206 & fn, 208 fn-209, 210 fn, 212, 215, 222, 227, 275, 283-284, 300, 305, 454, 475, 520, 597, 601-602 & fn, 632, 651, 654-655 & fn, 656 fn, 666-667, 679, 685-686 & fn, 687 fn-688 fn, 696, 719  
 —, V.P., (VOL. 2, P. 114), 214, 233 fn, 256, 291, 598  
 Meos, 37 & fn-38 & fn, 39-40 & fn, 41 & fn, 558; Fact Finding Committee on, 38, 40 & fn-41 & fn  
 Merwara, 15, 414 fn  
 Metcalfe Hall (Calcutta), 568 fn  
*Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (P.M.S. Blackett), 271 fn  
 Mines and Minerals Bill, 495  
 Mingaladon (Burma), 352 fn  
 Ministers for Local Self Government, meeting of (New Delhi, 6 August 1948), 414 fn  
 Ministry of Commerce, 362, 623, 628 fn  
 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 447 fn  
 Ministry of Communications, 321, 375  
 Ministry of Defence, 321, 354, 522 & fn, 573 fn, 602  
 Ministry of Education, 49 fn, 72, 77 & fn-78, 79-81, 338, 477, 543 fn-544, 545 & fn  
 Ministry of External Affairs, 196-197 fn, 256, 275, 321, 335, 557, 559-561, 566-567, 609, 633 fn, 644 fn, 682, 712 fn; Information Publicity department of, 92  
 Ministry of Finance, 55, 365, 447 fn, 476, 479, 488-489, 542 & fn, 555-556, 623, 719; Revenue Division of, 556-557  
 Ministry of Health, 474, 476; Department of Housing of, 476  
 Ministry of Home, 56, 168, 373-374, 550, 719  
 Ministry of Industry and Supply, 369-370 fn, 533, 536-537, 623  
 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 93, 237, 574 fn  
 Ministry of Iron and Steel, 447 fn  
 Ministry of Labour, 56, 461; National Employment Service of, 461  
 Ministry of Law, 575 fn  
 Ministry of Planning, 434 fn  
 Ministry of Production, 434 fn, 628 fn  
 Ministry of Railways and Transport, 101-102, 375, 557, 559 & fn  
 Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, 25, 30 fn-31, 40-41, 55 & fn-56, 60, 66, 68 fn, 72 fn, 77 fn-78, 79, 101-102, 161 fn, 331, 558-559; Harijan Section of, 30 & fn-31; Women's Section of, 55 & fn-56, 59  
 Ministry of River Valley Schemes, 434 fn  
 Ministry of Social and Economic Affairs, 431, 434-435  
 Ministry of States, 17, 40-41, 194-196, 198 fn, 201, 204, 211, 213, 233 fn, 262, 536, 566, 576, 687  
 Ministry without Portfolio, 557-559  
 Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, 628 fn  
 Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, 467-468, 538, 563, 574 fn, 595, 602  
 Mirpur, 220, 279 fn, 694  
 Mirpur Khas, 101 fn  
*Mirror-News, The*, (Los Angeles), 619 fn  
 Mitra, Dharendra Nath, 475 fn  
 —, Khagendranath, 445 & fn  
 Moazzam, Prince, 237 fn  
 Mody, Homi, (*Vol. 7, p. 418*), 467 fn  
 Mohammad, Bakshi Ghulam, (*Vol. 9, p. 440*), 281, 541  
 Mohammed, Ghulam, (VOL. 5, P. 80), 201 fn, 207 fn, 339 fn, 719  
 Molotov, V.M., (VOL. 1, P. 134), 671, 692, 698  
 Monckton, Walter, (VOL. 4, P. 28), 204  
 Monghyr, 490 fn  
 Mookerjee, S.P., (*Vol. 11, p. 739*), 12 & fn-13 fn, 439, 506 fn, 533, 538 & fn, 541, 606, 668 & fn-669  
 Morin, Louise, (*Vol. 9, p. 622*), 714  
 Morrison, Herbert, (*Vol. 9, p. 102*), 206 fn

- Moscow, 576, 634, 644 fn. 661, 663, 667, 669, 671, 685-686, 708 fn, 710
- "Moti Nagar" (proposed name for Delhi), 605
- Mountbatten, Edwina, first countess, (VOL. 3, P. 43), 3 & fn, 57, 185, 209, 221, 284-285, 287, 325, 327, 430, 566, 570, 586, 598, 685, 695-696, 698, 705-706
- , Louis, first earl, (Vol. 13, p. 279), 184-185, 201 & fn, 205, 209, 219, 224, 227, 283 & fn-284, 287, 325, 327 & fn, 339 & fn-340 fn, 430, 475, 566-567, 570, 586, 590, 597-598, 685, 695-696, 698, 705-706, 719
- Pamela, (VOL. 6, P. 358), 185, 706
- Mudaliar, A.L., 475 fn
- , A.R., (Vol. 15, p. 299), 693-694, 698 & fn
- Mukherjee, Radhakamal, 357 fn, 442 fn
- Multan, 340
- Munshi, K.M., (Vol. 5, p. 292), 197-198, 237, 256-257, 262, 581 fn
- Murder of the Mahatma* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Murshidabad district, 356
- Murshidabad-Rajshahi border, 356 fn
- Musalman* (Karachi), 89
- Muslim League, All India, 5, 10 fn, 133, 352, 405-407; Madras branch of, 10 fn. 405-407; United Provinces branch of, 388
- Muslim League National Conference (Kashmir), 320 fn
- Muzaffarabad, 20, 413, 694; District Magistrate of *see* Mehta, Dunichand
- Mussoorie, 601
- Muzaffarpur Bar, 490 fn
- Mylapore (Madras), 679
- Mysore State, 89, 505 fn; Government of, 483,
- Naga *see* Nagaland
- Nagaland, Hills of, 422 fn
- Nagpur, 219
- Naidu, Leilamani, (Vol. 4, p. 557), 684, 706 & fn
- , Padmaja, (Vol. 2, p. 226), 275, 564, 706 & fn, 711
- , Sarojini, (Vol. 1, p. 261), 545, 684, 706, 712
- Naini prison, 689 & fn
- Naini Tal, 57, 544
- Nalavade, R.M., 188 & fn
- Nalgonda, 367 fn
- Nambiar, A.C.N., (Vol. 3, p. 300), 530 & fn, 577
- Nanaj (Hyderabad), 198 fn, 234 fn
- "Nanaj Day", 234 fn
- Nanda, Gulzari Lal, (Vol. 9, p. 309), 434 fn, 443 fn-444, 453, 461 & fn
- Nangal Dam Project, 466 & fn-467 & fn
- Nanking, 610 fn
- Naoroji, Dadabhai, (Vol. 3, p. 241), 385
- Naoroji, Khurshed, (Vol. 5, p. 134), 576
- Narayan, Jayaprakash, (Vol. 4, p. 305), 246, 328 fn, 379-380, 382, 440 fn, 690-691
- Narendra Deva (Vol. 4, p. 367), 690
- Nasik, 327
- Natesan, P., 606 fn
- National Anthem, 332 & fn, 406, 421-422 & fn, 423-425
- National Cadet Corps (N.C.C.), 330-331
- National Conference (Kashmir), 320 & fn
- National Defence Force, 330 fn
- National Employment Service, 461
- National Flag, 175, 421
- National Herald*, 301 fn, 315 fn, 319 fn, 414 fn, 418 fn, 461 fn, 699 fn, 718 fn
- National Library (Calcutta), 565, 568 & fn
- National Military Council (China), 665 fn
- National Sun Yat-sen University (China), 663 fn
- National Wuhan University (China), 665 fn
- Natu, W.R., 442 fn
- Nawanagar, 685, 687, Maharaja of *see* Digbijay Singhji Jam Shree
- Nayar, Sushila, (Vol. 6, p. 381), 562 & fn, 566
- Nazareth, 341 fn
- "Neecha Nagar" (Film script written by Hayatullah Ansari), 388
- Nagri Sembilan, 326 fn
- "Nehru Anthology", proposal for, 685, 710 & fn
- Nehru, Braj Kumar, (Vol. 1, p. 283), 429 fn
- , Jawaharlal, 2 fn, 4 fn, 7 fn-8 fn, 12 fn-14 fn, 18 fn, 32 fn, 40 fn, 47, 66 fn, 88 fn, 90 fn-91 fn, 99 fn, 112 fn, 119 fn, 137-138, 150, 152, 162, 166 fn, 186 fn, 189, 197 & fn-198 & fn, 199 fn-200, 201 fn, 203, 206 fn, 225 fn, 233, 236-241, 242 & fn, 258 fn, 265 fn, 267 fn, 281 & fn, 287 & fn-288, 289 & fn-290, 291 & fn-292, 293-295, 296 fn-297, 298, 300, 306, 329



fn, 337 fn, 349 fn, 352, 362 fn, 369, 371, 374 fn, 381 fn, 384 fn-388 fn, 391 & fn, 409, 441, 447 & fn-448 fn, 449, 453 fn, 467 fn, 471 fn, 499 fn, 501 fn, 527 fn, 530 fn, 533 fn, 535 fn, 538 fn, 542 fn-543 fn, 545 fn, 549 fn, 552 fn, 563 fn, 592 fn, 598-599, 615-617, 623, 625, 633 fn-635 fn, 639 fn, 644, 660 fn-662 fn, 666 fn, 668 fn-669, 671, 674-675, 677 & fn-678 fn, 680 & fn, 689 fn, 692 fn, 703 fn, 705 fn, 707 fn, 710 fn-711, 716 fn, 717 fn

—, accepts resignation of R. K. Shanmukham Chetty, 551; addresses conference of provincial Ministers of Health, New Delhi, 474-475, of provincial Ministers of Self-government, New Delhi, 414-416, of Premiers of Provinces, New Delhi, 25-27, and of World Health Organisation's regional Committee for South East Asia, New Delhi, 699-700; advocates non-alignment, 611-613, 616; appeals for Flag Day, 523-524, appoints new members for Cabinet, 559-560; broadcasts on Gandhi Jayanti, 150-152, on Hyderabad, 257-259, and on Independence Day, 176-178; decides reimposition of controls, 449; gives guidelines on policy to be followed at U.N., 609-615, and acceptance of U.N.C.I.P.'s ceasefire proposal on Kashmir issue, 304; lays foundation stone of refugee colony, New Delhi, 45 and of Electro-Chemical Research Institute, Karaikudi, 472-474; leaves India, for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, 691; makes statements in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on Hyderabad, 228-233, on inflation, 436-441, 445-448, on inter-parliamentary group, 675-677, on Kashmir, 306-314, on National Anthem, 422-424, and on resignation of Shanmukham Chetty, 553-554; opens Lajpatrai Municipal Market, Delhi, 269-271; participates at meeting of Standing Economic Committee of Congress, New Delhi, 443-445; regrets Sri Lanka's decision on Indian citizenship, 646; sends messages to *Al Jamait* on Id-ul-Fitr, 11, for American Independence Day, 627, for

the celebration of first year of Independence in India, 155-167, 169-170 and in London, 168-169, to Community Church of New York, 133-134, for formation of Press Trust of India, 418 and of National Employment Service, 461, for Gandhi Jayanti Week, 135, for inauguration of Orissa High Court, 725; shifts residence to Teen Murti House, New Delhi, 564; talks with, British High Commissioner, New Delhi, 281, 287-298, Russian Ambassador, New Delhi, 670-671 and with U.N.C.I.P., New Delhi, 281, 287-298; unveils portrait of Mahatma Gandhi in Madras, 131-133 and of C. Rajagopalachari in Madras, 721-724; visits Amritsar, 29, Bombay, 244-246, 523-525, Madras, 131-133, 391-413, 454-459, 511-514, Pathankot, 337, 602, Srinagar, 315-316; welcomes the arrival of HMIS *Delhi*, 523-525.

—, on abducted women, recovery and rehabilitation of, 107-108; administration, 374, 549, interference by Congressmen with, 584-586, reorganisation of, 549-550; administrative services, 432; Agatha Harrison, 580; Agra, communal disturbances in, 86; Akalis, 18, and Centre, 18, activities of, 18-19; Alexandra Kollontai, Vijayalakshmi Pandit's interview with, 666; Ambala, incident in, 3; armed services personnel, conduct of, 330, 519, 572-573, consumption of alcohol by, 526-527, grant of land to, 573, role of, 527-528; Asoka Vihar (Madras), 474-475; Assam, Bengalis in, 582-583, and Calcutta press, 583, communal situation in, 67, 582-583, immigration into, 67, 582, land for Bhutan from, 422; Assam Rifles, recruitment to, 522; atomic energy, commission for, 352, 617, development of, 536-537, 613; austerity, 339, 348, 602, 614-615; aviation laws, 192; 'Azad Kashmir', non-Muslims in, 192; Banking Bill (1948), 350, 553; Barrackpore, communal violence in, 9; Barsi episode, 343; Bengal, East, developments in, 1-2, 85, 88, migration from and to, 1-2, 71-74, 98-99, minorities in, 1-2, 85, 88, 98-99,

role of Hindu leaders in, 98-99; Bengal, West, and *char* lands dispute, 356, inclusion of Bengali-speaking areas of Bihar in, 506-508, civil liberties in, 350-351, Communist activities in, 326, financial relief to, 69-70, 72, law and order in, 589-590, minorities in, 88, refugees problem in, 71; Berlin crisis, 332-333, 341, 349, 360, and currency reforms, 332, role of U.S.S.R. in, 332 and of western powers, 332; Bhakra Nangal Dam, 465-467, 471, contract for construction of, 406, waters for Bikaner from, 470; Bhubaneswar, 484; Bihar, Muslims serving in, 14, minorities in, 13, zamindari abolition in, 14; *Blitz*, reports in, 520; Bombay, master plan for, 484, Refugee Act applicable to, 66, 187; Britain, and Commonwealth, 623-626, foreign relations of, 186, 287, 344, 613-614, 623-626, hostilities towards, 344; Brunners, paintings of, 542-543, 706; Buddhist manuscripts, 539; building construction, 468-469; Burias, 558; Burma, communist activities in, 326, 631-633, Indians in, 631-632, protests against Patel's speech on, 632-633, rebellion in, 326, 352, 360-361, 631-633, 657; canal waters dispute, 38, 123-124; capital punishment, 597; Cariappa, K.M., functioning of, 560; Central Statistical Organisation, 477; Chandigarh, 483; Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 662; child welfare, 709; China welfare fund, 661; civil liberties, 350-351, 373-374, 456, 587, 657-658; citizens, duties of, 157, 171, 414; commerce, 624; Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 361; communal organisations, ban on, 2-3; communal riots, 9, 86, 148, 221, 271; communalism, 7-9, 17, 151, 172, 175, 177, 221, 235, 243, 245, 258, 266-267, 269, 326, 366, 368-369, 372, 394, 416, 587; Communist Party of India, and French colonies, 588, ban on, 326; communists, in India, 667-669, arrests of, 205, 373, 587, role of, 373, 455-456; conferences, 416; Congress, and Socialists, 327, 382-383, 690, Central Relief Committee, 69-70, coordination with government of,

380-381, 439, assistance for Punjab from, 74, differences with Socialist Party, 382-383, presidential candidates for, 384-387, problems in, 386, Congressmen, interference with administration by, 380-381; Constitution, 10, 351, 604, Hindi translation of, 604; constructive activities, 336, 376, 399, 412; coordination, 439, 555-559; controls on cloth and food, 160, 346, 363, 369, 374, 449; criticism, 455; cultural symbols, 407-408; Czechoslovakia, Technical Mission from, 536; defence delegation abroad, 448; Delhi, Muslims in, 32-33, eviction of refugees from, 46-48, mosques in, 16-17, 147-148, peace committee of, 147, transport in, 51; democracy, 177, 364, 388, 414, 625; Deshmukh, C.D., 580; detentions without trial, 338, 347, 566, 587, 589; development schemes, 458-459; Dhillon, Gurbaksh Singh, fast by, 591; discipline, 158-159, 173, 177, 233, 410; disparities in income, and fixed income groups, 346; disruptive forces, 416, 528; distribution of wealth, 346; diversity, 392, 524-525; economic experts, 434-435; economic policy, 438; economic situation, 60, 164, 227, 328, 335-336, 341, 345-346, 357-359, 363, 397-398, 430, 440, 443-444, 617, 624, 673, 695, economists' reports on, 357-359, 442, Economy Committee, 444, constitution and working of, 432; electricity, 473; embassies abroad, 566, 579, 614, cypher staff in, 579, serving of alcohol by, 614-615; enforcement personnel, recruitment of, 370; English language, 512, 514, Europe, developments in, 332-333, 336, 341, 349, 360, proposed tour of, 684-688, 691-693, 695-698; servicemen, resettlement of, 527-528; Charles Fabri, 541-542; faith, 175; Fakir of Ipi, India's alleged understanding with, 162; favouritism, 555; fear; 141-145, 148, 151, 160, 176-177, 241, 269-271, 316, 325, 372; feudal autocracy, 235; flag day, appeal for, 267, 527-528; foreign languages, 512; foreign office, 567, external publicity by, 609; foreign policy, 340, 355-356, 371, 594, 609-619, 623-626, towards



Britain, 613-614, towards China, 610, 612, towards Far East, 610, towards SouthEast Asia, 610-612, towards U.S.A., 613-614, towards U.S.S.R., 611-614, towards West Asia, 610; foreign visits of ministers, 594; freedom, 165, 168-169; 171-172, 245-246, attainment of, 155, 168-169, 171-172, 244-246, responsibilities of, 155-158, 168-169, preservation of, 624-525, economic, 397, political, 397; freedom struggle, 155-158; French Ambassador's complaint, 681-682; French possessions in India, elections in, 680-682; Gandhi, Mahatma, and communalism, 6, 151, birthday celebration of, 135, 269, 339, 348, death of, 132, 156, 168, 244, 339, 348, homage to, 170, 348, life and message of, 131-139, 148, 150-152, 156-157, 164, 167, 169, 170-172, 174-176, 246, 365, 619, memorials to, 135, 170, 605, pledge made to, 16, 46, 177, Gandhi National Memorial Fund, 601, 605; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 347; Ghulam Mohammed, 339; Goa, future of, 678-679; Godse, Nathuram, death penalty for, 716; Gopalaswami Ayyangar, 557-561; Government of India, criticism of, 399-400, foodgrains policy of, 433, import policy of, 362, limitations of, 399, monetary policy of 445-446; Governor General, salary and allowances of, 570-572, 576 & fn; greatness, 139, 157; 'Grow More Food' campaign, 476; harmony, 9, 266-267; hatred, 141-144, 410; Hayatullah Ansari, 388; health, 699-700; Hindi, 513, and Urdu, 2, translation of legal and technical terms into, 511; Hindu Code, 499-501; Hindu communalists, 403; Hindu Mahasabha, 12-13; return to politics of, 12; Hindu State, 15, 403-404; Hindustani, 511-514, as national language, 511; Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on, 513; Hindustani Prachar Sabha, 514; his mail, 704; his future, 711; his resignation, 712; history, 5-7, and India, 171, 244; honesty, 174; housing factory, 337-338; housing problem, 67-69, 337-338, 347, in Delhi, 79; human resources, 458; humanity, 133; Hyderabad, and Indian Muslims,

5, and Islamic countries, 196, accession of, 165-166, 212, 229, 408-410, 674, anti-India propaganda by, 197-198, attack on Indian troops in, 202, attack on train in, 206, authority in, 199, 588, and Communists atrocities in, 239, 273, 588, blockade against, 186-187, 195, 328, 334, ceasefire order by Nizam of, 252, chaos in, 202, civil life in, 256, communal tension in, 263, connections with Goa, 213, Debate in House of Commons on, 200, 214, 247, developments in, 160, 165-166, 183, Englishmen in, 186 and Europeans, 353, territorial position of, 164-165, 199-200, 345, gun-running to, 166-167, 183-185, 189-192, 207, 213, 228, 335, 345, 719-720, India's policy towards, 194, 199, 210, 229, 368, indifferent attitude of Government of, 195, 199, 230, military administration in, 254-257, 259-260, 262, negotiations with, 183, 212, 228, 231, 242, 245, 344, status of, 252-253, surrender of, 273, non-Muslims in, 199, 210, 212, 240, police action in, 71, 165, 187, 189, 207, 223-224, 226, 234, 237, 240, 247, 260, 263-265, 267-269, 272-275, 328, 354, 366, 368, 650-651, 693, Pakistan's reaction to, 220, 258, 266, West Asian reaction to, 254, posting of Indian troops in Bolaram, 251, in Secunderabad, 197, 222, 224, 226, 229, 232, 236-238, 240-241, 251, 257, protection of life and property in, 199, 210, 232, 243, 354, 274, raids into Indian territory from, 165-166, Razakars in, 185, 189, 195, 198, 203, 212-213, 215, 221, 223, 228, 230, 234-235, 243, 328-329, 343, 364, 367, atrocities by, 185, 189, attacks on Indian troops by, 202, 243, banning of, 251-253, 257, reference to United Nations by Government of, 198, 209-211, 213, 255-256, 376, drafting of statement on Indian standpoint on, 211-212, responsible government in, 914, 229, role of Ittehad in, 214, situation in, 1, 90, 183-185, 187, 189-190, 198-199, 202, 209, 221-223, 226-241, 255, 272, 334, 344 364, 376, Standstill Agreement with, 194, 197, 229, 232, 239-240, 245, supply of essential commodities to, 166, 198, 201, 203, violent speeches in

186, 195, 214, white paper on, 196, 353, world opinion about, 254, 258, 266, 367; Hyderabad State Army, British Officers in, 195, 242, surrender of, 253, idolization, 398-399; immigration problem, 199, 202, 233; Income Tax Amendment Bill, 551-553; income tax investigations, 550-555; on India, and world, 157, agreement with Nepal of, 683, as a a secular state, 7, 86, 99, 167, 404, assimilation and adaptability of, 393, charges made by Hyderabad against, and refutal thereof, 201, relations with Britain, 613, 623-626, Burma, 631-633, China, 659-665, Indonesia, 647-651, Malaysia, 651-658, neighbouring countries, 146, Pakistan, 85-124, 227, 273, 401-402, Sri Lanka, 634-647, U.S.A., 613, 623, 627-630, U.S.S.R., 613, 666-671, Vatican, 689, composite culture of, 7-8, 405, 407, Constitution of, 10, 351, 581, 604, dedication towards, 168-169, 173, disruptive forces in, 246, French possessions in, 588, 680-682, fundamental unity of, 392-393, future of, 393-394, government employees in, cases against, 31-32; independence, celebration of first year of, 155-179, 348, 602, 614, in Britain, 168, in Tokyo, 614 and stay of execution, 168, internal peace in, 199, Muslims in, 5-7, 405, 408, Pakistan's policy towards, 167, 208, 220, political developments in, 167-168, poverty in, 172-174, problems before, 158, 170, 173, progress of, 171-175, situation in, 4-6, "third independent state" in, 6-7, tasks ahead of, 158, 176; Indian ambassadors, 332-333, 340, 355-356, 448, Indian Army, recall of British officers from, 520-521, formation of provincial units in, 522, homogeneous character of, and 354, 522; I.N.A., 423, assistance to Anita Pfaff Bose by, 529-530, employment of personnel of, 528-530, Indian Navy, growth of, 523-525, Indian Philosophy, 392; Indonesia, communist activities in, 649, situation in, 648-651; industrial workers, 455-456; Industry, 624, wealth of, 174; inflation, 160, 173, 178, 331, 335, 363, 397, 431, 436-437, 446-447, 617; I.N.S. *Delhi*, commis-

sioning of, 523-525; integrity, 178, 375, 722; inter-Dominion conferences, discussions and decisions of, 1, 67-68, 124, 192, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 675-676; inter-provincial marriage, 707; international cooperation, 699-700; I.N.T.U.C. and Factory Workers' Committee, 208, 453; Israel, 334; Jagirdari system, 487; Jamsaheb of Nawanagar, 687; *Jana Gana Mana*, choice of, 332, 423-435, and *Vande Mataram*, 332; Japan, U.S. assistance to, 674; Jinnah, role of, 5-6; Jodhpur Railway affair, 101-102; Junagadh, 240; Karaka, D.F., comment on, 713; Kashmir, 236, 309, 314, 325, 330, 357, 372, and charges against India of, genocide, 192, and of non-implementation of agreements, 8, and Pakistan propaganda, 89, 93, 118, 143-144, 146-147, 151-152, accession to India of, 299, 320-321, authority of state over entire territory of, 288, 290, 301, 303, British officers' involvement in, 193, 205, 208, 210, 215-216, 284-286, 288, 300, charge against Indian Army in, 279, constitutional position of Abdullah government, 320-321, emotional appeal to, 310-311, invasion of, 152, 209, 288, 302-303, 307, 309-316, 374, military help to, 146, 192, 282, 309-311, and Mahatma Gandhi's and Sheikh Abdullah's reactions, 311, 314, military situation in, 45, 192, 201, 308, 319-320, 329, 342, 374, need for presence of Indian troops in, 293-294, 299-300, 303, Pakistan Army involvement in, 162-164, 192, 203, 205, 209, 215-216, 220, 279, 282, 284, 288-289, 293-294, 307, 315-316, 343, 353-354 and denial and later acceptance of, 283, 285-286, 288, 299, 302, 307-308, 313-316, and press attitude to, 85, permits for visit to, 319-320, Praja Sabha in, 320, relief in, 57-59, Security Council's, resolution (17 January 1948) on, 282, policy on, 288, 402-403, statement in Constituent Assembly on, 306-314, western powers' attitude to, 191-192, 355-356; Kashmir issue and U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan (U.N.C.I.P.), announcement on outcome of negotiations, 304-



314, boycott of visit to Kashmir, 280, discussions with, 281, 287-298, 300, jurisdiction of, 280, proposals for cease-fire, truce and plebiscite of, 288-293, India's consideration of, 290-292, 294, 300, 302-303, acceptance of, 304, 316, Pakistan's reply to, 304-307, 313; Korea, India's attitude to, 629; Kotnis' child, visit to India of, 660, 664-665; Krishna Mehta, 57, 413; Krishna Menon, 685; Kurukshetra, refugee camp at, 21, 68-69; labour, demands of, 460; language question, 415; law and order, 87, 266, 303, 364, 587-592, and laws, 87, 140, 266, 303, 364, 373; linguistic provinces, 505-506, commission for, 505-506; local self-Government, 414-415; loyalty, 408, of Indian Muslims, 7; Madras city, 392, people of, 396, 410; Madras province, appointment of Governor of, 356, 603, ban on Rashtriya Seva Dal in, 2-3, treatment to Muslims in, 11-12; majority, responsibility of, 408; Malabar, communist activities in, 656; Malaysia, British Government's intervention in, 653, Chinese in, 652-653, 655-656, Communists in, 326, 352, 651-652, condition of labour in, 652-658, law and order in, 652-653, rebellion in, 352, 360-361, situation in, 651-652, 654-656; Masud, M.N., arrest of, 61; Meos, 37, 558, immigration of, 39, rehabilitation of, 37-41; utilization of land vacated by, 40; military secrets, leakage of, 572-573; minerals, export of, 617, 625-626; Ministers of State, appointment of, 375, status of, 568-569; ministerial responsibility, 557; Ministry without Portfolio, 557-559; minorities, 1, 87, 367, 408, protection of, 367; M.L.A.s, charges against, 606; Mohan Singh, 591-592; monazite sands, export of, 536; morality, 132-133, 308, 311; mother tongue as medium of instruction, 541-515; Mountbattens, 185, 327, 365, 552, Mridula Sarabhai, 558-560; Mukund Malaviya, 15; Muslim and non-Muslim refugees from East Bengal, 67-68, loyalty of, 7, 558; Muslim League, 405-406, role of, 5-6; Nation building, 140; National Anthem, 332, adoption of, 423-424,

at the cinema shows, 421, objections to, 421, significance of, 425, tune of, 423, and National Flag, 175; National Cadet Corps, formation of, 330-331; national emblem, 175; National Library, shifting to Belvedere of, 565, 568; national pride, 175; national unity, 133, 150-152, 159, 175, 258, 327, 332, 375, 392-393; Nationalist Muslims, 28; nationality, 188; natural resources, tapping of 458; *Neecha Nagar*, 388; N.E.F.A., development of, 479; non-cooperation, 139; non-Muslims, seizure of property in West Punjab, 29; non-violence, 172, 266, 287, 311; nutrition, 474; N.W.F.P., and Khan Brothers, 117, Khudai Khidmatgars in, 117-120, rehabilitation of refugees from, 21, situation in, 117-120, 650; Nyes, 578; office discipline, 584; official secrets, leakage of, 521, 526-527, 574-575; oil situation, 337; opposition, 414; Orissa, 725, and representation in delegation going abroad, 593; paintings, purchase by Government of India of, 540; Pakistan, and Islamic character, 8-9, 404, 406, anti-India propaganda by, 89, 93, 118, 143-144, 146-147, 149, 151-152, 161, 163-164, 262, 268, 279, 286, 344, attitude towards Mountbatten, 719, complicity in Kashmir invasion, 520, British Army officers in, 208, 286, 288, 343, 520, 720, economic situation in, 287, exchange of prisoners with, 111, 113 347, fraternity with, 91, gun-running for Hyderabad from, 166-167, 183-185, 189-192, 207, 213, 228, 335, 345, 719-720, harassment of Indian nationals by, 100, 102-103, India's relations with, 557-558, 560, interference in India's internal affairs by, 86, issue of permits, 85, 97, 99-100, minority's plight in, 88, possible steps against, 520, possibility of war with, 693, regulation of movement in, 85, 97, 99-100, 102-103, relations with, 9, 91-93, 145-146, 208; religious freedom in, 287, return of Meos from, 37, scrutiny of permit holders from, 99-100, situation in, 650, support by British officers to, 430, theocracy in, 8, 236, 287-289, 404, 406, transfer of Qureshi to, 111 113; Pales-

tine, 333-334, 341, 362, 616-617, relief to refugees in, 689; parliamentary committees, 432-433; partition, 6, 169, 287, 338, 372-373, 391-392, 394-395, 400-401, 403; Patharia Hill Forest Reserve, Joint Boundary Commission for, 129, mobilisation of troops by East Bengal in, 128-129; Patiala Maharaja, grant of land to officers by, 519; patronage, 555; peace, 19, 132, 140, 148-151, 169, 172, 178, 199, 233, 257-258, 266-267, 269, 298, 304, 316, 373, 523-524, 587, peasants, 457-458; Posts and Telegraph Department, tribunals to deal with appeals, 331; Peshawar, liaison officer in, 107-108; petrol and steel, rationing of, 337; police behaviour in Delhi, 48; police, charges against, 48, 174; postal stamps, special issue of 385, Posts and Telegraph staff in Kashmir, option to join either Dominion of, 579; poverty, removal of, 472, 474; power blocs, 618, 629; pre-fabricated houses, 474; press, American, 263-264, 270, British, 191, 205, 263-264, 273, 626, Indian, 158-159, 355, 367-368, 419, criticism of Madras Government order by, 590-591, responsibilities of, 158-159, Pakistani, 161-164, 270, 272, 339, Russian, 667, 670; Press Advisory Committees, 93; price rise, 178, 246, 331, 335, 356; Prime Minister, holding of foreign portfolio by, 441-442, residence for, 563-564; production, 60, 71-73, 363, 400, 455; progress, 336; prohibition, enforcement of, 381-382, in defence forces, 526-527, provincialism, 394-395, 416-417; provincial governments, autonomy to, 372-373, criticism of foreign countries by, 371, dealing directly with foreign countries by, 592-595; Punjab, situation in, 4; Punjab, East, Akali activities in, 18-19, future of Hindus in, 4, Government policy regarding Hindus converted to Islam, 3, grant of lands to M.L.As in, 603; High Courts in, 580-581, land policy of, 20-21, rehabilitation of refugees, 21, role of non-Muslims in, 29-31, settlement of Harijans in, 20, tension between Hindus and Sikhs in, 4; Punjabi-speaking state, suggestion for, 18; Punjab, West, seizure of property in,

29, supply of electricity to, 127, **Raja**-gopalachari, C., 718, 721-724; Rajendra Prasad, as Congress president, 386; Rajputana, developments in, 325-326; Rajputs, support to Pakistan by, 487-488; Ramaswami Mudaliar, 698; Rampur, popular government in, 725; Rashtrapati Bhawan, 562-563, 566, 570-571, art exhibition in, 567, moving of Foreign Office to, 566-567, use of, 566-567; Rashtriya Seva Dal, activities of, 2, ban in Madras on, 2-3; Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and Indian Army's alleged link with, 279, activities of, 12, 351-352, in Rajasthan, 15, in various provinces, 12, Syama Prasad Mookerjee's association with, 12-13; Red Cross, and its association with U.C.R.W., 57-59; Red Shirts, 117-120; refugee problem, 37-41, 47-48, 55-59, 72, 77, 79-81, 101-102, 161, 346, 413, refugee children, education of, 72, centre in Madras for, 80-81, problems facing, perception at macro level and micro level of, 161; refugee students, accommodation for, 77-81, 161, agitation by, 77, education of, 77-81, freeship for, 78; refugees, 25-33, 37-41, 46-51, 55-61, 65-74, 77-81, constructive work of, 57-59, eviction of, in Delhi, 47-48, from Government houses, 50-51, from N.W. F.P., 68-69, housing for, 56, in Delhi, 47, 50-51, plight of, in Delhi, 56, in Sind, 101-102, problems facing, 56, 101-102, professional man-power among, 25, rehabilitation of, 25-27, 31, 37-45, 65, 161, stoppage of dole to, 73, teachers among, 338, welfare of, 28, Rehabilitation and Development Board, function of, 577; relief agencies, coordination among, 72; Reserve Bank Bill (1948), 350, 553; Reserve Bank of India, governorship of 580; responsibility, 173; Revenue Division, coordination with, 555-557, working of, 556; river service, 606; river valley schemes, 616, contract to foreign firms for, 465, 470, 616, financing of, 470; rumours, 189, 274, 325, 367, precaution against, 325, Hyderabad Radio's alleged role in spreading of, 241; sacrifice, 171-173, 176; Santhanam, K.,



559; Satyagraha, 139; science, 473; scientific research, 533-534; scientists, visits of, 535; secrecy, 275, 572-576; secular state, 7, 86, 99, 167, 404; secularism, 7, 99, 258, 267, security, 272; Shanti Dal, in Delhi, 49-50; Shanmukham Chetty, resignation of, 349-350, 362, 551-554; Shanti Sena, role of, 19; shortcomings, 155; Sikhs, 4, 17, 29, 406, 467, demands of, 4, 18; Pakistan's charges against, 340; Sind, conditions of non-Muslims in, 1, migrations from, 101-102, refugees from, 65, financial assistance to, 66, rehabilitation in Bombay of, 65; smuggling, 166-167, 183-185, 189-192, 213-214, 229-230; social and economic affairs, a ministry for, 434-435; Socialist Party, 382-383, 690, criticism of Government by, 383; socialism, 455; solidarity, 272; South East Asia, 656, 659, communist party in, 659, 668; South Indian languages, 512; Special Marriage Act, (1872), proposed amendment to, 499; Sri Lanka, admission to U.N. of, 634, benefits to immigrant labour in, 635, issue of citizenship to Indians in, 635-647, and distinction between citizenship by descent and by legislation, 641-642, basis for refusal of, 640, compliance with the laws for, 638, enquiry for, 639, period of residence for, 636-637, procedure for, 639, loss of citizenship, 641, rights of people of Indian origin in, 635-647; stability, 327, 332; State, 724, security of, 456-457, 523-524, social functions of, 411-412; statistical organisation, importance of, 76; statistics, 440, importance of, 438-439, 475, 477; Sterling Balances Agreement (Tripartite) (1948), 186, 333, 336, 339, 429; 430; strength, 164, 171, 175, 327, 332; strikes, 246; Sudhir Ghosh, appointment of, 581-582; Sushila Nayar, 561; Sun Yat-sen, Madame, (Ching Soong Ling), 660-661; Swaraj Bhawan as children's home, 717; Switzerland, friendship treaty with, 348; Tara Singh, objectionable speeches by, 4, 18; Teen Murti House, his shifting into, 204, 563-564, 567, 713; theocratic state, 8-9, 236, 287-289, 404,

406; tolerance, 177; town planning, 483-484; trade in the past, 525; trade unions, 461-462; truth, 176, 314; U.C.R. W., 57-59, 66; unemployment problem, 178, 461; United Nations Organisation, 699-700, General Assembly of, 206, Hyderabad issue before, 198, 209-211, 213, 255-256, 376, Argentine attitude and apology, 376, drafting of statement on Indian standpoint, 211-212. India's faith in, 149, 633, issues before, 148, principles of, 149; United Provinces, Legislative Assembly of, elections to the, 327 & fn; United States' attitude towards India, 613-614, independence day celebration of, 627, policies of, 630, press in, 263-264, 270, proposed sale of Bahawalpur House for embassy of, 563-564, proposed treaty with, 627-630, relations with, 613-614, 627-630; unity, 133, 150-152, 159, 175, 258, 327, 332, 375, 392-393, 417, 524-525; Vande Mataram 424; and freedom, 656; values, 703, 723-724; Vijaya-lakshmi Pandit, 576, term in Moscow of, 663; violence, 86, 176, 245, 373, 410; youth and children, 72, 161; war, 132, 141-143, 148, 151-152, 159-160, 167, 171-172, 208, 220, 268, 272, 285, 333, 341, 343, 345, effects of, 160, prevention of, 159, rumours about, 159; warlike situation, 457; weakness, human, 145; women, 413, and children, 55-56, abduction of, 413, appointment to all branches of public services of, 352, 577-578, community centres for, 80-81, housing for, 56, 81, immoral traffic in, 55-56, International Abolitionist Federation's role in fighting against, 55-56, world financial grant thereto, 55, productive activities of, 60; world government movement, 672-673, 677, Indian Government's stand on, 672; world problems, proposed conference on, 710-711; workers, 457-458, role of, 454-455, 459; world situation, 619, and India, 157, 629; world war, 148, 178, 190; Zakir Husain, relief centres opened by, 80-81; zamindari system, 487, bills for abolition of, 365, effect on Hindu temples of South India due to, 375-376, legislation of, 375-376,

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- financial implications of, 336-337, in Bihar, 14, 488-492, 494-495, in Madras, 490-491, 493, in Orissa, 492-493
- , Rajan, (*Vol. 6, p. 414*), 713 & fn
- , Rameshwari, (*Vol. 1, p. 2*), 55 & fn-56, 59 fn-60, 61
- Neogy, K.C., (*Vol. 13, p. 219*), 256, 362, 385 & fn, 506 fn, 552, 554, 580
- Nepal, 624, 628 fn, 683; Government of, 683 fn
- Netherlands, The, 212, 616 & fn, 649; Government of, 647 fn, 648 & fn, "Police Action" by, 648 fn
- New Delhi, 1 fn, 48 fn, 50, 55 fn, 60, 79, 264, 300, 315, 325 fn, 335 fn, 348 fn-349 fn, 353 fn, 414 fn, 467-468, 545 fn, 670 fn, 699 fn, 717 fn *see also* Delhi
- New Jersey, 281 fn, 300 fn
- New Statesman and Nation*, 265 fn
- New Times, The*, (Moscow), 667 & fn
- New York, 55 fn, 133-134 fn, 162, 423, 634, 686 fn, University of, 543 fn
- New York Times, The*, 673 fn
- New Zealand, 610, 659
- Newsweek* (New York), 615 fn
- Nigade, Vaman Tukaram, 707 & fn
- Noel-Baker, P.J., (VOL. 5, P. 187), 206 fn, 283
- North East Frontier Agency (N.E.F.A.), 479 & fn
- North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), 21, 68-69 & fn, 107-108, 111, 117-119, 263 fn, 299, 413, 520 fn, 650; Government of, 117 fn-118 fn; Muslim League in, 117 fn
- Northcroft, Col., 686
- Novikov, M., (VOL. 4, P. 600), 668 & fn-669, 670-671
- Nowicki, 483 fn
- Nu, Thakin, (VOL. 4, P. 452), 360 fn, 611 fn
- Nye, Archibald, (VOL. 3, p. 51), 283 & fn, 356, 578, 705 fn
- , Colleen, 283 & fn, 381 fn, 578, 705 & fn
- Of Mountains and Men* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Official Secrets Act (Indian), 574-575
- One World Government *see* World Federal Government
- Ooty (Ootacamund) Conference *see under* Udagamandalam
- Orissa, 71 fn, 99 & fn, 414 fn, 484, 493, 505 fn, 539 & fn, 725 & fn; Government of, 492 & fn; Legislative Assembly of, 493 fn
- Orissa High Court, 725 & fn
- Orissa Sahitya Akademi, 593 fn
- Our Judicial System* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Oxford University, 691
- Pai, A.V., (*Vol. 10, p. 44*), 275, 680 & fn
- Pakistan, 1 fn-2 fn, 5-6 & fn, 7-8 & fn, 9, 14, 25 fn, 29, 31-32, 37 & fn-38 & fn, 67 & fn-68 & fn, 71-72 fn, 74, 77, 85 & fn-86, 87 & fn-88, 89-90 & fn, 91 & fn-92, 97, 99-100, 101 fn-102 & fn, 103 fn, 107, 111-112 & fn, 113, 117 & fn-118 & fn, 123 fn, 128, 133, 141-147, 149, 152, 159, 161-162 & fn, 163-164, 167 & fn, 183, 186, 188, 190, 193, 201 fn, 203-205, 206 fn-207 & fn, 208-209, 210 & fn, 213, 215-216, 219-220, 223-224, 227, 236, 240, 243, 246-247 fn, 252, 258 & fn, 263-264, 266, 268, 270-273, 279 fn, 282 & fn-284 & fn, 285-288, 289 & fn, 293-294, 295 fn-296, 297, 299-301, 303 & fn-305 & fn, 306-313, 314 fn-316, 321 & fn, 325 & fn-326, 329, 335 & fn-336 fn, 340, 342 & fn-343 fn, 345-346 & fn, 347, 353, 362-364, 366, 373-375, 400-401 & fn, 402-403 & fn, 404-406, 412-413, 430, 487, 513, 520 & fn-521, 523, 557-558, 560, 573, 579, 609, 611, 618, 628 fn, 650-651, 674, 679, 685, 687, 693-694, 697, 717, 719 & fn-720; Government of, 1 fn, 29, 38, 68, 85 fn-86, 87-88 fn, 91 fn, 93, 100, 103 & fn, 108, 111 fn-112 fn, 117, 123, 127, 161 fn-162 & fn, 184 & fn, 191-192, 203, 236, 258 fn, 280, 285, 290-291, 292 & fn, 294-295 fn, 296-297, 298 fn, 302-303 fn, 304 & fn-305, 306-310, 312-313 & fn, 339, 342, 344-345, 353, 374, 403 fn, 520, 650; Legislative Assembly of, 188
- Pakistan Air Force, 720
- Pakistan Army, 192-193, 203-204, 215-216, 220, 279, 282, 284, 286, 288, 293, 297, 302, 307-308, 314 fn-315, 329, 335, 342-343 & fn, 573, 720
- Pakistan, East, 338
- Pakistan, West, 18, 20, 67, 85 fn
- Pakistan People's Party, 117 fn
- Pakistan-Hindustan Phir Basao (Rehabilitation) Committee, 28 fn
- Pal, Dr. B.P., 535 fn



- Palam airport (New Delhi), 665
- Palestine, 148 fn, 172 fn, 333-334 & fn, 341 & fn, 362 & fn, 616 & fn-617, 686 fn, 689 & fn; U.N. Mediator in, 689 & fn
- Pande, Badri Dutt, (*Vol. 5, p. 357*), 113
- Pandit, Chandralekha, (*Vol. 4, p. 331*), 663, 698
- , Nayantara, (*Vol. 4, p. 331*), 685, 698
- , Rita, (*Vol. 13, p. 14*), 696-698, 705
- , Vijayalakshmi, (*Vol. 1, p. 1*), 286, 321, 448 fn, 576, 663, 666-668, 670 & fn-671, 684 & fn-685 fn, 687, 691 & fn, 693, 695 & fn, 697, 710-711, 713 & fn-714
- Panikkar, K.M., (*Vol. 1, p. 384*), 662 fn, 665
- Pant, G.B., (*Vol. 3, p. 106*), 68, 379 & fn-380 & fn, 388, 453, 585, 592, 594, 601
- Parade Grounds (Delhi), 30 fn
- Paris, 135, 148-149, 206, 256, 263-264, 285-286, 315, 321, 347, 349 & fn, 361, 369, 371, 376, 383, 545 fn, 559, 567, 618 fn, 633, 649, 663, 665-666, 685-686 & fn, 687 & fn-688, 691 & fn-692, 695-698, 708, 714; Hyderabad Delegation to, 256
- Parliament (British), 586 fn
- Parliament, Provisional (Dominion), 188 fn, 200, 242, 304-305 & fn, 321, 432, 436 fn, 447 fn, 501 fn, 506, 537, 552 fn, 570, 677 fn; delegation to Luxembourg, 677 & fn
- Parliament Street (New Delhi), 468 fn
- Parsi Community, 373, 406
- Pasricha, C.L., 475
- Pataudi, Nawab of *see* Ali, Mohammad Iftikhar
- Patel, H.M. (*VOL. 5, P. 236*), 188, 192, 256, 262
- , Vallabhbhai, 12 fn, 15-17, 30-31, 32 fn, 40, 66, 70, 73, 92 & fn, 119-120, 147, 184, 187, 189, 195-196, 203, 211, 225, 230, 240, 243, 255, 261, 275, 290-291, 371, 384 fn-385 & fn, 386 fn-387 & fn, 507, 520, 529 & fn- 530 & fn, 549-550, 561 & fn, 579-581, 583, 596, 598, 603, 632 & fn-633 & fn
- Pathankot, 281, 337, 602
- Pathankot-Jammu road, 337 & fn, 602
- Pathans, 108 fn, 117 fn
- Patharia Hill Forest Reserve, 127-128 & fn
- Patiala, 17, 466 fn, 519, 603; Maharaja of *see* Singh, Yadavendra
- Patiala and East Punjab States Union (P.E.P.S.U.), 18, fn, 683 fn
- Patna, 159 fn, 696 fn
- Patwardhan, Achyut, (*Vol. 11, p. 217*), 383 & fn, 690
- Pay Commission, Central *see* Central Pay Commission
- Peace Committee, Central, 16 fn, 49 fn
- Peace Committee (Delhi), 16 fn
- Peasants and Workers Party, 188 fn
- Pennsylvania University, 543 fn
- People's Age* (Bombay), 205 fn
- Peoples Political Council (China), 665 fn
- Perak (Malaysia), 326 fn
- Perak, South (Malaysia), 361 fn
- Persian Gulf, 49 fn
- Pethick-Lawrence, first baron, (*Vol. 14, p. 83*), 131 & fn
- Peshawar, 107-108
- Pfaff (Bose), Anita, 529 & fn- 530 & fn
- Pham-Ngoe-Thach, 714 fn
- Phatak Habash Khan (Delhi), 49 & fn
- Philippines, 676
- Phulkian States, 17
- Phulkian Union, 471 fn
- Pilani, 605
- Pillai, A.S. Vengadashalabady, 680 & fn
- , J. Shivashunmugam, 721 & fn
- , K. Shankar, (*Vol. 8, p. 846*), 336 fn
- , N.R., (*VOL. 1, P. 598*), 211, 347
- , Pattom Thanu, (*Vol. 12, p. 539*), 536
- , P.P., 634 & fn
- , V.N., 644 fn
- Pinkley, Virgil, 619 & fn
- Pithapuram, Yuvaraja of, 721 & fn
- Planning Board, 477
- Polak, H.S.L., (*Vol. 1, p. 263*), 131 fn
- Poland, 336 fn, 626
- Poli, Angelo, 689 & fn
- Politics of Planned Economy* (Asoka Mehta), 442 fn
- Pondicherry, 680 fn-681, 682
- Poonch, 279 fn, 694
- Pornography and Censorship in India* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Portugal, 678-679; Government of, 678 fn-679
- Prague, 567, 688
- Praja Sabha, 320
- Praja Socialist Party, 442 fn; West Bengal branch of, 445 fn
- Prasad, Mahabir, 494 & fn
- , P.S. Narayan, 442 fn
- , Rajendra, (*Vol. 3, p. 4*), 11, 66, 112 &

# SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- fn, 339, 380-381 fn, 384 fn-385 & fn, 386  
& fn-387 fn, 483 fn, 490-491, 499 &  
fn-500 & fn, 507 fn, 511, 585 & fn, 604  
& fn, 606
- Prasad, R.R., 507 & fn
- Prasada, Shankar, 30 & fn, 32, 81
- Prayag, 15 fn
- Prehistoric and Roman Wales* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- Premiers' Conference (Delhi), 347, 560
- Presidential Predicament, The*, (Bimanesh Chatterjee), 566 fn
- Press Advisory Committee, 93 & fn, 574
- Press Trust of India (P.T.I.), 418 & fn
- Price of a Wife, The* (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Prime Minister's National Relief Fund, 28, 33, 65-66 & fn, 69, 73, 80-81
- Prince of Wales Medical College (Patna), 696 fn
- Prome (Burma), 352 fn, 360 fn
- Public Order Act (1947), 590 & fn
- Public Safety Act, 351
- Pul Bangash (Delhi), 80-81
- Pune, 2, 247 fn
- Punjab (undivided), 465 fn, 580 fn; High Court of, 580 fn
- Punjab, East, 3 fn, 17, 19-21, 25 fn, 28-29 & fn, 38 & fn, 40, 65, 68, 72, 85 fn, 111, 124, 127, 220, 316, 325, 394, 412-413, 414 fn, 433, 459, 465-466 & fn, 467, 470 fn, 483 fn, 529, 581 & fn, 584, 591 fn, 617, 703 fn; High Court of, 580 & fn-581; States of, 19, 25 fn, 111, 413, 581 fn; Government of, 3, 19-20 & fn, 21 & fn, 37, 68, 113 fn, 123 & fn, 127, 161, 465 & fn-466 & fn, 467 fn, 469-470, 471 fn, 529, 591 fn-592 fn, 603; Legislative Assembly of, 28 fn; Legislative Council of, 4 fn
- , West, 21 fn, 29 & 38, 74, 100, 111, 113 fn, 123, 127, 146, 299, 316, 339-340 & fn, 363, 413, 519, 703 fn; Government of, 29 fn, 100, 113 fn, 127; Governor of, 340 fn
- Punjab University, Camp College of, in Delhi, 78 fn, 161 fn
- "Punjabi speaking state", demand for, 354 fn
- Puri, Balwant Singh, 593 & fn
- , Y.K., (VOL. 5, P. 93), 100 & fn
- Pusa Road (Delhi), 45 fn
- Qassab Pura (Delhi), 80-81
- Qaumi Awaz*, 388
- Qureshi, Abdul Ghani, (VOL. 4, P. 135), 111 & fn-112 & fn, 113
- Radhakrishnan, S. (Vol. 4, p. 564), 714 fn
- Raghavan N., (Vol. 14, p. 365), 650
- Rajagopalachari, C., (Vol. 1, p. 359), 16, 39, 65, 183-184, 193-194, 203-204, 219, 223, 225, 228, 232, 242 & fn, 243, 252, 262 & fn, 265, 267 fn, 282, 284, 325, 331, 339, 431, 475, 488 fn-489 fn, 493 fn, 495, 508 & fn, 549-550, 554, 562 & fn, 564, 566-567, 570-572, 578, 597, 600, 633, 694, 718 & fn, 721 & fn-722, 723-724, 726
- Rajasthan, States of, 25 fn, 379 fn
- Rajauri, 192
- Rajendrasinhji, Gen., (VOL. 4, P. 111), 253-254, 255 fn-256, 257, 259-260, 262
- Rajghat (Delhi), 170
- Rajendra Prasad Remembered* (Bimanesh Chatterjee), 566 fn
- Rajputana, 325
- Rajputs, 325-326, 487-488
- Rajshahi district (*Bangladesh*), 356, fn
- Rajya Sabha, 28 fn, 721 fn
- Raksha Dal, 379
- Ram, Jagjivan, (Vol. 15, p. 208), 443, 461
- Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital (New Delhi), 696 fn
- Ramadhar, (VOL. 4, P. 321), 319 & fn
- Ramakrishna Mission, 98 fn, 132
- Ramlal, (Vol. 13, p. 565), 581
- Ramleh, 341 fn
- Rampur State, 49 fn, 89, 245 fn, 258 fn, 725 & fn; Assembly of, 725; Nawab of *see* Usman, Mohamed
- Ranadive, B.T., (VOL. 5, P. 350), 668 fn
- Ranchi, 507
- Rana, Padma Shamsher Jung Bahadur, 683 & fn
- , Sarada Shumsher Jung Bahadur, 683 & fn
- Randhawa, M.S., (VOL. 4, P. 410), 31-32, 49
- Ranga, N.G., (Vol. 7, p. 534), 440 & fn-441, 443 fn, 644 fn
- Rangoon, 220, 352 fn, 360 fn, 561 fn, 631 & fn-632 & fn, 633 fn
- Rao, B. Shiva, (Vol. 3, p. 345), 41, 592 fn, 647 & fn, 672, 677 & fn, 685 fn, 687



- , Narayan, 357 fn  
 —, Raja, (*Vol. 7, p. 12*), 708  
 —, S.V. Krishnamurthy, 644 fn, 677 fn  
 —, Thirumala, 644 fn, 677 fn  
 —, U. Krishna, 391 & fn  
 —, V.C. Kesava, 422 fn  
 —, V.K.R.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 306*), 357 fn, 442 fn  
 —, V. Narahari, (*VOL. 6, P. 381*), 429 & fn  
 Rashtrapati Bhawan, (New Delhi) 388 fn, 542 & fn, 544–545, 562 & fn, 564, 566–567, 571, 705; Estates of, 570  
 Rashtriya Seva Dal, 2 & fn  
 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R.S.S.), 2, 12, 15, 238, 279, 351–352  
 Rasul, Begum Kudsia Aizaz, (*VOL. 6, P. 448*), 245 fn, 644 fn  
 Rau, B.N., (*Vol. 14, p. 559*), 212–213, 685 fn, 694  
 —, B. Rama, (*Vol. 1, p. 56*), 212  
 Rauf, M.A., (*Vol. 15, p. 296*), 631  
 Ravi river, 337  
 Ravi river bridge (Madhopur), 602  
 Rawalpindi, 340  
 Razakars, 1 fn, 89–90, 166 fn, 184 fn–185, 195, 198 & fn–200 & fn, 202–203 & fn, 205, 207, 212–213, 215, 221, 223–224 fn, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234 & fn–235, 238, 240, 242 fn–243, 244 fn, 247, 251–252 fn, 253, 257, 259, 267 fn, 274, 326 fn, 328–329, 343–344, 366 & fn, 458 & fn  
 Razvi, S.M.A., 353 & fn  
 —, Syed Mohammad Kasim, 142, 185 & fn, 202, 205, 214, 234, fn, 254, 261–262 & fn, 326, 343, 693  
 Red Cross, Indian, 57 & fn, 59, 598 & fn; Kashmir branch of, 57 & fn  
 Red Cross Association, Swedish, 362 fn  
 Red Fort (Delhi), 185 fn, 214, 339  
 Red Shirts, 119  
 Reddiar, O.P. Ramaswami, (*VOL. 3, P. 20*), 2 & fn, 264 & fn, 274, 490–491, 493, 578, 586, 606, 681  
 Reddy, G.K., (*VOL. 6, P. 75*), 684 fn  
 Rehabilitation Conference, 41  
 Rehabilitation and Development Board,, 26, 577  
 Rehman, Habibur, (*Vol. 7, p. 401*), 28  
 Renville Agreement (Indonesia), 648 & fn  
*Republic of Indonesia, The*, (Dorothy Woodman) (1956), 265 fn  
 Reserve Bank of India, 123 fn, 186, 350 & fn, 434, 553, 570; Governor of, 434  
 Reserve Bank (Transfer of Public Ownership) Bill, The, (3 September 1948), 350 & fn  
 Reuters (London), 403 fn, 418 & fn, 520  
 Rohtak, 591 fn–592 fn  
 Rolland, Marie Romain, 707  
 —, Romain, (*Vol. 2, p. 230*), 707 & fn–708  
*Roman Art and Architecture* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn  
 Roman Catholic Church, 689  
 Rome, 676 fn  
*Roop Lekha* (art magazine), 545 fn  
 Roy, B.C., (*Vol. 4, p. 230*), 9, 70–71 & fn, 73, 98 & fn–99 fn, 332 & fn, 460, 507, 528, 565 fn, 589  
 —, Keith, 429 fn  
 —, Kiran Shankar, (*Vol. 3, p. 74*), 188, 589 & fn  
 —, M.N., (*Vol. 3, p. 250*), 508 & fn  
 Royal Academy (Britain), 543 fn  
 Royal Air Force, 190 fn, 719  
 Royal Australian Air Force, 190 fn  
 Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, 543 fn  
 Royal India Air Force (R.I.A.F.) *see* Indian Air Force  
 Royal Indian Navy *see* Indian Navy  
 Royal Pakistan Air Force, 191; British Commander of, 191  
 Royal Society (London), 271 fn  
 Rust, William, 205 & fn  
 Safdarjung airport (New Delhi), 467 fn  
*Safina* (Lahore), 89  
 Safiq-ur Rahman, 80 & fn–81  
 Saha, M.N., (*Vol. 13, p. 320*), 534  
*Sahakar* (journal), 593 fn  
 Sahu, Lakshminarayan, 593 & fn  
 Saksena, Mohanlal, (*Vol. 1, p. 233*), 19 & fn, 21, 27 & fn, 30, 40, 45 & fn–46, 47, 50, 79, 102, 331, 432, 557, 560, 568, 712  
 Sampurnanand, Dr. (*Vol. 2, p. 143*), 453  
 San Francisco, 453 fn  
 Sanger, Margaret, 709 & fn–710  
 Sant Attar Singh Gursagar Mastuana Trust (P.E.P.S.U.), 683  
 Santhanam, K., (*Vol. 1, p. 350*), 375, 559 & fn  
 Santiniketan (Bolpur), 545 fn  
 Sarabhai, Mridula, (*Vol. 5, p. 316*), 49, 68 & fn–69, 80, 558, 560  
 Saudi Arabia, 49 fn

## SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Savage, J.L., 465 fn, 467  
 Savarkar, V.D., (*Vol. 3, p. 394*), 12 & fn  
 "Save Children Committee" *see under* All India Women's Conference  
 Sayeed, Ahmed, (*VOL. 4, P. 221*), 97  
 Schenkl, Emilie, 530 & fn  
 Schuman, Robert, 371 & fn  
 Scots, 527 & fn  
*Second Motherland—China* (Anna Wang), 660 fn  
 Secunderabad, 197, 222, 224 fn, 226, 232, 236–238, 240–241, 242 fn, 244 fn, 251–252 fn, 256 fn, 366, 409  
 Secunderabad Cantonment, 212, 224, 232 fn, 409  
 Selangor, 361 fn  
 Sen, Hannah, 55 & fn, 60  
 —, Nakul, (*VOL. 4, P. 502*), 3 & fn  
 Sen Gupta, Nellie, (*Vol. 5, p. 489*), 541  
 Senanayake, D.S., (*Vol. 10, p. 484*), 634 & fn–635 fn, fn, 636 fn–640 fn, 642–643 fn, 644–645 & fn, 646–647  
 Seoul, 612 fn  
 Setalvad, M.C., (*Vol. 15, p. 86*), 685 fn, 687, 693  
 Seth, Isaq, 188  
 Sewagram, 388  
 Shah Jehan, pictures of, 542  
 Shah, K.T., (*Vol. 2, p. 399*), 357 fn, 442 fn  
 Shanghai, 660 fn–661 fn  
*Shankar's Weekly* (New Delhi), 336 fn  
 Shanti Dal (Delhi), 49 & fn  
 Shanti Sena (Peace Brigade), West Bengal branch of, 19  
 Sharma, Balkrishna, 677 fn  
 Shaw, G.B., (*Vol. 1, p. 35*), 691, 715–716 fn, 717 fn  
 Shillong, 67, 422 fn  
 Shimla, 466, 570  
 "Shiva" (Sass Brunner), 542 fn  
 Sholapur, 89, 185 & fn, 198 fn, 244 fn, 343  
 Sholapur-Barsi road, 198 fn  
 Shone, T.A., (*VOL. 4, P. 227*), 183, 196–197 fn, 202, 572–573, 623–625, 683 & fn, 715  
 Shukla, R.S., (*Vol. 11, p. 273*), 188–189 fn, 354 & fn, 522  
 Sialkot, 220  
 Siam *see* Thailand  
 Signet Press (Calcutta), 710 & fn  
 Sikhs, 4 & fn, 272, 325, 339 & fn–340, 354, 373, 403, 406, 413, 467, 519  
 Silverman, Julius, 586 & fn–587  
 Simon Commission, 280  
 Sind, 1 & fn, 65 & fn–66 & fn, 101 fn, 103, 111  
*Sind Observer* (Karachi), 89–90, 273 fn  
 Singapore, 352 fn, 651 fn, 655; Indian Consul in, 655  
 Singh, Baldev, (*Vol. 14, p. 122*), 189, 206, 256, 271, 290 fn–291, 519–521, 527 fn, 572, 602–603  
 —, Datar, 32 & fn, 449  
 —, Ganga (Maharaja of Bikaner), 487  
 —, Hari (Maharaja of Kashmir), (*VOL. 3, P. 187*), 246, 320, Declaration of, 320  
 — Harindar (Maharaja of Patiala), 603 & fn  
 —, Kameshwara, 644 fn  
 —, Giani Kartar, (*VOL. 6, P. 45*), 18 & fn–19  
 —, Maharaj, (*Vol. 4, p. 319*), 431  
 —, Gen. Mohan, 529, 591 & fn–592 & fn  
 —, Sant, 263 & fn  
 —, Master Tara, (*Vol. 4, p. 572*), 4 & fn, 18 & fn–19, 354 fn  
 —, Veer, 4 & fn  
 —, Yadavendra (Maharaja of Patiala), (*VOL. 3, P. 263*), 17, 519, 573, 603 & fn  
 Sinha, Kumar Taranand, 490 & fn  
 —, Satyanarayan, (*VOL. 2, P. 17*), 677 fn  
 —, Sri Krishna, (*Vol. 3, p. 420*), 13–14 fn, 490–491, 494, 506 & fn–507, 511  
 Sitaram (alias Haddu), 596  
 Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, 384 & fn–385, 386 fn–387 fn, 443 fn  
 Skardu (Jammu and Kashmir), 1 fn, 301  
 Smith College (U.S.A.), 709  
*Socialism and Peasantry* (Asoka Mehta), 442 fn  
 Socialist Party, 2, 231 fn, 327 fn, 379 fn–380 & fn, 382–383 & fn, 442 fn–443 fn, 445 fn, 690  
 Socialists (Indian), 327 & fn, 379 fn–380 fn, 382 fn, 443 fn, 453 fn  
 Soekarno, A., (*Vol. 14, p. 452*), 649 & fn–650, 651  
 Sonamarg, 330  
 Sondhi, V.P., 535 fn  
*Sonntagsblatt* (Hamburg), 709 fn  
 Sorensen, Reginald W., (*Vol. 14, p. 137*), 586, 708  
 South Africa, 148 fn, 629, 687



- Soviet Russia : Some Random Sketches and Impressions* (Jawaharlal Nehru), 708 & fn
- Spain, 148 fn, 205 fn; Government of, 679
- Special Marriage Act (1872), 499 & fn
- Special Marriage (Amendment) Bill (proposed), 499 & fn
- Sri Jayaprakash Narayan—Sixtyfirst Birth Day Celebration: Commemoration Volume* (Ed.S. Vijayalakshmi) (Madras, 1962), 382 fn
- Sri Lanka, 391 fn, 624, 628 & fn, 634 & fn—636 & fn, 637–638 & fn, 639, 641–642, 643 & fn–645 & fn, 646–647, 676; Citizenship Bill of, 635 fn, 638, 641–643, 644 & fn, 646 fn; Parliament of, 635, 642; Supreme Court of, 640; Immigration Fund of, 638 & fn; Legislature of, 646 & fn; Indian Congress leaders in, 645; Government of, 635–636 & fn, 637 & fn–638 & fn, 641
- Sri Prakasa*, (*Vol. 2, p. 203*), 102 & fn–103, 164, 184, 242, 267, 314
- Srinagar, 1 fn, 58, 146, 281, 541, 651
- Srinivasan, Kasturi, 418 fn
- St. John's Ambulance (Indian), 598 fn
- Stalin, Joseph, (*Vol. 2, p. 397*), 205, 341, 360 fn, 666 & fn, 670–671
- Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad (29 November 1947), 209 fn, 229 & fn, 232 fn, 239–240, 245, 409
- Star, The*, (London), 265 fn
- Star of Utkal* (journal), 592 fn
- Statesman, The*, 40, 245 fn, 466, 543 fn, 561 fn, 574 & fn, 633 fn
- Sterling Balances Agreement, 333 fn, 429 fn
- Sterling Committee, 188 fn
- Stern-group (Jewish), 616 fn
- Still Digging* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn
- Strasbourg, 371 fn
- Studies of War* (P.M.S. Blackett), 271 fn
- Subandrio, Dr., 714 fn
- Subhan, Muhammad, 319 fn
- Suez Canal Commission, 628 fn
- Suhrawardy, H.S., (*Vol. 5, p. 287*), 1, 9, 266
- Sultan, Begum Sajeda, 712 & fn,
- Sun Yat-sen, (*Vol. 9, p. 632*), 659 fn
- , Madame, (*Vol. 2, p. 286*), 660–661 & fn
- Sundar Lal, (*Vol. 4, p. 368*), 604
- Swaminadhan, Ammu, (*Vol. 7, p. 466*), 369
- Swaraj Bhawan (Allahabad), 712, 717 & fn
- Sweden, 336, 362
- Swedish Army, 362 fn
- Swedish Red Cross Association, 362 fn
- Switzerland, 165, 281, 336 & fn, 348, 362, 530, 672 fn, 707
- Sylhet, Bengalis of, 582 fn
- Symon, A.C.B., 623
- Symonds, Richard, (*VOL. 4, P. 397*), 183, 694
- Syriam (Burma), 361 fn
- Tagore, Rabindranath, 542 fn, 545 & fn
- Taj building (New Delhi), 563
- Tandon, Purushottam Das, (*Vol. 1, p. 127*), 384 fn, 386 fn–388 fn
- Tai Chi-tao (Tai Chuansein), 663 & fn
- Tarachand, (*Vol. 1, p. 331*), 568
- Tara Devi (Maharani of Kashmir), 281
- Taste of India, A*, (G.D. Khosla), 580 fn
- Tata, J.R.D., (*Vol. 15, p. 100*), 685 fn, 687, 704
- Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 55 fn; Child Guidance Clinic of, 55 fn
- Teen Murti House (Delhi), 562 fn–563 & fn, 567, 684 & fn, 713
- Telangana, 326 fn, 505 fn
- Thaik, Sao Shwe, 326 fn
- Thailand, 668
- Thakurdas, Purushottamdas, (*Vol. 10, p. 558*), 429 fn
- Thayetmyo (Burma), 352 fn, 361 fn
- Thimayya, K.S., (*VOL. 4, P. 13*), 263
- Thivy, J.A., (*Vol. 15, p. 52*), 653–655, 656 & fn, 658 & fn
- Thomas, P.J., 357 fn
- Thousand Days with Rajaji* (Bimanesh Chatterjee), 566 fn
- Tibet, 146
- Tilak, Raghukul, 379 & fn
- Times, The*, (London), 142 fn, 295
- Times of India, The*, (Bombay), 244 fn, 319 fn
- Tithwal, 342
- Tokyo, 614
- Toungoo, 360 fn
- Travancore, 219, 536–537, 626; Government of, 536–537
- Trieste, 148 fn
- Tripartite Agreement (Britain, India and Nepal) (1947), 683 fn

- Trivedi, C.M., (VOL. 3, P. 5), 10, 19 fn, 37, 123 & fn-124, 467 & fn, 469
- Tsiang, Tingfu F., (VOL. 5, P. 257), 371 & fn, 698
- Ubani, B.A., 648 & fn
- Udagamandalam, E.C.A.F.E. Conference at, 668 & fn
- Udaipur, 15; Maharana of, 15
- Ukil, Barada, 545 & fn
- Ukraine, 634
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), 146, 332, 371 & fn, 439, 477, 612 fn-613, 614-616, 617 fn, 634 & fn, 647, 667-669, 670 & fn-671, 675 fn-676 & fn, 708 & fn; Foreign Office of, 666-667, 670; Government of, 612 fn, 634, 666 & fn-667, 669, 671
- Union Public Service Commission, 598, 678 fn, 721 fn
- United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), 148 fn, 196 fn, 336 fn
- United Nations Organisation, 55 fn, 148-149, 152, 162-163, 172 fn, 195-196, 202 fn, 209 & fn, 211 & fn-212, 219, 223, 239, 255, 280, 282, 289 & fn, 295, 297 fn, 304, 309-310, 313, 316, 334-335, 349, 362 & fn, 364, 366, 371 fn, 376, 383, 401, 559, 561, 565, 616 & fn, 618, 633-634 & fn, 647 & fn, 671, 674-675, 685, 687 & fn, 689 fn, 691 fn-692, 694, 697-699, 714, Atomic Energy issue before, 613; Charter of, 282, 315, 619, 695 fn, Force in Korea, 253 fn; Indian delegation to, 690
- Commission for India and Pakistan (U.N.C.I.P.), 1 fn, 152, 162 & fn-163, 183, 187, 203, 208-210, 215, 219-220, 223-224, 273, 280 & fn-282 & fn, 283-284 & fn, 285-286, 288-289 & fn, 290-291 & fn, 292 & fn-293, 294-295 & fn, 296 & fn-298 & fn, 299-300, 301 & fn-302, 303 & fn-305 & fn, 306-307 & fn, 309-310, 312-313 & fn, 314 & fn-315, 316, 320-321 & fn, 330, 335 & fn, 342 & fn, 353-354, 364, 366 & fn, 374, 402-403 fn, 520-521, 694 & fn, 720
- Commission for Palestine *see* Special Committee on Palestine
- Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (U.N.E.S.C.O.), 49 fn
- Good Offices Committee, 280, 330, 361 fn, in Indonesia, 361 fn
- General Assembly, 148, 206, 213, 239, 285-286, 315, 321, 349, 361, 369, 423, 609 & fn, 663, 666, 669, 684, 685-686 & fn, 687, 693, 695 & fn
- Security Council, 148 fn-149, 152, 195 & fn-196, 202 fn, 207 fn, 209-212, 213 & fn, 220, 224, 247, 256, 279-280, 282 & fn-283, 288, 295 & fn-296 fn, 297-299, 302, 307-311, 330, 333 fn, 341 fn-342, 361 fn, 366 fn, 376, 401-403, 612 fn, 616, 632, 634, 675, 694, 697-698 & fn
- Special Committee on Palestine, 334 fn, 616 & fn
- United Council for Relief and Welfare, 57-59, 65-66 & fn
- United Provinces, 2, 21, 25 fn, 69 & fn, 103, 394, 412, 414 fn, 513-514 fn, 520, 585, 592 fn; Government of, 2 fn, 379 fn, 430 fn, 453 & fn, 594, 601; Labour Department of, 453; Legislative Assembly of, 2 fn, 327 fn, 379 fn, 388, election to, 327 & fn; Legislative Council of, 379 fn, 388 fn; Provincial Congress Committee of, 381 & fn, 388, 725 fn
- United States, 8 fn, 134, 136, 212 fn, 220, 294-295, 332 fn, 336, 341, 371 & fn, 439, 461, 466 fn-467 fn, 469, 477-478 fn, 562, 577, 612 fn-613, 614, 616-617 & fn, 624-625, 627-629, 630 & fn, 651, 659 fn, 670, 673-674 & fn, 677 fn, 686, 694 fn, 700, 711; Allied Commander-in-Chief of, in Germany, 360 fn; Allied Headquarters of, 674 fn: ambassador of 465, 563, Army of, 332 fn; Bureau of Labour Statistics of, 630 fn; Embassy of, in New Delhi, 563 & fn-564; Government of, 212 fn, 612 fn, 617 fn, 627, 649, Independence Day of, 627 & fn; State Department of, 212 & fn, 710 fn;
- Universal Movement of World Confederation *see* World Confederation, Universal Movement for
- University Service Commission (Bihar), 490 fn
- Universities of Bihar, Syndicates of, 490 fn
- Uri, 329, 342
- Uri-Domel front, 329
- Uri-Tithwal sector, 342
- Usman, Mohamed (Nawab of Rampur State), 245 fn, 258 fn
- , Brig. Muhammad, (VOL. 5, P. 305), 45 & fn, 319, 684 fn



- Utkal Sahitya Samaj, 593 fn  
 Utkal Union Conference (1936), 593 fn  
 Uttar Kashi, 684
- Vaitarani*, (Oriya journal), 593 fn  
 Vakil, C.N., 357 fn, 442 fn  
*Vande Mataram*, 332, 421-422 fn, 424  
 Varadachari, N.S., (*Vol. 15, p. 648*), 381 & fn  
 —, S., (*VOL. 6, P. 396*), 555 & fn  
 Varanasi, 379 fn  
 Varma, Vikrama Deo (Maharaja of Jeypore), 597 & fn  
 Vatican, 678 fn-679, 689 & fn  
 Vellodi, M.K., (*VOL. 2, P. 255*), 291  
 Venkatasubbiah. H., 714 fn  
 Verma, Vindeshwari Prasad, 490 & fn  
 Viceregal Lodge *see* Rashtrapati Bhavan  
 Vidya Mandir Scheme, 189 fn  
 Vijayalakshmi S., 382 fn  
 Vijayawada, 206, 239 fn, 244 fn  
*Vishwamitra* (Calcutta, Patna, Kanpur, Bombay), 159 fn  
 Vyshinsky, A.Y., (*VOL. 5, P. 541*), 371 & fn, 692, 695-696, 698
- Wang, Anna, 660 & fn, 664 & fn  
 — Bing-nan, 660 fn  
 Wang Shih-chieh, 665 & fn 692-693, 696  
 Wakf Council, 49 fn  
 Washington, 579  
*Washington Post, The*, 270 fn  
 Waziristan, 117 fn, 162  
 West Bengal Security Act (1948), 350 fn  
 West Punjab Evacuee Property Ordinance, 29 fn  
 West Punjab Rehabilitation Ordinance, 29 fn  
 Westminster Bank (London), 697  
 Wheeler, Robert Eric Mortimer, 543 & fn  
 Whitehall (London), 438  
 White Paper (August 1948), 196 & fn  
 White Paper (on Hyderabad), 230, 353  
 Willingdon Hospital *see* Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital
- Willingdon aerodrome (New Delhi), 467 fn  
 Win, U, 561 fn  
*With Nehru in the Foreign Office* (Subimal Dutt), 644 fn  
 Woodman, Dorothy, 265 & fn, 714 & fn  
 World Confederation, Universal Movement for the (Switzerland), 672 fn  
 World Health Assembly, 475  
 World Health Conference, 700  
 World Health Organisation, Regional Committee for South East Asia, 699 fn  
 World Federal Government, 672-673 fn, Conference of, 677 fn; movement for, 672-673, 677 & fn  
 World War, Second, 148, 190, 263 fn, 362 fn, 615 fn, 675 fn
- Yanam, 680 fn  
*Years of Pakistan* (R.E.M. Wheeler), 543 fn  
*Years of Wrath* (David Low) (1949), 265 fn  
 Yemen, 49 fn  
 Yolanda, 696 & fn  
 Young Communist League, 205 fn  
*Young Worker* (London), 205 fn  
 Youth Conference (Karnataka), 505 fn  
 Yuan, Examination (China), 663 fn  
 Yugoslavia, 336  
 Yunus, Laj, 651  
 Yunus, Mohammed, (*Vol. 10, p. 643*), 650
- Zafrullah Khan, M., (*Vol. 9, p. 394*), 162 fn, 207 fn, 236 & fn, 279 & fn, 282-283, 285, 304, 309, 313 fn-314 fn, 401 fn, 403 fn, 720  
 Zaidi, Syed Bashir Husain, 725 fn  
 Zamindari Abolition Bills, 14, 336, 365, 488 & fn, 490 & fn-491 & fn, 492-493 & fn, in Bihar, 14, 336, 488 & fn, 492, 494 & fn, in Madras, 490 & fn-491 & fn, 493 & fn, in Orissa, 492 & fn-493  
 Zamindari system, 487  
 Zoji La (pass), 262, 330  
 Zutshi, Ladli Prasad, 717  
 24 Paraganas (West Bengal), 85 fn





During the twelve weeks from 1 July to 5 October 1948, covered by this volume, India celebrated the first anniversary of the achievement of independence and the first Gandhi Jayanti after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. The Government were faced with an economic crisis due to soaring prices; and they integrated by police action the Hyderabad State with the Union. Pakistan belatedly admitted the participation of her troops in the fighting in Kashmir; and the United Nations Commission could find no solution to the problem but, at the end of its visit of ten weeks to India and Pakistan, brought forward a proposal for a ceasefire. Anti-Indian propaganda in Pakistan continued. But the communal tension in India was far less than before and this helped towards the solution of some of the special problems resulting from partition.

Jawaharlal Nehru constantly impressed on the people that only by following the Mahatma's example and principles could India endure. He stressed the need for unity and tolerance, the exploitation for the general good of the many resources of the country, the building of an industrial base and the development of scientific research. Both at home and abroad all issues should be viewed on their merits. He gave special attention to the problems of Indians overseas, particularly in Sri Lanka and the countries of South East Asia.

*Distributed by*  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

SBN 19 562337 1